removed. There then arises the question of how it shall be done. Finding the first solution, that of picking them off with the fingers, a very slow process, and knowing that cotton cloth is very cheap, the question arises whether there is not some better way of removing the seeds. The child may be led to conceive this problem for himself, and to undertake its solution. His attempt to solve the problem helps to define the problem more sharply and prepares him for a right understanding of the method and the significance of the invention of the cotton gin. One of the chief values of manual training and of all the forms of laboratory science is to be found in the fact that the pupil can be made, through the results of his own activities, to confront new problems of thought the nature of which he rightly conceives and the solution of which is not formal but inherently necessary for the completion of his concrete work.

4. THE UNITY AND CONTINUITY OF INTELLECT, FEELING, AND WILL.

Intellect, feeling, and will are not so much structural as functional distinctions. They all have their significance within one whole of activity in which adjustment is being effected to a given situation.

(1) Their functional distinction.

The functional distinction between intellect, feeling, and will may be roughly sketched through the use of an illustration. Suppose that I am paddling up a stream with a canoe. At a bend in the stream I suddenly come upon a stretch of very swift rapids. My routine activity is interrupted and now becomes problematic. The situation as a whole is immediately reflected in my consciousness in the form of feeling. I am surprised and probably disappointed. Now this flood of feeling will probably operate to bring sharply into the focus of my consciousness the idea of my purpose or end, which hitherto may have functioned only marginally. I did so want to get a good catch of fish to-day! And the

sharpening of the consciousness of my end, an intellectual process, defines more sharply my feeling of disappointment. I cannot be satisfied without having that good catch of fish. If the overcoming of the obstacle appeals to the self thus as vital, as something without which the self cannot be satisfied, then feeling is the stimulus to the arousal of further cognitive, or intellectual, processes. I must find out some way of overcoming the obstacle, I must get beyond the rapids. Perception, memory, imagination, thinking, one or all, may be called forth to define the situation more perfectly and to find the proper method of dealing with it. I observe the stream more carefully. Are there too many rocks? Perhaps there is some portion of the stream that is not so swift as the rest. I examine carefully to see. The thought occurs to carry the canoe. I remember that I did this once before and found it very heavy. I discover a footpath along the stream. The boat is too heavy when I am in it to paddle against the current. But I may walk in the footpath and drag the canoe up the stream. I have thought out a solution of the problem. When a solution of the problem is reached, then the motor tendency which has been held in abeyance in the meantime is released. But it does not operate blindly. It is under the guidance of a definite image of the end to be realized, and it is determined in its course by the idea of the means which have been chosen in solving the problem. This controlling of action by ideas is will.

While no single illustration can serve adequately to show the precise functions of intellect, feeling, and will, this one may have served the purpose of making clear what we mean by saying that the distinctions are essentially functional ones, each having a specific significance within one whole of adjustment activity. The sketch here given has also indicated roughly the general nature of the functions which are subserved by intellect, feeling, and will.

(2) Their essential unity.

The very method which we have employed to show that intellect, feeling, and will are functional distinctions has also emphasized their unity and continuity. This thought will now be developed a little more fully. The mere persistence of motor impulse is not will. The rat running around and around in his cage in the vain endeavor to escape is not giving a real manifestation of will. The child who fights and kicks and screams when thwarted is not truly exercising his will. The motor tendencies escaping in these cases are the raw material of will. They are basic only. Without the light of ideas will is blind and indistinguishable from pure impulse. Action is accordingly inefficient. Will is not an independent thing; it is merely the control of action by ideas.

Without feeling there is no worth-whileness, and on that account nothing gets done, no matter how clear a conception of the end there may be or how definitely the mode of procedure may be worked out. Feeling is the me-side of the whole complex of conscious processes involved in adjustment, and it cannot be separated from them without their losing all motivation and dynamic character.

Without cognition there is no past experience available for use and no possibility of conceiving ends and of making plans to realize them, and hence there is no control of problematic situations. No matter how much energy of motor impulse there may be present, no matter how much dissatisfaction of the self may be involved in the present situation, without the cognitive processes there can be no secure and satisfactory adjustment, except in cases where there is a solution already determined by some hereditary organization of activity or by some previously organized habitual mode of action.

In problematic situations all three phases of consciousness are necessary, and all three are interrelated and mutually interdependent. They are not separate structures; they are

rather organizations of consciousness in different ways, each mode of conscious activity being adapted to a particular phase of the work needing to be done in the facilitation of adjustment. They are to be regarded as phases, or attitudes, or aspects of the one unitary consciousness which appear within the complete mental act to meet specific needs within the process of adjustment. One or the other of them may be predominant in any given situation and give its name to the whole movement of consciousness according as the stress falls primarily on the problem phase of the act (intellect), or on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the self (feeling), or on the motor aspect of overcoming obstacles or resolving conflicts through activities which takes place under the guidance and direction of ideas (will). 5. THE FALLACY OF ISOLATING INTELLECT, Feeling, and WILL IN TRAINING.

From this functional interpretation of intellect, feeling, and will, which is inherent in the concept of the organic circuit, we can see clearly that it is abnormal and formal to isolate any one of these fundamental aspects of consciousness for separate and independent training.

(1) Isolation of the intellectual aspect.

The isolation of the intellectual phase of consciousness in the process of training is preeminently the fallacy of formal discipline. When the intellect is set apart from its relation to feeling and to action, we make the discipline of memory, imagination, and thinking purely formal. The dynamic aspect is lacking; the worth-whileness that is experienced in the form of feeling, the push-from-behind that comes from the consciousness of value to the self, is not continually stimulating and reënforcing the cognitive activities. Take away the feeling of relevancy to a situation which concerns me, and you take away the very heart of the intellectual process. The feeling element is, then, essential to the training of the intellect. This is usually recognized at the

present time in the demand that the child's interest be aroused. Our analysis shows from the scientific point of view why we must secure the interest of the child.

Neither can the training of the intellect normally be isolated from the motor process. The great function of the higher psychical processes is to give more adequate control over experience. In other words, their right-to-be consists in the fact that they are an integral phase of a more perfect will. The whole intellectual activity is pointless unless it is to eventuate somehow in the modification or control of action, or else in the determination of some attitude which shall make a difference to future actions. Intellectual processes have their significance in the contribution which they make to individual control. If this is true, then cultivation of intellect apart from either healthy interest on the one side or appropriate and controlled motor expression on the other side is abnormal.

(2) Isolation of the feeling aspect.

If we accept the functional interpretation of feeling, we cannot expect to train the feelings, or sentiments, of the child properly by devising exercises which are wholly imaginary for the sake of calling the feelings forth. Fairy stories may serve a useful function in stimulating the backward imagination and hastening the process of its development, but they are inadequate as means of cultivating the sentiments of the child. They deal in too many unreal situations, which furnish him with no illustrations of how to employ his sentiments in the world in which he actually lives. Feeling has normally a function to perform in the whole process of activity. It is an important factor in furthering certain activities and in checking others. Respect for the aged, reverence for parents, the love of the beautiful, pride in fair play, righteous indignation over the wrongs of the poor and oppressed, etc., cannot be adequately inculcated through words. Situations which arise must be seized upon in which these sentiments are called forth in the