tunities which Congress had to take into account. Thus, on August 18, 1914, an act was passed which eliminated the five-year age limit and also the requirement of "fitness to carry dry and perishable cargo"; in other words, removed all the modifications of the Panama Canal clause admitting foreign-built vessels to American registry Thus the doors were opened wider still. Ships entering American registry were allowed to retain foreign officers, which reversed the policy that the American flag could fly over no ships not officered by Americans. As a result some hundred and seventy-five to two hundred steam and sail vessels have come under the American flag. A large percentage of the boats was already employed in American trade, most of them the property of American citizens before their admission to American registry. The motive of shipowners in transferring their ships to American registry at the outset of the European war was to secure the protection of the flag of the most powerful neutral. The flag and the more favorable marine insurance rates constituted a generous subsidy to these ships for the time being. The Government also established a War Risk Bureau to insure American vessels during the war. This action afforded American vessels the same protection in the war zone as was given to vessels of other nations through the establishment of similar institutions. Little real encouragement can be found in the results of the Emergency Act of 1914, for in spite of the great inducements resulting from war conditions, there came a significant halt in seeking American registry. Fewer and fewer vessels applied for permission to fly the American flag. The Ship Purchase Bill.-Following the ship registry act, the preferential clause of the tariff and the War Risk Bureau, ambitious projects appeared to develop American shipping in foreign trade. At that junction a severe blow was struck by the administration's Ship Purchase Bill. In this, the Government announced its intention to operate ships in foreign trade under government control. Without leaving commercial and financial enterprise time to recover from the initial shock of the war, the Government took this unfortunate form of expressing its discontent with the failure of private shipping concerns to avail themselves of the momentous opportunity to build up an American merchant marine. The only ships that could have been bought were the interned German ships in our ports, which were needed to carry cotton to Germany, not yet cut off by the blockade. But the British objection to the purchase of German ships caused the administration so to veil its intentions as to ships and services that it finally appeared as if the administration were asking for ships from unnamable sources to institute unnecessary and superfluous services. The bill was defeated in February, 1915. Seamen's Law.-Another unfavorable Government policy was introduced by the enactment of the Seamen's Law. This bill had once before passed both the House and the Senate, but had been vetoed by President Taft just before the close of his administration. In the Presidential campaign of 1912 both parties committed themselves to the passage of the Seaman's Bill. The Seamen's Bill accordingly was introduced into the Sixtythird Congress and after almost two years of consideration was unanimously adopted by both Houses of Congress. It became effective for American vessels November 4, 1915, and has applied to foreign vessels since March 4, 1916. The Attorney-General has decided that the severe requirements as to life-saving equipment and the manning of such equipment do not apply to foreign vessels owned in countries with which the United States still has reciprocity treaties. American ships thereby are placed under a further handicap. The Seamen's Law contains the stipulation that on a seagoing steam vessel of one hundred tons or over 75 per cent of the crew in each department must be able to understand any order given by the officers. This paragraph prevents the employment of Asiatic crews on American vessels and thereby makes it practically impossible for American ships to compete in the Pacific with Japanese vessels on which the Asiatic crews naturally understand the language of their officers. The enforcement of this Act is in the hands of the Secretary of Commerce. Through the construction which he has put on the language of this paragraph (section 13), he has considerably mitigated the hardships placed upon American shipowners.1 Some important provisions of the Act.-According to this law, the deck crew of a seagoing steam vessel of one hundred tons or over is to be composed in the first year after the passage of the law of forty per cent. of rated able seamen; in the second year, of forty-five per cent; in the third year, of fifty-five per cent; and thereafter, of sixty-five per cent exclusive of officers and "apprentices." Able seamen are rated as such only after three years' service at sea and upon certification of this service and of their physical capacity by the Department of Commerce. Attempts are being made to modify this 1 See Andrew Furuseth's protest (Senate Document No. 694). section. The Rowe Bill is the most prominent.1 If passed, it would reduce the time of training very considerably. The rapid increase in the number of ships operated under the American flag has created a new situation, radically different from the one prevailing when the Seamen's Bill was passed. Change of circumstances necessitates change of law. The most disputed section of the Seamen's Act is that which virtually states that American seamen in all ports and foreign seamen in American ports may desert at will and demand one-half of their earned wages. The Merchant Marine Act, 1920, contains a provision (section 31) of the same nature. By a decision handed down on March 29, 1920, the Supreme Court declared this statute applicable to foreign vessels in American ports. The advocates of the Seamen's Act claim that this section is largely responsible for the gradual equalization of seamen's wages of all nations. It is claimed that Japan and Greece excepted, all seafaring nations have had to raise the wages of their seamen to within fifteen per cent of the American wage level.2 Mr. Rosseter, former Director of Operations of the Shipping Board, admits that through its effect upon the wages paid to foreign seamen, the Seamen's Act has been beneficial to the American Merchant Marine. But it is difficult to determine to what extent abnormal war conditions are blurring the picture. Undoubtedly depreciation of foreign money values, the international exchange situation, changes affecting the general attitude of labor, etc., have contributed much toward raising the wage level of foreign 1 See H. R. 9692; for discussion of its provisions see Hearings on Establishment of an American Merchant Marine, pp. 1560ff. 2 See Nautical Gazette, March 27, 1920. seamen. It remains to be seen whether the permission to desert is a real blessing or a boomerang. It should be remembered that the former strict prohibition of desertion, the so-called "involuntary servitude" as the advocates of the Seamen's Law choose to call it, was the outgrowth of conditions elemental to shipping, which no law can change. "It was enacted not on behalf of the masters of vessels, nor of seamen, nor of ships, nor of owners, but in the just interest of all. It was a master's assurance against the desertion of a crew in a foreign port where other sea labor was unobtainable; it was a seamen's assurance against being beached because of a master's whim or parsimony or because a master could ship men at a smaller wage—a sailor's inviolable guarantee from the Government that a vessel must bring him back from the ends of the earth to the port of departure or another port in the United States; it was a vessel's assurance that she would not be left helpless; it was an owner's assurance that his property would be reasonably safeguarded at all times and that he would be permitted to perform his legal contracts." 1 The subsequent development centers around the work of the United States Shipping Board which will be described in the following chapter. 1 See William Brown Meloney, The Heritage of Tyre, p. 147. REFERENCES ANNIN, R. E. Ocean Shipping, Chaps. I and II. (1920.) BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, NEW YORK. America's Merchant Marine. (1920.) CLARK, A. H. The Clipper Ship Era, 1843-1869. (1911.) |