Kearney v. King, 2 B. & A. 303; sed quære? for this appears in several Acts of Parliament. Though the courts took judicial notice of the articles of war which were printed by the King's printer (Bradley v. Arthur, 4 B. & C. 304; R. v. Withers, cited 5 T. R. 446), and are now bound to do so by the Mutiny Act, yet the book called Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Army" will not be noticed. Bradley v. Arthur, supra.

The courts would not formerly notice the seal or proceedings of a foreign court; Henry v. Adey, 3 East, 221; Ganer v. Lanesborough, Lady, Peake, 17; but this is altered by the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 7, cited post, p. 95.

The courts are bound to take notice of the law and privilege of the Stannaries; Co. Litt. 11 b; Gaved v. Martyn, 19 C. B., Ñ. S. 732, 757; 34 L. J., C. P. 353, 362, per Erle, C. J.

As to how far judicial notice will be taken of the custom of gavelkind and borough English, see Co. Litt. 175 b, (4); Robinson on Gavelkind, 41; Rider v. Wood, 1 Kay & J. 644; 24 L. J., Ch. 737; 1 Taylor, Evid. § 5. There are perhaps some other customs of which judicial notice would be taken, especially some of those in use amongst persons engaged in commerce. See Lethulier's case, 2 Salk. 443. In Brandão v. Barnett, 3 C. B. 519, the court took judicial notice of the lien of bankers on the securities of customers in their custody. Probably also judicial notice would, in some cases, be taken of the practice of solicitors. Shoreditch Vestry v. Hughes, 17 C. B., N. S. 137; 33 L. J., C. P. 349. In the case of In re Bodmin United Mines, 23 Beav. 370; 26 L. J., Ch. 570, Romilly, M. R., refused to take judicial notice of the nature of an association on the cost-book principle; but the constitution of these associations has since been recognised by the legislature in the Stannaries Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 19). A custom of which judicial notice is taken ought to be considered, not as a fact, but as part of the general law of the land; vide ante, pp. 23, 24.

The courts of the City of London will take judicial notice of the city customs; Com. Dig. London (N. 1), (N. 7); 1 Doug. 380, n.; and the Court of Quarter Sessions, of petty sessional divisions of a county. R. v. Whittles, 13 Q. B. 248.

Evidence of collateral fucts.] In general, evidence of collateral facts, not pertinent to the issue, is not admissible. Thus, where the question was whether beer supplied by plaintiff to the defendant was good, the plaintiff was not allowed to give evidence of the quality of beer supplied by him to other persons. Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391. In an action by indorsee against the acceptor of a bill who defends on the ground of forgery, evidence that the drawer suspected of the forgery has forged the defendant's name in other instances, is inadmissible. Balcetti v. Serani, Peake, 142; Griffits v. Payne, 11 Ad. & E. 131. See also Hollingham v. Head, 4 C. B., N. S. 338; 27 L. J., C. P. 241, ante, p. 76. But where a collateral fact is material to the proof of the issue joined between the parties, evidence of such fact is admissible. Thus in an action for work done and materials supplied to certain houses on the orders of a third person, the defendant denying that he is the owner of the house or the real principal, evidence is admissible to show that other persons had received orders from the defendant to do work at the same houses without showing that the plaintiff knew of these orders at the time he did the work. Woodward v. Buchanan, L. R., 5 Q. B. 285. So in an action by a rector for tithes, where the question is whether a modus exists of a certain sum of money for a particular farm in a township within the parish, the plaintiff may inquire whether other farms in the same township are not subject to the same payment, for the purpose of showing that such payments cannot be a farm modus. Blundell v. Howard,

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1 M. & S. 292. So proof of the local usage of trade, &c., may be material to explain a contract, or to disprove an alleged breach of it. Noble v. Kennoway, 2 Doug. 510. But the usage at Lloyd's is not evidence, unless the contract be made with reference to that usage. Gabay v. Lloyd, 3 B. & C. 793. In a case of libel, where the meaning is ambiguous, other similar libels on the plaintiff by the same defendant may be shown against him; see post, Action for defamation. Upon a question of skill and judgment, evidence may be given of facts, which, although in other respects collateral, are by means of the skill and judgment of the witness connected with, and tend to elucidate, the issue. Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157. See Opinion of Witness, when admissible, post, p. 165. Where the object of the evidence is to show the knowledge of the party with regard to the nature of a particular transaction, evidence of his having been engaged in other transactions of the same kind is admissible; thus, in cases of forgery and coining, proof that the prisoner has passed other forged notes, or other counterfeit coin, is constantly admitted. So also upon questions of intent, evidence of other transactions is admissible. In an action for bribery, evidence of other acts of bribery by the defendant at the same time and place is admissible to show the animus. Webb v. Smith, 4 N. C. 373. The seditious object of a meeting may be shown by the acts of similar meetings in other places convened by the same person. Redford v. Birley, 3 Stark. 93. In order to prove that the acceptor of a bill knew the payee to be a fictitious person, or that the drawer had a general authority from him to fill up bills with the name of a fictitious payee, evidence may be adduced that he had accepted other similar bills under circumstances that indicated such knowledge or authority. Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 288. Examples of the exclusion or admission of collateral facts might be multiplied to any extent; but it will be enough to add generally, that all proof of facts which merely tends to create an unjust prejudice, or unduly to influence the jury, or occupy the time of the court in irrelevant inquiries, is inadmissible; but if the proof be directly or inferentially pertinent to the issue, it will be admitted.

Evidence of rights in other manors and places.] As a general rule, proof of a customary right in a particular manor or parish is no evidence as to the customary right in an adjoining manor or parish. Somerset, Dk. of, v. France, 1 Stra. 661. But there are occasions on which such evidence is relevant. Thus, where there is proof that all the manors in a particular district are held under the same tenure, and a question arises in one of the manors as to an incident to the tenure, evidence may be given of the usage prevailing in the others. Ibid.; Champian v. Atkinson, 3 Keb. 90; R. v. Ellis, 1 M. & S. 662. So where in each of several detached manors called by the common name of "assessionable manors," and parcel of the possessions of an ancient earldom and duchy, it appeared that there was a peculiar class of tenants answering the same description, to whom tenements were granted by similar words, it was held that evidence of the mineral and other rights enjoyed by those tenants in one manor might be received to show what were their rights in another. Rowe v. Brenton, 8 B. & C. 758 (case of the duchy of Cornwall). But mere contiguity, or the identity of the leet or parish in which two manors are situate, or payment of a chief rent by one to the other, will not let in such evidence. Anglesey, Ms. of, v. Hatherton, Ld., 10 M. & W. 218. Where the question was, whether a slip of land between some old inclosures and the highway was vested in the lord of the manor or the owner of the adjoining freehold, it was held that evidence could not be received of acts of ownership by the lord of the manor on similar, but distinct, slips of land within the manor.

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Aliter, if the strips, though detached, could be regarded as part of a continuous tract of waste adjoining the same highway. Doe d. Barrett v. Kemp, 2 N. C. 102, Ex. Ch. And, even if the continuity be broken, it is a question for the jury whether such strips alongside the same road be not waste. Dendy v. Simpson, 18 C. B. 331. Where the question was as to the right to certain trees growing in a woody belt held entire and undivided under one title, evidence was admitted of acts of ownership in different parts of the belt. Stanley v. White, 14 East, 332. So acts of ownership in part of a wood, though unenclosed, or in part of a continuous fence, are evidence as to the whole. Jones v. Williams, 2 M. & W. 331. So where the plaintiff' claims the whole bed of a river between his land and the defendant's, acts of ownership over the river just below the defendant's land are admissible; and the evidence need not be confined to the precise spot of the trespass. Id. 336; Neill v. Duke of Devonshire, 8 Ap. Ca. 135, D. P. This principle applies also to the foreshore of a navigable tidal river. Ld. Advocate v. Ld. Blantyre, 4 Ap. Ca. 770, 791, D. P. So in the case of an inland non-tidal lake. Bristow v. Cormican, 3 Ap. Ca. 641, 670, per Ld. Blackburn. But in trespass by the proprietors of a canal, it was doubted whether evidence of acts of ownership by the proprietors on other parts of the banks than those in question was admissible to prove property without showing that they had belonged to one person; for the proprietors may have bought the freehold in one place and not in another; and, being unnecessary, there was no ground for presuming such a purchase in any place. Hollis v. Goldfinch, 1 B. & C. 205; Tyrwhitt v. Wynne, 2 B. & A. 554. In proof of the boundary between the manors A. and B., evidence is admissible of the boundary between A. and C., C. being a manor abutting on B., and separated from A. by a natural boundary (namely, a mountain ridge), which continued between A. and B. Brisco v. Lomax, 8 Ad. & E. 198. Under a lease of all minerals under a tract of waste land called M. mountain, working a mine under one part of it is evidence of possession of the whole subject of demise, so as to entitle the lessee to sue in trover for ore taken by a wrongdoer from any part of it. Taylor v. Parry, 1 M. & Gr. 604; Wild v. Holt, 9 M. & W. 672. Where the question was, whether a township, A., was liable to repair an ancient highway, the conviction of an adjoining township, B., for non-repair of the part situate in the latter, is evidence against A. that the highway situate in A. is also ancient. R. v. Brightside Bierlow, 13 Q. B. 933. Where the construction of the charters of the Duchy of Lancaster was in question, proof that under them coroners were always appointed in some parts of the Duchy was admitted to prove the like right of appointment in any part. Jewison v. Dyson, 9 M. & W. 540.

Evidence of damage.] By Rules, 1883, O. xxi., r. 4, ante, p. 73, damages unless expressly admitted are deemed to be put in issue. Evidence tending to increase or diminish the damage is, of course, admissible, though not expressly involved in the issue. Thus, in an action for breach of promise of marriage, plaintiff may give evidence of the defendant's fortune; for it obviously tends to prove the loss sustained by the plaintiff; but not in an action for adultery; James v. Biddington, 6 C. & P. 589; nor for seduction; Hodsoll v. Taylor, L. R., 9 Q. B. 79; nor for malicious prosecution for it is nothing to the purpose "that damages are taken from a deep pocket." Short v. Stoy, Winton Sum. As. 1836, per Alderson, B.

But special damage cannot be shown unless alleged in the statement of claim; and it must be alleged with certainty on the sufficiency of which the judge is to decide, who will require that the averment shall be so made as to enable the defendant to meet it by counter-evidence, if untrue. Thus, where, in an action for an irregular distress, it was averred that the plaintiff,

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in consequence of the injury, had lost divers lodgers, without naming any, Lord Ellenborough rejected evidence of the damage. Westwood v. Čowne, 1 Stark. 172. See further, Craft v. Boite, 1 Wms. Saund. 243 d, (5); Martin v. Henrickson, 2 Ld. Raym. 1007; and see post, Action for defamation. And now, Rules, 1883, O. xix., r. 15, ante, p. 72, require the plaintiff to allege all such facts as he relies on, as if not so alleged would be likely to take the defendant by surprise. But evidence of the amount of damage which is the necessary and obvious result of the defendant's breach of contract or tort may, it would seem, still be proved, though only alleged generally in the statement of claim. Thus formerly in an action for not giving plaintiff possession of premises demised to him by the defendant, plaintiff was allowed to show his consequent loss of business, though only alleged generally, and though the plaintiff's business was not mentioned in the pleadings. Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19. See also Rodgers v. Nowill, 5 C. B. 109.

Evidence of Character.] In general, in actions unconnected with character evidence as to the character of either of the parties to a suit is inadmissible, being foreign to the point in issue and only calculated to create prejudice. For the same reason, where particular acts of misconduct are imputed to a party, evidence of general character is excluded; but it is otherwise where general character is put in issue; Doe d. Farr v. Hicks, per Buller, J., cited 4 Esp. 51; Jones v. James, infra; 1 Taylor, Evid. §§ 328, 329; for evidence of bad character is admitted in some actions with a view to the amount of damages. Thus, in actions of crim. con., the defendant could adduce evidence of the wife's bad character for chastity, and even of particular acts of adultery committed by her before her intercourse with him; for, by bringing the action, the husband put her general behaviour in issue. B. N. P. 27, 296. So, in seduction, the defendant may show the previous bad character of the person seduced. See post, Action for seduction. But even in such cases, it has been held that the plaintiff cannot give evidence of the good character of the wife or daughter, until evidence has been offered on the other side to impeach it; Bamfield v. Massey, 1 Camp. 460; and if such evidence be not general, but go only to a specific instance, it has been ruled that the plaintiff cannot, in reply, give evidence of general character, but must be restricted to disproof of the specific instance. Ibid. ; Dodd v. Norris, 3 Camp. 519. So in an action for slander imputing dishonesty to the plaintiff, he cannot adduce evidence, in the first instance, of good character. Stuart v. Lovell, 2 Stark. 93; Cornwall v. Richardson, Ry. & M. 305. Where the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness has been directed to impeach the character of the plaintiff, and the witnesses deny the imputation intended, proof of the plaintiff's good character is not admissible. King v. Francis, 3 Esp. 116.

The practice, as reported in some of the above cases, which excludes the proof of general good character, where it is obviously attacked at the trial, though unsuccessfully, has been generally condemned by later text writers; and there are some authorities at N. P. for the admissibility of such testimony. See post, Actions for seduction and for defamation; and 1 Taylor, Evid. § 335.

In an action for breach of promise of marriage, where the defendant by his plea sets up a general charge of immodesty, the plaintiff may, in the first instance, give general evidence of good character for modesty and propriety of demeanour; though this could not be done in the case of a specific charge of immoral acts. Jones v. James, 18 L. T., N. S. 243; E. T. 1868, Ex. Where general character is in issue, evidence of general reputation is admissible. Foulkes v. Sellway, 3 Esp. 236.

As to evidence of character, in reference to the veracity of a witness, vide post, p. 173.

Plaintiff confined to his particulars.] The delivery of particulars of claim or defence in ordinary actions is now regulated by Rules, 1883, O. xix., rr. 6, 7, and particulars are now usually given in the pleadings. It would seem that the particulars indorsed on a writ of summons under O. iii., r. 6, will in the absence of other particulars be considered as particulars of demand, though the rule contains no express provision to that effect similar to that contained in the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 25.

Where the plaintiff has delivered particulars of his demand, he will be precluded from giving any evidence of demand not contained in them. But the plaintiff may recover more than his particulars demand, where it appears to be due on the defendant's own evidence; as where the defendant gave in evidence an account from which it appeared that there was a sum of money due to the plaintiff beyond that claimed in his particulars. Hurst v. Watkis, 1 Camp. 68. Accord. per Parke, B., in Fisher v. Wainwright, 1 M. & W. 486. See also Green v. Marsh, 5 Dowl. 669. A mistake in the particulars, not tending to mislead, is immaterial. The materiality of the variance is a question for the judge, subject to the opinion of the court above.

The particulars may be amended, even after the discovery of their insufficiency on the trial: and where the mistake has been made inadvertently, and the defendant has not been prejudiced, they will be amended almost as a matter of course. If the amendment may prejudice the defendant the judge may sometimes think proper to adjourn the cause. See Fromant v. Ashley, 1 E. & B. 724. This power of amendment renders it useless to retain many cases formerly collected under this head. After delivery of particulars under a judge's order (or, ut semb., under O. xix., r. 6), fresh or amended particulars cannot be delivered except by a judge's order or by consent, so as to supersede the first at the trial. Brown v. Watts, 1 Taunt. 353. It is, however, competent for the opposite party to waive the objection and accept the second particulars; and if the party served pleads over and goes to trial, he will be taken to have accepted them. Fromant v. Ashley, supra.

If the particulars are too general, or not sufficiently explicit, the remedy is to apply for a better; for it seems to be no ground of objection at the trial, except in the case of particulars of set-off, and in that case, where the terms of the order exclude the proof unless the particulars comply strictly with the terms of the order; if the particulars do not strictly comply with the order, the judge will reject the proof of it at the trial. Ibbett v. Leaver, 16 M. & W. 770; Young v. Geiger, 6 C. B. 552; and the plaintiff does not waive the objection by merely denying the set-off and going to trial. S. CC. Irregular particulars of set-off, may, however, be waived. Thus, where the order was to deliver it in a fortnight, and the plaintiff accepted it three weeks later, and the plaintiff afterwards amended his declaration by consent, Lord Tenterden, C. J., admitted proof of the set-off. Wallis v. Anderson, M. & M. 291; also Lovelock v. Cheveley, Holt, N. P. 552.

Effect of particulars as an admission.] The object of particulars is to control the generality of the claim, or set-off, in respect of which they are delivered. Their value as an admission depends upon the mode in which they are framed. When they merely limit the amount claimed in the pleadings, no admission can be implied; but where they, in addition, give credit to the opposing party for some particular specific item, they are