5 N.E. town. At the trial in the superior court, before BARKER, J., without a jury, who found for the plaintiff, the defendant alleged exceptions to the admission of certain evidence, and the refusal of the court to give certain rulings. The facts appear in the opinion. F. P. Goulding, for plaintiff. Norcross & Hartwell, for defendant. HOLMES, J. 1. It is not denied that the printed book put in evidence was in fact one of the volumes printed under chapter 98 of the Resolves of 1866, as it purported to be. This being so, it was properly admitted. Assuming that the resolve could not directly affect the rules of evidence, it made the document a public document, and it would seem to have been passed with the purpose of causing the facts to be recorded, while still fresh, for the benefit of the public. It was recognized by an act of the legislature. St. 1866, c. 301, § 1. The facts collected in it were public facts. Starkie, Ev. (10th Amer. Ed.) 273. They were known to the adjutant general ex officio. See Brockton v. Uxbridge, 138 Mass. 292. Moreover, this class of evidence is not strictly confined to facts within the personal knowledge of the officer making the record. See Hanson v. South Scituate, 115 Mass. 336; Whiton v. Albany Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 24. 2. The clerk, Kezar, was properly allowed to testify that in 1862 the adjutant general's department was governed by the place of residence stated in the descriptive rolls in assigning credits to towns, although Kezar was not employed in that office until July, 1863, and only professed to be able to state this from his knowledge of the custom of the department after he was employed there. It would be difficult to say that the jury might not have inferred what was the practice of the office in 1862 from direct evidence of what it was in 1863. But it is evident that Kezar's testimony was more than a naked inference of that sort. A clerk who is in the same office, and taking part in the routine a year later, and who continues there for a long time, practically knows from a multitude of small details, which he cannot hope to reproduce, whether the course of business which he finds is new or long established. Moreover, Kezar's testimony seems to have been, not merely the best, but the only, evidence that could have been obtained upon this point. See Townsend v. Pepperell, 99 Mass. 40, 43, 44. 3. It follows that the court rightly refused to rule that there was no evidence that Hanley was ever assigned as part of the quota of Northborough. 4. The last ruling requested should have been given, to the effect that the plaintiff could only recover for the board and attendance furnished within two years of the date of the writ. Pub. St. c. 84, § 14. We agree with the defendant that a town furnishing relief to a pauper is not required to wait until it has stopped giving relief before it can bring suit. The services were rendered, and the liability accrued, de die in diem. On this ground alone, the exceptions must be sustained, unless the plaintiff remits all but $15.56. Exceptions sustained. (140 Mass. 455) (Norfolk, ss.) COMMONWEALTH v. FITZPATRICK. Filed January 7, 1886. 1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS—UNLAWFUL SALE-EVIDENCE-ILL FEELING OF PROSECUTING WITNESS. Upon a complaint charging the defendant with the unlawful sale of liquor, evidence that a person to whom liquor was alleged to have been sold had been ordered from the defendant's premises, and forbidden to come there, was incompetent, and does not tend to show ill will towards the defendant on the part of the witness. 2. SAME-Knowledge oF OTHER VIOLATIONS OF Law. Evidence that an officer who made a seizure believed that other persons in the same town were also making unlawful sales, but had not been molested, was incompetent. Complaint for maintaining a liquor nuisance in Dedham, from Januuary 1, 1885 to April 8, 1885. At the trial in the superior court one Jennie Lamire testified, for the government, that she had several times procured liquor at the defendant's house; that she had gone to the house of the defendant on March 4, 1885, but that the defendant had told her she did not want her to come into her house, as the neighbors would talk; and that the defendant delivered the liquor to her in the woods away from the house. On cross-examination witness said she had never been forbidden to come to the house of the defendant. She also denied that she had any ill feeling towards the defendant. A Mrs. Campbell testified, for the defendant, that she lived next door to the latter's house. She was asked whether she had, during the last summer, heard the defendant order Mrs. Lamire out of the yard, into which she came to draw water, and tell her to keep out of the same in the future. The question was excluded by the court as incompetent. James W. Chadwick testified, for the government, that he went to the house of the defendant, as a police officer; that he made a search for liquor, and found bottles of lager beer and some tumblers in a cellar-way; that the defendant said in his presence, “Just as I begin to do a little business, you jump on me." On cross-examination, prejudice against the defendant being disclaimed by witness, he was asked whether, at the time of the seizure at the defendant's premises, he had reason to believe, and did believe, that there were other places in the town in which liquors were sold in violation of law, at which no seizure had been recently made or search made by him. The court excluded the question as incompetent. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant alleged exceptions. E. Greenhood, for defendant. E. J. Sherman, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth. W. ALLEN, J. The defendant was charged with keeping and maintaining a common nuisance, namely, a tenement, between January 1 and March 9, 1885, used for the illegal sale and illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors. One Lamire testified, for the government, that she had several times procured liquor at the defendant's house and that she went to the house on March 4th to get liquor. On cross-examination, she de 5 N.E. nied that she had ever been forbidden by the defendant to go to her house, and also denied that she had any ill feelings towards the defendant. The defendant offered to prove that at one time in the course of the summer before the time of the alleged offense, when the witness had gone into the defendant's yard to get water, the defendant ordered her to leave the yard, and to keep out of it in the future. The court excluded the evidence, and we think rightly. It was not competent, for the purpose of contradicting the testimony of the witness, that she had not been forbidden the house; it was not a declaration or act of the witness competent for the purpose of showing ill will by her towards the defendant; and the fact that the witness had been ordered not to come to the defendant's yard for water was not material upon the question whether she did, six months afterwards, go to the defendant's house for liquor. The question put, on cross-examination, to the witness Chadwick, an officer who searched the defendant's premises, and made a seizure of liquors, whether, at that time, he had reason to believe, and believed, that there were other places in the town where liquors were sold in violation of law, and where no search or seizure had been recently made by him, was upon collateral and immaterial matter which the court in its discretion could reject or admit; and no exception lies to its exclusion. Exceptions overruled. (141 Mass. 42) (Suffolk, ss.) BERNEY V. DINSMORE and others. Filed January 12, 1886. 1. EVIDENCE-BEST EVIDENCE. Where the evidence is the best evidence attainable, it should be admitted, unless admitting it contravenes some established rule of law. 2. SAME-EXPERT. There is no rule that a witness must be an expert, to testify. 3. SAME-VALUE OF PEARL. The defendants, as common carriers, received from the plaintiff a ring containing a valuable pearl. The defendants lost the ring in transportation. Held, in an action to recover the value of the pearl, that the plaintiff, though not an expert as to the value of pearls, should be allowed to select stones corresponding in size, shape, and color to the one lost, to be shown to the jury, and that an expert might then testify as to the value of the stones selected. Tort for the conversion to their own use by the defendants of a pearl ring, the property of the plaintiff. The defendants were common carriers doing business under the name of the Adams Express Company. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that she delivered to the defendants, at their office in Boston, September 25, 1882, a box, secured by a wrapper, string, and seals, which plaintiff said contained a solitaire pearl ring and a diamond ring; that the defendants carried the box to Washington, D. C., by one of their messengers, delivered it to Alfred Berney, to whom the same was directed; that when the box was opened by him the diamond ring alone was found in it; that afterwards the plaintiff told the defendants, at their Boston office, that the pearl ring was not received by Alfred Berney; and that neither he nor the plaintiff had had or seen the pearl ring v.5N.E.no.2-18 since. The defendants introduced evidence tending to show that the box was carried by them from Boston to Washington in the same condition, and with the same contents, as when received by them at their Boston office; and that it was so delivered by them to Alfred Berney; that at once, upon the plaintiff's informing the defendants of her claim of nondelivery of the pearl ring, the defendants made full inquiry and investigations to ascertain whether the pearl ring had been carried and delivered, but could learn nothing additional, except that their messenger in Washington testified he received the box for delivery in perfect condition, securely sealed, and so delivered it to Alfred Berney. The plaintiff testified as to the appearance and value of the pearl, but it was not claimed that she was an expert in regard to pearls. In answer to questions by plaintiff's counsel, she testified that she could select a stone to match the one lost, and upon being shown two pearls in a case said they were about the size and color of the one lost. The questions and answers were objected to by defendants' counsel, as not being competent to show the value of the pearl lost, but they were admitted by the court. Charles M. Foss, a witness for the plaintiff, and an expert in the value of pearls, testified that the two pearls shown to previous witness were valued at about $175 each. The evidence of the witness was objected to by the defendants, but admitted by the court. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendants alleged exceptions. W. B. Gale and J. W. McDonald, for defendants. H. W. Bragg, for plaintiff. FIELD, J. The testimony of the plaintiff described the size, shape, color, and quality of the pearl in a manner perhaps as accurate as she was capable of doing. If any other rule were adopted than that used in this case, it might be impossible to determine the value of the pearl. When the evidence is the best evidence attainable, it should be admitted, unless admitting it contravenes some established rule of law. There is no rule which requires that a witness must be an expert, to testify. The witness Foss was an expert upon the value of pearls, and he was in effect asked what a pearl such as the plaintiff had described was worth, and the description given by the plaintiff was conveyed to his mind more accurately, perhaps, by exhibiting to him pearls which the plaintiff had sworn were in all respects like the one she lost, than could have been done in any other manner. The jury were to weigh this evidence, with all other evidence concerning the age, condition, size, shape, color, and quality of the pearl, and the variations of value dependent upon these characteristics. We are satisfied that this method of determining the damages is more reasonable and better supported by modern authority than that laid down in Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 679, which was "that unless the defendant did produce the jewel, and show it not to be of finest water," the jury "should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of the best jewels the measure of their damages." Exceptions overruled. (141 Mass. 179) (Middlesex, ss.) 5 N.E. LIVERMORE v. BATCHELDER. Filed February 25, 1886. ANIMALS-KILLING DOG-JUSTIFICATION. The defendant killed a dog of the plaintiff, believing that the dog was about to maim and kill his (defendant's) hens. Held, that he was not justified in killing the dog unless he had reasonable cause to believe it was necessary to kill the dog in order to prevent him from killing the hens. Action of tort for killing the plaintiff's dog. The plaintiff was on February 20, 1884, the owner of a dog, a bull terrier, which was duly licensed by the town of Reading, and wore a collar duly marked. On the morning of said February 20th, plaintiff's said dog, with another dog, came upon defendant's premises, and there killed and maimed hens of defendant, which were in defendant's henhouse or shed. Said dogs were driven away, and in about 15 minutes afterwards came again upon the defendant's premises, and were running towards the same shed and hen-house of defendant where said dogs had previously killed hens as aforesaid, when defendant, having reasonable cause to believe that said dogs were proceeding to maim and kill others of his hens in said shed and hen-house, shot and killed plaintiff's dog. Upon the facts found, the court ruled that the defendant's killing of plaintiff's dog, under the circumstances stated, was not in law justifia ble, and ordered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant alleged ex ceptions. I. W. Richardson, for defendant. HOLMES, J. The ruling of the court, as we understand it, meant that. the facts found, without more, did not disclose a justification for killing the plaintiff's dog. It was found that the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the dog was proceeding to maim and kill his hens, but not that he had reasonable cause to believe that it was necessary to kill the dog in order to prevent him from killing the hens. The justification, therefore, was not made out. Wright v. Ramscot, 1 Saund. 84; Janson v. Brown, 1 Camp. 41. See Com. v. Woodward, 102 Mass. 155, 161. It is unnecessary to consider whether the common-law remedy is taken away by Pub. St. c. 102, §§ 80-110. Exceptions overruled. (141 Mass. 329) (Essex, 8s.) WOODBURY v. WOODBURY. Filed March 10, 1886. 1. GIFT-UNDUE INFLUENCE-CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS-PRESUMPTION. Where an intestate, before her death, gave to the defendant certain sums of money, and the evidence tended to show that, previous to, and at the time of the gift, the intestate was of a feeble mental condition; of advanced age; that the defendant, who was not a relation of the intestate, was her physician, friend, adviser, judicial agent, and managed her affairs, having a considerable influence over her; held, that the evidence raised such a presumption of |