once ascertained, it is altogether a question of law, whether the notice was reasonable or not; and in such case, there is nothing to be left to the jury.'

In England, it seems to be necessary that notice should be given in a particular newspaper, the London Gazette, but no similar rule prevails in America. It is sufficient in this country, if notice is given in some one of the usual advertising newspapers of the city or county where the business is carried on. A reasonable notice thus published is constructive notice from the date of the publication to all the world, except those who have had previous dealings with the firm. Evidence of the mere notoriety of the dissolution is not admissible to prove notice.*

It is well settled, that those who have had previous dealings with the firm must receive actual notice, and the usual and proper mode is to send circulars to all such persons.* A creditor's knowledge of the retirement of a partner may be inferred from circumstances, for it is sufficient if he possess such knowledge, without regard to the manner in which it was acquired. Evidence has even been admitted, that it was the usage of a firm to send circulars to their customers on any change of partners." Where plaintiff sued A on a note signed A and B, dated 3d April, 1820, and subscribed in the handwriting of B, and it appeared that A the defendant and B had carried on business together as partners, under the firm of A and B, and that plaintiff had been one of their customers; and two witnesses proved, that in April, 1818,

1 Mowatt v. Howland, 3 Day, 353.

2 Coll. on Part. 311, and cases there cited.

3 Ketcham v. Clark, 6 Johns. 147; Mowatt v. Howland, 3 Day, 353; Coll. on Part. 311.

Pitcher v. Barrows, 17 Pick. 361.

Graham v. Hope, Peake, 155; Wrightson v. Pullan, 2 E. C. L. 433; Coll. on Part. 311.

• Hart v. Alexander, 32 E. C. L. 715.

7 Ib.; but see Flack v. Green, 3 Gill & J. 474.

A, B, and C entered into copartnership under the firm of C, B & Co., and carried on business at the same store, previously occupied by A and B, that they (the witnesses), after the last mentioned period, had no knowledge of any separate firm existing under the name of A and B, and that the plaintiff, who lived in the same neighborhood, was frequently in the store of C, B, & Co., where notice of the dissolution of the partnership of A & B was posted up, it was held to be sufficient evidence from which a jury might infer that the plaintiff had notice of the dissolution.' In one case, notice of a dissolution of a partnership published in a gazette, which was taken by a bank, was held to be sufficient notice to the bank, though it had had previous dealings with the partnership. The rule deducible from this case, says Mr. Justice Cowen, in Vernon v. Manhattan Co., 17 Wend. 527, is too general. The mere taking of the gazette is supposed to be enough, which is clearly going beyond the strongest cases. But it may be questioned, whether the latter case does not go quite as far in the opposite direction. The court there decided, that a publication of notice of dissolution, in a newspaper taken at a bank, is not sufficient notice the bank having had previous dealings with the firm-and was not competent evidence to be submitted to the jury. In England, the rule seems to be, that such evidence is sufficient to go to the jury, who may infer or not, as they think proper, that the party taking the paper received notice. In a case, where it was proved that notice of a dissolution of partnership was inserted once in a newspaper, taken in by the party sought to be affected by the notice, and left at his house in the usual course, lord Ellenborough left it to the jury to say, whether the attention of a tradesman, in reading a newspaper, was not likely to be attracted by notices of the dissolution of partnerships, to 1 Irby v. Vining, 2 McCord, 379.

2 Bank of S. C. v. Humphrey, 1 McCord, 388.

which the attention of others might not be directed, and whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff's had actually received notice of the dissolution; observing, that in such cases, the usual and most prudent course was to send circular letters to all with whom the partners had dealings. In another case, his lordship observed, that a creditor might be expected to look into the gazette for notices of the dissolution of partnerships, but not for notices by carriers of the limitation of their responsibility. And in a late case, it was even given in evidence against a creditor having had previous dealings with a firm, to prove notice of a dissolution, that the dissolution was published in a newspaper which was taken at a reading room, to which the creditor was a subscriber and which he frequently visited. Whether actual or constructive notice has been given, is a question of fact for the jury, and the weight of authority seems to be, that publication of notice of dissolution of partnership in a newspaper, which is proved to be taken by a creditor, is evidence to go to the jury, that such creditor received notice.

Although due notice of the dissolution of a partnership has been given, yet if the retiring partner suffer his name to be held out to the world in such a manner as to induce the belief that he still continues therein, he will be held liable for future contracts made by the other partners in the name of the firm; as if he allow his name to remain in the firm exposed to the public over a shop door, or to be used in printed invoices or bills of parcels, or to be published in advertisements. The knowledge of the party that his name is so used, and his assent thereto, is the

1 Jenkins v. Blizard, 2 E. C. L. 451.

2 Munn v. Baker, 3 E. C. L. 339.
3 Hart v. Alexander, 32 E. C. L. 715.

4 By Shaw C. J. in Goddard v. Pratt, 16 Pick. 432.

5 Fox v. Clifton, 19 E. C. L. 240.

ground upon which he is estopped from disputing his liability as a partner.'

A party has been held liable on a promissory note made in the name of the firm in which he had been a partner, though it was drawn after the dissolution of the partnership, he having suffered his name to continue in the firm, and although the plaintiff knew the facts at the time he took the note. Thus A, B, and C were partners. B retired from the firm, but it was agreed that his name should continue until a future day. A afterwards drew a note in the name of the firm, payable to B. Before this note was drawn, B informed D that he had ceased to be a partner, but that his name was to continue for a certain time. It was held, that B was liable on this note notwithstanding such communication made to D; for that D knowing that B's name was to be continued, knew that he was therefore responsible, and of course he relied on that responsibility.

There appears to be some disagreement among the cases, as to what shall be considered such an assent of the retiring partner. In one case, A and his three sons carried on business under the firm of A and Sons. A died in 1805, and his three sons continued the business under the same firm until 1808. Two of the sons, B and C, then withdrew and established a new business under a new firm; notice of dissolution was published in the London Gazette, and was sent round to the correspondents of the house. D, the other son, continued the old business by himself under the old firm, and accepted the bill in question drawn upon A and Sons. The plaintiff had not had any dealings with the partnership of A and Sons when composed of the three brothers, and when he took the note in question did not know that the partnership had been dissolved. Lord Ellenborough held that defendants were not liable, ample notice

1 Ib.; and see Stables v. Eley, 11 E. C. L. 497.

* Brown v. Leonard, 18 E. C. L. 270; Coll on Part. 312.

having been given of the dissolution; and that they were not bound to apply to the lord chancellor for an injunction, to prevent the brother from using the old firm, or to take any notice of the firm which he might happen to use.1

In a subsequent case, however, the same judge decided, when after the dissolution of a partnership between A and B, and the advertisement of it in the gazette, A accepted a bill in the name of the firm bearing a date previous to the dissolution, for the accommodation of a third person who indorsed it for value, the name of the old firm continuing to remain over the shop after the dissolution of partnership and notice of it, and indorsement of the bill, that B was liable as a partner to a bona fide holder. The mere fact of B's name remaining in the old firm over the shop after dissolution was held by the court to be sufficient evidence of B's assent to his name's so remaining. In another case, Abbott C. J. seems to take the same view and says, "if the name was continued over the door, that was certainly inducing persons to believe that he continued a partner."

The assent of the retiring partner to the continuance of his name in the firm seems to be properly a question for the jury. The fact that his name did so remain would in connection with other circumstances be strong and perhaps conclusive evidence of his assent thereto, as where it appeared that he was aware of the continued use of his name and was in the habit of visiting the place of business of the firm and advising with them as to their operations; in other cases, as where the retiring partner lived in a distant place and could not be supposed to be informed as to the acts of the remaining partners, the mere fact that his name continued to be used by them would not be competent evidence to prove his assent.

1 Newsome v. Coles, 2 Camp. 617.
2 Williams v. Keats, 3 E C. L. 351.
3 Dolman v. Orchard, 12 E. C. L. 47.

G. W. B.

Baltimore, Md.