on the process is merely the application of that general notion. But the active search for the appropriate general notion is a very vital part of the whole process. The significant point in deduction is that, whether it starts with general notions or whether the general notions have to be searched out, in any case it works with general notions which are accepted or unquestioned. The problem is not one of perfecting the tools of thinking, but of using those we already have. (2) Criticism of the formula, "Induction is a process of going from particulars to the general.” The inductive process does not necessarily start, as the catch-phrase would suggest, with a group of given particulars, or individuals. These particulars may have to be sought after very diligently. Psychologically, the process of induction normally starts with something problematic in a concept or law. This general notion had been hitherto taken for granted, it was adequate within the limits of its previous applications. But now it fails at some point, it is unsatisfactory and calls for further investigation. Take for example the Ptolemaic system. For centuries it seemed adequate to the explanation and interpretation of the phenomena of the heavenly bodies. Even eclipses could be accurately predicted on its basis. But, later, facts were discovered which this theory could not adequately control. Doubt was thrown upon its validity. This resulted in further investigations of the phenomena of the heavens with this particular point in view. These investigations ultimately culminated in a reconstruction of the concept of the universe. The Copernican system was not entirely new; it retained much that was characteristic of the older system, but reconstructed it at critical points, noticeably in the position which the sun occupies in the system. When a concept becomes problematic, we turn to the investigation of the individuals which fall, or might possibly fall, under this concept. This phase of the inductive process might be described as virtually proceeding from the general to the particulars,-just the reverse of what the popular formula has it. But the study of the individuals is taken up for the sake of arriving at a more adequate concept. This phase of the process is virtually proceeding in harmony with the popular formula, "from individuals to the general." But the tension of mind due to the breaking down, or failure, of the general notion and the active search for, and selection of, the proper individuals for investigation, is a very vital part of the whole inductive thinking process. This dynamic aspect should not be ignored in a complete psychology of induction. The emphatic point of this discussion is that induction does not start out with individuals, or particulars, which are given, but the critical thing in the whole process is a general notion which is problematic and calls for reconstruction through the search for, and investigation of, individuals which are not problematic. (3) Deduction and induction to be distinguished in terms of locus of problem. In defining deduction and induction we cannot seize upon the movement from general to particular or from particulars to general as the most significant thing. From the functional point of view, it is more significant to get the exact locus of the problem. The deductive movement starts with a problematic individual; the inductive with a problematic concept or law. The deductive movement is concerned with finding and applying the proper accepted concept to interpret the individual and bring it under control; the inductive movement is concerned with the perfecting of the problematic concept so that it shall adequately control indisputable particulars. If we once get the locus of the problem as our starting point, the form of the movement of thought is secondary and dependent. There will, of course, be a characteristic difference in the form of the movement of thought in deduc tion and induction because the locus of the problem is different. But we should distinguish, as our definitions attempt to do, between the two phases of thinking not by the secondary difference in form, but by the primary difference in function. 5. THINKING IN ITS RELATION TO SYSTEM Of Knowledge. (1) General statement. Thinking presupposes some sort of a system of knowledge. Thinking must make use of past experience as well as present, but this past experience cannot be said to have mental existence in the form of isolated chunks. There is always some degree of organization or unity or wholeness to our past experiences. They have some sort of a setting, or context; they represent systems, rather than isolated facts. It is a commonplace of modern psychology that consciousness always gives some sort of vague wholes from the very beginning. To the unreflective activities of apperception and crude imagination we must ascribe the first vague unities, or systems, of knowledge which rise above the purely perceptual level. As we have seen in our earlier discussions, the child's imagination in the period from two and one-half years of age until six or seven is very active and is an important factor in enlarging and giving something of definite form to his experiences. His imagination is a solvent for the holding together in larger wholes, at least in terms of emotional congruency and satisfaction, elements that would otherwise seem discordant. We have seen that the child's experiences tend continually in an unreflective way to develop meanings, and these meanings tend to crystallize about certain symbols, and thus knowledge gets some sort of organization in the form of class concepts, laws, and principles. Now the point of this discussion is this, that wherever you may conceive that the thinking process starts in the life of the child, there will always be some sort of a system, or better, systems of knowledge, within which it works. The thinking process may operate within existing organizations, or systems, of knowledge, utilizing accepted ideas as the basis of adjusting means to ends; or, finding an existing organization of experience inadequate to perform the function of controlling action, the thinking process may be concerned with its reconstruction and perfection as a tool of thought. But in either case, whether the movement of thought be deductive or inductive, the starting point is within some system of knowledge. (2) Relation of deduction to the system. Deduction presupposes some system of already organized knowledge, which is, for the time being at least, unquestioned. The mind already has a stock of general notions,— concepts, definitions, laws, and principles,-which are relevant to the problem of thought. The individual which is problematic is conceived of as belonging to some particular system, only we do not know at once just how or where. But, as the system is already organized, every part of it has relation to every other part. It is possible, then, to start at any point in the system and to pass through the whole system to any other point by making explicit the series of relationships, or ties of connection, involved. Deduction makes explicit, by a process of analysis, the relation between the problematic individual and other individuals within the same system, and by an act of synthesis this individual is given its place within that system of relationships. When the place of the individual is definitely recognized, or made explicit, and its function within that system is seen, then the deductive movement is complete, and the individual is interpreted and brought under control. In saying that deductive thinking presupposes a system of already organized knowledge which is brought to bear upon the individual to interpret and control it, it is not to be implied that in bringing this individual under the prevailing general notion the system is in no way modi fied. In deduction, however, the system of already organized knowledge, in the form of concepts, laws, etc., is the dominating, or controlling factor. But every general notion is modified in some respect by bringing under it a new individual. (3) Relation of induction to the system. Induction presupposes not necessarily the absence of an organized system of knowledge but merely some inadequacy in that system to control certain individuals. Take for illustration the case already cited of Ptolemaic astronomy. Induction operates within a system, but that system is one which is being organized or reconstructed. Its function is to so reconstruct and reorganize a system of relationships that as the outcome the general notion which results shall be adequate to the control of the individuals concerned. But there must be some system of knowledge relevant to the process to give some definite point of view for the process of investigation and reconstruction. Supplementary Readings for Chapters XVIII, XIX and XX James, Psychology, Ch. 22. Welton, Logical Bases of Education, pp. 116-22 and Chs. 9, 10. 13. Bagley, The Educative Process, Chs. 19 and 20. McMurry, Elements of General Method, Ch. 5. McMurry, Method of the Recitation, Chs. 8 and 9. |