bills in theirs to be discounted for him. By this intermediate agency, the London bankers were capable of extending the loans of the bank to their country connections, and of giving them that support which had been refused to their direct application : they thus secured to themselves the power of offering a certain quantity of bank notes, or specie, upon any sudden aspersion on their credit.

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"In the year 1797, another alarm gave rise to another suspicion of their stability. But by the measures which they had taken, the press was in reality directed against the bank of England instead of themselves. Immediately that a run was made upon them, a drain was made upon the bank for specie through their London connections, and vast sums were remitted for their support. In proportion as the alarm became prevalent, and paper became contracted, specie was the more and more demanded to supply the vacuum. The bank, apprehensive of being exhausted of its deposits, pursued its accustomed policy, and reduced the amount of its notes. By this diminution it augmented, in a greater degree, the general distress, without any relief to itself, as the smallest quantity of paper which it continues permanently in circulation would be sufficient, by frequent exchanges, to draw out any given sum of money, and eventually to drain it of its stores. As this policy, therefore, had no other effect than to aggravate the evil which it was intended to remedy; and as, by an increased demand for specie, great danger existed of a total privation of its deposits, it was reduced to the necessity of applying to government for support, and suspending its cash payments. But no blame is imputable to the directors; they found their house involved in difficulties by no imprudence of their own, and adopted the line of conduct which existing circumstances, in their opinion, demanded. No doubt whatever can be entertained, but that the order of council was necessary at the time to prevent worse consequences."

After some pages more of similar reasoning the author thus continues

"

In order, therefore, to obviate the danger which threatens the bank of England upon a return of cash payments, and to prevent the probable recurrence of the calamities of 1793 and 1797, it appears to me absolutely necessary, that the circulation of country notes should be prohibited."

The facts adduced in this whole passage are most unfairly related. There were great failures at the beginning of the anti-jacobin war. Whence did they arise? A war always throws a great mass of capital into a new direction; there

is a sudden progressive absorption for the public service, and a sudden speculative investiture in naval stores and other new objects of demand; of course many ap plications for payments are made at once pressingly and peremptorily in the commercial world. Whoever finds it difficult to be punctual becomes a marked man; whoever is really insolvent is at such times compelled to the acknow. ledgment. The war of 1792, terminated a commercial treaty which had introduced British manufactures to every

corner of France: of course the inter

cepted masses of capital much belonged to merchants trading with the French ports, and to manufacturers who directly supplied the store-keepers of France. Manufacturers for the foreign market are usually principal creditors of the country-bankers: they can circulate much paper in the payment of their dependents, where they make it an object: and a banker willingly proportions the credit given, to the consumption of his paper. The country-bankers therefore were much inconvenienced by the diminished command of capital among the manufacturers, and endeavoured to get advances of their regular correspondents -the London bankers. On a system of open banking, this could easily have been accomplished; the houses in credit would have issued a greater quantity of notes, and have discounted the circulable securities of their provincial friends. But the bank of England, possessing in London a monopoly of discount, and wishing to employ its own capital rather in government securities than in private accommodation, refused to discount for the London bankers with the increased facility, which the provincial demand for capital required. The bank of England even narrowed its discounts at that time; and thus inflicted, in rea lity, much of the commercial embarrassment and misfortune of 1793. During the subsequent difficulties of the West India merchants, similar evils arose from the monopoly-bank, and government had to advance the defective capital in a manner very favourable to the corrup tion of mercantile political opinion; but very dangerous to the property of the nation, very hostile to the inculcation of prudence, and very needless and inexpedient on a system of open banking.

THE theorists, who have best discussed the doctrine of circulation, are accustomed to denominate that circulation useful, which adds a value to the commodity transferred; and that circulation noxious, which expends unproductively the labor and venture of transfer, and leaves the commodity transferred in its pristine state. Those who speculate in bullion, in cochineal, in corn, may gain or lose much by a fluctuation in the price of their purchase; but they restore it to the consumer unaltered; no addition of labour is consolidated with its value it might as well have wandered to the goldsmith, the dyer, or the miller, without mediation, and have escaped the chance of an intervening rise or fall. It is probable, how ever, that such speculators find usually a profit accruing; they would not else invest capitals, which might quiescently produce an interest; they consequently tend to inhance the price to the ultimate consumer, and thus offer a bounty to the original producer. They stimulate the miner at Santafé, the nopalgardener at Quito, the farmer on the Delaware, to increase his produce; and by securing a more abundant growth they eventually indemnify, and more than indemnify the consumer, for the added cost of his present purchase. But no apology of this kind can be devised for the speculators in the stock-market: the commodity is increased or diminished by war or peace, not by the value they withdraw or confer: the time, the capital, the intellectual effort they employ is all withdrawn from productive industry and expended on barren gambling and the rank and comfort of innumerable families is staked on the caprice of a cabinet, or the arrival of a Courier. Even Professor Busch (Von dem Geldsumlauf; book III. section 43) who approaches Mandeville in the conviction, that whatever is, is right, declares against stock-jobbery, as he calis it, and pronounces it to be completely hurtful. Under this impression a law was made in the 7th year of George II., that all contracts made after the 1st June, 1731, for wagers relating to the public stocks, should be void:

May it not Lowever be surmised that, some advantages accrue to a commuLity from a perpetual fund of ready

money, which can be advanced at a moment's notice to the government, or to individuals? Does not a stock-exchange retain in this applicable form a mass of capital, which would else be vested in bonds, mortgages, or other slowly derangeable securities? Do not some advantages arise from the political vigi lance of a body of jobbers much interested in the wise conduct of state-affairs? Do not the commissions levied by bankers and brokers on the amounts which change hands, belong to the class of productive circulations? Is there not an important consumption of stamps occasioned by these transactions? Ought all the prizes of life to be reserved for prudence, industry, frugality; has not a spirit of enterprize and adventure, bordering on rashness, also its value? "Nothing venture nothing have," may be no proverb in poor Richard's almanac; but if it does not suit an economic, it may suit an opulent society. Does not much of our most important commerce originate in, and owe its success to this liberal daring? Is not a stock-exchange a seminary and conservatory of courageous hazardy? Mutability of fortune is the parent of many virtues: there is more of courtesy, of at tention to inferiors, of tenderness to the victims of adversity,in those who are much exposed to reverses of situation, than in those whose entailed acres defy imprudence itself. The stock-jobber is favourably circumstanced for discipline in such qualities: nor are his misfortunes wholly useless; the inequality of riches is surveyed with more complacence for being liable to capricious interruptions.

There is an old book of Mortimer's, Every man his own Broker. Cases of difficulty are since become more various and complex. Further elucidations and instructions were desireable. The present writer has collected with meritori ous industry the principal trials which have occurred since the 7th of George the second, in order to compel the ful filment of bargains, of which evasion has been attempted under that act. We think the act itself should be repealed; and indeed all the laws, which hinge gaming transactions on a mere principle of honor. They were originally made to privilege noblemen against bankruptcy:

they are in the spirit of feudal legislation they legalize villainy, when they are obeyed: they secure a preference to the sharper and swindler, over the tradesman and the regular creditor, when they are disobeyed. They encourage gaming by taking out its sting: a man plays more boldly, because he knows he can take refuge in dishonour: but when he has lost, he chooses to quit the asylum, which during his frenzy he looked to as a refuge. The good sense of Lord Mansfield saw that these privileged

frauds should be restricted within the narrowest possible bounds. He made the first inroad on the exceptionable act, which our author has recited: we shall transcribe the narration.

"Notwithstanding the plainness and precision with which the act was drawn, numerous cases have been argued and adjudged in the different courts respecting the extent of its provisions. The devices and subtleties that were invented to erade its obvious meaning, soon rendered applications to courts of justice necessary and the first case of importance came on to be heard in the court of King's Bench before Lord Mansfield, in the seventh year of his present Majesty, which is hereafter stated.

"But as the act itself forms the grand basis upon which most of the cases have been decided, perhaps it will be the least perplex ing method of arrangement to take them in chronological order, so far as the subject matter will admit of it: remarking, as we proceed, on the rules and principles arising out of them; and adverting to other cases relating to stock-jobbing transactions prior to the passing of the act, when they serve to elucidate any point of law. Que decided advantage of this mode will be, that of carrying the reader along, step by step, in the history of stock-jobbing, from what may be called its legal birth, to its present state of

maturity.

"It would appear that the act had the effect of curbing the then prevailing disposition for jobbing, as no case of importance seems to have been decided on it till the period above alluded to, when that of Faikney against Raynous and Richardson was heard, in which the court decided, That money borrowed to pay a stock-jobbing contract, though of the partner in the transaction, was not within the statute.'

"The case reported in the 1st of Blackstone, 633, is as follows:-To an action of debt on bond, dated the 23d February, 1765, for $,000l., the defendant prayed oyer of the bond and condition, which was to secure 1,500l. and pleaded. first, Non est factum, in which issue was joined: and, second, That since the statute, the plaintiff corruptly entered into several agreements for transferring sun

dry parcels of stock, on the joint account of himself and defendant Richardson, to be de livered at a certain time, called the Rescounter Day, in February following; and, in performance thereof, corruptly, and contrary to the form of the statute, paid 5,000l. to divers persons, for making up the difference in price, for not performing the said con tracts, and that the bond was made for securing to the plaintiff 1,500l., being Richardson's moiety of the said differences; and for no other consideration, and therefore void in law.

joined in demurrer. "The plaintiff demurred; and defendant

"LORD MANSFIELD.- I am clear that this is no defence, even allowing it to be well pleaded. Compounding differences for stock sold, is not malum in se, but merely prolatitum. Where a thing is prohibited by Act of Parliament, it is void as between the par ties, and no court of justice will allow a ma to recover for what is made unlawful to e done. But this case is not within the Act of Parliament.

"The bond is for money lent to anchor

to fulfil a prohibited contract. If a man lends money to be lent upon usury, or to pay a gaming debt, can it not be recovered?

There is no difference whether borrowed of Faikney, or of any other person.' "Judgment for the plaintiff, in winch Yates, Aston, and Hewit, concurred."

We sincerely wish this pamphlet may be a mean of drawing the legislature to the immorality of the act of parl ment, and that all bargains made at the stock-exchange may be rendered as le gal, as valid, as open to recovery in the courts of justice and by the process c law, as the bargains of merchants on their Exchange. Principle is the victim, and fraud the gainer by a system, which has lately protected the dishonesties of opulence, and punished the honourable fidelity of mediocrity.

We shall state this author's highly proper and respectable counsel concern ing a recent transaction.

"But a subject of considerable impor tance, and which has of late claimed much attention, continues still undetermined by any express decisions:-this is the validity of a bargain made at a time when filse and groundless reports, raised and propagated for fraudulent purposes, materially affecting the price of stocks, are generally credited. Under such circumstances, some persons contend that a bargain made for the purchase of sale of stock, which has not been actually transferred, becomes ipso facto void; and that no legal claim can be maintained for any damage which the buyer or seller may there by sustain. The same persons will admit,