(116 Ill. 587) PEOPLE v. HOFFMAN and others. (Quo Warranto.) PEOPLE ex rel. BROWN v. PRENDERGAST, Co. Judge, etc. (Mandamus.) PEOPLE ex rel. ADAIR v. Same. (Mandamus.) In re Petition of BROWN. (Objection of WETHERELL.) In re Petition of BROWN. (Objection of ADAIR.) WETHERELL v. Divine. (Bill for Injunction.) WETHERELL V. Seipp. (Error to Circuit Court, Cook County.) Filed March 27, 1886. 1. ELECTION LAW, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF-LAW WHICH ANY OR ALL CITIES MAY ADOPT IS NOT A LOCAL OR SPECIAL LAW, WITHIN PROHIBITION. The statute known as the "Election Law," approved June 19, 1885, in force July 1, 1885, (Laws 1885, p. 119,) is not a local or special law, within article 4, § 22, of the constitution, (1 Starr & C. St. 119,) prohibiting special laws on the conduct of elections. The fact that the law is left to take effect in such cities and villages as by a vote of their electors may adopt it, and that in fact it has been adopted by only two municipalities, does not make it a special or local law. MÜLKEY, C. J., and SCHOLFIELD, J., dissent. 2. SAME "FREE AND EQUAL ELECTIONS" UNDER BILL OF RIGHTS NOT INFRINGED -UNIFORMITY NOT REQUIRED. The statute above cited is not unconstitutional as infringing the freedom and equality of elections secured by the bill of rights in article 2, § 18, of the constitution. 1 Starr & C. St. 108. That provision, to-wit, "All elections shall be free and equal," does not require uniformity of election laws. Elections are free when the voters are subjected to no intimidation or improper influence, and when every voter is allowed to vote as his own judgment and conscience dictate. Elections are equal when the vote of every voter is equal in its influence upon the result to the vote of every other elector. 8. SAME-APPOINTMENT OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS BY COURT-ACT FOR, NOT AN INFRACTION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER INTO THREE DEPARTMENTS -EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. The lodgment with the county court of the power to appoint election commissioners is not an infraction of the constitutional provision distributing governmental powers into three departments, and forbidding that either of these departments shall exercise powers properly belonging to another department. Article 3, § 1, Const. (1 Starr & C. St. 109.) The constitutional jurisdiction of the county courts (1 Starr & C. St. 134) includes "such other jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law." Even if that be construed to mean jurisdiction of judicial questions only, the election law would be sustained thereunder, as involving judicial questions in revising the registration of voters. Acts investing the judiciary with the power to appoint officials whose duties are not connected with the judicial department have been fully recognized in this state. People v. Williams, 51 Ill. 63; People v. Morgan, 90 ̊Ill. 558. There is no constitutional prohibition against such legislation; and the law making power can do any legislative act not prohibited by the constitution. 4. SAME POLITICAL TEST-APPOINTMENT OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS FROM LEADING POLITICAL PARTIES, NO EXACTION OF SUCH TEST. The law which authorizes the appointment of election commissioners from each of the leading political parties is not unconstitutional, under section 25 of article 5 of the constitution, (1 Starr & C. St. 128,) which prescribes an oath, and further provides: "And no other oath, declaration, or test shall be required as a qualification." If the law had required the election commissioners or judges to take an oath as to his political opinions, or that he belonged to one or the other of the leading political parties, there might be some force in the objection.1 5 SAME-REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS-REQUIREMENT OF, IS NOT A NEW QUALIFICATION, BUT METHOD OF ASCERTAINING EXISTENCE OF QUALIFICATIONS. The provisions of the law requiring registration of electors are not unconstitutional as adding a new qualification for legal voters, contrary to section 1 of article 7 of the constitution, (1 Starr & C. St. 140,) but merely provide a proper method for ascertaining the existence of the constitutional and lawful qualifications of voters. The requirement that registration be complete three weeks previous to the general election at which the right of suffrage may be exercised under the law is not unreasonable. H. B. Hurd, Adolph Moses, and George Scoville, for appellants in first case. Abram M. Pence, James W. Beach, John D. Adair, and H. O. McDaid. for appellees. James H. Miller, also for appellees. W. C. Goudy, of counsel, for appellees. James W. Beach and John D. Adair, for petitioners in mandamus cases, respectively. F. H. Winston, Jr., for the City of Chicago, and for its officers, Divine and Seipp. MAGRUDER, J. The question presented by this record is the constitutionality of an act of the legislature of this state commonly known as the "Election Law," approved June 19, 1885, in force July 1, 1885, and entitled "An act regulating the holding of elections, and declaring the result thereof, in cities, villages, and incorporated towns in this state." The law may be found in chapter 46 of the Revised Statutes of 1885, p. 550. An extended statement of its provisions here is unnecessary. It is claimed that the act in question is such a local or special law as is prohibited by section 22 of article 4 of the constitution. That section provides that the general assembly shall not pass local or special laws for certain specified objects, and among them, for "the opening and conducting of any election or designating the place of voting." The feature of the act which is especially insisted upon as showing it to be local and special in its character is the provision which is made for submitting the question of its adoption to the votes of the electors in any city, village, or town. It is charged that the act was passed for the benefit of the city of Chicago, and that, having been adopted by that city, and by the town of Lake, in the county of Cook, but not elsewhere, it is in force only in one locality. It is said that, inasmuch as it operates solely and exclusively upon the particular city, village, or town which 1 See note at end of case. adopts it, and not upon all the cities, villages, or towns in the state, it is special and local in its application, and therefore forbidden by the constitution. Laws which depend for their operation upon the votes of the people have sometimes been held to be unconstitutional, as involving a delegation of legislative authority. In this state, however, they have been held to be valid. The case of People v. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1, decided that such laws were perfect and complete when they left the hands of the legislature, although they might not take effect until the happening of some future event or contingency arising from the voluntary act of others. It was there said: "We may well admit that the legislature cannot delegate its general legislative authority. Still, it may authorize many things to be done by others which it might not properly do itself." People v. Salomon, 51 Ill.37; Erlinger v. Boneau, Id. 94; Guild v. City of Chicago, 82 Ill. 472. In the case of Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653, we again said: "Whatever the rule may be in other states, it is well settled in this, as will appear from the cases just cited, that it is competent for the legislature to pass a law, the ultimate operation of which may, by its own terms, be made to depend upon some contingency, as upon an affirmative vote by the electors of a given district." But it is contended that, although statutes which are passed in reference to other subjects may be made to depend for their future effect upon the votes of the people, yet such feature cannot be embodied in any law which has reference to the particular subjects enumerated in section 22 of article 4 of the constitution. The reason assigned for this position is that the restriction of a law's operation to the cities, villages, or towns which may vote to adopt it, necessarily, and from the nature of things, makes it local and special. A statute, however, may not only be "perfect and complete" according to the ruling in People v. Reynolds, but also general in its character, even though it does not take effect until the happening of some future contingency. When the Corporations are organized every day under an "Act concerning corporations" for pecuniary profit, found in the thirty-second chapter of the Revised Statutes. When this act first became a law, on July 1, 1872, it had nothing whatever to operate upon. Its provisions were suspended until some corporation was formed to call them into action. first company was organized under it, it was in force as to that alone. Upon the formation of the second it was only operative as to two companies, and no more. It was none the less a general law because the objects upon which it took effect came into being at different times, and not all at once. Hundreds of corporations formed in pursuance of its terms are now doing business in the state. In 1872 the legislature of Illinois passed an "Act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages." Rev. St. c. 24. The incorporation of cities and villages is one of the subjects about which section 22 of article 4 of the constitution forbids the passage of local or special laws. This act contains all the provisions essential to a complete municipal code. Moreover, it starts out with an adopting clause. The first three sections of its first article provide that "any city now existing in this state" may become incorporated, provided that upon the petition of one-eighth of its legal voters, and at an election to be held as therein directed, the majority of the votes cast in such city shall be in favor of organizing under said act. On July 1, 1872, that act was in a certain sense dormant. Until some city or village should vote in favor of accepting it there was nothing for it to operate upon. When the first city adopted it, its provisions took effect as to the municipal affairs of that city, but of no other. It was for the time being in force in one locality alone, and not elsewhere. Notwithstanding these features, we say of it in Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 70: "After full consideration and reconsideration we are as firmly committed to the doctrine as we can be to any doctrine, that the act in relation to cities and villages is a general law, and not local or special." If the act for the incorporation of cities and villages is a general law, in spite of the fact that by its terms it is restricted in its operation to those cities and villages only which vote to adopt it, then the election law now under consideration cannot be considered local or special because it contains a similar restriction. The title of the election law is general. It is an act for holding elections, and declaring their result, not in any particular city, town, or village, but in all "cities, villages, and incorporated towns in this state." Its terms are general. It provides that the electors, not of one city or of two or three cities, but of "any city now existing in this state, may adopt and become entitled to " its benefits. It furnishes the machinery, not for one election, but "for all elections, general, special, local, municipal, state, and county, and all others of every description." If it has not yet been adopted elsewhere than in Chicago and the town of Lake, it is for the present only operative upon elections there held. But its terms are such that it may hereafter be accepted by other cities and towns. "All that is practicable or could have been intended was that the legislature should, by a general law, provide for holding elections, and declaring their result, in cities, towns, and villages, leaving it to those interested to bring them within its operation." Guild v. City, supra; Town of Fox v. Town of Kendall, 97 Ill. 72; Hundley v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 67 Ill. 559. Whether laws are general or not does not depend upon the number of those within the scope of their operation. They are general, "not because they operate upon every person in the state, for they do not, but because every person who is brought within the relations and circumstances provided for is affected by the laws." Nor is it necessary, in order to make a statute general, that "it should be equally applicable to all parts of the state; it is sufficient if it extends to all persons doing or omitting to do an act within the territorial limits described in the statute." People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388; People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585. This election law is not local or special because of the limited number of cities, towns, and villages which may have adopted it. It may rather be said of it that it is general because of the possibility that all the cities, towns, and villages in the state may accept its provisions if they choose. It is to be noted that the "Act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages" is in part an election law. Its fourth article provides for conducting elections, and declaring their results, in the cities and villages which adopt it. It is only in force in cities and villages which vote in favor of adopting it; therefore the cities and villages which have adopted it by their votes have at the same time adopted those parts of it which relate to the conduct of elections. In a number of decisions this court has declared the incorporation act constitutional; consequently the decisions so made are authority for the position that where a law which provides for conducting elections, and declaring their results, is restricted in its operation to the cities, villages, and towns which vote to adopt it, such a law does not thereby violate that part of the constitution which prohibits the legislature from passing local or special laws for "the opening and conducting of any election, or designating the place of voting." It is said that the law cannot be held to be constitutional consistently with the views of this court as expressed in the case of People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585. But it contains no such feature as subjected the city tax act to the condemnation of the court in that case. The city tax act attempted to confer upon the council of a city the power to assess and collect its taxes through certain officers named therein, or through certain other and different officers named in the general incorporation act. An option was conferred upon the city council to select either one of two sets of officers for the purposes named. This was held to be invalid, as "establishing dissimilarity in the powers and modes of different cities in the levy and collection of taxes." The case of People v. Cooper and the case at bar would be alike if the election law had left it optional with any city, town, or village which should adopt it, either to pursue the method of conducting elections provided for in the act, or to pursue the old method of conducting them provided for in the general election law of this state. It does not, however, permit any such option. We are of the opinion that it is not a local or special law, within the meaning of those terms as used in section 22 of article 4 of the constitution. It is said that the law is in conflict with that clause in the bill of rights which provides that "all elections shall be free and equal." Const. art. 2, § 18. In order to support this position, it is assumed that the word "equal" means the same as the word "uniform," and it is then argued that, inasmuch as the cities, towns, and villages which adopt the law will conduct elections according to its provisions, while those which do not adopt it will conduct them according to some other and different provisions, therefore there will be no uniformity, and in consequence no freedom or equality. The declaration in the bill of rights that all elections must be equal does not necessarily mean that there must be uniformity of regulation in regard thereto in all portions of the state. That the definition of "equal elections" does not include and involve the idea of uniformity in regulation is apparent from the considerations already |