of the right to window lights possessed by tenements used for purposes of business. It is, "Is the extent of light and air, to the unimpeded access of which the dominant tenement is entitled, to be confined to the extent sufficient for the use to which the tenement is applied for the time being, or to be enlarged to the extent sufficient for any use to which it may at any time be put?" This question has not yet been satisfactorily decided, and there are on this point decisions of the highest living authorities at direct variance with one another. A similar point with regard to houses occupied for the ordinary purposes of life is mentioned in Luttrel's Case (v). “If a man has an old window to his hall, and afterwards he converts the hall into a parlour or any other use, yet it is not lawful for his neighbour to stop it, for he shall prescribe to have the light in such part of his house." In Back v. Stacey (w), Best, C. J., said, "It was not sufficient to constitute an illegal obstruction, that the plaintiff's warehouse, the part of his house principally affected, could not be used for all the purposes to which it might otherwise have been applied." The point does not seem to have been adverted to in any other case, until Jackson v. The Duke of Newcastle (x) was decided by Lord Westbury, C. In delivering judgment in that case, his Lordship said, "I cannot say that the abridgment of the light will, to such a material extent, detract from the value of the counting-house, considered as an integral portion of (v) 4 Rep. 87a. (n) 2 C. & P. 465, (x) 33 Law J., N. S., Ch. 698; 4 N. R. 448. the premises, as materially to affect the suitableness of those premises for the purposes to which they are now applied. But then I am sensible that it is quite possible that premises in that situation may hereafter be applied to another purpose, and made applicable to a different business, in which the proposed abridgment of light and air will operate most materially to the prejudice of the owners of these premises, and may interfere to a considerable degree with their valuable application and adaptation to some future business different from that which is now carried on there. The question, then, that I have to determine is this, whether I can interfere by way of injunction, when that injunction will be founded, not upon the extent of present injury requiring that interference, but upon an injury which, having regard to a possible future destination of the premises, may materially affect their value. I cannot find that the question has been anywhere decided. I cannot find that it has been in any authority adverted to. The ground of the jurisdiction, when stated, is always stated with this accompaniment, that it must be an injury for which damages at law can be obtained. If I regard the injury for which damages at law can be obtained, it would be the injury done simply to the counting-house by the proposed diminution of light—a diminution which I believe would leave the light quite sufficient for all the purposes to which the room is now applied. It is perfectly true that these premises, when they cease to be a grocer's shop, may be converted into a jeweller's shop, where the sunshine and the light at the back of the premises, received through the window of the counting-house, may be of the greatest possible value for the conduct of that business; or they may be applied for a silk-mercer's shop, where the requisite quantity of light for the purpose of distinguishing colours, and the shades and hues of colour, may be of the greatest importance. The obstruction, therefore, may injure the premises possibly hereafter; but the obstruction at the present time does not injure the premises to such an extent as, having regard to the rules which I have extracted and adverted to, would warrant the interference of the court by way of injunction." The Lord Chancellor dissolved the injunction which had been granted by the Master of the Rolls, saying, "I have had considerable difficulty in arriving at this conclusion, which certainly I am aware may stop short, in point of the exercise of jurisdiction, of that which the reason of the case would require, if I could find any authority to warrant me in going the length that I thought it would be reasonable to go. But I have found nothing which authorizes me to look into the possible future, or to speculate about the future condition of the premises; and I am obliged, therefore, to confine my right of interference to that which the exigency of the present circumstances justifies and renders necessary." His Lordship gave the plaintiff's counsel an opportunity of searching for an authority that would warrant him in looking to the possible future use that might be made of the premises; but they were unable to find any such authority, and the injunction was dissolved. Damages were, however, given to the plaintiff. This result is curious, for the arguments of Lord Westbury would seem to apply as strongly to a claim for damages as to a suit for injunction; especially since, as was said by Wood, V. C., in Dent v. The Auction Mart Company, so far as the amount of injury is concerned, a court of equity will now interfere where substantial damages would be given at law. In Yates v. Jack (y), Lord Cranworth took the opposite view. He there said, "An attentive consideration of the evidence of the trade witnesses on the one side and on the other has led me to the conclusion, as did the evidence of the architects, that the erection of the new buildings will materially interfere with the quantity of light necessary or desirable for the plaintiffs in the conduct of their business. I desire, however, not to be understood as saying that the plaintiffs would have no right to an injunction unless the obstruction of light were such as to be injurious to them in the trade in which they are now engaged. The right conferred or recognized by the statute 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, is an absolute indefeasible right to the enjoyment of the light without reference to the purpose for which it has been used. Therefore, even if the evidence satisfied me, which it does not, that for the purpose of their present business a strong light is not necessary, and that the plaintiffs will still have a sufficient light remaining, I should not think the defendant had established his defence unless he had shown that, for whatever purposes the plaintiffs might wish to employ the light, there would be no material interference with it." "... "In deciding that what the defendant proposed to do would cause material injury to the plaintiffs, I am only arriving at the same conclusion at which the ViceChancellor arrived. But I cannot concur with him in (y) L. R., 1 Ch. 295; 35 Law J. Rep., N. S., Ch. 539. thinking that the Court ought to make any declaration narrowing or appearing to narrow the right of the plaintiffs to the quantity of light heretofore used by them for the purposes of their business." It is remarkable that Lord Cranworth in his judgment makes no allowance whatever to the contrary previous decision of Lord Westbury in Jackson v. The Duke of Newcastle. From the report it would appear that that case was cited only on the part of the plaintiffs, who would naturally not have called his Lordship's attention to that portion of it adverse to their own contention. This portion also of the judgment in Yates v. Jack was commented on and approved by Wood, V.-C., in Dent v. The Auction Mart Company (z). "Further than that," observed the Vice-Chancellor, "he (Lord Cranworth) says, (which, perhaps, if I may be allowed to say so, is going a little beyond what, so far as I am aware, any previous case has decided,) that the plaintiffs' right to an injunction does not depend on the obstruction being injurious to them in the trade for which they naturally used the premises, but is an absolute indefeasible right to the enjoyment of the light without reference to the purpose for which it has been used. Now that observation certainly goes further than any case has gone since it was decided in Martin v. Goble (a), that property which had been used for a malt-house would not claim the same privilege as if it had been used for a dwelling-house. But the two authorities may be easily reconciled by saying that the Lord Chan (z) L. R. 2 Eq. 249; 35 Law J. Rep., N. S., Ch. 563. |