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some courts hare held that the wrong must the judgment now and here sued on, was in be one which would be actionable by the the strivtest sense a penal statute, imposing a law of the place where the redress is sought, penalty upon any insurance company of anas well as by the law of the place where the other state doing business in the state of Wiswrong was done. See, for example, The cousin without having deposited with the Halley, L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 204; Phillips v. proper officer of the state a full statement of Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 28, 29; The M. Mox its property and business during the previous ham, 1 Prob. Div. 107, 111; Wooden v. Rail year. The cause of action was not any priroad Co., 126 N. Y. 10, 26 N. E. Rep. 1050; vate injury, but solely the offense committed Ash v. Railroad Co., 72 Md. 144, 19 Atl. Rep. against the state by violating her law. The C13. But such is not the law of this court. prosecution was in the name of the state, and By our law, a private action may be main the whole penalty, when recovered, would tained in one state, if not contrary to its accrue to the state." Page 299, 127 U. S., own policy, for such a wrong done in another, and page 1378, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. and actionable there, although a like wrong *Such were the grounds upon which it was would not be actionable in the state where adjudged in that case that this court, under the suit is brought. Smith v. Condry, 1 How. the provision of the constitution giving it 28; The China, 7 Wall. 53, 64; The Scotland, original jurisdictio of actions between a 105 U. S. 24, 29; Dennick v. Railroad Co., state and citizens of another state, had no 103 U. S. 11; Railway Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. jurisdiction of an action by a state upon a 593, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905.
judgment recovered by it in one of its own Upon the question what are to be consid courts against a citizen or a corporation of ered penal laws of one country, within the in another state for a pecuniary penalty for a ternational rule which forbids such laws to be violation of its municipal law. onforced in any other country, so much reli Upon similar grounds, the courts of a state ance was placed by each party in argument cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction of a apon the opinion of this court in Wisconsin v.
suit to recover a like penalty for a violaInsurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. tion of a law of the United States. Martin 1370, that it will be convenient to quote from v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 330, 337; U. S. v. that opinion the principal propositions there | Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4, 265; Delafield v. Ilfirmed:
nois, 2 Hill, 159, 169; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. “The rule that the courts of no country ex Cas. 34; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239; Davison v. ecute the penal laws of another applies, not Champlin, Id. 244; Haney v. Sharp, 1 Dana, onls to prosecutions and sentences for crimes 442; State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83, 85; Ward v. and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of Jenkins, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 583, 587; 1 Kert, the state for the recovery of pecuniary pen. Comm. 402-404. The only ground ever sug. alties for any violation of statutes for the gested for maintaining such suits in a state protection of its revenue, or other municipal court is that the laws of the United States laws, and to all judgments for such penal arc, in effect, laws of each state.
Claflin v. ties." Page 290, 127 U. S., and page 1374, 8 Housenian, 93 . S. 130, 137; Platt, J., in U. Sup. Ct. Rep.
S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 22; Ordway v. Bank, “The application of the rule to the courts 47 Md. 217. But in Claflin v. Houseman the of the several states and of the United States point adjudged was that an assignee under is not affected by the provisions of the con the bankrupt law of the United States could stitution and of the act of congress, by which assert in a state court the title rested in him the judgments of the courts of any state are by the assignment in bankruptcy; and Mr. to have such faith and credit given to them in Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion in every court within the United States as they that case, said the year before, when sitting have by law or usage in the state in which in the circuit court, and speaking of il prosethey were rendered.” Page 291, 127 U. S., cution in a court of the state of Georgia for and page 1375, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep.
perjury committed that state in testifying “The essential nature and real foundation before a commissioner of the circuit court of of a cause of action are not changed by re the United States: “It would be a manifest covering judgment upon it; and the technical incongruity for one sovereignty to punish a rules, which regard the original claim as person for an offense committed against the merged in the judgment, and the judgment as laws of another sovereignty.” Ex parte Implying a promise by the defendant to pay Bridges, 2 Woods, 428, 430. See, also, Loit, do not preclude a court, to which a judg. ney's Case, 134 U. S. 372, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. ment is presented for affirmative action, 584. (while it cannot go behind the judgment for Beyond doubt (except in cases removed the purpose of examining into the validity of from a state court in obedience to an express the claiin,) from scertaining whether the act of congress, in order to protect rights unclaim is really one of such a nature that the der the constitution and laws of the United court is authorized to enforce it.” Pages 292, states) a circuit court of the United States 293, 127 U. S., and page 1375, 8 Sup. Ct. cannot entertain jurisdiction of a suit in beRep.
half of the state, or of the people thereof, to "The statute of Wisconsin, under which recover a penalty imposed by way of punishthe state recovered in one of her own courts ment for a violation of a statute of the state;
" the courts of the United States," as ob court of the United States held in the state served by Mr. Justice Catron, delivering a of New York, by an administrator of the de judgment of this court, “having no power to ceased, appointed in that state. execute the penal laws of the individual Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering judgment, states." Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 How. 29, 36, said: "It can scarcely be contended that the 37; Gwin v. Barton, 6 How. 7; Iowa v. Chi act belongs to the class of criminal laws cago, B. & Q. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 497; which can only be enforced by the courts of Ferguson v. Ross, 38 Fed. Rep. 161; Texas v. the state where the offense was committed; Day Land & Cattle Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 228; for it is, though a statutory remedy, a civil Dey v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 45 Fed. action to recover damages for a civil injury. Rep. 82.
It is, indeed, a right dependent solely on the For the purposes of extraterritorial juris- statute of the state; but when the act is done diction, it may well be that actions by a com for which the law says the person shall be mon informer, called, as Blackstone says, liable, and the action by which the remedy is “ 'popular actions,' because they are given to to be enforced is a personal and not a real the people in general,” to recover a penalty action, and is of that character which the law imposed by statute for an offense against the recognizes as transitory and not local, we law, and which may be barred by a pardon cannot see why the defendant may not be granted before action brought, may stand on held liable in any court to whose jurisdiction the sanie ground as suits brought for such he can be subjected by personal process or a penalty in the name of the state or of its by voluntary appearance, as was the case officers, because they are equally brought to here. It is difficult to understand how the enforce the criminal law of the state. 3 BI. nature of the remedy, or the jurisdiction of Comm. 161, 162; 2 Bl. Comm. 437, 438; the courts to enforce it, is in any manner de Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch, 336; Gwin v. pendent on the question whether it is a statBreedlove, above cited; U. S. v. Connor, 138 utory right or a common-law right. WherU, S. 61, 66, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Bryant v. ever, by either the common law or the stat Ela, Smith, (N. H.) 396. And personal dis ute law of a state, a right of action has beabilities imposed by the law of a state, as an come fixed, and a legal liability incurred, that incident or consequence of a judicial sentence liability may be enforced, and the right of or decree, by way of punishment of an of action pursued, in any court which has juris fender, and not for the benefit of any other diction of such matters, and can obtain juris person, such as attainder, or infamy, or in- diction of the parties.” 103 U. S. 17, 18. competency of a convict to testify, or dis That decision is important as establishing qualification of the guilty party to a cause of two points: (1) The court considered "crim-5 divorce for adultery to marry again,-are inal laws,” that is to say, laws* punishing doubtless strictly penal, and therefore have crimes, as constituting the whole class of pe no extraterritorial operation. Story, Confi. nal laws which cannot be enforced extraterLaw, $8 91, 92; Dicey, Dom. 162; Folliott v. ritorially. (2) A statute of a state, manifest. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 123, and 3 Term R. 726; ly intended to protect life, and to impose a Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 263, 303, 12 Sup. new and extraordinary civil liability upon Ct. Rep. 617; Dickson v. Dickson, 1 Yerg. those causing death, by subjecting them to 110; Ponsford V. Johnson, 2 Blatchf. 51; a private action for the pecuniary damages Com. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 471; Van Voor thereby resulting to the family of the de bis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 28, 29.
ceased, might be enforced in a circuit court The question whether a statute of one state, of the United States held in another state, which in some aspects may be called penal, is without regard to the question whether & a penal law, in the international sense, so similar liability would have attached for a that it cannot be enforced in the courts of similar cause in that state. The decision was another state, depends upon the question approved and followed at the last term in whether its purpose is to* punish an offense Railway Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 605, 12 against the public justice of the state, or to Sup. Ct. Rep. 905, where the chief Justice, afford a private remedy to a person injured speaking for the whole court, after alluding by the wrongful act. There could be no bet to cases recognizing the rule where the laws ter illustration of this than the decision of of both jurisdictions are similar, said: “The this court in Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 question, however, is one of general law, and U. S. 11.
we regard it as settled in Dennick v. Rail. In that case it was held that, by virtue of road Co." a statute of New Jersey making a person or That decision has been also followed in the corporation, whose wrongful act, neglect, or courts of several states. Herrick v. Railway default should cause the death of any person, Co., 31 Minn, 11, 16 N. W. Rep. 413; Chicaliable to an action by his administrator, for go, etc., R. Co. V. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977; the benefit of his widow and next of kin, to Knight v. Railroad Co., 108 Pa. St. 250; Morrecover damages for the pecuniary injury re ris v. Railway Co., 65 Iowa, 727, 23 N. W. sulting to them from his death, such an ac Rep. 143; Railway Co. v. Lewis, 24 Neb. 848, tion, where the neglect and the death took 40 N. W. Rep. 401; Higgins v. Railroad Co., place in New Jersey, might, upon general 155 Mass. 176, 29 N. E. Rep. 534. principles of law, be maintained in a circuit In the case last cited, a statute of Connect
Icut having provided that all actions for in burdensome liability on the oficers for their juries to the person, including those resulting wrongful act, it may well be considered peinstantaneously or otherwise in death, should nal, in the sense that it should be strictly survive, and that for an injury resulting in construed. But as it gives a civil remedy, at death from negligence the executor or ad the private suit of the creditor only, and ministrator of the deceased might maintain measured by the amount of his debt, it is as an action to recover damages not exceeding to him clearly remedial. To maintain such $5,000, to be distributed among his widow and a suit is not to administer a punishment imheirs in certain proportions, it was held that posed upon an offender against the state, but such an action was not a penal action, and simply to enforce a private right secured unmight be maintained under that statute in der its laws to an individual. We can see no Massachusetts by an administrator, appoint- just ground, on principle, for holding such a ed there, of a citizen thereof, who had been statute to be a penal law, in the sense that it instantly killed in Connecticut by the negli cannot be enforced in a foreign state or coungence of a railroad corporation; and the gen try. eral principles applicable to the case were The decisions of the court of appeals of carefully stated as follows: "These princi New York, so far as they have been brought ples require that, in ses of other than penal to our notice, fall short of hol ling that the actions, the foreign law, if not contrary to liability imposed upon the officers of the corour public policy, or to abstract justice or poration by such statutes is a punishment or pure morals, or calculated to injure the state penalty which cannot be enforced in another or its citizens, shall be recognized and en state. forced here, if we have jurisdiction of all In Garrison v. Howe, the court held that necessary parties, and if we can see that, the statute was so far penal that it must be consistently with our own forms of proce construed strictly, and therefore the officers dure and law of trials, we can do substantial could not be charged with a debt of the corjustice between the parties. If the foreign poration, which was neither contracted nor law is a penal statute, or if it offends our existing during a default in making the reown policy, or is repugnant to justice or to required by the statute; and Chief Jusgood morals, or is calculated to injure this tice Denio, in delivering judgment, said: “If state or its citizens, or if we have not juris the statute were simply a remedial one, it diction of parties who must be brought in to might be said that the plaintiff's case was enable us to give a satisfactory remedy, or within its equity; for the general object of if, under our forms of procedure, an action the law doubtless was, beside enforcing the here cannot give a substantial remedy, we duty of making reports for the benefit of all are at liberty to decline jurisdiction.” 155 concerned, to enable parties proposing to Mass. 180, 29 N. E. Rep. 535.
deal with the corporation to see whether The provision of the statute of New York they could safely do so." "But the provision now in question, making the officers of a cor is highly penal, and the rules of law do not poration, who sign and record a false certifi ermit us to extend it by construction to cate of the amount of its capital stock, liable cases not fairly within the language." 17 N. for all its debts, is in no sense a criminal or Y. 458, 465, 466. quasi criminal law. The statute, while it en In Jones v. Barlow, it was accordingly held ables persons complying with its provisions that officers were only liable for debts actuto do business as a corporation, without be ally due, and for which a present right of acing subject to the liability of general part tion exists against the corporation; and the ners, takes pains to secure and maintain a court said: “Although the obligation is whol. proper corporate fund for the payment of ly statutory, and adjudged to be a penalty, the corporate debts. With this alm, it it is in substance, as it is in form, a remedy makes the stockholders individually liable for the collection of the corporate debts. The for the debts of the corporation until the cap act is penal as against the defaulting trustees, ital stock is paid in, and a certificate of the but is remedial in favor of creditors. The payment made by the officers, and makes the liability of defaulting trustees is measured officers liable for any false and material rep by the obligation of the company, and a disresentation in that certificate. The individ charge of the obligations of the company, or nal liability of the stockholders takes the a release of the debt, bars the action against place of a corporate fund, until that fund the trustees." 62 N. Y. 202, 205, 206. has been duly created; and the individual The other cases in that court, cited in the bability of the officers takes the place of the court of appeals of Maryland in the present fund, in case their statement that it has been case, adjudged only the following points: duly created is false. If the officers do not Within the meaning of a statute of limits truly state and record the facts which ex tions applicable to private actions only, tho empt them from liability, they are made lia action against an officer is not "upon a la ble directly to every creditor of the company, bility created by statute, other than a penalwho by reason of their wrongful acts has not ty or forfeiture," which would be barred in the security, for the payment of his debt out six years, but is barred in three years as "an of the corporate property, on which he had action upon a statute for a penalty or for• Hight to rely. As the statute imposes a feiture where action is given to the party ag
grieved,” because the provisions in question, | Hun, 48; Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Brelsaid the court, “impose a penalty, or a liabil tung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217, 230; Gregory ity in that nature." Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. v. Banks, 3 Colo. 332. But whether that is 412, 417. A count against a person as an offi so, or whether, within the decision of this cer for not filing a report cannot be joined court in Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, 23, with one against him as a stockholder for such a repeal so affects the security which the debts contracted before a report is filed, that creditor had when his debt was contracted being "an action on contract." Wiles v. Suy as to impair the obligation of his contract dam, 64 N. Y. 173, 176. The action against with the corporation, is aside from the quesan officer is an action ex delicto, and there tion now before us. fore does not survive against his personal It is true that the courts of some states, inrepresentatives. Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. cluding Maryland, have declined to enforce a Y. 323.
similar liability inposed by the statute of anIn a later case than any of these, the court, other state. But in each of those cases it apin affirming the very judgment now sued on, pears to have been assumed to be a sufficient and adjudging the statute of 1875 to be con ground for that conclusion that the liability stitutional and valid, said that “while liabil was not founded in contract, but was in the ity, within the provision in question, is in nature of a penalty imposed by statute; and some sense penal in its character, it may no reasons were given for considering the bave been intended for the protection of statute a penal law, in the strict, primary, creditors of corporations created pursuant to and international sense. Derrickson v. Smith, that statute." Huntington v. Attrill, 118 N. 27 N. J. Law, 166; Halsey v. McLean, 12 AlY. 365, 378, 23 N. E. Rep. 544. And where len, 433; Bank v. Price, 33 Md. 487. such an action against an officer went to It is also true that in Engine Co. v. Hubjudgment before the death of either party, bard, 101 U. S. 188, 192, Mr. Justice Clifford it was decided that “the original wrong was referred to those cases by way of argument. merged in the judgment, and that then be But in that case, as well as in Chase v. Curtis, came property, with all the attributes of a 113 U. S. 152, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, the only judgment in an action ex contractu,” and that point ildjudged was that such statutes were if, after a reversal of judgment for the plain so far penal that they must be construed tiff, both parties died, the plaintiff's repre- *strictly; and in both cases jurisdiction was sentatives might maintain an appeal from assumed by the circuit court of the United the judgment of reversal, and 'have the States, and not doubted by this court, which defendant's representatives summoned in. could hardly have been if the statute had Carr v. Rischer, 119 N. Y. 117, 124, 23 N. E. been deemed penal, within the maxim of inRep. 296.
ternational law. In Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. We do not refer to these decisions as evi 371, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 263, the liability sought dence in this case of the law of New York, to be enforced under the statute of New because in the courts of Maryland that law York was the liability of a stockholder aris. could only be proved as a fact, and was ing upon contract; and no question was prehardly open to proof on the demurrer, and, sented as to the nature of the liability of ofif not proved in those courts, could not be ficers. taken judicial notice of by this court on this But in Hornor v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228, writ of error. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. this court declined to consider a similar liaS. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; Chicago & A. R. bility of officers of a corporation in the DisCo. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615, 7 trict of Columbia as a penalty. See, also, Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Wernwag v. Pawling, 5 Neal v. Moultrie, 12 Ga. 104; Cady v. SanGill & J. 500, 508; Coates v. Mackey, 56*Md. ford, 53 Vt. 632, 639, 610; Nickerson v. 416, 419. Nor, for reasons to be stated pres Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295, 298; Post v. Railroad ently, could those decisions, in any view, be Co., 144 Mass. 341, 345, 11 N. E. Rep. 540; regarded as concluding the courts of Mary Woolrerton v. Taylor, 132 Ill. 197, 23 N. E. land, or this court, upon the question wheth Rep. 1007; Mor. Corp. (2d Ed.) $ 908. er this statute is a penal law, in the interna The case of Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. tional sense. But they are entitled to great | S. 513, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, on which the de consideration, because made by a court of fendant much relied, related only to the auhigh authority, construing the terms of a thority of the legislature of a state to compel statute with which it was peculiarly famil railroad corporations neglecting to provide tar; and it is satisfactory to find no adjudica fences and cattle guards on the lines of their tion of that court inconsistent with the view roads to pay double damages to the owners which we take of the liability in question. of cattle injured by reason of the neglect;
That court and some others, indeed, have and no question of the jurisdiction of the held that the liability of o:ficers under such courts of another state to maintain an action a statute is so far in the nature of a penalty for such damages was involved in the case, that the creditors of the corporation have no suggested by counsel, or in the mind of the vested right therein, which cannot be taken court. away by a repeal of the statute before judg. The true limits of the International rule are ment in an action brought thereon. Manu well stated in the decision of the judicial com. facturing Co. v. Beecher, 97 N. Y. 651, 26 mittee of the privy council of England, upon
an appeal from Canada, in an action brought the state wliose law had been infringed. by the present plaintiff against Attrill in the All the provisions of municipal statutes for province of Ontario upon the judgment to en the regulation of trade iind trading comforce which the present suit was brought. panies were presumably enacted in the interThe Canadian judges, having in evidence be est and for the benefit of the community at fore them some of the cases in the court of large; and persons who violated those proappeals of New York, above referred to, as visions were, in a certain sense, offenders well as the testimony of a well-known lawyer against the state law, as well as against indi. of New York that such statutes were, and viduals who might be injured by their mishad been held by that court to be, strictly conduct. But foreign tribunals did not repenal and punitive, differed in opinion upun gard tliose violations of statute law as ofthe question whether the statute of New fenses agaiust the state, unless their vindicaYork was a penal law, which could not be en tion rested with the state itself, or with the forced in another country, as well as upon comnunity which it represented. Penalties the question whether the view taken by the miglit be attached to them, but that circum. courts of New York should be conclusive up stance would not bring them within the rule, on foreign courts, and finally gave judgment except in cases where those penalties were for the defendant. Huntington v. Attrill, 17 recoverable at the instance of the state, or of Ont. 245, and 18 Ont. App. 136.
an official duly authorized to prosecute on its In the privy council, Lord Watson, speak- behalf, or of a member of the public in the ing for Lord Chancellor Halsbury and other character of a coinmon informer. An action judges, as well as for himself, delivered an by the latter was regarded as an actio popuopinion in favor of reversing the judgment laris, pursued, not in his individual interest, below, and entering a decree for the appel but in the interest of the whole community." lant, upon the ground that the action “ He had already, in an earlier part of the not, in the sense of international law, penal, opinion, observed: “Their lordships could not or, in other words, an action on behalf of the assent to the proposition that, in considering government or community of the state of whether the present action was penal in such New York for punishment of an offense sense as to oust their jurisdiction, the courts against their municipal law." The fact that of Ontario were bound to pay absolute defer. that opinion has not been found in any series ence to any interpretation which might have of Reports readily accessible in this country, been put upon the statute of 1875 in the state but only in 8 Law T. R. 341, affords special of New York. They had to construe and reasons for quoting some passages.
apply an international rule, which was a mat* The rule" of international law, said Lord ter of law entirely within the cognizance of Watson, “had its foundation in the well the foreign court whose jurisdiction was in. recognized principle that crimes, including in voked. Judicial decisions in the state where that term all breaches of public law punish- the cause of action arose were not precedents able by pecuniary mulct or otherwise, at the which must be followed, although the reainstance of the state govern inent, or of some soning upon which they were founded must one representing the public, were local in always receive careful consideration and this sense,-that they were only cognizable might be conclusive. The court appealed to and punishable in the country where they must determine for itself, in the first place, were committed. Accordingly no proceed the substance of the right sought to be ening, even in the shape of a civil suit, which forced; and, in the second place, whether its had for its object the enforcement by the enforcement would, either directly or indi. state, whether directly or indirectly, of pun rectly, involve the execution of the penal law ishment imposed for such breaches by the lex of another state. Were any other principle loci, ought to be admitted in the courts of to guide its decision, a court might find itself any other country. In its ordinary accepta in the position of giving effect in one case, os tion, the word “penal' might embrace penal and denying effect in another, to suits of the ties for infractions of general law, which did same character, in consequence*of the causes* not constitute oftenses against the state; it of action having arisen in different countries, miglit, for many leg:il purposes, be applied or in the predicament of being constrained to with perfect propriety to penalties created give effect to laws which were, in its own by contract; and it, therefore, when taken by judgment, strictly penal." itself, failed to inurk that distinction between In this view, that the question is not one of civil rights and criminal wrongs which was local, but of international, law, we fully conthe very essence of the international rule."
The test is not by what name the stat. After observing that, in the opinion of the ute is called by the legislature or the courts judicial committee, the first passage anore of the state in which it was passed, but quoted from Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., whether it appears, to the tribunal which is 127 U. S. 265, 290, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370, “dis called upon to enforce it, to be, in its essen. closed the proper test for as ertaining wheth ti:il character and effect, a punishment of an er an action was penal, within the meaning offense against the public, or a grant of a civil of tlie rule," he added: “A proceeding, in or right to a private person. der to come within the scope of the rule. In this country, the question of internamust be in the nature of a suit in favor of tional law must be determined in the first in