THE IMAGE AS AN ELEMENT OF TE IN THINKING

In the earlier stages in the development of t imagery is all concrete; in the later stages and forms, a large amount of abstract imagery is substitution of abstract for concrete images in process is a decided advance in the direction of ment of a superior technique.

2. OUR USE OF THE TERMS CONCRETE AND IMAGE.

By concrete images we shall mean those th faithful reproductions of sense-perceptions, whe auditory, motor, or those relevant to any other the case of visual images, they would doubtless less pictorial in character.

While all images are more or less symbolic i yet there are wider divergencies in their symbo from the image which is primarily re-presenta which is arbitrarily symbolic. There are corr different degrees of abstractness of images. T stract is not used to mark off a class of imag sharply differentiated from the concrete, but rath ture from the reproductive and re-presentative the image in the direction of greater symbolism. image house might be called concrete, if it were tion, a more or less detailed mental picture, of s ular house; it might be called abstract to a certa

the image were only schematic, like this,-Such an image is certainly not lacking in concrete character, yet it certainly represents a movement of the mind away from reproductive detail toward greater symbolism. In so far as this is true the image is abstract. The image house would be still more abstract if it were only the visual image of the printed word or the auditory image of the word spoken. In these cases, the re-presentative character of the image is entirely lacking, and the symbol is arbitrary. Any other word-symbol would do just as well, provided we agreed upon it.

There can be no doubt that the thinking of trained adults goes on very largely in terms of word-images or some other form of arbitrary symbols. Mathematics affords us a striking illustration of a field in which as you go from the lower to the higher and more advanced lines of investigation you necessarily employ more and more compact arbitrary symbols in order to carry on the thought process effectively. The more precise significance of the use of abstract images can be seen to better advantage if we postpone the discussion until we have worked out something on the nature and genesis of meaning.

3. THE NATURE AND GENESIS OF MEANING.

(1) Genesis of meaning.

For an illustration let us take a case of the development of meaning in perception. Suppose the child has never seen sugar. He now sees it in the form of a little cube. This cube can have no more meaning to him than any other white cube. But the child has a natural impulse to reach for the object which he sees. Vague perception is followed by reaction. As a result of the reaction process he ultimately gets hold of the lump of sugar. He gets new sensory experiences different from those which come from the smooth cubes of wood with which he has played. Perhaps he likes the new sensations. If so, they make a more vivid

impression and with repeated experiences get ciated with the visual appearance of the cube. to the laws of association, if either of these occurs alone it tends to suggest the other. C if the child gets the characteristic visual appe mind now supplies, without his going through process of reaching, the characteristic quality o which would result from reaching and touchin case the visual appearance has operated as a syn gest something not given. That which is s meaning.

Or if the touch sensation is that which is giv mind supplies, without the child's going through of looking, the characteristic color and form touch sensation has operated as a symbol and th form are elements of meaning. If the child through play reactions with the cube of sugar, its touch may suggest these play experiences ag play experiences are anticipated on the basis given, then they become a part of the meaning

Through still other reactions having their deepseated impulse the child will almost inevita piece of sugar in his mouth and thus get a ne sensations, those of taste, which will become with the others. If, when the piece of sugar visual qualities suggest the sweet taste, then th tion in advance of the reaction which would br case of meaning of sugar for the child.

The genesis of meaning is, then, to be explain such way as this:-Reaction to data given to results in further sensory experience in terms o and of other senses. In process of time, as exp this sort repeat themselves in the activity of the such a firm association of the various related ph total experience is set up that when one of t

alone it suggests one or more of the further possible developments of the experience.

The data given to consciousness on the basis of which the mind responds in terms of meaning may be either senseperception data or images. If I see a stream of water and this perception suggests to me boating, quenching my thirst, going in bathing, in all of these cases I have meanings attached to water. My mind runs on beyond the percept water as something which affects my vision in certain characteristic ways to further results which could be secured from reactions to this thing in certain specific ways. These anticipations are meanings. This is equally true in the case that the water is not actually present to sense but is embodied in the form of an image, either concrete or abstract. If these anticipations follow upon the emergence of the image, then they are elements of meaning of which the image is the symbol.

(2) Definition of meaning.

From the point of view just developed we may formulate in functional terms a definition of meaning somewhat as follows Meaning is the mental anticipation of the outcome, or result, of reactions not yet made, but which might be made, in response to data immediately given to sense or to images arising in the mind.

(3) Correlativity of meaning and symbol.

We can easily see now that meaning and symbol must be correlative. Each involves the other necessarily. That which is suggested is meaning, and that which suggests it is the symbol, or carrier, of the meaning. In terms of content, that which is meaning at one time may be symbol at another, and vice versa. The color and form of the object may suggest to the child the sweetness of sugar in advance of his putting it to the mouth. Again, if the lump of sugar is not seen, but is tasted only, the sweetness may suggest color and form in advance of turning the eyes upon the object. In the first case, color and form operate as symbol

to suggest the meaning sweetness; in the other, sweetness to the taste operates as the symbol to suggest the element of meaning color and form. There is no such thing as absolute symbol and no such thing as absolute meaning. The two, meaning and symbol, are correlative, but not fixed and absolute.

In every experience which has meaning for us, analysis is always capable of distinguishing between certain elements which may be regarded as given and as having little or no value in themselves, but only for what they signify, and certain other elements which are supplied by the mind and which are significant. Without meaning there is no symbol; what we call a symbol is not a real symbol, but only an empty form. It is equally true, but more difficult to understand and more easily overlooked, that without symbol there is no meaning. If we have any experience which is absolutely contained within itself, suggesting nothing not immediately given, not serving as the basis of any anticipation,-in other words, to which the mind adds or supplies absolutely nothing, this experience may have some sensational and perhaps some feeling value, but it cannot be said to have any meaning for the person who has the experience. To connect this thought with the familiar doctrine of apperception, this is an experience of something totally new and it is not apperceived.

The element of meaning involved in experiences of recognition seems difficult to bring under our conception and definition. But even here there is undoubtedly some splitting up of the immediate experience into two phases, one of which is symbolic and the other suggested, only here the two phases are so closely related that it is hard to distinguish them from each other. When we have the experience of recognizing our friend Jackson, that is virtually mentally assuming that he is the same person whom we saw yesterday. In this case we at least supply a setting different from that of the present by way of a foil to bring out