dynamic relations to each other, one as subject and the other as predicate. Judgment set up the relationship between the two, or at least developed it and made it explicit. After this has been done and the judgment process is expressed in the form of the proposition, then it is possible to compare the two concepts and assert or deny one or the other. But to view this comparison of the two concepts as judgment would be to take the point of view of the finished product and to make the results of its analysis our standard for defining the whole process. This would ignore the most dynamic aspect, the tension and strain of mental activity, in the live judgment as it actually takes place.

3. CONDITIONS OF JUDGMENT.

The function of judgment is called forth under conditions of doubt or uncertainty of some sort which interferes with reaction, mental or motor. It is then necessary for us to raise the question "What is this?" We have to evaluate the situation, interpret it, judge it with reference to what we shall regard as its essential characteristic for the purpose of dealing with it satisfactorily. When the situation is satisfactorily interpreted, then it is possible for the reaction to take place in accordance with the result of our judgment.

4. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. (1) Judgment in the application of accepted concepts.

It is not a real live judgment which ordinarily gets expression in the proposition, "This is a book." We do not stop to evaluate the experience. The object is familiar; there is no doubt. We know exactly how to deal with this book experience. We make the appropriate motor reaction or the appropriate transition in thought by habit. But if the question arises, "How shall I catalogue this book?" and we are uncertain whether it should be classed as metaphysics, as logic, or as psychology; then a real process of judgment is called forth. We try to bring the work first

under one of these concepts, then another, through a definite investigation of its essential characteristics. On the basis of our investigation we definitely evaluate the problematic situation, and we bring the book under the concept metaphysics. The act of judgment is then complete, and its result may be expressed in the proposition, "This is a book on metaphysics." It is evident that as soon as our judgment is complete, we know how to catalogue the book, that is, our method of reaction is determined. The illustration given is a case of judgment in which a well-defined concept, namely metaphysics, furnished the idea to which the problematic experience of cataloguing was referred for successful interpretation.

(2) Judgment in the process of building up concepts. We have already noticed that in the process of building up concepts, as for example the concept of trade center, there was a constant process of evaluation, or judgment, going on. What is it that makes Minneapolis a trade center? Is the waterfall a factor? Is the river a factor? Is the abundance of forests along the river a factor? In the process of comparison of Minneapolis with Chicago, the relevancy of each one of these to the problem had to be judged, or evaluated. And in the process of abstraction there was further judgment as to just what characteristics were essential to the idea of trade center. Thus it is evident that not only is judgment a phase of the application of concepts to the interpretation of problematic experiences, but that it is also an important activity in the building up of concepts. In other words, it is the dynamic element in both deduction and induction.

5. JUDGMENT AND THINKING.

Whether our thinking be the inductive movement from individuals toward a more perfect concept, or whether it be the deductive movement of applying concepts to the interpretation of problematic individual experiences, in so far as

this process is active and dynamic, the vital aspect of the thinking process is judgment. Wherever there is an activity of mental reconstruction going on, there is judgment, This act of judgment does not seem to be describable in terms of a comparison of two concepts and a resulting affirmation or denial of connection between them. It is rather an analysis and development of some problematic situation with reference to the discovery of connections between elements of that situation and elements of previous experience, connections that we can take advantage of in seeing the situation from some point of view which shall give it meaning and put it under our control. Such processes of evaluation are certainly a very necessary phase of the ability to deal with novel data, which Mr. James regards as the very essence of the reasoning process.

6. JUDGMENT IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT.

Many writers recognize a difference between judgments in terms of their implicit or their explicit character. This difference is analogous to the distinction between psychological and logical concepts. Implicit judgment, if we may use the term at all in speaking of judgment, is, like the psychological concept, unreflective in character; while explicit judgment is, like the logical concept, reflective.

(1) Implicit judgment.

If I hear the whistle blow and say, "It is noon," this is an implicit judgment. The situation presented by the perception of the whistle blowing is almost instantly cleared up by the application of the concept noon hour. Judgment always presupposes some ground for the interpretation given. In this case, the ground of inference is present, but it is used unreflectively and almost automatically. The inference is the outcome of a complex of very closely associated past experiences, including probably the daily repetition of the same tone quality of the whistle, repeated examinations of my watch on the occasion of the whistle's

blowing and finding that it was twelve o'clock, frequent experiences of eating my dinner immediately after the whistle blew, uniformly seeing the workingmen come from the factory at the signal of the whistle, etc. As a result of the close association set up between the various items of this complex of experiences, now, when I hear the whistle blow, this single item of experience may touch off any one or all of the other items of the complex immediately as an interpretation of the auditory experience. This immediate interpretation is likely to take the form, "It is noon." But it might take the form, "The men in the factory will quit work," or "I ought to eat my dinner now," or "If I look at my watch now, I can tell whether I have the right time, or not." These all might be implicit judgments, having a ground in past experience, but that ground being utilized unreflectively.

(2) Explicit judgment.

Suppose that I receive a letter. I look at the handwriting, and see that it is that of Mr. Jones. I notice that the letter is registered. I remember that Mr. Jones owes me some money. I conclude then, that Mr. Jones has sent me a payment on his note. If my judgment that Mr. Jones has sent me a payment on his note is consciously based upon these grounds, then the judgment is explicit. My judgment, "It will rain to-morrow," is explicit, if I base it on the recognized ground, “The wind is shifting to the south." All the judgments in a demonstration in geometry are explicit.

By an explicit judgment, we mean one in which the ground of the judgment has been brought out clearly. Such a case of judgment is called inference. The ground of the inference in reflective judgment operates reflectively in consciousness. Inference is judgment made explicit through pointing out, mentally at least, the ground, or basis, of the judgment.

7. JUDGMENT AND OTHER MENTAL FUNCTIONS.

Judgment is implicitly involved in the percept, in the psychological concept, and in unreflective forms of thinking. It is explicitly involved in the logical concept and in all forms of reflective thinking.

If we are on the sea and some dim object looms up on the horizon, our percept of it is apt to be very vague, but the sailor quite likely sees it at once as a lighthouse, or as a vessel. What makes the difference between his percept and ours? Certainly not the sensory data; for we all have the same. But he has had a great deal of experience in judging, or evaluating, such vague experiences, so that now the process of evaluation works practically automatically and is swallowed up in the perception process. Here judgment is implicit in the percept. What is true in this case of perception is true in all our definite percepts of things. Judgment is implicit in every developed percept.

In an earlier chapter we gave the boy's concept of chestnut tree, of hickory tree, etc., as illustrations of psychological concepts. These concepts involve implicitly judgment. There is a ground, or reason, for calling one tree a chestnut tree and another a hickory tree, but in the conceptual process the ground does not operate reflectively. In the case of the logical concept chestnut tree, as we have already explained in our study of the logical concept, the elements of meaning have been brought explicitly to consciousness. What does this mean but that virtually in the formation of the logical concept a series of explicit judgments have been made? The logical concept summarizes, as it were, and condenses, or holds in solution, a whole group of evaluations of situations of the same general class or type.

Reasoning, as we shall see later, differs largely from less highly reflective types of thinking, in that the grounds of all inferences are explicitly pointed out, or that they operate reflectively in consciousness. Judgment, in reasoning, is explicit.