There is no doubt that attempts to abolish the coroner's office will meet with opposition, not only because it does away with an elective office, but also because a position of inertia in public affairs seems to be so much easier to maintain than one of progression. There can be no doubt, however, that the abolishment of the present anachronistic coroner's office and the distribution of its duties between the prosecutor and medical examiner would lead to vastly increased efficiency. The method of appointment of the medical examiner, whether by the prosecutor, the county commissioners, or some court, is a matter for solution by each state. Important for good service is the freedom of the medical examiner from political influences. That there may be in every state a few coroners who perform their duties well is not a good argument against the abolishment of the office. They are rather the exceptions which prove the rule. In the opinion of the writer the following conclusions appear justifiable: 1. The statutes relating to the coroner's office in most states are not adapted to present-day conditions. This is especially true in cities. 2. The duties demanded of the coroner require considerable knowledge of both medical and legal matters. No single individual can be expected to be properly qualified in both subjects. 3. Because of improper medical qualifications, most coroner's autopsies are valueless, both for determining the cause of death in a scientific manner, and for furnishing the basis of expert testimony. 4. Because of inadequate legal training upon the part of the coroner, the coroner's inquest is usually not conducted to the greatest advantage of the state. In fact, it often hampers the prosecution of criminals. 5. The inquiry into the circumstances surrounding violent deaths should be by an official with legal training. Since the prosecutor or commonwealth attorney is responsible in such cases it would seem best that the inquest should be by the prosecutor's office. 6. The examination into the causes and nature of death should be by an official with proper medical training. The medical examiner would then become an important aid to the prosecutor. 7. There should be ample provision for the calling in, upon the request of the prosecutor or medical examiner, of experts. 8. In most states the investigation of the coroner into deaths due to accident or negligence leads to nothing of value. With proper criminal negligence laws the prosecutor and medical examiner would act together, in these cases, just as in deaths due to violence, for the purpose of preparing the strongest possible case in criminal actions. 9. Where there are vital statistics laws, deaths from unknown causes or deaths when a physician has not been in attendance should be reported first to the registrar of vital statistics, and not to the coroner. Only when the registrar is unable or unwilling to assign a cause of death should the medical examiner be asked to investigate; in this group of cases his examination should be made only upon the definite request of the registrar. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: HIS POWERS, TEMPTATIONS AND LIMITATIONS BY HOWARD S. GANS, Of the New York Bar. Formerly an Assistant District Attorney of It All The prosecuting office is one of wide-reaching influence. is the focal point of the administration of the criminal law. prosecutions of major importance pass through it and are conducted by it, and upon the skill with which it conducts them depends in large measure the effectiveness of the administration of the criminal law. But efficiency in the conduct of criminal cases represents the least of its potentialities. The radius of its influence extends to every activity of municipal government. Wilful neglect of duty on the part of any public officer is a crime. Every public officer and every public office performing functions within the territorial limits over which the prosecutor's jurisdiction extends, is at all times subject to investigation by the grand jury; and, while theoretically the prosecuting officer is but the agent and official adviser of the grand jury, in practice the grand jury acts upon his initiative and does his bidding. Hence it lies within his powers, if not to ensure good government, at least to stimulate efficiency in almost every branch of the public service. The fate of political parties, the choice of candidates, the issue of elections, often depend upon his almost unhampered discretion. An investigation shrewdly instituted and effectively protracted, may create an impression of inefficiency or of corruption sufficient to discredit an administration or a candidate for office, however honest or efficient. A failure to investigate often permits the continuance of an inefficient or corrupt administration. Upon the vigor and impartiality of his activities with regard to offenses against the election laws, the result of an election is often dependent. For the manner of the exercise of his powers, the prosecuting officer is singularly free from accountability. Rarely is there pre sented to him a situation in which any particular course of action is made imperative; in which it can be established that, through any particular course of action, he has failed in the performance of his duty. He is bound by law to do nothing save to conduct the cases that are brought to his attention, to advise the grand jury as to the law, and to produce for their examination such witnesses as they may desire to hear. Though corruption be rife, vice flaunting, and crime flagrant and undetected, the prosecuting officer may find justification for quiescence in the claim that the duty of detecting and repressing crime is not his, that he has subject to him neither a constabulary nor a detective force with which to enforce the laws, that he is but a law officer retained by the commonwealth to present in court such criminal cases as are brought to his office, and that he has no duty to perform until legal proof of criminality shall have been presented to him. On the other hand, there is practically no limit to the initiative he may display if he be moved to make his powers rather than his duties the measure of his activity. The public purse is practically at his command; private detectives, accountants, experts of all descriptions are at his service; the books and papers of every municipal department are open to his inspection, and every official subject to his interrogatories. He exercises the broadest discretion in determining whether, when, and how he shall act. No criminality is so clear that he cannot grant immunity from conviction if he be so minded. On the other hand, no complaint can be so flimsy as to make it impossible for him to give it currency and lend it plausibility by an investigation. And though his activities result in oppression, or his passivity enable corruption to flourish, it is rarely possible to establish that he has exceeded the bounds of his discretion or failed to measure up to the obligations of his office. A governor who would remove a prosecuting officer for misconduct must act arbitrarily or upon the basis of suspicions, unless the prosecutor shall have been extraordinarily stupid as well as extraordinarily corrupt. Moreover, less than most public officers, is his conduct subject to be influenced by enlightened public criticism. His is peculiarly an office as to which the public judgment is likely to be led astray, for the public has no adequate means of judging either of the honesty or of the efficiency of its prosecutor. In almost every instance the essentials to an intelligent judgment of his conduct, are a minute knowledge of the facts and a thorough familiarity with the law; and the public, of necessity, bases its judgment upon a partial disclosure of the facts and an almost total ignorance of the law. It is prone to mistake rumor for proof, to confuse moral obliquity with criminality, and to imagine that a conviction for larceny should follow whenever its favorite newspaper prints the word "steal" in its headlines. It thirsts for sensations, and is fain to drink the blood of sacrificial offerings with its morning coffee. Its newspapers thrive by feeding to it the pabulum it craves, and the prosecutor who furnishes the sensations wins both the newspapers and the public. A refusal to yield to public clamor, often the highest proof of the highest integrity, is not infrequently construed to be evidence of dishonesty; and the yielding to clamor, often the highest proof of weakness and dishonesty, generally creates a reputation for unimpeachable integrity. Moreover, the public judges, of necessity, by results or by so much of them as it can understand. To it the conviction of a person accused is an evidence of integrity and efficiency; a failure to convict is a miscarriage of justice, for which it holds or fails to hold the prosecutor responsible according to the degree of favor he has found in its eyes. It can know nothing of methods or their propriety. Whatever conduces to a conviction is likely to seem right in its eyes. The reversal of the conviction by an appellate court, for improprieties however grave, it is apt to attribute to the mysterious technicalities of the law and to urge as an argument for the recall of the judiciary. It can rarely be made to realize that the prosecutor's duty is not to win cases, but to further the ends of justice under the law; that he violates his duty and is false to his oath quite as flagrantly when he prosecutes a person whom he believes to be innocent of crime, even though that person be censurable in the forum of morals, as when he fails to prosecute a person whom he believes to be guilty and against whom he has sufficient evidence; that a successful prosecution may be a disgraceful prosecution. In this there lies public danger; for from this it results that in few places is the road to popularity so easy, and that in few places is it so often at variance with the honest performance of public duty. The assurance of promotion, and the music of popular applause wait to enchant the ears of nim who will but sound the keynote to which the public is ever ready to attune its chants, by attacks upon those whom it lusts to destroy; and the applause may be swelled |