Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Max Maranofsky and another, for the death of Morris Maronofsky, the deceased employee, opposed by the Gillette Safety Razor Company, the employer, and the Travelers' Insurance Company, the insurer. Compensation was denied by the Industrial Accident Board, the denial affirmed by the superior court, and from its decree the claimants appeal. Affirmed. Wyner & Freedman and Francis S. Wyner, all of Boston, for appel lants. Walter I. Badger and Louis C. Doyle, both of Boston, for appellee Travelers' Ins. Co. CROSBY, J. This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751, as amended) by the alleged dependents of the emplove to recover compensation for his death. The single member of the Industrial Accident Board made, among other findings, the following: was floor. way "In the night of the accident the deceased was called to answer a telephone call, as to the nature of which there is no evidence and, in order to reach the telephone which was located in the first floor of building A, he had to go from the basement of building B, where he employed, through the basement of building A and up to the first After he ended his telephone conversation he started back on his to the basement of building B, his place of employment, but on the way stopped to talk with a fellow workman who was standing at a tank in the basement of building A and inquired about the contents of the tank. He was told that the tank had a little water in there and a few blades.' At the time, the deceased happened to be leaning on a galvanized iron table and in reaching for the portable electric lamp that hanging from the ceiling he received a shock which caused his It appears, from the evidence, that the tank had nothing to do with the employment of the deceased and that he looked into it through curiosity, an act which could not be reasonably said to be incidental to his employment. * * Therefore, I find that the employe did not receive an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and the claim of the dependents is dismissed." was death. Later the case was referred back to the single member to hear further evidence, some of which tended to show that the deceased went to the tank for the purpose of having a pair of overalls washed in accordance with an alleged custom among the employes. The single member thereafter found in part as follows: I am satisfied, after hearing this new evidence, that the deceased employe did not meet his death while in the act of preparing to wash ous finding." [1, 2] The Industrial Accident Board on review affirmed the find ings and decision of the single member and dismissed the claim. The finding that the fatal injuries received by the employe did not arise out of and in the course of his employment must stand as there was evidence to support it. If, as the board found, the deceased while on his way back to the room where he was employed stopped at the tank to talk with a fellow workman on matters not connected with his employment, and while so engaged leaned on a galvanized iron table and took hold of an electric lamp to enable him to look into the tank, merely for the purpose of satisfying his curiosity, it is plain it properly could not be found that the accident arose out of or in the course of his employment. Haggard's Case, 125 N. E. 565: Savage's Case, 222 Mass 205, 110 N. E. 283; O'Toole's Case, 229 Mass. 165, 118 N. E. 303; Warren v. Hedley's Colliery Co., Ltd, 6 B. W. C. C. 136; Horsfall v. Steamship Jura, 6 B. W. C. C. 213. Decree affirmed. its use. On the day of his injury, July 11, 1919, he had been hauling coal from a pile near a railroad. During the noon hour, he sat on the railroad track, and leaned against a railroad car while eating his luncheon. While so sitting, an engine was attached to another car, and thereby the car against which he was leaning was caused to "kick," and Haggard was "rolled under" that car and injured. While he was eating, his horses stood at the coal pile near by and were being fed It did not appear that Haggard received orders except as to places of receipt and delivery of his loads. Even if, as the board found, he was an employe, as to which see Centrello's Case, 232 Mass. 456, 122 N E. 460, Winslow Case, 232 Mass. 458, 122 N. E. 561, Eckert's Case, 234 Mass. 124 N. E. 421, and Robichaud's Case, 234 Mass. 124 N. E. 890, the board was justified in finding, if not constrained to find, that the accident did not arise out of his employment Haggard was not in a place in which it was necessary for him to be in the course of his work, or in going to or coming therefrom. The act in which he was engaged when injured had no relation to his employment; indeed, his going upon the railroad track seems to have been in violation of St. 1906, c. 463, part 2, § 232, although the decision of this case is not based on that statute. Fumiciello's Case, 219 Mass. 488, 107 N. E 349; Ross v. John Hancock Mut. Life, Ins. Co, 222 Mass. 560, 111 N. E. 390; Borin's Case, 227 Mass. 452, 116 N. E 817, L. R A. 1918A, 217; Rochford's Case, 234 Mass. 124 N. E. 891. He chose "to go to a dangerous place where he [had] no business to go, incurring a danger of his own choosing and one altogether outside any reasonable exercise of his employment." Brice v. Edward Lloyd, Ltd. [1909] 2 K. B. 804, 810. The decree for the insurer was properly entered, and must be affirmed. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. Jan. 6, 1920.) 125 Northeastern Reporter 565. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON; FINDING SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVE ON REVIEW. The finding of the Industrial Accident Board that the fatal injury received by the employee did not arise out of and in the course of his employment must stand on review, where there was evidence to support it. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 418[6].) 2.MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN,S COMPENSATION; FATAL ELECTRIC SHOCK THROUGH CURIOSITY NOT AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT. Where an employee, while going from a telephone to the room where he was employed, stopped to talk with a fellow workman on matters unconnected with the employment, and leaned on an iron table and took hold of an electric light to enable him to satisfy his curiosity by looking into a tank, his consequent death from electric shock was not an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, entitling his dependents to compensation. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment. Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Max Maranofsky and another, for the death of Morris Maronofsky, the deceased employee, opposed by the Gillette Safety Razor Company, the employer, and the Travelers' Insurance Company, the insurer. Compensation was denied by the Industrial Accident Board, the denial affirmed by the superior court, and from its decree the claimants appeal. Affirmed. Wyner & Freedman and Francis S. Wyner, all of Boston, for appel lants. Walter I. Badger and Louis C. Doyle, both of Boston, for appellee Travelers' Ins. Co. Act CROSBY, J. This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation (St. 1911, c. 751, as amended) by the alleged dependents of the employe to recover compensation for his death. The single member of the Industrial Accident Board made, among other findings, the following: was floor. way "In the night of the accident the deceased was called to answer a telephone call, as to the nature of which there is no evidence and, in order to reach the telephone which was located in the first floor of building A, he had to go from the basement of building B, where he employed, through the basement of building A and up to the first After he ended his telephone conversation he started back on his to the basement of building B, his place of employment, but on the way stopped to talk with a fellow workman who was standing at a tank in the basement of building A and inquired about the contents of the tank. He was told that the tank had a little water in there and a few blades.' At the time, the deceased happened to be leaning on a galvanized iron table and in reaching for the portable electric lamp that was hanging from the ceiling he received a shock which caused his death. It appears, from the evidence, that the tank had nothing to do with the employment of the deceased and that he looked into it through curiosity, an act which could not be reasonably said to be incidental to his employment. * * * Therefore, I find that the employe did not receive an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and the claim of the dependents is dismissed." Later the case was referred back to the single member to hear further evidence, some of which tended to show that the deceased went to the tank with an alleged custom among the employes. The single member thereafter found in part as follows: am satisfied, after hearing this new evidence, that the deceased employe did not meet his death while in the act of preparing to wash his ous finding." [1, 2] The Industrial Accident Board on review affirmed the findings and decision of the single member and dismissed the claim. The finding that the fatal injuries received by the employe did not arise out of and in the course of his employment must stand as there was evidence to support it. If, as the board found, the deceased while on his way with a fellow workman on matters not connected with his employment, back to the room where he was employed stopped at the tank to talk and while so engaged leaned on a galvanized iron table and took hold of an electric lamp to enable him to look into the tank, merely for the purpose of satisfying his curiosity, it is plain it properly could not be found that the accident arose out of or in the course of his employment. Haggard's Case, 125 N. E. 565; Savage's Case, 222 Mass 205, 110 N. E. 283; O'Toole's Case, 229 Mass. 165, 118 N. E. 303; Warren v. Hedley's Colliery Co., Ltd, 6 B. W. C. C. 136; Horsfall v. Steamship Jura, 6 B. W. C. C. 213. Decree affirmed. MORAN'S CASE. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. Jan. 9, 1920.) 125 Northeastern Reporter 591. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; INSURANCE SOLICITOR, STRUCK BY STREET CAR, INJURED "IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.” A solicitor and collector for a life insurance company, fatally injured by a street car when running across the street to take a car, was injured in the course of his employment, within the Workmen's Compensation Act; his necessary use of street cars in his employment exposing him to dangers not too remote in their causative relation to the employment. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911. c. 751, as amended) by Margaret Moran, widow of John Moran, the deceased employee, opposed by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, the employee, and the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, the insurer. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Accident Board, the award affirmed by the superior court, and from its decree the insurer appeals. Decree affirmed. Sawyer, Hardy, Stone & Morrison, of Boston (Gay Gleason, of Boston, of counsel), for appellant. Bernard J. Killion, of Salem, and Charles Toye, of Boston, for appellee. PIERCE, J. The evidence warranted a finding that the decedent, who was a solicitor and collector in the employ of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, on the evening of January 2, 1919, left his home on Harvard avenue, Dorchester, intending to take an elevated car, running to Dudley street, at a white post opposite Harvard avenue on Washington street; that the car had passed the white post without stopping before he had an opportunity to board it; that he then ran from Harvard avenue diagonally across Washington street in the direction of the car; that the next stop was at Norwell street, 500 feet beyond; that he was on his way to take the car at Norwell street; that he was struck by the front left-hand fender, as he ran by the side of the car in the space between the outbound and inbound rails; that he fell on the left-hand corner of the car, and died the following morning. The immediate reason of his leaving home to take the elevated car was to make certain collections and to solicit some "ordinary insurance" which his superior officer desired him to obtain that day. His employment compelled him "to make use of the public streets and to ride in street cars to call on prospective purchasers of new insurance" and to make collections on his route. Upon the facts the insurer contends that the hazards of the street in their relation to the employment of the decedent are hazards common to persons engaged in any employment who have occasion to travel along the streets and are not a causative danger peculiar to Moran's employment, and cites as authorities for his position Hewitt's Case, 225. Mass. 1. 113 N. E. 572, L. R A. 1917B, 249, and Donohue's Case, 226 Mass. 595, 116 N. E 226, L. R. A. 1918A, 215. These were cases "where the causative relation between injury and employment was too remote to charge the employment with the risk of the particular injury received." Kearney's Case, 232 Mass. 532, 534, 122 N. E. 739, 740. In the case at bar, the workman to do the work of his employment must continually stand in danger of receiving an injury from accidents resulting from exposure to what ever risks and hazards are commonly attendant on the use of public streets and conveyances; which risks to him are greater because more constant than those that are incidental to the occasional and casual use of such streets by persons who use them in the ordinary way. We are of opinion that the risk and hazard of the decedent's employment were not too remote in their casuative relation to the employment, and that the case is governed by Kearney's Case, and similar cases, and is distinguishable from Hewitt's Case, supra, and from Donohue's Case. supra. Decree affirmed. SONIA'S CASE. Suffolk. Jan. 9. 1920.) (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 125 Northeastern Reporter 574. COMPENSATION. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S DECISION OF SINGLE MEMBER MAY BE REVERSED BY INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD. Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 10, as amended by St. 1917, c. 297, § 6, the Industrial Accident Board has power on review to set reverse the findings and decision of the member who heard the parties and their witnesses, though the same are not clearly erroneous and have support in evidence. aside or (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 416.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; FINDINGS BY BOARD AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE BY SINGLE MEMBER CONTROLLING. Under Workmen's Compensation Act, §10, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 13, St. 1917, c. 297, 86, the Industrial Accident Board, on the same evidence as that on which the single member acted, has full power to find facts at variance with and contrary to those found by the member. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 416.) Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Sonia, the employee, opposed by the Woodside Motor Company, the emProceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Alfred J. ployer, and the Travelers' Insurance Company, the insurer. Compensation was denied by the Industrial Accident Board, the denial affirmed by the Superior Court, and the employee appeals. Decree affirmed. Thomas E. Hamill, of Chelsea, for appellant. Walter I. Badger and Louis C. Doyle, both of Boston, for insurer. "upon all the evidence," found and ruled "that at the time the employe PIERCE, J. The Industrial Accident Board on a "claim for review," received the injury complained of he was not in the employ of the subthe parties and their witnesses, and dismissed the claim for compensascriber," reversed the findings and rulings of the member who heard In the Superior Court the action of the Industrial Accident Board tion. |