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No. 828 of the Information Bureau of the Shipping Board. We quote the following:

"The supercargo is first expected to acquaint himself with the organization and history of the United States Shipping Board and the general duties of a supercargo as they relate to a ship and its cargo. Then he is taught enough about marine insurance to learn what bearing it has upon the profitable operation of ships. After that he must learn what is expected of him in observation and reports upon other matters. Voyage logs, port logs and history of water transportation must be mastered in detail, together with a full knowledge of charters, bills of lading, manifests and other routine matters aboard ship. The whole course of training is intended to develop the faculties of observation and perception in the student and unless he shows encouraging response in these lines, his chances for entering the service have touched the vanishing point.

"Once aboard ship the supercargo must still prove himself worthy of the important position for which he is training. He must show himself tactful, both in his relations with the officers and crew of the vessel to which he is attached and with the officers and workmen of ports and harbors where his vessel may touch. He is expected to make a report embracing practically everything of interest that happens, at sea, in port and ashore until his vessel is again tied up in her home port.

"The supercargo of to-day will perform the same duties under the advantage of direct telegraphic wireless and cable contact with ship operators. He also will act in conjunction with the captain of the ship in berthing the ship in foreign ports, in bunkering the ship and in all business pertaining to the operation of the ship with the object of reducing to a minimum the overhead charges. The consequent effect of such economies through efficient management upon freight rates will do much in keeping our shipping upon the seas."

Reasons for failure. However, the new institution could not resist very long the same tendency to change which characterized the other activities of shipping during the period of transition from war to peace times. When Chairman Payne succeeded Mr. Hurley, he practically abolished

the supercargo. His main reason was the constant friction between supercargo and master arising out of conflicting authority. Theoretically the supercargo was subject to the master's authority in all matters regarding the safety of ship and cargo. But beyond that, the line was not distinctly drawn. When asked by Senator Fletcher on March 10, 1920, what he intended to do about the supercargo, Chairman Payne said:

Mr. PAYNE. Let me say just a word about the supercargo. Of course, in August we had supercargoes on practically all of the ships. Constant controversies arose between the captain or master and the supercargo, and the division of responsibility seemed to me to paralyze both. If the captain is efficient and competent, you do not need a supercargo. If he is not efficient and competent, he is in command of the ship, and unless the supercargo is an exceptional person, he does not do much good. The greatest difficulty was, in my judgment, however, that the fact that you put a supercargo on a ship creates in the mind of the captain or master the impression that we are suspicious of him, and that instead of representing the Shipping Board, who employs him and pays him his salary, he represents the operators, and there is a conflict between the operators' side as represented by the captain and our side as represented by the supercargo. So that, with such an investigation as we gave to the subject, I think most of them concluded that wherever we could have a European agency, as a representative in the port, to take care of the port conditions, it was much wiser than to have a supercargo.1

The main function of the supercargo in war time was to assure despatch. Normal times will render this task less difficult. As to the training of American youth, other methods may be found.

Hearings for the Establishment of an American Merchant Marine, pp. 1885f.

REFERENCES

ANNIN, R. E. Ocean Shipping. Chap. XVII. (1920).

HUEBNER, G. G. Ocean Steamship Traffic Management. Part I. (1920).

UNITED STATES. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce. Training for the Steamship Business. Mis-
cellaneous Series No. 98. (1920).
Senate Committee on Commerce.
Establishment of an American Merchant Marine. (1919-1920).
Shipping Board, Bureau of Information. Various Press Notices.

Hearings relative to the

CHAPTER XXIII

CONCENTRATION AND COMBINATION

Aim of combination.-Ever since 1850, more particularly since 1870, a constant movement towards larger units of control has marked the evolution of the steamship business. This tendency has been particularly pronounced since the beginning of this century. A trend towards concentration is found not only in shipping but in most business activities. The aim is, invariably, increased profitableness, which is achieved in three ways: through an increased price or charge for commodities sold or services rendered; through a reduction of cost per unit produced; or through a lessening of the risk entailed. Most combinations serve one of these purposes, some more than one, and a few all. Forces driving shipping to greater concentration-As far as shipping is concerned, the causes underlying the movement towards concentration have largely to do with the increasing financial risk of the shipping business. The ship itself has grown costlier, competition more severe and the demands made by the shipper more exacting. All this is true much more of the liner than of the tramp. The tramp, not being bound to a given route, is not exposed to the vicissitudes that depressions, panics, crop failures, etc., bring to the liner. The latter has to stay in the service, unless goodwill, painstakingly built up by years of effort, is to be sacrificed. Rigidity, in other words, means increased risk, which is the greater if the field served by a given line is by nature of circumstances not a very lucrative one.

Growth of the single line.-The simplest form of concentration is represented by the expansion of the individual line. This may be achieved either by putting earnings into

additional ships or by increasing the outstanding capital, represented either by stocks and bonds, or indirectly, by absorbing other companies, or simply acquiring their assets. If company A absorbs company B we call it a merger; but if companies A and B form a new company, C, we apply the term amalgamation. In the following tables we give the names of the leading steamship companies together with the number of ships, and the aggregate gross tonnage. Table 1-British merchant fleets of over 100,000 tons gross:

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