office, during the intervals between his trips, in such manner as the postmaster directed, but not as a clerk.

It is not stated in the findings that the claimant was so employed as a clerk, nor does it appear what the duties of a clerk in the post office in question were, but merely that, during the time covered by the claim, there were nine carriers and three clerks employed in that post office. It is also found, by finding 4, that the carriers remonstrated against the performance of work not connected with their duties as carriers, but that the postmaster held that, under the regulations, he could use them in that service, and therefore required them to perform it. This, in view of the provision of section 647 of the regulations, is substantially a finding that they were not employed as clerks.

The whole contention on the part of the United States amounts to this: That the court of claims has substantially found that none of the extra work for which compensation is claimed was incident to the general duties of the claimant as a letter carrier, and that the statute in regard to extra service relates exclusively to that which is connected with the general duties of the claimant as a letter carrier, and not to compensation for extra service, when he is not employed for eight hours a day in the performance of his general duties as a letter carrier.

The statute of 1888 provides that eight hours shall constitute a day's work "for letter carriers" in cities or postal districts connected therewith. It does not state what duties the letter carriers shall perform during such day's work, but merely that they shall receive for such day's work of eight hours the same pay that was then paid for a day's work of a greater number of hours. It further provides that, if a letter carrier is employed a greater number of hours per day than eight, he shall be paid extra for such greater number of hours in proportion to the salary fixed by law for his compensation. This extra pay is given to him by the statute, distinctly, for his being employed a greater number of hours per day than eight. The statute does not say how he must be employed, or of what such employment is to consist. It is necessary only that he should be a letter carrier, and be lawfully employed in work that is not inconsistent with his general business under his employment as a letter carrier. The employment authorized by section 647 of the regulations is defined to be an employment in the post office in such manner as the postmaster may direct, during the intervals between the carrier's trips in delivering and collecting mail matter, provided that he be not employed in the post office as a clerk therein.

The court of claims, in its opinion, arrived at the following conclusions: (1) That the letter carriers were entitled to recover, not only for all work done by them on the street, in delivering and collecting mail matter, but

also for all work done in the post office, in receiving and arranging the letters of their routes; (2) that as to the distribution of mail matter for the boxes and general delivery, as found in finding 3, during the times intervening between one trip and another in the same day, the regulations of the department set forth in finding 5 could properly be construed as permitting such services; and (3) that as to the services of the same character rendered after the termination of the last trip for the day of the carrier in delivering and collecting mail matter, they were services fairly within the power of the postmaster to prescribe.

We are of opinion that, in respect of all such services, the letter carrier, if employed therein a greater number of hours than eight per day, was entitled to be paid extra. To hold otherwise would be to say that the carrier was employed contrary to the regulations of the department, when it clearly appears that he was employed in accordance with such regulations. The statute was manifestly one for the benefit of the carriers, and it does not lie in the mouth of the government to contend that the employment in question was not extra service, and to be paid for as such, when it appears that the United States, in accordance with the regulations of the post-office department, actually employed the letter carriers the extra number of hours per day, and it is not found that they were so employed as clerks. The postmaster was the agent of the United States to direct the employment, and, if the letter carriers had not obeyed the orders of the postmaster, they could have been dismissed. They did not lose their legal rights under the statute by obeying such orders. Judgment affirmed.

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1888, he was a letter carrier in the post office at the city of New York, of the class entitled to a salary of $1,000 a year; that during that period he was, from time to time, actually and necessarily employed in excess of eight hours a day, in the performance of the duties assigned to him as such carrier, aggregating a specified excess; that by the act of May 24, 1888, (set forth in case No. 1,061, U. S. v. Post, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567, just decided,) he became entitled to extra pay for all the time during which he was so employed in excess of eight hours a day; that he had applied to the post-office department for payment, and it had not been paid; and that he claimed judgment for a specified amount, besides costs. A traverse of the petition was filed July 14, 1891, and the case was heard by the court of claims, which, on the evidence, found the facts to be as follows:

(1) The claimant was, during the months of May, June, and July, 1888, a letter carrier of the first class, salary $1,000 a year, in the city of New York, in the state of New York.

"(2) From May 24, 1888, to July 31, 1888, he was actually and necessarily employed, in the performance of his duties, more than eight hours a day, the excess over such eight hours being as follows:

"(3) For the said period of time, claimant performed only fifteen hours of service on the ten Sundays, and four hours and thirty minutes on Decoration day, and the same time on the 4th day of July."

On such findings of fact the court found, as a conclusion of law, that Gates was entitled to recover for the 165 hours and 9 minutes of extra work performed by him, without being required to deduct therefrom the deficit of less than 8 hours a day worked on Sundays and holidays, as shown by finding 3, amounting, at 34.2 cents per hour, to $56.48; and for that amount a judgment was entered for him, to review which the United States has appealed.

In the opinion of the court of claims, reported in 27 Ct. Cl. 244, 259, it is stated that No. 1,061, U. S. v. Post, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567, (just decided,) embraced, with a single exception, all the questions presented by the present case, No. 1,060, besides many more questions, and that No. 1,060 presented one question which was not presented in the other case. That question is stated in the opinion as follows: "On week days the carriers were employed more than eight hours, but on Sundays less, and the deficit of the latter nearly equals the excess of the former. The post-office department, by its circular Feb

""The time necessarily consumed in the performance of the service between "Report for duty" and "End of duty" is the "actual time" to be allowed, and the interim between de liveries is the carrier's own time, and cannot in any case be charged against the United States.'

"The carrier's eight-hour law declares 'that hereafter eight hours shall constitute a day's work,' but it allows compensation to continue in the form of an annual salary, and requires no deduction to be made if the duties of the day do not extend through the prescribed time. It also declares that, if any letter carrier is employed a greater number of hours per day than eight, he shall be paid extra for the same.' To sustain the interpretation given to the act by the department, it will be necessary to read in it, by construction, the words 'on an average,' i. e. if any letter carrier is employed on an average a greater number of hours per day than eight, he shall be paid extra for the same. This the court is not at liberty to do. The carrier is entitled to eight hours' work, and to his pay if work is not furnished to him. For any excess on any day he is entitled to extra pay. The only set-off that can be maintained is when he is absent from duty without leave. The department is at liberty to keep a carrier employed eight hours every day, but not to give him a deficit of work one day and an excess another."

In the brief of the solicitor general in the present case, it is stated that in his opinion the decision of the court of claims was correct; that he is prevented from dismissing the appeal only by the fact that another department of the government has differed from that view, and declines to follow it until the question is decided authoritatively by this court; and that justice to the letter carriers seems, therefore, to require that the case be submitted to this court for its deter mination, which he does without argument.

The conclusions which we have reached in No. 1,061 cover the same questions arising in this case which are presented in that; and, as the appellant does not challenge the decision of the court of claims as to the question presented in this case which is not presented in No. 1,061, it is sufficient to say that we concur with the views of that court, above stated, as to that question.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the decision of this case.

(148 U. S. 157)

SUPREME

In re SCHNEIDER. (March 14, 1893.)

COURT JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES-ERROR TO SUPREME COURT OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The supreme court of the United States has no jurisdiction to review on writ of error a judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia in general terms affirming a judgment of the trial court sentencing a prisoner to death for murder. Cross v. U. S., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842, 145 U. S. 571, followed.

Petition on behalf of Howard J. Schneider for the allowance of a writ of error to the supreme court of the District of Columbia, to review a judgment of that court affirming a judgment of the trial court convicting said Schneider of murder, and imposing sentence of death. Denied.

Jeremiah M. Wilson, William F. Mattingly, and A. A. Hoehling, Jr., for petitioner.

* Mr. Chief Justice FULLER. The application for a writ of error or appeal is denied upon the authority of Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22; In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615; In re Cross, 146 U. S. 271, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 109; Cross v. U. S., 145 U. S. 571, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842. See, also, Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398; Dennison v. Alexander, 103 U. S. 522; U. S. v. Wanamaker, 147 U. S. 149, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279.

(118 U. S. 162)

In re SCHNEIDER.
(March 14, 1893.)

HABEAS CORPUS-WHEN ISSUED ERROR IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS.

The fact that, in a capital case, the prisoner exhausted his peremptory challenges, and the court overruled his challenges for cause, so that, as he avers, he was deprived of a trial by an impartial jury, as guarantied by the constitution of the United States, is not a matter affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court, but is mere matter of error, and hence is no ground for issuing a writ of habeas corpus.

Application on behalf of Howard J. Schneider for leave to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari to release him from the custody of Jerome B. Burke, warden of the jail of the District of Columbia, by whom he was held under

sentence of death for murder, imposed by the supreme court of the District. Denied. The ground of the application was, in substance, that the petitioner had been denied the right, guarantied by the constitution of the United States, of a trial by an impartial jury. This charge was founded upon the allegation that the prisoner exhausted his peremptory challenges, and that his challenges for cause were overruled by the court in the case of certain jurors, after examination on their voir dire, and that such jurors sat at the trial. The examination of such jurors was set out in full in the petition.

Jeremiah M. Wilson, Wiliam F. Mattingly, and A. A. Hoehling, Jr., for petitioner.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER. Leave to file' petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari is denied. The ground of the application does not go to the jurisdiction or authority of the supreme court of the District, and mere error cannot be reviewed in this proceeding. Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S 417, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672.

1. Under the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, (26 St. at Large, p. 131,) a federal circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a decision of the board of general appraisers upon a question involving merely the valuation, and not the classification or rate of duty on imported merchandise. 50 Fed. Rep. 788, affirmed.

2. It was within the competency of congress to provide by the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, (26 St. at Large, p. 131,) that the decision of the board of general appraisers should be final as to the dutiable valu ation of merchandise.

3. When the valuation of imported merchandise, as fixed by the board of general appraisers, exceeds by more than 10 per cent. the value declared in the entry, it is the duty of the collector, under the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, § 7, (26 St. at Large, p. 131,) as matter of mere computation to levy an additional sum equal to 2 per cent. of the total appraised value for each 1 per cent. by which the appraised exceeds the declared value.

4. Such additional duty is a legal incident to the decision of the board of general appraisers, and where the importer has full notice of the proceedings before the board, and ample opportunity to be heard on the question of the market value of the goods, the levy and collection of the additional duty is not a deprivation of property without due process of law, nor is the importer subjected to a penalty without notice or opportunity to be heard.

5. Under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, (26 St. at Large, p. 827,) on appeal from a decree of a circuit court dismissing an application for a review of the decision of the board of general appraisers as to the valuation of imported merchandise as provided for in the cus

166

toms administrative act of June 10, 1890, (26 St. at Large, p. 131,) the supreme court can consider only the question of the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

Proceeding by Passavant & Co. to review a decision of the board of general appraisers sustaining the action of the collector of the port of New York in fixing the valuation of certain imported merchandise. A motion to dismiss the application for a review was granted. 50 Fed. Rep. 788. The importers appeal. Affirmed.

Edwin B. Smith, for appellants. Asst. Atty. Gen. Parker, for the United States.

under paragraph 458 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890; and, in addition thereto, a further sum equal to 2 per cent. of the total appraised value for each 1 per cent. that such appraised value exceeded the value declared in the entry, under and by virtue of section 7 of said act of June 10, 1890, which provides and directs that "if the appraised value of any article of imported merchandise shall exceed by more than ten per centum the value declared in the entry, there shall be levied, collected, and paid, in addition to the duties imposed by law on such merchandise, a further sum equal to two per centum of the total appraised value for each one per centum that such appraised value exceeds the value declared in the entry; and the additional duties shall only

The principal question presented by the record in this case is whether, under the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, (26 St. at Large, p. 131,) the circuit courts of the United States have any jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by importers from a decision of the board of general appraisers as to the dutiable value of imported merchandise; in other words, whether the circuit courts of the United States have, under the provisions of said act, any authority or jurisdiction, on the application of dissatisfied Importers, to review and reverse a decision of a board of general appraisers, ascertaining and fixing the dutiable value of imported goods, when such board has acted in pursuance of law, and without fraud, or other misconduct, from which bad faith could be implied.

The material facts of the case on which this question arises are the following: In November, 1890, and July, 1891, the appellants, Passavant & Co., imported into New York from France gloves of different classes or grades, which were entered by the importers at certain valuations. The collector of the port of New York, under the authority conferred by section 10 of said administrative act, caused the imported goods to be appraised, and upon such appraisal their value was advanced or increased by the appraiser to an amount exceeding by more than 10 per cent. the value thereof as declared by the importers upon entry. The importers being dissatisfied with this advanced valuation, a reappraisement was made by one of the general appraisers, and on further objection by the importers to this valuation, the matter was sent to the board of general appraisers, under and in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the customs administrative act. This board, after due notice and examination of the question submitted, sustained the increased valuation of the merchandise. Thereupon the collector of the port levied and assessed upon the imported goods a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem, that being the rate of duty on the gloves

each invoice which are undervalued."

The importers duly served upon the collector a protest against his appraisement of duty for any and all excess above 50 per cent. ad valorem, and upon any greater value than the declared or entered value, for the alleged reasons that no legal reappraisement had been made; that the board of appraisers had declined to receive or entertain evidence offered by them as to the true market value of the merchandise; that the board had determined matters upon estimates or values furnished by agents of the treasury; that evidence of persons who were not experts, and had no personal knowledge of the value of gloves in the markets of France, had been taken and acted on; that the importers were given no opportunity to controvert evidence against them; that the original invoice was correct; that the duties should not be assessed upon any greater amount, and that the action of the board was in all respects illegal. The collector duly transmitted this protest, with the papers in the case, to the board of general appraisers, who adhered to the increased valuation, affirmed the action of the collector, and held that the decision of the board as to such valuation was final and conclusive under section 13 of said act of June 10, 1890, and could not be impeached or reviewed upon protest. Thereupon, and within due time, the importers filed their application in the United States circuit court for the southern district of New York for a review of the case, and a reversal of the decision of the board of appraisers and the action of the collector in assessing the duties on the basis of the increased valuation placed upon the imported merchandise, and in imposing the additional duty as provided by section 7, above referred to.

The petitioners, in their application, set forth and complained of many alleged errors of law and fact on the part of the board of general appraisers, which need not be specially noticed, as they were manifestly not well founded, and have been abandoned. The board of general appraisers, in pursuance of

the usual order in such cases, returned to the circuit court the record and evidence taken by them, together with a certified statement of the facts involved in the case, and their decision thereon, etc. From this return it appeared that the proceedings as to the appraisement of the merchandise and the determination of their dutiable value were in all respects regular; that the board of appraisers duly examined and decided the case after fixing a day and giving reasonable notice thereof to the importers, who were allowed the opportunity to introduce evidence, and to be heard on the matter submitted. It is stated in the opinion of the board, which forms part of said return, that "the appellants were served with reasonable notice of these several hearings after a day fixed therefor, and were cited to appear before this board, and offer evidence to sustain the contentions of fact alleged as the grounds of their protest. This they failed to do, and the board accordingly adjudges all of said issues against them as confessedly untrue. The decision of the collector in each case is affirmed."

Upon the record as thus presented the assistant United States attorney moved the court to dismiss the application or appeal for want of jurisdiction to entertain the same. This motion was sustained, and the circuit court thereupon certified to this court, under the fifth section of the act of March 3, 1891, (26 St. at Large, p. 827,) the question whether said court had any jurisdiction to enter upon, hear, and decide the issues sought to be raised by the allegations of the petition, which are specially set out in the certificate, but need not be here enumerated, as they are embraced in the two general claims or propositions, hereinafter stated, which are relied on by appellants before this court.

In addition to the certification of the question of jurisdiction, the circuit court, upon dismissing the petition allowed the importers an appeal from the order or judgment of dismissal, which was taken. But this appeal, although general in form, does not and could not bring up for review anything more than the question of jurisdiction certified by the lower court. An ordinary appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court lies, since the act of March 3, 1891, to the court of appeals, and not to this court. Hubbard v. Soby, 146 U. S.*56, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13. The certificate and the appeal, therefore, present substantially the same question, and need not, for that reason, be separately considered. It is not claimed or alleged in either the protests made by the importers as to the appraisement of the merchandise or in their application to the circuit court to review and reverse the decision of the board of general appraisers, that there was any wrongful or erroneous classification of the gloves, or improper rate of duty levied thereon, under the tariff act of October 1, 1890; but the substantial complaint is that the dutiable

value of the imported goods was not greater than the value mentioned in the invoice and declared in the entry, and that the advanced appraisement was, therefore, erroneous, and also that the merchandise was not liable for any additional or penal duty such as the collector levied and imposed thereon under section 7 of the act of June 10, 1890, by reason of the advanced or increased valuation placed upon the same by the appraisers.

Can a complaint of this character be entertained and considered by the circuit courts of the United States in a case like the present, where the board of general appraisers has, upon the appeal of the importers, ascertained and decided that the imported article actually possesses a value greater than that stated in the invoice or entry? Can the decision of the board on the question of the dutiable value of the merchandise be reviewed by the courts under the provisions of section 15 of the customs administrative act? This is the real question presented, and we are clearly of the opinion that no such jurisdiction is conferred by this statute, or any other provision of law. It is provided by section 15 of the act "that if the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of any imported merchandise, or the collector, or the secretary of the treasury, shall be dissatisfied with the decision of the board of general appraisers, as provided for in section 14 of this act, as to the construction of the law and the facts respecting the classification of such merchandise, and the rate of duty imposed thereon under such classification, they, or either of them, may, within thirty days next after such decision, and not afterwards, apply to the circuit court of the United States within the district in which the mat-* ter arises for a review of the questions of law and fact involved in such decision."

It was said by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the court in Ex parte Fassett, 142 U. S. 479-487, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295, that "the appeal provided for in section 15 [of said act] brings up for review in court only the decision of the board of general appraisers as to the construction of the law, and the facts respecting the classification of imported merchandise, and the rate of duty imposed thereon under such classification. It does not bring up for review the question or whether an article is imported merchandise or not, nor, under section 15, is the ascer tainment of that fact such a decision as is provided for. The decision of the collector from which appeals are provided for by section 14 are only decisions as to 'the rate and amount' of duties charged upon imported merchandise, and decisions as to dutiable costs and charges, and decisions as to fees and exactions of whatever character."

The appeal to the court in the present case seeks to review no such decisions as are thus enumerated as falling within its jurisdiction under said sections. On the contrary, the