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be that the party finally held liable to pay for these benefits would lose his right of appeal. He could not know that he was aggrieved until it was too late to appeal.

The report of the commissioners is imperfect and incomplete. No judgment can be rendered upon it as it stands, and we are therefore of opinion that it must be recommitted. Until the award is amended, and returned to the court, and the case is ready for some final judgment, it is premature to raise any questions of law under it. The reservation must be discharged, and the report recommitted to the commissioners. Ordered accordingly.

(140 Mass. 243)

CITY OF WORCESTER v. INHABITANTS OF GREAT BARRINGTON. (Worcester, ss.)

Filed October 26, 1885.

1. POOR AND POOR LAWS-SETTLEMENT.

A., born in Ireland, came to this country in 1845, and married B. in 1851, she then being of age, and lived with B., in the defendant town, until B.'s death in 1856. After the death of B., A. lived in said town, a widow, till 1859, when she married F., with whom she lived in the same town until 1867, when she removed to H., where F. died in 1869. A. then returned to the defendant town, and lived there till 1873, when she married D., who then had, and at the time of the suit had, a pauper settlement in S., where A. and D. resided at the time of said suit. Neither B. nor F. had a settlement in this state. Held, that A. gained no pauper settlement in the defendant town.

2. SAME-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-"EXISTING SETTLEMENT.”

The words "existing settlement" mean a settlement existing at the time the statute took effect, and the words "any unsettled person mean any person unsettled at the time the statute took effect. The words "any unsettled woman" in the statute of 1879 have the same meaning.

Contract for expenses incurred in the relief of one Thomas Quigley, a minor, whose settlement was alleged to be in the defendant town. At the hearing in the superior court, judgment was ordered for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. The material facts appear in the opinion.

F. P. Goulding, for plaintiff.

J. Dewey, for defendant.

MORTON, C. J. The rights of the parties in this suit depend upon the question whether Margaret Quigley, the grandmother of the pauper, gained a settlement in Great Barrington prior to February 11, 1873. She was born in Ireland, came to this country in 1845, was married to Thomas Quigley in 1851, she being then of age, and lived with him in Great Barrington until his death in 1856. After the death of her husband, she lived in Great Barrington, a widow, until 1859, when she married one Finneran. She continued to live with Finneran in the same town until 1867, when they removed to Huntington, where Finneran died in 1869. She then returned to Great Barrington, and lived there until 1873, when she married one Burke who then had and now has a settlement in Sandisfield, in this state, where they now live. Neither Thomas Quigley nor Finneran ever had any settlement in this state. The plaintiff, upon these facts, contended that Margaret gained a settle

ment in Great Barrington, under St. 1878, c. 190, § 1, cl. 6, as amended by St. 1879, c. 242, § 2. The statute of 1878 provides that "any woman of the age of twenty-one years, who resides in any place within this state for five years together, without receiving relief as a pauper, shall thereby gain a settlement in such place." The statute of 1879 made this provision applicable to married women, and further provided that "a settlement thereunder shall be deemed to have been gained by any unsettled woman upon the completion of the term of residence therein mentioned, although the whole or part of the same accrues before the passage of this act." These provisions are re-enacted in Pub. St. c. 83, § 1, cls. 6, 7.

Upon the admitted facts, Margaret, having resided in Great Barrington for more than five years prior to 1873, must be deemed to have gained a settlement there, under St. 1878 and 1879, if she is a person within the purview of these statutes. This depends upon the meaning of the words "any unsettled woman," in St. 1879, c. 242, § 2. If these words mean any woman who was unsettled at the time the statute took effect, she is not within the statute, because in 1873 she, by her marriage with Burke, gained a settlement in Sandisfield, which continues to the present time.

The provisions of the present laws were derived from St. 1874, c. 274. Section 3 of that act provides that "no existing settlement shall be changed by any provision of this act, unless the entire residence and taxation herein required accrues after its passage; but any unsettled person shall be deemed to have gained a settlement upon the completion of the residence and taxation herein required, though the whole or a part of the same accrues before the passage of this act." Several cases have been decided under this statute, but the question now before us has never arisen, because, in those cases, it appeared that the person alleged to have gained a settlement under it had no settlement in the state except that conferred by the statute itself. Cambridge v. Boston, 130 Mass. 357; Fitchburg v. Ashby, 132 Mass. 495; Dedham v. Milton, 136 Mass. 424. See, also, Worcester v. Springfield, 127 Mass. 540.

We concur with Mr. Justice FIELD in the statements of the first paragraph of his dissenting opinion in Fitchburg v. Ashby, ubi supra, that the words "existing settlement" mean a settlement existing at the time the statute took effect, and that the words "any unsettled person" mean any person unsettled at the time the statute took effect; and we are of opinion that the words "any unsettled woman" in the statute of 1879 have the same meaning. Generally, a statute speaks from the time it takes effect. The object of the statute is to provide for the relief of poor persons who are now in distress, or may hereafter fall into distress, by giving them a settlement in some town which shall be under obligation to relieve them. A person who already has a settlement has no need of such provision. It has been held, in regard to a similar statute, that it did not apply in the case of a person who died before it took effect, (Taunton v. Boston, 131 Mass. 18;) and also that the statute of 1874 did not apply to the case of a person who had ceased to be a resident of

5 N.E.

the state many years before its passage. Fitchburg v. Athol, 130 Mass. 370. The purpose of the statute is not to force upon a person who has a settlement a former settlement for the benefit of his children and grandchildren, but to provide for the present and the future, and to afford to such as are or may be in distress succor and relief.

We are therefore of opinion that Margaret Quigley gained no settlement in the defendant town, and that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action. Judgment for the defendant.

APPEAL-BOND-SUFFICIENCY.

A. appealed from a judgment against him, and filed a bond, which did not state against whom the judgment appealed from was rendered, nor the date of the judgment, nor the amount thereof, either in debt or costs. The bond bore no date, and did not appear to have received the approval of the adverse party or the justice before whom the case was tried. Held, that it was not a sufficient bond, although, taking the instrument in connection with the record of the district court, which showed that the defendant appealed with sufficient sureties, the intention of the parties signing the same could be gathered therefrom, and they might be held liable.

Motion to dismiss an appeal, on the ground that the bond filed in the action was defective. In the superior court, the motion was allowed, and judgment ordered for the plaintiff, and the claimant appealed. The material facts appear in the opinion.

A. J. Bartholomew, for claimant.

J. M. Cochran, for plaintiff.

DEVENS, J. It was the duty of the appellant, if he desired effectively to prosecute his appeal from the district court, to file within 24 hours after the entry of judgment, a bond to the adverse party, with sufficient surety or sureties, to be approved by the adverse party or the justice, in a reasonable sum fixed by the justice, or approved by the adverse party, with condition to enter and prosecute his appeal with effect, and to satisfy, within 30 days from the entry thereof, any judgment which might be entered against him in the superior court, upon said appeal, for costs. Pub. St. c. 154, § 52; chapter 155, § 29; St. 1882, c. 95. The bond filed by the claimant recites in its condition an appeal from a judgment given in favor of the plaintiff, but against whom it was given does not appear. There is no statement when such judgment was rendered, nor what was the amount thereof, either in debt or costs. The bond itself bears no date, nor does it appear to have ever received the approval of the adverse party or the justice. An examination of the record of the justice shows that the claimant recognized before him with -sufficient sureties, but the record makes no mention of any bond.

The contention of the claimant is that, taking the whole instrument together, in connection with the record, the intention of the parties signing the same can be gathered therefrom; that they must be held liable:

and thus that he has perfected his appeal. It may be that the omissions in this bond, or in regard to the failure by the magistrate to act thereon, if the plaintiff had seen fit not to object on account thereof, would not have been held to be of so vital a character as to deprive the superior court of its jurisdiction; and that, if the plaintiff had eventually prevailed, he might, by the aid of the record and such other evidence as would connect this bond with the case at bar, have maintained an action thereon against its signers. Santom v. Ballard, 133 Mass. 464; Keene v. White, 136 Mass. 23; Wheeler & Wilson Manuf'g Co. v. Burlingham, 137 Mass. 581. But the plaintiff is not compelled to submit to the manifest inconveniences to which such errors necessarily subject him. They are not purely immaterial, and, when a motion to dismiss on account of them is seasonably made by the plaintiff, it should prevail. The remedy by review, when any party, without fault on his own part, has lost his right of appeal, affords him ample protection. Pub. St. c. 187, § 25; Keene v. White, ubi supra. The appellee is entitled to a bond fully identifying the cause in which it is filed, with proper surety duly approved, before the appeal should be allowed. There is no such bond in the case at bar. Judgment affirmed.

(140 Mass. 276)

(Hampshire, ss.)

COMMONWEALTH V. PREECE and others.

Filed October 26, 1885.

1. EVIDENCE-CONFESSION TO OFFICERS.

A., B., and C. were arrested on a charge of burning a building in the nighttime. A. was taken into the presence of three officers, and, upon being questioned, confessed to committing the crime charged, together with the other defendants. It appeared that the confession was made by A., after being told by one of the officers to "tell the truth." There was no evidence that A. made the confession through fear, or that the officers made any threats or promises to induce A. to confess. A., B., and C. were young boys, and, upon hearing the confession of A., B. and C. also confessed. Held, that the confessions were admissible.1

2. ARSON-EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY-REGISTERED COPY OF DEED. Where a deed cannot be produced, a registered copy is competent evidence to prove the ownership of the property, and such evidence, together with oral testimony that the owner of the property has leased the same to the person occupying it, is sufficient proof of the ownership and possession of the premises.

Indictment against Richard Preece, Erick Guerin, and James Burns, charging the defendants with burning a building at Northampton on October 27, 1883; said building being owned by the New Haven & Northampton Company, and occupied by the Williams Manufacturing Company as a warehouse. The verdict against each of the defendants was guilty, at the trial in the superior court before ROCKWELL, J.; and they alleged exceptions. The material facts appear in the opinion.

J. B. O'Donnell, for defendants.

E. J. Sherman, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

1 See note at end of case.

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MORTON, C. J. The principal question in the case is as to the admissibility of the confession of the defendant Burns. The rule is well established that, to be admissible, a confession must be the free and voluntary confession of the defendant. If it is induced by any promises or threats of one in authority over the defendant, it is incompetent. When a confession is offered in evidence, the question whether it is voluntary is to be decided primarily by the presiding justice. If he is satisfied that it is voluntary, it is admissible; otherwise it should be excluded. When there is conflicting testimony, the humane practice in this commonwealth is for the judge, if he decides that it is admissible, to instruct the jury that they may consider all the evidence, and that they should exclude the confession, if, upon the whole evidence in the case, they are satisfied that it was not the voluntary act of the defendant. Com. v. Cuffee, 108 Mass. 285; Com. v. Nott, 135 Mass. 269; Com. v. Smith, 119 Mass. 305.

In the case at bar, the defendant Burns was taken into the presence of three officers. Munyan, one of the officers, testified: "I did not tell him he had better tell about it. I think Mr. Wright [one of the other officers] said he had better." Wright testified that "he did not say to Burns that he had better tell the truth, but that he might have told him to tell the truth." If either officer had said to Burns, "You had better tell the truth," or, "You had better tell about it," we should be of opinion that the confession would be incompetent, because such language, in the connection in which, according to their testimony, it was spoken, would naturally convey to the mind of Burns the idea that he would gain some advantage if he confessed his guilt. Com. v. Nott, ubi supra. But, on the other hand, if the officer merely asked him to tell the truth, this would not imply that the officer promised any advantage if he confessed. As the evidence was conflicting, we cannot say, as matter of law, that the decision of the presiding justice of the superior court, admitting the evidence, was erroneous.

Nor can we see any evidence that the defendant Burns was induced by any acts of the officers to make a confession through fear. The kind of fear must be something more than the fear which is produced by the fact that the defendant was accused of a crime, and was arrested or taken into custody. Com. v. Smith, ubi supra; Com. v. Mitchell, 117 Mass. 431. There was no evidence of any threats made by the officers, or of any acts on their part, to induce him to confess that he was guilty when in fact he was not guilty. The bill of exceptions does not show what instructions were given, and it is to be presumed that the presiding justice properly left it to the jury to determine whether the confession was voluntary, with instructions to disregard it if it was not. The evidence does not show any promises or threats made to the other defendants. They at first denied their guilt; but, upon being confronted with Burns, and hearing his statement, they confessed. Whether it is just and humane to take into custody young boys suspected of a crime, and, apart from their parents and friends, and without warning them that they are not obliged to criminate themselves, to worm out of them a confession, is not

MASS.DEC.1-6 N.E.-34