the ship arrived at that place the convoy had sailed. Stevenson v. Snow, 3 Burr. 1237; 1 W. Bl. 318.

The defendant having paid the amount of premium into court, the plaintiff afterwards obtained a verdict on the policy for a sum less than the sum assured: the court directed that judgment should be entered only for the amount of the verdict, less the sum taken out of court. Carr v. Montefiore, 5 B. & S. 941; 34 L. J., Q. B. 21.

Life Insurance.

Many of the cases and authorities on marine policies apply equally to policies on lives and against fire; but, the contract of life assurance is, in consideration of a lump sum or of periodical payments, to pay a sum certain upon the death of a given life, and is not a contract of indemnity, like that of marine and fire policies. The pleadings sufficiently point out the nature of the required evidence.

Form of policy.] It does not appear ever to have been decided that an agreement for life insurance need be expressed in a policy or reduced to writing. The statute 14 Geo. 3. c. 48, s. 2, enacts that it shall not be lawful to make any policy on the life of any person or other event, without inserting in such policy the person's name interested therein, or for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy is so made or underwrote. The Stamp Act, 1870, s. 118 (which replaced the earlier statute, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, s. 6), requires every person, receiving or taking credit for any premium or consideration for any contract of insurance, to make out and execute a stamped policy of such insurance, within one calendar month from the receipt of the premium, under a penalty of 50l. This section was passed for the better securing the payment of the stamp duty, and rather negatives the idea that 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, supra, was intended to avoid agreements for life insurance not in writing.

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), s. 11, "A married woman may, by virtue of the power of making contracts hereinbefore contained, effect a policy upon her own life, or the life of her husband for her separate use, and the same and all benefit thereof shall enure accordingly. A policy of insurance effected by any man on his own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of his wife or of his children, or of his wife and children or any of them, or by any woman on her own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of her husband, or of her children, or of her husband and children, or any of them, shall create a trust in favour of the objects therein named, and the moneys payable under any such policy shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the insured, or be subject to his or her debts." The section enables the insured to appoint a trustee or new trustees of the policy by a memorandum in writing and the receipt of a trustee duly appointed, or in default of notice to the office, the receipt of the legal personal representative of the insured shall be a discharge to the office. See Holt v. Everall, 2 Ch. D. 266 C. A.; In re Adam's Policy Trusts, 23 Ch. D. 525, decided on 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, s. 10.

As to stamp duties, vide ante, p. 247.

Assignment of policy.] The Policies of Assurance Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 144), s. 1, enacts that "any person or corporation now being or hereafter," vide post, p. 409 " becoming entitled by assignment or other derivative title to a policy of life assurance, and possessing, at the time of action brought, the

Assignment of Policy.-Interest.

409 right in equity to receive and the right to give an effectual discharge to the assurance company, liable under such policy, for monies thereby assured or secured, shall be at liberty to sue at law in the name of such person or corporation to recover such monies."

By sect. 3, no assignment made after the passing of this Act" (20th August, 1867), "of a policy of life assurance shall confer on the assignee therein named, his executors, administrators, or assigns, any right to sue for the amount of such policy, or the monies assured or secured thereby, until a written notice of the date and purport of such assignment shall have been given to the assurance company liable under such policy at their principal place of business for the time being, or, in case they have two or more principal places of business, then at some one of such principal places of business, either in England or Scotland or Ireland, and, the date on which such notice shall be received, shall regulate the priority of all claims under any assignment; and, a payment, bona fide made, in respect of any policy, by any assurance company, before the date on which such notice shall have been received, shall be as valid, against the assignee giving such notice, as if this Act had not been passed.'

By sect. 4, assurance companies are, in policies issued after 30th of September, 1867, to specify the principal place or places of business at which notices of assignment may be given.

By sect. 6, every assurance company, to whom notice of the assignment of any policy shall have been duly given, shall deliver an acknowledgment in writing, under the hand of the manager, secretary, treasurer, or other principal officer of the assurance company, of their receipt of such notice; and every such written acknowledgment, if signed by a person, being de jure or de facto, the manager, &c., of the assurance company whose acknowledgment it purports to be, shall be conclusive evidence, as against such assurance company, of their having duly received the notice to which such acknowledgment relates.

An agreement for assignment is not an assignment within this Act. Spencer v. Clarke, 9 Ch. D. 137.

The J. Act, 1873, s. 25 (6), ante, p. 282, contains a general provision with reference to the assignment of choses in action.

Interest.] By stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, ss. 1, 2, a policy on lives or other events is unlawful and void, unless the person on whose account the insurance is made has an interest, and the name of the person interested, or for whose use or benefit, or on whose account, it is made, be inserted therein. If A., having no interest in B.'s life, causes him to effect an insurance in his own name, but at A.'s expense, and for A.'s benefit, this is a fraudulent evasion, and the policy is void under sect. 1. Wainewright v. Bland, 1 M. & Rob. 481; Shilling v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., 2 H. & N. 42; 26 L. J., Ex. 266. See also S. C., 27 L. J., Ex. 16. Every one is presumed to have an insurable interest in his own life, and if he insures, whether for life or a limited time, his executor is not bound to show any interest beyond this. Wainewright v. Bland, supra. So, it is said, where a wife insures her husband's life. Reed v. R. Exch. Assur. Co., Peake, Add. Ca. 70; and now see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 11, ante, p. 408. But, where a wife was entitled to a legacy on attaining 21, and her husband insured her life in her name, to secure the amount of the legacy, which was then advanced to him, it was held that the policy was void, as it did not state that the husband was the person having the present interest therein; although the ultimate benefit might be for the wife. Evans v. Bignold, L. R., 4 Q. B. 622. A creditor has an insurable interest in his debtor's life. Anderson v. Edie, Park Ins., 8th ed. 914-15. And, in general, the interest which the insurer is required

to have in the life of the assured, under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 1, must be a pecuniary interest; and therefore, the insurance by a father in his own name on the life of his son, without any pecuniary interest in it, is void. Halford v. Kymer, 10 B. & C. 724. As to what is sufficient pecuniary interest, see Hebden v. West, infra. If a father, being engaged in a hazardous employment, agrees with his son, that the father will insure his life and the son pay the premiums, and that the father shall leave the sum insured to his son by will, semble, per Martin and Bramwell, BB., that the insurance would be the father's and valid. Shilling v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., 2 H. & N. 42; 26 L. J., Ex. 266.

By sect. 3, a person who insures the life of another, or any other event, can recover from the insurer or insurers no greater sum than the amount or value of his interest in such life or event. The interest referred to is the interest at the time of making the policy, and this amount is recoverable whether the interest ceased or not before the death, or, has been satisfied aliunde. Dalby v. India and L. Assur. Co., 15 C. B. 365; 24 L. J., C. P. 2; in the Ex. Ch., overruling Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East, 72. Law v. L. Indisputable Policy Co., 1 K. & J. 223; 24 L. J., Ch. 196, is to the same effect. But, by this section, the assured can in no case recover more than this insurable interest, whether upon one policy or many; and if he has already received that amount on other policies, this is an answer to an action. Hebden v. West, 3 B. & S. 579; 32 L. J., Q. B. 85.

The assignee of a life policy is not within the Act, and need not show any interest other than the original one on which the policy is founded. Ashley v. Ashley, 3 Sim. 149.

Damages.] As to damages in the nature of interest under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 29, vide ante, p. 404.

Defence.

The general observations made, ante, p. 404, with respect to defences to actions on Policies of Marine Insurance, will apply here.

Misrepresentation.] The assured usually subscribes a declaration answering facts inquired of by the insurers, and it is made a condition that if any be untruly answered the policy is to be void; in such case the policy is avoided though there be no intentional untruth; Duckett v. Williams, 2 Cr. & M. 348; Macdonald v. Law, &c. Insur. Co., L. R., 9 Q. B. 228; and, though the mis-statement is found by the jury to be immaterial: for as the basis of the contract is the truth of the representation, its materiality is not in question, and ought not to be left to the jury. Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L. C. 484; Cazenove v. British Equitable Assur. Co., 6 C. B., N. S. 437; 28 L. J., C. P. 259. See British Equitable Assur. Co. v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., 17 W. R. 43, M. T., 1868, Malins, V.-C. If there is such express condition on the policy, yet material and fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation, though the inquiry and statement be oral, will also avoid it. Wainewright v. Bland, 1 M. & W. 32; 1 M. & Rob. 481. But, mere representations or statements, which turn out untrue, will not avoid a life policy (as in some cases they do a marine policy), unless the policy purports to be based upon their truth, or there be fraud. Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 E. & B. 232; 26 L. J., Q. B. 265 ; 8 E. & B. 285 ; 27 L. J., Q. B. 241,. Ex. Ch. See Fowkes v. Manchester and London Assur. Association, 3 B. & S. 917; 32 L. J., Q. B. 153. If there be an untrue statement without fraud, and the policies of a company are expressed to be "indisputable except in case of fraud," the company will, in equity, be estopped from relying on the mis-statement; and this may be

Defence.-Misrepresentation.-Suicide.

411

specially replied to the defence. Wood v. Dwarris, 11 Exch. 493; 25 L. J., Ex. 129. But, where the policy is issued by a company, which circulates a prospectus purporting that their policies are indisputable, a reply, relying on this fact, must be supported by proof, that the prospectus had been seen, or acted upon by the insured; and, the mere proof of the public circulation of the prospectus, before the policy was effected, is not sufficient. Wheelton v. Hardisty, ante, p. 410. The omission to state that the deceased had any occupation, in answer to questions in the proposal, any misstatement or concealment in which was to vitiate the policy, is not such an untrue statement as to vitiate the policy. Perrins v. Marine & General Insur. Society, 2 E. & E. 317, 324; 29 L. J., Q. B. 17, 242. But, the omission to state, that proposals for insurance were made to, and declined by, other insurance offices was held to vitiate a contract for insurance. London Assur. v. Mansel, 11 Ch. D. 363. The person whose life is the subject of insurance by another has been held to be so far an agent for the assured that his false answers will vitiate the policy. Rawlins v. Desborough, 2 M. & Rob. 328, and note, Id. 334. But this case turned on the form of the particular policy; and, the false and fraudulent statements of the person whose life is insured, and of the medical referee, will not vitiate the policy, as against an innocent person, who effected the insurance, there being no condition, that the untruth of the statement, contained in the proposal, should avoid the policy. Wheelton v. Hardisty, Ex. Ch., supra.

Suicide.] Clauses, avoiding a policy if the person, whose life is insured, "commits suicide," or "dies by his own hands," are construed to include all voluntary self-destruction, though not felonious; and consequently the unsoundness of the person's mind is not material. Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Dormay v. Borradaile, 5 C. B. 380. Where the policy was conditioned to be valid, notwithstanding suicide, to the extent of any bona fide interest acquired by any person, by virtue of an equitable lien or security on it, on proof of such interest, to the satisfaction of the directors of the company: proof of the policy, being held by the trustees of the wife of the assured, by way of marriage settlement, was held to support the alleged lien. Moore v. Woolsey, 4 E. & B. 243; 24 L. J., Q. B. 40. Proof of the above facts was reasonable evidence for the directors, by which they were bound to be satisfied. S. C.; see also Braunstein v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., infra. The clause is, in the absence of fraud, for the benefit of the assured. Solicitors & General Life Assur. Soc. v. Lamb, 1 H. & M. 716; 33 L. J., Ch. 426. So, where the policy is mortgaged to the society, they are in the same position as if it had been mortgaged to a third party. White v. British Empire, &c. Assur. Co., L. R., 7 Eq. 394. But, the assignees of the assured under a foreign bankruptcy, are not within the condition in a policy that it should be valid, notwithstanding suicide, if any third party had acquired a bona fide interest therein by assignment, or by legal or equitable lien for a valuable consideration, or as a security for money. Jackson v. Forster, 1 E. & E. 463; 28 L. J., Q. B. 166; 1 E. & E. 470; 29 L. J., Q. B. 8, Ex. Ch.

Insurance against Personal Accidents.

In a policy of insurance effected against injury caused by accident or violence, provided the same should be caused by some outward and visible means, of which satisfactory proof should be furnished to the insurers, is meant such proof as the insurers may reasonably require, and not such as they may capriciously demand. Braunstein v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., 1 B. & S. 782; 31 L. J., Q. B. 17. See Moore v. Woolsey, supra, Trew v. Ry. Passengers' Assur. Co., 6 H. & N. 839; 30 L. J., Ex. 317, Ex.

and

Ch. Where there was an exception in the policy, of death from certain specified diseases, or any other disease or cause within the system of the assured before or at the time or following such accidental injury; it was held that one of the specified diseases brought on, solely by the accident, was not within the exception. Fitton v. Accidental Death Insur. Co., 17 C. B. N. S. 122; 34 L. J., C. P. 28. Where, however, the exception extends to secondary causes, the insurers are not liable. Smith v. Accident Insur. Co., L. R., 5 Ex. 302. Where the policy excepted injury caused by natural disease or weakness, or exhaustion consequent on disease, and the assured while fording a stream was seized with an epileptic fit and fell into the stream and was drowned, this was held not to be within the exception. Winspear v. Accident Insur. Co., 6 Q. B. D. 42, C. A.; see also Lawrence v. Accidental Insur. Co., 7 Q. B. D. 216.

Death by sunstroke is not a death from the effects of an injury by accident. Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers' Assur. Co., 3 E. & E. 478; 30 L. J. Q. B. 77.

As to stamp duties, vide ante, p. 247.

Fire Insurance.

The fundamental principle of fire insurance is that like an open marine policy, it is a contract of indemnity. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 380, C. A.

Policies of fire insurance are within the stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, cited ante, pp. 408, 409. As to their form, vide ante, p. 408. A fire policy was not generally assignable, at law, except with the consent of the insurer. 3 Kent, Com. 375; Park Ins., 8th ed. 978; but, this is now altered by the J. Act, 1873, s. 25 (6), ante, p. 282. Where the policy requires particulars of loss to be delivered by the plaintiff, within a certain time of the fire, it is a condition precedent. Mason v. Harvey, 8 Exch. 819; 22 L. J., Ex. 336. See Fearnley v. L. Guarantee Co., 5 Ap. Ca. 911, D. P. As to whom the notice of loss may be given under a similar clause see Marsden v. City & County Assur. Co., L. R., 1 C. P. 232. Fire policies are sometimes so framed as to be covenants to pay only an adjusted loss; in such case before adjustment no action can be maintained on the policy. Elliott v. R. Exchange Assur. Co., L. R., 2 Ex. 237. A policy from August 14th to November 14th was held to include the latter day, on which a fire took place. Isaacs v. R. Insur. Co., L. R., 5 Ex. 296.

As to interim receipts for premiums which are analogous to slips in marine insurance, vide ante, p. 249. See Parsons v. Queen Insur. Co., 7 Ap. Ca. 96, P. C.

As to stamp duties, vide ante, p. 247.

Interest.] Vide ante, p. 409. It is necessary to show an interest in the subject insured at the time of insuring and of the fire. Lynch v. Dalzell, 4 Bro. P. C., 2nd ed. 431; Saddlers' Co. v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554. The unpaid vendor of a house may recover the full value thereof, if it be burnt before the conveyance is executed, though after the contract of sale. Collingridge v. R. Exchange Assur. Co., 3 Q. B. D. 173. This interest need not be the absolute property; thus, an insolvent might insure a house, &c., to which his assignees were entitled, he being in possession and responsible to the real owners. Marks v. Hamilton, 7 Exch. 323; 21 L. J., Ex. 109. Warehousemen and wharfingers may insure their customer's goods in their custody, and may recover the whole value under a policy on goods "held in trust or on commission." Waters v. Monarch Assur. Co., 5 E. & B. 870; 25 L. J.,