WILL HAVE TO COME DOWN WHETHER OR NO, in order to reduce the unnecessary income.

It is perfectly apparent that the time has arrived in the carrying out of the policy for Coast Defense, when it is urgently necessary to commence the provision for the proper increase in the personnel of the Artillery Corps and in the militia; and it seems that the expected conditions in the Nation's financial affairs could not be more propitious to such an end. On the 30th of June, 1903, this Corps was short 26,000 of the men necessary for one relief for the manning tables for the armament then actually in position. (See Journal Military Service Institute, April, 1904, p. 220.) The proposed scheme would not provide one-fifth of this shortage for the first year, nor would it provide the full number required until after fifteen years; and not even then if future conditions repeat those which have so changed during the past fifteen years.

etc.

There is another feature of the situation that will be viewed with more complacence from the political standpoint. A congressional delegation securing an appropriation of a million and a quarter for its state would be considered as having done a great thing for their constituents. The pay, etc., of the garrisons of each artillery district when completed will amount to about that sum, not for one year, but annually for all time; and the pay, etc., for a regiment of Field Artillery together with horses, etc., will amount to about the same annually, aside from the million and a third for barracks and quarters, There are twenty-two states, having forty-four Senators and 207 Representatives, having Coast Defenses within their limits, six others having twelve Senators and thirty-seven Representatives on the northern frontiers, along which the Endicott Board located defenses, and along which at least three siege artillery regiments should be distributed, and six other States in which Field Artillery regiments would be stationed. Besides this the scheme proposed provides for sixteen other regimental posts for the field artillery, which should be located: Ist, where good horses and forage abound; 2d, in a mild climate which will enable men and horses to be out without inconvenience throughout much of the year, and 3d, near a mountainous country where large reservations can be secured at little cost, insuring field artillery practice up to a range of at least 7,000 yards. Such conditions will be found in California, Kansas and the District of Columbia (?), for the three regiments of Horse Artillery.

In Pennsylvania, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and Oregon for six regiments of light Field Artillery, and in Georgia, Alabama, Missouri, Arkansas, Washington and California for six

regiments of Heavy Field Artillery. The three Siege Artillery regiments distributed to Vermont, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska and Montana. (It should be remembered that there is another condition connected with the distribution of the field artillery, namely: in a manner convenient to the organization of the military forces into army corps.) Of the two regiments of mountain artillery, one would be on so-called "foreign" service, and the other stationed in Missouri where plenty of the best mules are found. A large majority of the sixty-six Senators and nearly 300 Representatives would be politically very much interested in the distribution of the money necessary for carrying out the policy of National Defense. It is also the duty of a wise statesman to previse if possible, so that the money collected by the Government for its expenses shall return to the people as equally as possible, which would very largely be the case in carrying out this policy. An army is generally supposed to be a great but necessary evil; all things considered this is very far from being the truth, even in the most military nations. There are many and great mitigating circumstances; not the least of which is the fact that every dollar of military appropriations in this country almost immediately find its way back to the pockets of the taxpayer.

It is beyond question that the Field, should be separated from the Coast Artillery, and reorganized into regiments as is the case all over the world. There is no more nor any less reason for organizing troops of cavalry and companies of infantry into regiments, than batteries of Field Artillery. They all belong definitely and absolutely to a FIELD army; forming the "three arms" thereof, and none having any direct connection with Coast Artillery more than another.

It is also beyond question that the same policy should be applied to the Field Artillery that has so wisely been applied to the cavalry arm of our service, and to a less extent in every modern army; namely; to provide the maximum possible strength for both arms of the mounted service, because these arms are entirely too costly to find representation in the militia, and require entirely too long a period for the acquisition of efficiency to be depended upon in either the militia or volunteer forces of this country, in these days of sudden and powerful attack.

To advocate the continuation of our already established policy in the manner and to the extent indicated, will no doubt excite no small amount of interest, and not in its favor-at first at least. But when it is understood that it is only carrying to a logical and extremely wise conclusion a policy already adopted, and which has been followed for

fifteen years, and at great cost under adverse financial conditions, it will present a very different aspect.

When the question of the recent organization of the Army was up for consideration, the party in opposition was bitterly opposed to any increase of the Army other than for coast defense. The reasons for such a force appeal directly to every mind, and the Coast Artillery stands before the people in much the same light as does the Navy. In fact the latter would have no value as a military force unless the Coast Artillery could insure for it a safe and certain base of operations in the harbors it defends.

This country is at last "up against it," as the common saying has it, and there is no sense whatever in not squarely facing the problem, and correctly solving it at once. The questions of expediency and of makeshifts are peurile and unworthy the consideration of even a reasonably wise politician, much less a statesman. One of these is to confine the service of the regular Artillerymen to that of the heavy guns and mortars, and turn the rapid fire armament over to the militia. As well might the Regular Army be confined to a single arm— the field artillery or the cavalry, and depend upon the militia for the other arms. Such a proposition is not one whit more absurd than

the other.

One or the other of the arms of the service is at some time of vastly greater importance in battle than either of the others, or both. But it requires the combination of the three arms to make an efficient army. The same applies to the Coast Artillery; the heavy guns, the rapid-fire guns, the submarine defenses and the mobile defenses on land and water. At some time in battle any one of these will become of much greater importance than all else, and in case of the rapid-fire guns the stress, confusion and danger will be greater than all else combined, requiring not the poorest, but by far the coolest, bravest and most efficient of all the personnel of the Coast Artillery.

According to the experiences of many generations of artillerymen in coast defense, there should be three reliefs to complete the manning tables for the armament in war. We have no valid reason for believing that this requirement is not just as absolute as it ever was; for some of the duties it is even more so. This would call for 213,000 men and 6,000 officers, all in the regular Artillery Corps to properly and adequately man our defenses when completed, and there is no one wise enough in this day or generation to say authoritatively that every man of this force is not necessary in case of a sudden and powerful attack, or that such an attack is not possible. When we ask for a single one of the necessary three reliefs of regular artillerymen, sub

stitute a relief of militia artillerymen for the second (except in foreign parts), and discard the third relief entirely, it may be confidently asserted that we have gone much further in the direction of expediency than wisdom dictates.

This, then, may safely be asserted to be as far as we dare go and still believe that we can, under such conditions, put up an efficient and certain defense. This is certainly the minimum that any authority. upon the subject of Coast Defense has ever accepted as possible, and this, then, is what we should demand, and what the military powers that be should approve and aid us to the utmost in securing, and that in turn the statesmen, and the Congress in power should call into being.

If we are to trust to a militia artillery for one relief in war, provision should be made for very much more active service at the guns than has ever been exacted from any militia in this country, in order to insure even a reasonable measure of efficiency. To require it to encamp at the fortifications for not less than fifteen days each year, and to drill thereat not less than twenty-two nor more than forty-five other days, would certainly be a minimum. But it would be utterly useless to expect this unless the men were paid, and provided with rations and transportation, etc., which for 59,000 officers and men would cost about $4,000,000 a year. If, then, this number of men is to have real value, that amount of money a year is certainly a mighty small sum with which to secure the services of so powerful a force of coast artillerymen; the fact would appear to be that the cost is so little that the article is a mighty "cheap" one indeed. However, if we can get intelligent men, and they will give fifty or sixty days' service during each year alongside our regular artillerymen and under their officers, we certainly should be able to turn out a better drilled, instructed and disciplined body of militia than this country has ever yet seen. At the same time it can be iterated that no militia in this country will ever submit to such a course of training unless adequately paid therefor; which pay should of course be the same-grade for grade as the regular artilleryman receives for each day of service at the guns.

With the strength of the Artillery Corps made exclusive of the 100,000 men authorized for the Army, its present strength (1904), of 67,259, as shown by the Army Register, would be reduced to 53,755, four regiments thereof being Field Artillery. The addition of one regiment, about 1,178 officers and men, would in twelve years bring the strength of the field army proper back to its present strength;

67,891 in 1917, and to 72,603 in 1921, or 5,344 more than the present strength of the "army" proper.*

At present the cavalry of the Army is capable of furnishing a brigade of cavalry to each of the six Army corps, with three regiments to spare.

With the scheme here proposed carried out by 1921, the field artillery could then provide each of these six corps with a regiment of light field artillery for the divisional, and a regiment of heavy field artillery, and a battalion of horse artillery for the corps artillery.

From the Infantry Drill Regulations, a brigade would consist of three regiments, 5,400 muskets; a division of two brigades, 10,800 muskets; a corps of three divisions, 31,400 muskets, 2,400 cavalry, and 4,600 field artillery, total for the corps 38,400 fighting men. With three armies of two corps each distributed along say the Atlantic and Gulf coast, each army would have a strength of 76,800 fighting men, exclusive of the militia in the vicinity of its station, the total strength being 220,400, requiring 108 regiments of infantry to complete the organization. Of these twenty would nominally be found in the continental United States, and eighty-eight regiments of militia would be required, or of volunteers in case of war.

It need hardly be said that a force of 220,000 men, even including also the militia, would find it no easy matter to defend our enormous coast line from New Brunswick to Mexico from a determined and powerful attack, to be delivered at some absolutely unknown point along this extensive frontier.

A very superficial study of our military condition will reveal the fact that other features of our National defense are not by any means what they should be, though not by any means so bad as those relating to Coast Artillery defense, and to the field artillery of the Army.

NOTE. Since the above was written the new drill regulations for the Coast Artillery have been received, which increases the gun attachments for 12-inch guns from the 18, upon which the total force of 71,000 artillerymen was computed, to 21 men; for a 10-inch gun from 14 to 19, and for an 8-inch gun from 12 to 17. As there was provision made by the Endicott Board for 356 such guns (to say nothing of the additional guns for new projects, and those for the so-called "foreign" defenses), the additional men required beyond the estimate herein presented will be 1,560 privates; so there need be no fears of an overestimate. The facts of the matter are that by 1920, any estimate now made will fall short by many thousands of the requirements of that date. This already mighty country is not going to stop grow*See July-August, 1904, number Journal of the United States Artillery.