gagee should not, by execution of such deed, prejudice his security. There was no apparent intention to conceal this memorandum from other creditors who executed the deed. Held, that the security was not waived, by the usual clause in the deed releasing all claims, except under its provisions. Lee v. Lockhart, 3 M. & C. 302. MARKS IN TRADE. (Costs of injunction-Unnecessary litigation.) A perpetual injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from the use of certain marks in trade, although they had used these marks in ignorance, as it appeared, of the right of the plaintiffs, and under the notion that they were technical descriptive marks, and although they had, upon being informed of the title of the plaintiffs, expressed their readiness to give up the use of them, and to make compensation for all injury done. But under these circumstances, and the right to an account being abandoned by reason of the smallness of the injury, the court refused to the plaintiffs the costs of the suit upon the ground of unnecessary litigation. Millington v. Fox, 3 M. & C. 338.

PLEADING. (Plea and answer.) Where a bill charges matters which if true would destroy an anticipated legal bar, a plea setting up that bar will be overruled unless supported by an answer negativing those matters.

N. B. In this case leave was refused either to amend the answer or to withdraw both plea and answer. Foley v. Hill, 3 M. & C. 475.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. (Direction for payment of debts.) A direction for payment of debts in a will of personal estate, will not stop the running of the statute of limitations. Freake v. Cranefeldt, 3 M. & C. 499.

N. B. The decision in Jones v. Scott, 1 Russ. & Myl. 255, has recently been reversed in the house of lords, but the appeal is not yet reported.

2. Where the statute has once begun to run, its course will not be

suspended by any intervening disability, as by the delay which may have elapsed between the death of the debtor and the taking out administration to his estate. S. C.

II-DIGEST OF AMERICAN CASES.

Selections from 13 Peters's (Supreme Court of the United States), and 8 Gill and Johnson's (Maryland) Reports.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS. (By guardian.) A deed was executed and acknowledged under a decree," W. M. Duncanson, guardian for Marcia Burnes;" and acknowledged by the guardian "to be his act and deed as guardian aforesaid, and thereby the act and deed of the said Marcia." This is a good execution and acknowledgment. Van Ness v. The Bank of the U. S. 13 Peters, 17.

ACTION. (Attorney.-Joint and several note.) The defendant

in an action in the circuit court, had, with others, received the proceeds of a joint and several promissory note discounted for them at the bank of the metropolis, and this note was afterwards renewed by their attorney, under a power of attorney authorizing him to give a joint note; but he gave a joint and several note, the proceeds of which the attorney received, and appropriated to pay the note already discounted at the bank. The interest of the sum borrowed, was paid out of the money of the parties to the note. Held, that although the power of attorney may not have been executed in exact conformity to its terms; and may not have authorized the giving of a joint and several note, a question the court did not decide; yet the receipt of the proceeds of the note by the attorney, and the appropriation thereof to the payment of the former note, was sufficient evidence to sustain the money counts in the declaration. Moore v. The Bank of the Metropolis, 13 Peters, 402.

2. (Mortgage by agent.) A mortgage was executed by D. G. as the agent of the union steam mill company, conveying to the mortgagee certain lands in Rhode Island, with a woollen mill and other buildings, with the machinery in the mill. D. G. was, and had been the general agent of the company, and as such, had made all purchases and sales for the company, and the mortgage was executed by him, with the consent and authority

of the persons who at the time of its execution were members of the company. The machinery, and other movables had been taken in execution by the marshal of Rhode Island, under an execution issued on a judgment obtained after the mortgage against the company. The court held, that although the mortgage was not valid as the deed of the corporation, it was sufficient to convey a title to the mortgagee in the machinery; and that he could maintain an action of replevin for them against the marshal. Anthony v. Butler, 13 Peters, 423. AMBIGUITY. (What kind may be explained.) Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to explain a patent ambiguity, that is, one apparent on the face of the instrument; but it is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity, that is, one not apparent on the face of the instrument, but one arising from extrinsic evidence; that is but to remove the ambiguity by the same kind of evidence as that by which it is created. Bradley v. The Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria Steam Packet Company, 13 Peters, 89.

2. (Same.) Extrinsic parol evidence is admissible to give effect to a written instrument, by applying it to its proper subject matter, by proving the circumstances under which it was made; whenever, without the aid of such evidence, the application could not be made in the particular case. Ib. ASSETS. A bill was filed claiming a specific performance of an alleged contract to convey a house and lot in Georgetown, for the benefit of the wife of the complainant, the complainant having expended a large sum of money in improving the property, in the expectation that it would be conveyed as required by the bill. The court, not considering that sufficient evidence of an agreement to convey the property was given, ordered that the property should be sold, and out of the proceeds that the advances made by the complainant should be repaid. The property sold for a sum far less than the amount expended. Held, that the balance unpaid after the sale, was not a debt due by the estate of the father of the wife, and could not be claimed of his representatives, the estate being insolvent. King v. Thompson and another, 13 Peters, 128.

2. (Money paid to legal representatives.) The Joseph Secunda was condemned for a violation of the laws of the United States, prohibiting the slave trade; and by a decree, the district court of Louisiana allowed the claim of the collector, the surveyor, and naval officer, who had prosecuted for the forfeiture, to a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the property condemned. This decree was afterwards reversed, and the whole proceeds adjudged to the United States, on an appeal to the supreme court. William Emerson, the surveyor, afterwards died; and in 1831, congress passed an act for the relief of the collector, the heirs of William Emerson, and the heirs of the naval officer; under the authority of which the sums which had been adjudged to those officers, and which had remained in the district court of Louisiana, were by an order of the court paid to them according to the provisions of the law. One of the creditors of William Emerson claimed the sum so paid to his legal representatives, as assets for the payment of his debt. Held, that the payment made by order of the district court, to the minor children of William Emerson, as his legal heirs, was rightfully made; and that the same cannot be considered in their hands as assets for the payment of the debts of their father. Emerson's heirs v. Hall, 13 Peters, 409. ASSUMPSIT. (For tobacco instead of money.) Under the provisions of different acts of assembly, some of them passed more than a century ago, and when tobacco passed as currently as money, assumpsit will lie in Maryland, as well for tobacco, (where the contract is for payment in tobacco), as for current money, and in some such cases, judgments have been rendered for tobacco. Marshall v. McPherson, 8 G. & J. 333. 2. (Dower.) A widow having a right of dower in the lands of her deceased husband, may, instead of suing for, or receiving an assignment of her dower, by arrangement with the heir at law, or devisee, suffer him to rent out the lands, with the understanding, that she, in lieu of her dower, is to receive her proportion, or one third of the annual rent. In which case, if the heir at law, or devisee rents out the lands, and receives the

rents, and keeps from the widow her just proportion, she may recover in assumpsit. And if she marry again, her husband having an interest in the land, by virtue of his wife's right of dower, may in lieu of an assignment of dower make a like arrangement and recover his just proportion of the rents received to his use, in the life-time of his wife, in an action of assumpsit, brought either before or after her death. lb. BILLS OF EXCHANGE. (Dishonored.) A person who takes a bill, which on the face of it was dishonored, cannot be allowed to claim the privileges which belong to a bona fide holder without notice. If he chooses to receive it under such circumstances, he takes with it all the infirmities belonging to it; and is in no better condition than the person from whom he received it. There can be no distinction in principle, between a bill transferred after it is dishonored for non-acceptance, and one transferred after it has been dishonored for non-payment. Andrews v. Pond and another, 13 Peters, 65.

2. (Relation of acceptor.) The acceptor of a bill of exchange stands in the same relation to the drawee, as the maker of a note does to the payee; and the acceptor is the principal debtor in the case of a bill, precisely like the maker of a note. The liability of the acceptor grows out of, and is to be governed by the terms of his acceptance; and the liability of the maker of a note grows out of, and is to be governed by, the terms of his note and the place of payment can be of no more importance in the one case than in the other. Wallace v. M'Connel, 13 Peters, 136.

3. (Declaration.) In actions on promissory notes against the maker, or on bills of exchange where the suit is against the maker, in the one case, and the acceptor in the other, and the note or bill is made payable at a specified time and place; it is not necessary to aver in the declaration or prove on the trial, that a demand of payment was made, in order to maintain the action. But if the maker or acceptor was at the place, at the time designated; and was ready and offered to pay the money; it was matter of defence to be pleaded and proved on his part.

lb.