It would serve no useful purpose to state the evidence here. It has been carefully considered, and we are clearly of the opinion that it supports the findings. Even though relator had been employed by Wilcox, it is not made certain by the record before us that such employment would have been in the usual course of the latter's trade, business, profession, or occupation so that the case would fall within the provision of the Compensation Act as construed in State ex rel. Lennon v. Dist. Court, 138 Minn. 103, 164 N. W. 366, and in State ex rel. Foss v. Dist. Court, 176 N. W. 164, filed herewith. [2] The trial court did not err in sustaining an objection to the following question put to relator: "Did Tom Johnson tell you he was going to enter the service?" referring to Johnson's entry into the military service of the United States during the war with Germany. The contention. that, if the question had been answered in the affirmative, it would have demonstrated the impossibility of Johnson being relator's employer at the time of the injury, cannot be sustained There was no error in the admission of Wilcox's ledger account with Johnson in connection with the written contract between them, which expressly provided that Wilcox should pay the workmen their weekly wages. The fact that he paid relator his wages and charged the amount to Johnson tended to establish Wilcox's contention that he was not relator's employer. The judgment is affirmed. STATE EX REL. GREEN ET AL. V. DISTRICT COURT OF RAMSEY (Supreme Court of Minnesota. Feb. 6, 1920) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT - WHETHER EMPLOYEE'S INTOXICATION OR CONDITION OF PREMISES WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY WITHIN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT QUESTION FOR TRIAL COURT. In an action under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230), it is held that the question whether the intoxication of the injured employee or the condition of the stairway which he was required to use in going to his place of work was the proximate cause of his injury was one of fact for the trial court. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 412.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-TRIAL COURT NOT BOUND TO FIND EMPLOYEE'S INTOXICATION TO BE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY WITHIN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.. The intoxication was not the natural cause of the injury, and on the facts stated in the opinion the trial court was not bound to find that it was the proximate cause thereof, within the meaning of the Compensation Act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 412.) Certiorari to District Court, Ramsey County; Hugo A. Hanft, Judge. Certiorari by the State of Minnesota, on the relation of Nancy D. Green and others, to review a judgment of the District Court of Ramsey County, awarding compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of Thomas Davis, an employee. Judgment affirmed. Russell P. Fischer, of Minneapolis, for relators. Clifford L. Hilton and K. G. McManigal, both of St. Paul, for respondent. BROWN, C. J. Certiorari in review of a judgment of the district court of Ramsey county in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230). It appears from the record that defendant at the time in question was the owner and operator of the Fey Hotel in the city of St. Paul. For a time prior to February 25, 1918, and up to the time of his death on that day, Thomas Davis was in her employ at a salary or compensation of $35 per month, his duties being to attend the furnace or heating plant of the building, which was located in the basement. The basement was reached by means of a stairway leading from an alley in the rear of the premises. On the day named, at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, Davis in going to his work in some way tripped and fell down the stairway, receiving injuries which caused his death. Plaintiff is his widow, and brought the proceeding to recover the statutory compensation in such cases provided. [1] It stands conceded on the record that decedent was intoxicated at the time, and the court so found the fact. The court further found that the fall down the stairway and resulting death was not the natural result of the intoxication, nor shown to be the proximate cause thereof, and awarded plaintiff the compensation fixed by the statute. The correctness of that conclusion presents the only question in the case. The additional point made by relator that decedent was not in the course of his employment at the time of the accident is not sustained by the record. Decedent had been in relator's employ for some time, and though neglectful of his duties, had not been discharged. He was rightfully upon the premises, and on the way to the place of the performance of his work. Of this the record presents no question. We therefore hold without further comment that decedent was in relator's employ at the time of the accident and in the course of his employment within the meaning of the statute, and come directly to the question whether the trial court was right in the conclusion that the inoxication of decedent was neither the natural nor the proximate cause of his injury and death. General Statutes 1913, § 8203, of the Compensation Act provides that compensation shall be paid according to the schedules therein contained in every case of injury or death of an employe by accidental means, without regard to the question of negligence "except accidents which are intentionally self-inflicted or when the intoxication of such employe is the natural or proximate cause of the injury, and the burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer." [2] The question whether the intoxication of the decedent was the natural cause of his injury and death may be passed without comment. It clearly was not. Whether it was the proximate cause thereof presents another and different question, though on the facts here presented we hold that it was correctly disposed of by the trial court. In controversies under the Workmen's Compensation Act the contributory negligence of an injured employe is not a bar to his right to compensation. The intoxication of a person injured by the alleged negligence of another has usually been treated in actions at law for damages as a contributing cause thereof, and sufficient to defeat a recovery. But that condition of the injured person is not per se contributory negligence. 2 Dunnell's Dig. 7028, and cases there cited. It constitutes a bar to relief under the Compensation Act, only when shown to be the proximate, as distinguished from the contributory, cause of the injury complained of. This distinction necessarily follows from the express language of the statute, by which contributory negligence of the employe is expressly excluded from consideration in determining the liability of the employer. In this view of the law applicable to the cases we are of opinion that the court below was not bound to find that the intoxication of decedent was the proximate cause of his injury and death. From the facts presented reasonable minds might reach different conclusions upon the question, rendering the determination thereof by the trial court final. State ex rel. Niessen v. District Court, 172 N. W. 133. The proximate cause of an injury is that act or event which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening efficient cause produces the same. The record clearly shows the intoxication of decedent. The extent thereof the trial court does not find. The record also shows that at the time of the accident the stairway, the means of access to decedent's place of work, was to some extent not in good order. There was no railing by which one might guide his course up or down the stairway; one was placed therein soon after the accident. On the day following the injury some ice and snow was found on the first three or four steps of the stairway, and the trial court might well enough have assumed its presence on the day of the accident. From this state of the evidence we conclude that the proximate cause of the accident lay between the intoxication of decedent and the condition of the stairway, presenting a question of fact for the trial judge; and within the Niessen Case, supra, his conclusion thereon is not open to review in this court. Judgment affirmed. AMERICAN SMELTING & REFINING CO. v. CASSIL. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. Jan. 17, 1920.) 175 Northwestern Reporter 1021 (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT CONSTITUTES PART OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. The Workmen's Compensation Act is by construction a part of the contract of employment. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 348.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. The Workmen's Compensation Act is a remedial statute, enacted for the benefit of workmen, and is liberally construed to carry out the legislative intent. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 348.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; FACT ISSUES MUST BE DETERMINED BY CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASE. The issue of fact in a proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act must be determined by the circumstances of the particular case presented. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[1].) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; ACTS OF A PERSONAL NATURE ARE NOT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE LAW. Doing what is essential to sanitary conditions or to the comfort and welfare of the employee, preparing to go home and leaving the premises, are not outside of the workmen's compensation law, merely because they may be classed as acts of a personal nature. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) 5. MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; DEATH BY HOMICIDE HELD TO "ARISE OUT OF EMPLOYMENT." A quarrel between a watchman and a superintendent, resulting in a homicide, held to "arise out of the employment," under the evidence summarized in the opinion, though personal matters had entered into the controversy. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 373.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) 6. MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR INSURANCE CARRIED BY HIM ON LIFE OF EMPLOYEE. In a proceeding by a widow under the compensation law for the death of her husband, insurance carried by the employer on the life of the employee without expense to insured, and paid to the widow before the employer's liability for compensation had been determined, should be allowed as a credit on the amount of compensation to be paid. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385 [17].) Appeal from District Court, Douglas County; Redick, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Catherine Cassil to recover for the death of her husband, A. C. Cassil, opposed by the American Smelting & Refining Company, employer. Compensation was awarded by the Compensation Commissioner but on employer's appeal to the district court was disallowed, and claimant appeals. Reversed, with directions. Wm. J. Hotz and Geo. A. Lee, both of Omaha, for appellant. Crofoot, Fraser & Connolly, of Omaha, and Hird Stryker, for ap pellee. ROSE, J. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act Catherine Cassil, defendant, presented to the compensation commissioner, on account of the death of her husband, A. C. Cassil, a claim against the American Smelting & Refining Company, plaintiff, for $12 a week for 350 weeks and $100 for expenses of his last illness and funeral. On the premises of plaintiff defendant's husband was shot by Terrence Casey at night, January 27, 1919, and died the next morning. Plaintiff is engaged in the smelting and the refining of ores in Omaha. At the time of the shooting Cassil was assistant superintendent of a department, and Casey was head watchman of the plant. Defendant contends that the death of her husband was caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employment" within the meaning of those words as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act. Rev. St. 1913, § 3642. It is conceded by plaintiff that the homicide occurred in the course of Cassil's employment, but it is insisted that it did not arise out of such employment, being, from the standpoint of plaintiff, solely the result of a quarrel between Cassil and Casey over personal matters. The compensation commissioner allowed the claim of defendant, but deducted there from $1,690, which she had received as insurance carried by plaintiff on the life of her husband. From the award of the compensation commissioner plaintiff appealed to the district court for Douglas county. There the claim of defendant was disallowed. From a dismissal of the proceeding she has appealed to the Supreme Court. Did the death of Cassil arise out of his employment by plaintiff? The answer depends on the effect of the statute and the proper deductions from the evidence. [1-4] The Workmen's Compensation Act is by construction a part of the contract of employment. It is a remedial statute, enacted for the benefit of workmen, and is liberally construed to carry out the legislative intent. The protection of workmen and dependents under the act should not be limited by general principles of law having no application to the claim for compensation. The issues must be determined by the circumstances of the particular case presented. These are recognized principles of the workmen's compensation law. Courts have often declared that an injury resulting from a wrongful assault having no connection with the employer's business or with the employe's duty does not arise out of the employment. There are acts of a personal nature on the part of the employe, however, which do not necessarily defeat compensation. Doing what is essential to sanitary conditions or to the comfort and welfare of the employe, preparing to go home and leaving the premises, are not beyond the protection of the statute, merely because they may be classed as acts personal in their nature. The dividing line between purely personal incidents, resulting in injury on the premises of the employer during working hours and accidents "arising out of and in the course of" the employment is often obscure. [5] The solution of the problem now under consideration is involved in difficulties. There are formidable arguments on both sides. In the course of a wordy quarrel culminating in the homicide the participants referred both to their personal grievances and their conduct as employes. The motive for the shooting is a material inquiry. Was the violence of Casey the result of personal matters between him and his victim, or did it arise out of the employment? Plaintiff, the employer, contends that Cassil lost his life through a desire of Casey for revenge prompted by Cassil's conduct in refusing to return borrowed money amounting to $35, in converting to his own use a keg of whisky intrusted to him for another, and in falsely accusing Casey of intimacy with Cassil's wife. There is evidence tending to prove that on the night of the tragedy Casey and Cassil had exchanged vile and profane epithets in referring to these subjects. Casey was convicted of murder, and for that felony was sentenced to the penitentiary. It should be observed, however, that the debt, the conversion and the charge of sexual transgression were grievances of long standing, which hitherto had not resulted in physical violence, and that the liaison mentioned is found in the testimony of Casey at the murder trail on the issue of self-defense-a question of fact which the jury in that case decided against him. The convincing evidence of the incidents immediately preceding the homicide seems to indicate that Casey was the aggressor, whereas Cassil would naturally have assumed that role had he believed his marital rights had been invaded. Is the evidence in support of defendant's theory that the quarrel and resulting homicide arose out of the employment more convincing than that in favor of plaintiff's theory that Cassil lost his life in a quarrel over personal matters? The tragedy occurred at a time and place where defendant was protected by the Workmen's Compensation Act, if the homicide arose out of the employment. The participants were |