endowment of impulses and a meager endowment of instincts, man's conscious processes must be developed more fully, and he ultimately attains a superior adjustment.

d. Relation of consciousness to instinctive action. Consciousness cannot have much determining or controlling part in instinctive action. The organization of the motor processes is too fully determined by heredity to leave much room for conscious processes to function. Powerful impulses are stirred up easily by the presence of certain kinds of situations and they drain out into prepared pathways of nervous discharge, producing reactions characteristic of the species. Both the impulses and the modes of reaction adapted to satisfy them have been built up by natural selection in the process of evolution and are now a natural heritage of the species. Hence we cannot expect them to be dependent upon individual experience in any large measure. We should expect the consciousness involved in instinctive action, then, to be of a very low and vague order.

(a) Feeling involved in instinctive action.

In purely instinctive modes of reaction, neither the end to be realized nor the form of the reaction process by which it is to be realized are determined by consciousness. The inner impulse is blind. Yet it is not necessarily an unconscious impulse. It may be, and probably is, in many cases an impulse which makes itself felt in consciousness in the form of a vague feeling. Migrating species of birds, when kept in captivity from their birth, have been known to manifest great restlessness when the migrating season came around. If this restlessness was not merely physical but psycho-physical, it must have been reflected in consciousness in the form of feeling. There was no basis for an intellectual consciousness of an end to be achieved nor of a method of achieving it. The feeling could get no definition in terms of past experience. The specific reaction which should relieve the tension is determined by laws of nervous

action which act in correlation with the phy cesses characteristic of a certain stage of Feeling may be a factor in instinctive action of reënforcing motor tendencies which are determines not at all what shall be done or done, but only that something shall be done.

If the reader is not satisfied with this illust apply the same line of thought to the case of upon eggs, the rabbit "freezing," the child fi of anger, or the man who has always been pea resenting some insulting remark by a knock-d the last instance, there is quite likely no one n than the man himself at what he has done. factor in determining that motor discharge place, but consciousness cannot be said to ha the method of reaction nor to have directed a the response.

(b) Sense perception involved in insti While consciousness does not rise to the ceiving ends in instinctive action, and hence mine either the what or the how of action, ye something to do with keeping the action gc instinctive impulse is satisfied. This it seems a process of sense perception which is more ideational in character.

Instinctive action is made up of a series of which would usually have any value in itself. acts are parts of a larger whole of action w developed under the stress of a powerful i "seeks" satisfaction. The satisfaction of th possible only through the right correlation sensory situations. The sense perception pro to further the development of the impulse and tinuity to the series of acts. Let us take the building as an illustration. The bird is at development, or at that seasonal period, whe

physical impulse to rear young is asserting itself. The nest building impulse is a part of this larger whole, and this instinct begins to assert itself. The seeing of a straw is relevant to this impulse. If it were not, the straw would in all probability not have been noticed. Thus the inner impulse operates as a factor in the selection of stimuli to which the organism shall respond. The seeing of the straw is the occasion for an act, the picking up of the straw. Thus the sense perception process furthers the development of the activity through which the impulse shall be satisfied. In like manner we might follow the process through the acts of flying with the straw in the mouth and of laying it down in the crotch of a limb, and with the repetition of the series until the situation presenting itself to sense perception ultimately satisfies the impulse. Now the point which we wish to make clear as a result of this discussion is that while the chaining together of a series of acts into an instinctive mode of action is in part due to the fact that a fundamental impulse operates in the selection of stimuli, yet the development of the activity is one which involves conscious processes in the form of sense perception.

We must not, however, read into the sense perception processes which function in the instinctive action of animals the characteristics of our human perceptual processes. The sense perceptions of the animal may be so purely organic in character that we could hardly ascribe any intellectual character at all to them. The selective character of the instinctive impulse, of which we have spoken, is to be viewed as organically teleological rather than ideationally purposive. It is due to a strong predisposition of the inherited constitution of the nervous system toward certain forms of activity. The satisfaction of the animal's impulses through these forms of activity puts a premium on certain kinds of sensory experience which are relevant to them. Consequently the form of activity and the receptiveness to certain kinds of sense perception have become correlated

Th

in the process of evolution. For example, ten is under the stress of the instinctive imp there is a pre-adjustment of the animal's sense eye is strained to see and the ear to hear. drained out from the surcharged centers into p motor channels with the result of giving the "set" to the organism which we call "watchin When the right sensory impressions are recei kitten springs upon the moving object. But that the perception process did not involve any past experience, that is, any image process; f had not yet had any opportunity to acquire m responding to the motor process. It is doubtfu have the right to call the consciousness involve at all.

Even with experience, the sensory processes the instinctive action of animals must be less character than our human percepts. We manip more than the animals do, reacting to them variety of ways, and we also reflect upon our Hence our percepts are freighted with a richer: of the results of past experiences, and they are and through with the results of higher psychic In perception, all of these experiences, both ideational, function automatically to determin of the percept. A piece of paper is perceived very different way from that by which it is pe cat. I have utilized paper in so many differ compared with her. I can charge this scrap o meaning which flows over into it from my men imagination. This I usually do not stop to do. psychical processes function automatically to gi an internally richer character than it can have f (c) Organic memory involved in instin When instinctive actions are repeated in the more intelligent animals, doubtless they are mc

result of experience. Even if consciousness assumed no higher form than that of organic sense perception this would be true; for past experiences of the sensory type modify the psycho-physical disposition, and through this modification to some extent they modify action wherever action and sensory presentation need to be closely correlated. But some of the animals show evidence of possessing rudimentary memory. Attempts to take advantage of this memory in the training of animals, however, seem to indicate that it is of the organic type sometimes called associative memory. The results of past experience are retained but not imaged. The memory is little more than a complex of associations which have been set up and perfected very slowly and which now operate almost mechanically.

e. Instinctive action and the problem of control.

Our discussion of instinctive action has served to make it evident that in this class of acts we have the animals exercising considerable control over their environment. But allowing all that we can for the function of consciousness, we see that the sphere of its operations is very limited. Some small modifications of action can be effected, but they fall quite well, as a rule, within the limits of modes of action that are after all predetermined in their essential character. And the conscious processes which function are on a level that is more organic than intellectual. Past experience can be used very little, if at all, in the conscious determination of action. The control which animals exercise is what we have in an earlier place called racial control. It meets the needs of the organism only in so far as those needs are of a general character common to all the individuals of the species.

Perhaps the writer ought to apologize for working out in such detail in a book on the psychology of thinking the psychology of instinctive action. He may, perhaps, be pardoned on the ground that so little has been done with instinctive action from this point of view. It will not be necessary in leading up to the specific conditions and func