is likely to be the case with most computations of a similar nature, grounded on taxes, and as indeed he himself expressly apprehended, we may take a medium between his statement and that in the table, and safely venture to affirm, that the number of people in Ireland, in the year 1788, was about 4,169,904. By the table it appears, that in the year 1799 there were about 5,159,769 people in Ireland. And it being a fact, ascertained by a variety of coincident circumstances, that the increase of houses from 1788 to 1799 was not merely equal, but greatly superior to that from 1777 to 1788, which last Mr. Bushe tells us was 173,058, we are thence abundantly warranted in inferring that there were at least 5,078,348 inhabitants in Ireland in 1799; the demonstrable excess of increase during the former period, beyond that of any preceding one, being more than sufficient to cover the loss incurred by the late rebellion. Or taking a medium, as before, between these two statements, consonantly to Mr. Bushe's sentiments, we may distinctly affirm that Ireland did contain 5,119,508 inhabitants in the year last-mentioned. And to exhibit the subject in a relative point of view, we may add, that the population of Ireland is actually superior, in point of density, to that of England; there being, according to Mr. Templeman's survey, 27,457 square miles in the former, the population whereof, including the increase by generation from 1799, docs at present stand at about 5,497,500, giving about two hundred persons to every square mile; and, according to the same survey, 49,450 square miles in the latter, the inhabitants whereof, making suitable allow ances for omissions in the late return, certainly do not exceed 9,444,950, giving about 191 persons to every square mile, or nine less than in Ireland. "Were it necessary to have recourse to collateral proofs, in order to evince the rapid increase of people in Ireland, a very admissible one might be drawn from the importation of coals. "In 1727 there were imported about 70,000 tons; in 1764, 161,970 tons; and, on an average of three years, to 1799, to the value of 322,5831." It is not easy to persuade any nation that it gains by being judiciously taxed; and least so the very poor people of Ireland. Yet the fact is confirmed by universal experience. Taxation raises the price of spirits; suppose at the same time that it commutes part of the price of tea for a duty on windows. What is the consequence? The numerous classes are immediately reminded, that it is become expedient for them to employ less of their wages than before in the purchase of spirits, and more in the purchase of tea. Tea is drunk at home, spirits at the gin shop. Hence an increased habit of d mesticity sets in throughout the far. ratus of kettles, and cups and sate of the poor. Tea requires a little are Hence an increased consumption of p tery, &c. by which the manufactures. benefited, and a greater habitual becomes vested in furniture: by w means the love of home, the fear c workhouse, and the means of obriat a sudden pressure are all augmente The worst taxes are probably those wh endear objects of necessary popular sumption, as taxes on soap, candie, sugar. Yet even these taxes, by ra the price of commodities, which continue to be distributed in the s profusion, increase the returns of alt dealers in such commodities, and course their gains. Those consum who are chapmen, or who let their bour, make fresh contracts for their war or their toil, and the eventual suffers by such taxes is the idler, who lives his rents, and whom it is an object to mulate into employment. Taxes incr circulation, and circulation is the to risher of every form of prosperity. T create and to destroy, to produce and consume in the greatest possible q tity, is the highest perfection of cer mercial community. Philosophers paupers, who lead lives of privat who have the fewest wants, and wh complish the least expenditure, are worst citizens of the commonwealt industry. In discussing the national charac of the Irish, our author does not ficient justice to their placability. h. as their bursts of indignation may their reconciliations are so too; 25 government, which has recently qu a rebellion, might with a few concos rely on a glow of allegiance. Why encourage the Irish to form veluri associations? Pay their poor for con to drill. Let them elect their own cers, and that annually. To these cers let government allow a liberal come. It would thus both know conciliate the individuals on whem obedience of Ireland depends; and would find the voluntary conversion volunteers into regulars very easy country, where the commercial and tled classes are disproportionately where courage and enterprise a and where a hardier education pecul adapts the multitude for the life of camp. ART. LVII. An Investigation into the Principles and Credit of the Circulation of Papere money, or Bank Notes in Great Britain; as protected or enforced by Legislative Authority, under the Suspension of Paying them in Cash; in the Extent of such Paper-money, the Responsibility attached to it, and its Effects upon Prices of Commodities, individual Income, Agriculture, Manufactures, Commerce, and upon the Course of Exchange with Foreign Countries. Together with a Discussion of the Question, whether the Restraining Law in favour of the Bank of England from paying Notes in Money ought or ought not to be con tinued as a Measure of State? By WILLIAM HOWISON, Esq. 8vo. pp. 75. FORGETFUL of the old proverb, that good wine needs no bush,' Mr. Howison has given us an explanatory title page, in which he has taken care to omit no subject which is discussed in his pamphlet. The restriction bill, and the general principles of banking, have of late received a very ample and acute investigation from various quarters; as we stated our opinion at large on the nature of paper currency in our review of Mr. Thornton's "Enquiry, &c." (See Ann. Rev. vol. I. p. 384.) we shall not repeat it here. Mr. Howison feels very sensibly the general alarm on the present almost unlimited extension of paper credit, and reasons forcibly on the impolitic annulment of that law of William and Mary which prohibited the bank from advancing money to government, except on the credit of parliament. The restriction bill, if intended to be permanent, or even of indefinite duration, is severely to be reprobated; so long as it remains unrepealed, indeed, every bank of England note is stamped with a feliberate lie upon its face. The mea ure, however, from the circumstances of he country at the time of its enactment, as generally thought to be necessary, nd therefore it was defended. The Abject cannot long lie neglected: it must come before the public again, and t will be discussed with a judgment maured by time and sanctioned by expe ience. The following passage will suffice to In the intercourse betwixt foreign countries every advance upon commodities must either be repaid in the course of exchange, or discounted on the price on going out of the country in which it is produced. For in as much as the money in any country is depreciated, the goods or merchandise of any other country sold to it, will be just so much raised in price on entering the country. be "Excessive circulation of bank notes be yond the only possible criterion, their convertibility into gold, which the restraining law has done away entirely, would, from the preceding observations, so far as they may just, appear to be attended with much in jury to the community at large in various respects; more particularly, first, in bringing the public under contribution of an annuity to the banks of a million and a half, equal to the interest of thirty millions of estimated circulating paper, without any value what ever-this sum in real money formerly would have been equal to the expence of a campaign in war: secondly, in the diminution of the fixed income of every individual in the state, of one half, or at least of a third; and of course in a proportional deprivation of his comforts; thirdly, in increasing the difficulties to agriculture, to manufactures, and to commerce, by enhancing capital and interest employed in them by raising the prices of labour and commodities, and by diminishing the consumption; fourthly, in encreasing the evils of an unfavourable course of exchange with foreign countries: and finally, in laying the foundation for, and leading directly to a general explosion of all confidence founded on paper credit; and which may be attended by the ruin of many individuals at least, if not by public confusion." ART. LVIII. Thoughts on the Restriction of Payments in Specie at the Banks of England and Ireland. By LORD KING. 8vo. pp. 106. WHETHER Lord King has yet acquired that celerity of thinking, which enables him to deliver off hand the inFerences of his judgment, we know not. The speeches attributed to him in the apers, however honourable to the state fhis acquired information, did not imress that degree of admiration which his ritten treatise is adapted to secure. Vere Mr. Pitt to attempt so lucid a state ment of the topics here discussed, he would most probably fail in the work. Perspicuity, precision, and that decided ness of practical counsel, which always accompanies clearness of intellect, are not apparently within his competence. But in Lord King's they are: and as this nobleman's views in finance are not at present inflected from the line of duty by any ambitious considerations of per sonal expediency; by any disposition to prefer the interests of monopoly companies, of powerful combinations, and of leading individuals in the money. market, to those of the unprivileged, independent, and in the aggregate far more important commerce of the country, it would be reasonable to expect from his superintendance a wiser conduct of the exchequer. A pamphlet is the form in which a man of intellect may most unaffectedly advertise his power of mind, and his comprehension of science: it is then for his country to remark his expedient destination, and to invoke at the appropriate emergency his aid. Lord King ought to be heard in his own words. tween ten and eleven millions to nearly ent millions and a half. Had confidence be speedily restored, this reduction would bably have enabled them to survive the det for some reasons, thought it necessary to et ger. But the executive government have press their apprehensions of an invasion, and to take measures of precaution against ho attacks, a general panic ensued, and 2 mand for specie from all parts of the court was made upon the bank of England. This brought affairs to a crisis: and the 25th February 1797 the directors represented government their inability to perform the engagements to their creditors, and their prehension that, unless some immediate se was taken for their relief, the bank woul exhausted of the whole of its cash. "In this new and difficult state of thing it is an important question to determine w is the system of conduct which true per "It must however be evident, that the ad- would have dietated. In cases of private vantages which thus result from the use of commercial establishments of acknowledged a paper currency depend altogether upon the solvency recourse is often successfully tooth, fact of its exactly supplying the place of that upon such occasions, to associations of the coin which it represents; and this quality principal creditors. It seems highly prola can only be possessed by a currency which ble, that a similar measure would, in this inis immediately convertible into specie at the stance, have been attended with similar option of the holder. So long as this power effects; and that the impending danger a of conversion continues, the notes in circula- have been prevented by an association of tion must be considered as equivalent to spe- merchants and bankers of London to cie; since they exist only by the choice of port the credit of the bank, which would 5 the public, who, if they preferred gold and been followed by other associations in all b silver, might immediately receive them in ex- great and commercial towns. Engagemen change. But when the obligation to pay in of the same kind might have been ent coin ceases, the currency no longer retains into by the individuals of both houses this determinate value, but whatever may be parliament, grounded upon such ingur the credit or solvency of those by whom the into the solvency of the bank, and the c of paper is issued, it becomes capable of being depreciated by excess of quantity. That the power of immediate conversion into specie is the only circumstance which can prevent this excess, or maintain the value of any paper currency, is practically shewn by the occasional discount upon exchequer bills and other government securities bearing interest, of which the payment is ultimately certain. A currency exposed to such Auctuations must evidently be a very unfit medium of exchange or standard of value. "As all paper credit depends essentially pon confidence, it is one of the evils of the system to be exposed to great derangements in consequence of panics which produce runs, or sudden demands for cash, upon the banks which issue the paper. It now appears that for some time prior to February 1797, and indeed during the whole of the year 1796, the bank of England had been labouring under difficulties originating in an unfavourable exchange, but which were much aggravated by an extension of its issues to government, and an increasing demand for specie occasioned by public alarm. In con sequence of this demand the directors found it necessary to diminish the issue of their notes, which in the beginning of the year 1797 were reduced from the average of be its failure as those which in fact took plac "If a positive law for the suspension payments had been found unavoidable, should have been limited to a peremptors time, under the most solemn parliamenta engagement that it should not again be r newed; and immediate provision ought have been made for answering the demar of the public for gold by a new coinage tra considerable amount. Such a measure ce not have been attended with any serious 4 ficulty or expence; but had it even occas ed some degree of embarrassment, yet sacrifice was too great for the support of com mercial credit and national faith; and st struggle for such important objects m surely have been expected from that fir cial courage and fertility of resources, why upon occasions of a very different nature de tinguished the measures of the late adm tration. “Instead, however, of trying the effect these natural and obvious remedies, recor was at once had to the most violent me An order of council was issued on the of February for restraining the bank fre payments in cash; and the restriction confirmed by an act of parliament, why was afterwards renewed during the existe session., "The bank of England usually issues its notes by discounting bills of exchange to merchants; and it has been supposed that, providing the bills are not fictitious, but relate to transactions between real debtors and creditors, the paper money which is thus issued can never exceed the amount which would necessarily circulate if the obligation to pay in specie existed. But the occasional convenience of the merchants has a very remote connection with the permanent demands of the public. Though we should suppose the bank to possess the means of distinguishing in all cases between real and fictitious bills; yet transactions may pass between individuals, and payments may be made by bills of exchange to a large amount, upon occasions and for purposes which have no reference to the number or amount of such transactions in the community at large. But it is certain that the directors of the bank have no such power of distinguishing between bills of different kinds; and that, in any general system of discounting, they must be liable to be imposed upon by what are called bills of accommodation. This uncertainty would occasion great difficulties and constant errors in the use and application of any rule for the regulation of currency founded upon the calls of the merchants for discounts. "But a single instance of a great demand for discounts clearly unconnected with a general demand for currency may at once convince us that the rule itself has no just foundation, By the impolitic restrictions of the laws against asury, the bank of England, like other lenders, is prohibited from receiving an interest upon its loans of more than five per cent. But it may often happen that the rate of mercantile interest, and even that of government securitres, exceeds this sum. Under such circumstances the merchants have a strong induce ment to obtain money upon loans from the bank; and the demand for discounts in consequence of this inducement may be carried to any assignable extent. Demands originating in such causes have in fact frequently taken place at different periods during the late war; and the contrary effect of a diminished demand would naturally be produced by times of peace and prosperity when the ree of interest is low. Yet, at these periods, in which commerce is most flourishing, the Currency and circulation of the country would naturally be the greatest. "In real practice, it is well known that the directors of the bank do not consider the number or amount of good bills presented to them for the purpose of being discounted as faraishing the rule by which the amount of their issues is to be determined. Even since the period of the restriction, they have, on various occasions, thought it necessary to arrow their discounts. They are understood to give a certain limited credit to all the considerable bankers and merchants; and to discount for each a certain proportion of bills according to the ex ent of his credit. But so long as there is no obligation to exchange their notes for specie, it is evident that this proportion must be altogether arbitrary, and dependent upon the will and pleasure of the directors, not upon the actual wants or demands of the community. "Some persons have thought, that the acknowledged solvency of the bank of England, and its ample sufficiency to pay the amount of its bills in circulation, are an abundant security against an excessive issue of paper; or at least that no danger is to be apprehended while the currency is confined within these limits. The fallacy of this opi nion may be very easily shewn. It is perfectly obvious, in common cases, that the amount of a banker's capital, and his power of raising money, afford in themselves no proof or presumption whatever that he has the means of carrying his circulation to the same extent; and it is impossible to distinguish between the case of a common banker and that of the bank of England. A rule of limitation, therefore, founded upon the prinple of solvency, would be still more inaccurate than a rule founded upon the demands of the merchants for discounts. By additional subscriptions the capital of the bank of England and the amount of its property are capable of being augmented to an indefinite extent; but no one will therefore contend that the national currency could be extended without limit, or that it would admit of any considerable increase without great depreciation. Of all possible securities for money the security of government has always been considered as the most solid and indisput able; yet navy and exchequer bills are often brought to a discount by excessive issues: and it is known by experience to those persons who conduct such financial operations, that no quantity of these securities can be forced upon the market beyond its actual demand, without producing a reduction in value. "A mixed consideration of the price of bullion and the state of foreign exchanges would probably be the best practical rule by which the directors of the bank, during the suspension of their payments in cash, could regulate the issue of their notes; yet, in consequence of the irregularities which will hereafter be shewn to be produced by the balance of trade, it would on some occasions deviate from the true standard. But, whatever may be the principle by which the directors, since February 1797, have limited the issue of their notes, the following observations will prove that they certainly have not adopted this rule: though it is highly probable that a general consideration of the price of bullion and of the rate of exchange may have served to guard them against a flagrant and impolitic abuse of their powers. "If the above reasoning is well-founded, it must follow that there is no method of discovering à priori the proportion of the circulating medium which the occasions of the community require; that it is a quantity which has no definite rule or standard; and that its true amount can be ascertained only by the effective demand. In countries where the currency is carried on by the precious metals, the quantity is regulated, as in all other cases, by the skill and attention of individuals who are versed in this particular branch of trade; or, in other words, by the bullion merchant, who, in case of a redundant currency, withdraws the excess from circulation, and employs it in foreign commerce, or, in case of a deficiency, procures a new quantity of the metals to be converted into coin. Where the currency consists of paper convertible into specie, the excess or deficiency is in the same manner prevented by the demand of the public either for cash or notes as circumstances may require. A paper circulation which cannot be converted into specie, is deprived of this natural standard, and is incapable of admitting any other, The persons to whom the duty of regulating such a circulation is entrusted are in danger, with the very best intentions, of committing perpetual mistakes. The greatest possible degree of skill and integrity can only protect them against gross errors. They will not probably in one instance be exactly right. "That the experience of the officers of the bank may in some respects have furnished them with the proper skill and knowledge of the regulation of such a currency (if it ought in any case to exist) it would be injustice to deny but it may very reasonably be doubted, whether they possess sufficient firmness for the proper and independent exercise of so important and difficult a trust.. Whatever respect may be due to the characters of the directors as individuals, it is impossible, after the transactions of 1796, to acquit them of blame in their corporate capacity. During the present restriction of payments in specie they are obviously exposed to great temptations. Political influence may occasion an improper increase of their accommodations to the executive government; and their direct interest in the profits made by the bank furnishes a constant inducement to the extension of their notes beyond the proper limits. It is the object of the following pages to shew, from indisputable facts, that there are strong reasons for believing that the directors of the bank of England, and, in a still greater degroe, those of the bank of Ireland, have in reality yielded to these temptations, and that they have made an undue and improper use of the powers intrusted to them by Parlia ment,” It deserves notice, that in 1797 the circulation of English bank notes usually amounted to ten or eleven millions only: and that this circulation now amounts usually to fifteen or sixteen millions. The bank therefore circulates half as much again, in consequence of having obtained the patent for not pay ing in cash. The profits on an additional circulation of five millions of ca pital amount, at five per cent., which in discounting is the usual rate of interest, to two hundred and fifty thousand pounds yearly. It would be reasonable, that the bank should allow the country half this gain, as an indemnity for the risk which our whole public prosperity runs by tolerating the privilege. The bank would thus have to pay out of its profits, one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds yearly in the form of a tax. Ministers have committed a dere liction of public duty in not obtaining some such allowance. A circulation adequate to the wants of London could probably not be furnished by any individual company, without the privilege of withholding specie. Were there no bank of England, but instead of it a great number of private banks, the cir culation would indeed always be proper tioned to the effectual demand. Where, on the contrary, there is only one com pany, panics may annihilate at once the only circulating medium, and withdraw exactly when it is most wanted, the whole pabulum of commerce. Again such panics the restriction is a real tection. So long as the system of a mo nopoly-bank is entitled to enduré, so long probably it will be found expediert to tolerate this portentous restrictio which embarks, on the reputation for solvency of one institution, the solidity of all the forms of metropolitan trade. ART. LIX. Remarks on Currency and Commerce. By JOHN WHEATLEY, Esq. THE art of book-making improves by practice. It was formerly expected from an author, that he should collect his materials and draw his inferences in his closet, and present the result of com pared facts and antagonist arguments to the public after the investigation. pr But now, the opinions intended to be maintained, are first announced in a crude pamphlet, then corrected int consistency by help of the hostile comp mentaries of reviewers, and finally gar nished with such corroborating facts, a few years of desultory reading canno |