and motives were alike elevated. We do not venture to draw aside the veil which separated his domestic from his public life, nor to speak of him in those near and dear relations in which he shewed his most attractive traits. The void that is left in the hearts of that once happy circle can never be filled; and in the early removal of one who was their pride, hope, and joy, they can find no other consolation except in the recollection of his well-spent life and in the assurance of a reunion beyond the grave.

G. S. H.

ART. IX.-ON THE EXTENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAWS.

THE object, which the criminal laws of a state are intended to effect, is twofold: 1, to secure the continued existence and well-being of the state itself as such; and 2, to secure the continued existence and well-being of its individual members. The first includes also all institutions of a public, and the second all those of a private nature. It is manifest, that not only the state itself and its institutions, but likewise the individuals who compose it, may be attacked from without as well as from within; and this both by the citizens of the same state, and by the citizens of other states. It is important, therefore, in the formation of a penal code, to consider how far the criminal laws of a state can and ought to be extended; to determine whether they should be made to apply beyond the local boundaries and personal jurisdiction of the state; and, if so, to decide upon and enumerate the persons and offences, to which they shall be so extended.

The direct and immediate operation of the criminal laws of a state must necessarily be confined within its own territorial boundaries; they can only be executed in certain cases, by the aid of other states in apprehending and delivering up the offenders to the authorities of the offended state; and the exercise of this comity on the part of a foreign state.

may depend in some degree upon the aid afforded to the laws of such state by the authorities of other states. But as the degree and extent of the aid, which a state may be willing to afford in the execution of the criminal laws of other states, may depend somewhat upon the extent claimed by such state for its own laws,-inasmuch as a state may be supposed willing to aid in the execution of foreign laws, in the same manner and to the same extent, that it desires foreign aid in the execution of its own,-it is apparent, that the inquiry above stated is important also in an international point of view. If the subject be thus interesting, in reference to states which are wholly foreign to each other, its importance is greatly enhanced, in reference to the several states of the American union, by the provision inserted in the federal constitution, requiring that persons charged with crimes in any state, and escaping into another, should be delivered up to the authorities of the offended state. This provision makes that a matter of legal obligation between the several United States, which, between foreign states, is wholly a matter of international comity.

In order to determine the various questions involved in the general one above stated, it will be necessary, in the first place, to establish certain general principles, relating to the right of punishment,-the duty of exercising it, and the power of the state to do so; and, in the second place, to apply these principles to the different classes of cases which may be supposed. It will then be proper, in the third place, to inquire and determine how far the results thus obtained in theory, as applicable in reference to states wholly foreign to each other, ought to be practically adopted in legislation, and also how far they ought to be modified, in reference to the states of this union, by the circumstance of their being united together by the constitution into one government, for certain purposes. It will then remain only to consider how the provisions, which it may be thought proper to adopt, shall be inserted in a code or other legislative act.

It is proper to remark, however, before entering upon this inquiry, that it is not necessarily, or, if at all, very remotely, complicated with any considerations of the abstract theory of the right of punishment; since, whatever theory may be adopted, the object of all systems of criminal law is still the same, the security of the state and its citizens; and the inquiry refers not to the offences which are to be made punishable, or to the kind or degree of punishment, but simply to the extent to be given to whatever system of penal law the legislative power may think proper to adopt.

The first principle, which we have occasion to settle, relates to the punitory right of the state, or rather perhaps to the extent of that right. The object of penal law, as already stated, being to secure the existence and well being of a state and its citizens, it is obvious that the punitory right of the state must be coextensive with that object; or, in other words, that the provisions of the penal code of any state may rightfully, (in theory, at least,) be extended to all attacks against the state itself or its citizens, wheresoever or by whomsoever committed.

The duty of the state, in regard to the matter of punishment, requires next to be considered. If it be the general duty of a state to procure for itself and its citizens the security above-mentioned; and, if it have the right to do so by punishing all attacks against itself or its citizens, by whomsoever or wheresoever committed; it is quite clear, that the exercise of this punitory right ought to be limited only by the power of the state; and, consequently it may be laid down as the second principle, to be employed in this inquiry, that the penal code of a state ought to threaten with punishment all attacks, directed either against itself or its citizens, which it has or can obtain the power to punish.

It remains, thirdly, to consider the power of the state to punish. The state has the absolute and perfect control of all persons and things (except in reference to those persons

and things to which exterritoriality is attributed,) within its own territorial limits; and, consequently, it has the power to punish for all offences committed within those limits, by whomsoever they may be committed. The state has also the absolute and perfect control of all persons who constitute its citizens, and as such owe it allegiance, and are bound to obey its laws. It consequently has the power to punish for all offences committed by its citizens, whether committed within its own territories, or elsewhere. In those cases, where an offence is committed or the offender is without the territory of the state, whose security is attacked, and the state has no control over the offender as a citizen, it can only obtain the power to punish him, through the aid of the foreign power, within whose territory he may happen to be; but, as it is to be presumed, that every state will be willing to lend its aid to every other, in the punishment of offenders, on the principle of international comity and good neighborhood, so far at least as to deliver up such offenders to be tried and judged by the laws which they have broken; it may be safely assumed, for the purpose of this inquiry, to be within the power of the state to punish all offenders against its laws, who are neither within its territory nor bound to it by their allegiance, because, by a proper application, it may always obtain the control of the persons of such offenders. This is peculiarly true, in reference to the several United States, by reason of the constitutional provision already referred to.

Having thus established the principles to be applied in this investigation, we have now to enumerate and classify the various combinations of cases, which may be supposed to occur, and to make the application accordingly. Those attacks, directed against a state or its citizens, which, when made punishable by law, are denominated crimes and offences, may be committed:

I. By CITIZENS; 1, within the state, (a) against the state

itself, (b) against citizens, (c) against foreign states, (d) against foreign citizens; 2, without the state, (a) against the state itself, (b) against citizens, (c) against a foreign state, (d) against foreign citizens;

II. By FOREIGNERS; 1, within the state, (a) against the state itself, (b) against citizens, (c) against foreign states, (d) against foreign citizens; 2, without the state, (a) against the state itself, (b) against citizens, (c) against foreign states, (d) against foreign citizens.

This classification embraces all the combinations of cases, which can possibly call for the exercise of the punitory power of a state, in any contingency or circumstances whatever. It will be sufficient for the present purpose to consider them under the four general divisions of offences committed by citizens and foreigners within and without the state.

I. Of offences committed by citizens within the state. According to the principles above established, all attacks by citizens against the state itself or its citizens, within the territory of the state, ought to be made punishable by its laws; since it is the duty of the state to protect itself and its citizens from such attacks, and it has perfect power to afford this protection, as the offenders are both territorially and personally under its control. But the citizens of a state may, also, while within its limits, be guilty of attacks upon foreign states or their citizens; and the question then arises, to what extent and in what manner, if at all, shall acts of this description be made punishable by the laws of the state within whose limits they are committed? It is clear, on the one hand, that they do not directly attack the state itself or its citizens; and they consequently cannot be put upon the same footing and made punishable in the same manner with similar acts against the state. On the other hand, the state is under no obligation, neither has it a right, to punish them as offences against the laws of the state attacked; the punitory right and duty of a state, as already established, being