Besides, this theory has no general foundation; for the inclinations to good and evil being of a different nature, and of unequal power according to the characters and inclinations of individuals, it follows, that it would be necessary to establish a particular penalty for each individual, and to inflict it in such a manner, that the punishment should always be the opposite extreme of the inclinations of the offender. No one can pretend, that the desire to do evil, and the fear inspired by the prospect of chastisement, act in the same degree in all cases, in all circumstances, on all individuals. The system of Feuerbach has, notwithstanding, been adopted in Bavaria, and constitutes the foundation of the new criminal code of that country.

To the text of the Bavarian code, notes have been added by another very distinguished jurisconsult, Gönner, who died some years since at Munich. These notes, which have the force of law, very frequently derogate from the principles advanced by Feuerbach. It must be added, also, that the author, by bringing forward several other principles, among which is that of moral constraint, seems to have abandoned his theory. The gradation of punishments in Bavaria is regulated by the feelings of the jurisconsult; and a crime is punished with severity or otherwise, according to the opinion entertained by Feuerbach of the temptation to commit it.

3. Other systems, which have been taught with more or less of success, do not undertake so much to establish the right to punish, as to indicate the object of punishment. Almost all are agreed upon the point, that punishment ought not to be vengeance: but some propose to defend the state, as Martin and Schulze; others to restore violated rights, as Klein; others propose to improve the person of the guilty, as Spangenberg and Helzer; some philosophers only have entirely rejected the right to punish as immoral and unworthy of a civilized society, as Abicht and Krause.

These authors protest vividly against that elasticity of the common law, which is made to bend to the will of the majority, and destroys individuality in order to preserve the integrity of the body politic. According to them, absolute justice, that is to say, natural right, being once admitted, can never receive any modification, whatever may be the circumstances, the number, and the quality of the persons who demand it. Thus, the interests of an individuality, by the side of which reason and right are found, ought never to be sacrificed to ideas of generality. On the other hand, however, these authors admit, that an offender sins only because he is weak or drawn into error. It is necessary, therefore, to take measures for his improvement; but such an influence of the body politic upon the individual, does not deserve the name of punishment.

MIXED SYSTEMS.

The mixed systems, the most complicated of which have been developed by Leyser and Welker, propose to effect several objects at the same time by the application of punishment; as to indemnify and avenge the person of the injured party, to give satisfaction to the violated law, &c.

If all the relative theories are each the result of a personal sensation, or the expression of an object purely political, the mixture of all these doctrines must necessarily increase the uncertainty and confusion, when an application is made of them in one and the same system of law.

Besides, the mixed theories add nothing which can justify punishment; for the pretended greatest utility is not the criterion of the just; otherwise there would be no principles, but only interests; and right would always be on the side of the greatest number.

The above are some, probably not all, of the theories, which have been assumed in modern times, particularly in

Germany, as the basis of the right or of the object of punishment. In this country, very little attention has been given to the subject. Our criminal law is almost wholly of modern growth, and the result of our own positive legislation. We have had no ancient abuses to attack or to defend. The question of the abolition of the punishment of death, either wholly or in part, is the only one, we believe, which has led our jurists and legislators to investigate the nature of the right of punishment; and this question, whenever it has been brought to the decision of our legislative assemblies, has been decided upon practical rather than theoretical grounds.

In regard to the subject of prison discipline, and the improvement of the moral condition of criminals, the latter has been admitted as one of the legitimate objects of punishment, without stopping to inquire whether it is the only or ought to be made the paramount one. A knowledge of these various theories, therefore, is not likely perhaps to be of much practical value, in this country; but as explanatory of foreign systems of criminal law, and as the results of much profound and acute investigation, we think the foregoing brief sketch of them will not be wholly without interest for our readers.

L. S. C.

ART. VIII.-BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JAMES C. ALVORD.

In the recent death of James C. Alvord, Esq. of Greenfield, Mass., the community at large, no less than the legal profession, has sustained a severe loss. He died at an age when most men are but just assuming the duties and employments of manhood, and but just emerging from the restless agitations and uncertainties of youth; yet he had done so much and improved his opportunities with so rare a spirit, that he had won the consideration and attained to the excellence, which usually follow years of vigorous

action and manly self-control. His death is not to be lamented as that of a young man of great promise, for in him were combined the assurance which springs from the continued performance of high duties, with the promise that clings inseparably to the early period of life. We saw in him at once the beauty of the bud and of the flower. His death has left a chasm in society which cannot be readily filled. We miss the sagacious statesman, the sound and learned lawyer, the public-spirited citizen, one who had been tried in all the relations of life, public and private, and been found faithful in them all.

He was born in Greenwich, in the county of Franklin, in the year 1808. He was the eldest son of Elijah Alvord, Esq., the clerk of the courts for the county of Franklin. After the usual preparatory studies, he entered Dartmouth college and was graduated with distinguished honor in 1826. Immediately upon leaving college, he entered upon his professional studies, in the office of his father at Greenfield, and prosecuted them further, at the law-schools of New Haven and Cambridge. It was at this latter place, in the summer of 1830, that the writer of this article first became acquainted with him. He bore about him at that time the marks of manifest superiority, and those who became well acquainted with him felt no surprise at his subsequent rapid progress. There was the maturity of manhood, both in his person and in his mind. With the warmth, simplicity and frankness of youth, he had none of its weaknesses and was above its usual temptations. Indolence was impossible to a nature of such powerful activity, and pleasure had no charm to his well-regulated mind. His love of study was seconded by a robust frame and a constitution, apparently, of great vigor. He was at that time, even, a ripe and sound lawyer. He had read extensively and thought deeply on legal subjects, and his knowledge of law was free from that crudeness, usually found in young lawyers, how

ever much, or rather, however many books they may have read. He spoke with fluent and dignified self-possession; there was no lack of youthful ardor and impassioned power, but his speaking was most remarkable for a certain weight and impressiveness, more natural to the age of forty than to that of twenty. He had none of the reserve and coldness sometimes accompanying young men of his intellectual maturity, but was social in his tastes and ready in his sympathies. He was generous, warm-hearted and cordial, easily winning friends and keeping them when won, and in the interchange of affection giving as much as he received.

Soon after this period, he commenced the practice of the law in Greenfield, and subsequently formed a connexion in professional business with his maternal uncle, the honorable Daniel Wells. He immediately took a prominent position at the bar, passing over at a bound the space which young lawyers are usually doomed to move through at a snail's pace, and without feeling for a moment the heart-sickness of hope deferred, became at once fully occupied with important and responsible business. This early success by no means arose from want of fitting competitors. The banks of the Connecticut have always been fruitful in good lawyers, and never more so than at the present time; and those who know the professional merits of the antagonists, with whom he was called to measure his youthful strength, need not be told that he was not allowed to take the place which he did, without showing the most satisfactory intellectual credentials. His professional labors sustained a short interruption in the summer of 1833, when, upon the lamented death of professor Ashmun, he was selected to occupy his place as instructer in the law school of Harvard University, until the choice of a permanent professor should be made. This was a highly flattering compliment to his professional standing, and the admirable manner in which he discharged the duties of teacher justified the propriety of the choice. As