Johnstad v. Lake Superior T. & T. R. Co. 165 Wis. 499. JOHNSTAD, Appellant, vs. LAKE SUPERIOR TERMINAL & TRANSFER RAILWAY COMPANY and another, Respondents. April 24-May 15, 1917. Workmen's compensation: Holding case open for contingencies: Final hearing: Award: Judicial review: Injury not impairing wageearning capacity. 1. An order of the industrial commission finding that an injured employee had not suffered any impairment of his earning capacity after a certain date and that full compensation had been paid up to that date, but stating that, because he might suffer loss of earnings in the future on account of his disability, the case would be "left open for the statutory period until such contingency may arise," was a definite decision that up to the time of the hearing there was no ground for the allowance of further compensation; and it is held that there had been a final hearing and that the order or award was one which might be reviewed under sub. 1, sec. 2394-19, Stats. 2. There is no authority, in such a case, for holding the matter open or adjourning for any time other than for a reasonable time as provided in sec. 2394-16, Stats. 3. Physical injury not diminishing wage-earning capacity did not entitle an injured employee to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act as it existed in 1913. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane county: E. RAY STEVENS, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. The appeal is from a judgment of the circuit court confirming the order of the Industrial Commission dismissing the application of plaintiff and denying compensation. The plaintiff, a married man thirty-seven years of age, worked for the defendant railway company as boiler-maker helper and blacksmith at $2.40 per day. He was injured by a piece of steel penetrating his right arm, and was totally disabled from the time of the injury, September 30, 1914, to January 2, 1915, when he returned to work for the defendant helping take stock and assisting on books and doing other work. When applicant returned to work his wrist was some Johnstad v. Lake Superior T. & T. R. Co. 165 Wis. 499. what stiff, but much of the stiffness had disappeared at the time of hearing. He was left, however, with a permanent partial disability; he has stiffness of the wrist to the extent of fifty per cent. loss of motion thereof, but can use his hand for many kinds of work. He afterwards engaged in the lumber business with a partner. From the date of injury to January 1, 1915, appellant was paid compensation as for total disability and his expenses for medical attendance. The Commission denied compensation. The circuit court confirmed the findings and decision of the Industrial Commission and allowed no compensation. For the appellant the cause was submitted on the brief of W. P. Crawford of Superior. For the respondent Industrial Commission there was a brief by the Attorney General and Winfield W. Gilman, assistant attorney general, which brief was joined in by J. A. Murphy of Superior, attorney for the respondent Railway Company; and the cause was argued orally by Mr. Gilman and Mr. Murphy. KERWIN, J. 1. A preliminary question is raised by respondents as to whether the order or award can be reviewed upon this appeal. It is claimed that no review can be had because there was no final hearing, and sub. 1, sec. 2394-19, Stats., is relied upon. We think the contention of counsel for respondents cannot be sustained. It is true that under the order and findings of fact the Commission found that had the accident occurred subsequent to July 10, 1915, it would be adjusted on a relative injury basis, the same basis upon which the Commission had adjusted accidents of this kind. prior to July 10, 1915, and until the Northwestern Fuel Company decision [Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm. 161 Wis. 450, 152 N. W. 856] had been rendered. The Commission further found that it could not find as a fact that the appellant in the instant case had suffered any Johnstad v. Lake Superior T. & T. R. Co. 165 Wis. 499. impairment in his earning capacity in a suitable employment subsequent to January 2, 1915, therefore held that the case could not be closed because the appellant might suffer loss of earnings in the future on account of his disability, and that the case would therefore be left open for the statutory period until such contingency might arise. The Commission, however, held definitely that up to the time of the trial there was no ground for the allowance of any compensation other than what had been paid, for the reason that after January 1, 1915, up to the time of award there had been no loss of earning capacity. That was the issue presented and tried before the Commission, and we are of opinion that on the case tried and determined there was a final hearing and award, therefore there was an order or award to be reviewed. 2. We are also of opinion that the order or award must be affirmed, for the reason that the evidence sustains the findings that at the time of the determination of the matter before the Commission the appellant was not entitled to compensation. It appears that on January 2, 1915, appellant returned to work at the same wages he had been receiving before the injury, though in a different line of work, but a suitable employment, and that he continued in such employment until February 20, 1915, at which time he left of his own accord the employment of the Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Railway Company and entered into the retail lumber business with a partner, and that he was earning the same wages as when working full time for the railway company. The evidence fully establishes that after January 2, 1915, there was no loss of earning capacity. This was the test of the right to compensation in the instant case, and, it not having been established that there was a loss of earning capacity, the Commission was right in the award. There was no actual loss of any member and the injury occurred prior to the 1915 amendment of the law, therefore there could be no compensation allowed by the Commission under Johnstad v. Lake Superior T. & T. R. Co. 165 Wis. 499. the relative injury clause and no compensation or allowance under the law as it then existed. Physical injury not diminishing wage-earning capacity did not entitle one to compensation under the law as it existed in 1913. Northwestern F. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 161 Wis. 450, 152 N. W. 856. Sub. (2) (b), sec. 2394-9, Stats., provides, "If the accident causes partial disability, sixty-five per cent. of the weekly loss in wages during the period of such partial disability." Sub. 2, sec. 2394-10, Stats., at the time of the injury provided: "The weekly loss in wages referred to in section 2394-9 shall consist of such percentage of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, computed according to the provisions of this section, as shall fairly represent the proportionate extent of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in which he was working at the time of the. accident, and other suitable employments, the same to be fixed as of the time of the accident, but to be determined in view of the nature and extent of the injury." The Commission found: "We cannot find as a fact that the applicant in this case has suffered any impairment in his earning capacity in a suitable employment, subsequent to January 2, 1915." This finding is well supported by the evidence. We must therefore hold that the award of the Industrial Commission was right, and the judgment of the court below affirming the same cannot be disturbed. International H. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 157 Wis. 167, 147 N. W. 53; Northwestern F. Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra; Mellen L. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 154 Wis. 114, 142 N. W. 187; Weber v. American S. S. Co. 38 R. I. 309, 95 Atl. 603. We also find that there is no authority for holding the case open further than for a reasonable time provided by statute, sec. 2394-16, and there is no authority for adjourning for any time other than as provided by statute, and the order and award herein are final. Neff v. Barber, 165 Wis. 503. By the Court.-The judgment appealed from is affirmed; the Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Railway Company to recover costs on this appeal against the appellant. NEFF, Appellant, vs. BARBER, Special Administrator, and others, Respondents, and another, Appellant. April 24-May 15, 1917. Conspiracy to wreck corporation: Evidence: Sufficiency: Right to jury trial in equitable action: Costs: Discretion: Printing supplemental case on appeal. 1. In an action by a stockholder and creditor of a gas company in behalf of the company to recover damages on the ground that certain named defendants, as officers of the company, having fraudulently conspired to wreck the company, so mismanaged it that it went into the hands of a receiver and was sold to said defendants at foreclosure sale at much less than its real value, findings of the trial court to the effect that there was no conspiracy and no mismanagement and that the property was sold at its fair value at the foreclosure sale, are held to have sufficient support in the evidence. 2. Although the issue as to a conspiracy was one at law, plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial thereof as a matter of right, the action being an equitable one. 3. The right to trial by jury does not extend to equitable actions; and all issues therein, whether legal or equitable, are triable by the court. 4. Allowance by the trial court of full costs to the defendants in this case was not an abuse of discretion. 5. Upon affirmance of a judgment no costs are allowed to respondents for the printing of a supplemental case consisting almost entirely of exhibits properly referred to in appellants' case. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Langlade county: A. H. REID, Judge. Affirmed. Action in equity brought by plaintiff as a stockholder and creditor of the defendant the Antigo Gas Company, in its be |