tion, and interpretation be determined to the same extent as if its execution, performance, or cause of action thereon or growing out of the same, actually took place or arose in said District of Columbia." The contract did not stipulate the character of the services to be performed by Randall; but the services actually rendered by him consisted in the operation and care of what was termed a "privilege car," in which he sold food and soft drinks: and in which, and for and on behalf of appellant, he conducted games of chance, and received for his services in conducting such games a per cent. of the rake-off, which was in addition to the wages paid him in accordance with the terms of his said written agreement. On June 21, 1918, appellant show company gave an exhibition in the city of Michigan City, Ind., and was planning to give an exhibition on the following day in the city of Hammond in said state; that at an early hour on June 22, 1918, while appellant's show and show train were being transported over the Michigan Central Railroad from said city of Michigan City to said city of Hammond, and while in Lake county. Ind., and while the said Randall was "in the course of his employment under the lawful written contract," the said "privilege car" occupied by him, together with many other cars of appellant's train of cars carrying appel lant's show, was wrecked, causing bodily injuries to said Randall. resulting in his death on June 26, 1918. From an award of the Industrial Board, appellant show company appeals. Appellant assigns as errors that the award is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to law. The chief contention of appellant is that the Industrial Board has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this controversy, for the reason that the contract of employment was made in the state of Ohio, and by the express terms of the contract the parties in good faith stipulated that the laws of the District of Columbia should govern the validity and con struction of the contract. was in As shown by the finding, appellant is not only an Indiana corporation, but at the time in question was an Indiana business. Its show re quired the operation of a train, one of the cars of which train charge of Randall. It was contemplated by the parties, when they exe Icuted the contract in Ohio, that some time during the season the show train would return to, and be operated in, Indiana. Therefore, the important question for our consideration is: Can an Indiana corporation, Iwith its principal offices in this state, but which carries on its business, not only in Indiana, but elsewhere, and which is not engaged in interstate I work in many states, including Indiana, and by the terms of such contract commerce, make a contract with an employé in the state of Ohio to do relieve itself of all obligations under the Indiana Workmen's CompensaItion Act (Acts 1915, p. 392) if such employé should be injured or killed in the state of Indiana, while at work pursuant to the terms of such contract? [1] By the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, the state of Indiana Imade sweeping changes in its laws relative to the rights and duties of state was established; and it is a settled principle of the law that the public policy of a state is supreme, and, when once established, will not, as a rule, be relaxed even on the ground of comity to enforce contracts etc., R. Co. v. Teeters, 166 Ind. 335. 77 V. e suon Policy Lake (Ñ, S.) which, though valid where made, contravene such policy. Lake Shore. 425; 5 R. C. L. 944, and cases there cited. [2] The Workmen's Compensation Act of this state (sections 2-4. 15, Acts 1915) specifically provides that every employer in the state is presumed to have accepted the provisions of the act, and to have agreed to be bound thereby, unless such employer, 30 days before the accident resulting in injury or death, shall have given notice of exemption, and that no contract can operate to relieve any employer of any obligation created by the act. It is not contended that appellant gave the required notice, or any notice whatever. Appellant's show and show train were brought into Indi ana, and appellant's business was being conducted in Indiana, just as had been contemplated by the parties at the time the employment contract in question was executed, and Randall, at the time of his death, was in the line of his employment as provided by such contract. Under such circumstances the public policy of Indiana as established by her compensation law did not give way because the contract of employment had been made in Ohio. Appellant's obligation under the Indiana act was superimposed upon the Ohio contract as a condition of its performance in this state. Appellant could not relieve itself of the statutory obligation by a foreign contract. The one way of exemption was by notice as provided by the act. Substantially the same question presented by this appeal was decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. Law, 436, 92 Atl. 85. In that case the contract of employment was made in New York. The work of the employé was to be done partly in New York and partly in New Jersey. The employé died in New Jersey as a result of injuries received while about the work he was employed to do in that state. The court held that the employé was entitled to compensation under the laws of New Jersey. In passing upon the case, the court said: "The contention of the prosecutor is that as the relation is contractual, the contract must be governed by the law of New York, where it was made, and as that law at the time contained no provision for compensation, there can be no recovery. We think the answer to the prosecutor's contention is that the right of recovery rests, not upon the New York contract, but upon the New Jersey statute. * * * We find no evidence * * * of any term in the New York contract that prohibits the applicability of the New Jersey statute. If there were, the parties could not by their agreement prevent New Jersey from regulating the conduct of its own industries and from prescribing, as one of the terms upon which the performance of a foreign contract of hiring shall be permitted in this state, the implication by law of a contract for compensation to the workmen. It is open to the cmployer under a New York contract to prevent the operation of section 2, if he wishes, by notice. If he fails to give the notice, and undertakes to perform the contract in New Jersey, he voluntarily subjects himself to our law, and is governed thereby." The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of New Jersey (Laws 1911, p. 134), cited by the court of that state as controlling, do not materially differ from the provisions of the Indiana law to which we refer in this opinion. The reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in that part of the opinion which we have quoted is sound, and so far as applicable to the case at bar is approved. We therefore hold that the cause is governed by the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act. In addition to the Rogge Case above cited, see Davidheiser v. Hay Foundry & Iron Works, 87 N. J. Law, 688, 94 Atl. 309; Johnson v. Nelson, 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 620. [3, 41 Appellant does not attack the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but in its brief asserts that the award by the Industrial Board in this cause amounts to an impairment of appellant's said contract of employment with Randall, in violation of section 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and that it deprives appellant of property and denies it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of said Constitution. It is sufficient to say, in response to this complaint, that the constitutional prohibitions referred to do not extend to subjects affecting the general welfare of the public, and that the rights guaranteed by such constitutional provisions are subservient to the public welfare. Grand Trunk, etc., R. C. v. City of South Bend, 174 Ind. 203, 89 N. E. 885, 91 N. E. 809, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850; State v. Rich Creek, 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, 119 Am. St. Rep. 491, 10 Ann. Cas. 879; Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 182 Ind. 36, 105 N. E. 496; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v Anderson, 182 Ind. 140, 105 N. E. 49, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 182; Jensen v. Southern, etc., R. Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600, L. R. A. 1916A, 403, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 276; Hunter v. Colfax, etc., Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917B, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; 12 Corpus Juris 1157, 1197. The Industrial Board, among other things, found that appellee's son was not performing services under the unlawful gambling contract time he received the injuries resulting in his death, but was in the at the Course law as of his employment under the lawful written contract. There is there fore no merit in the contention of appellant that the award is contrary to giving to appellee the benefits of an illegal contract. Interstate Iron & Steel Co. v. Szot, 115 N. E. 599. The award is affirmed, and, as provided by section 61 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, p. 106) as amended by the act of 1917 (Acts 1917, n. 155), said award is increased by 5 per cent. CARL HAGENBECK & GREAT WALLACE SHOW CO. v. (No. 10673.) BALL (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. March 12, 1920.) 126 Northeastern Reporter, 504. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT EMPLOYMENT A domestic corporation, which has its principal place of business in the state and conducts its circus business by moving from town to town throughout the country, is liable, under the state Workmen's Compensation Act, for injuries to an employee injured in accident within the state, though the contract of employment was entered into in another state. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 368.) for Appeal from Industrial Board. Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation Wallace Show Company, employer. Award by Industrial Board, and ployer appeals Award increased and affirmed. em Rabb, all of Indianapolis, and Arthur McCart, of Paoli, for appellant. Fred Barnett, of Hammond, for appellee. cipal office and principal place of business at Indianapolis, and is engaged DAUSMAN, J. The appellant is an Indiana corporation, having its prinand employes a corps of performers. It conducts its business by moving in the circus business. In connection with the circus it owns a menagerie 13, 1918, at Toledo, Ohio, it made a contract in writing with appel ellee, by virtue of which appellee entered its service as an employé. On June 21, 1918, it gave a performance at Michigan City, Ind., after which it was Ind., by rail. While being thus transported the appellee received a pertransporting its menagerie, performers, and other employés to Hammond, Isonal injury in a railway wreck. He filed his application for compensa tion, and the proceeding resulted in an award at the rate of $11 per week. The only contention presented by appellant is that the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1915, c. 106) has no application to the case, for the reason that the contract of employment was made in Ohio and is governed by the laws of Ohio. This question is involved in the case of Hagenbeck v. Randall, 126 N. E. 501, decided by this court March 12, 1920, adversely to appellant's contention. On the authority of that case, the award is affirmed, and the amount thereof increased 5 per cent. In re BOLLMAN. (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. March 16, 1920.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-DEATH FROM ARTICLES FALLING ON EMPLOYEE AFTER RETIRING IN BARN FOR NIGHT HELD ACCIDENT "ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT" WITHIN COMPENSATION ACT. Where a thresher's engineer, who under the terms of his employment was required to travel from farm to farm and to stay out nights on premises on which the threshing outfit happened to be, was killed when a wagon suspended by ropes fell upon him after he had retired for the night in the driveway of a barn on the premises, his death was by "accident arising out of employment," within Workmen's Compensation Act, § 2. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 373.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-COMPENSATION ACT LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. The words "by accident arising out of" the employment as used in section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed so as to accomplish the humane purpose of the act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 371.) Appeal from Industrial Board. Proceedings by Hannah Bollman for compensation for the death of her husband, opposed by one Lewellen. The Industrial Board certified to the court the following questions: (1) Did the accident causing the injury resulting in the death of Bollman arise out of his employment as engineer by Lewellen? (2) Would a finding that the accident causing the death of Bollman arose out of his said employment be sustained by sufficient evidence? (3) Would such finding be according to law? Questions answered in the affirmative. Robert H. Williams and John B. Murphy, both of Crawfordsville, for appellant. Landers, McKay, Turner & Merrell, of Indianapolis, for appellee. REMY, P. J. The Industrial Board has certified to this court questions of law based upon the following facts: One Lewellen, a resident of Montgomery county, owned a threshing outfit which he had operated in ma his community for more than 10 years immediately prior to July 16, 1919. During all of said time Lewellen had in his employ as engineer one Bollman, whose duty it was to operate the engine used in propelling the machinery and in moving the same from farm to farm. Late in the evening of July 16, 1919, Lewellen moved his threshing machinery on to the farm of one Downey for the purpose of threshing wheat the following day. No threshing was done on the evening of said date, but the chine was set about 150 yards from the barn, and 250 yards from the house. Under the terms of his employment, "Bollman was required to stay of nights on the premises where the machinery was left, and to keep watch on the machinery to protect it from fire and trespassers." Lewellen had done the threshing on the Downey farm during the eight years diately preceding July 16, 1919, and during said years it had been the custom of Bollman to remain overnight and sleep in the Downey though there was room for him to sleep in the Downey residence, and each year he had been invited to sleep there. On the evening of July 16, 1919, at retiring time, Bollman was invited by Downey to sleep in the residence, but he declined to do so on the ground that it was cooler barn, and that he would be nearer the machinery, which was the reason given for sleeping in the barn in the previous years. Accordingly Bollman and other employés of Lewellen, on the night in question, prepared for themselves beds for sleep in the driveway of the Downey barn. Immediately over this driveway was a heavy wagon bed suspended by ropes, one of which suddenly broke during the night, causing the imme barn, in the same wagon to fall on Bollman, and inflicting upon him such injuries as caused his death on July 24, 1919. Bollman left surviving him as his only dependent his wife, Hannah Bollman, with whom he was living at the time of his death. to an It is conceded by the employer that said dependent is entitled award of 300 weeks' compensation at the rate of $13.20 per week, if the death of said Bollman was due to an injury arising out of and course of his employment by Lewellen. in the [1] Upon the foregoing facts, the Industrial Board respectfully submits the following questions for determination: (1) Did the accident caus. ing the injury resulting in the death of Bollman arise out of his employ. ment as engineer by Lewellen? (2) Would a finding that the accident causing the death of Bollman arose out of his said employment be sus tained by sufficient evidence? (3) Would such finding be according to law? [2] That the accident resulting in Bollman's death occurred in the course of his employment is not questioned. The important question is whether the accident arose "out of" such employment. The words "by accident arising out of" the employment as used in section 2 of the Workman's Compensation Act (Laws 1915, c. 106) should be liberally construed so as to accomplish the humane purposes of the act. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Willoughby, 123 N. E. 195. It is said that an accident arises "out of" the employment, if it is in some sense due to the employment-if it results Co. v. Brown, 117 N. E. 555; Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. Law, 76, 86 Atl. V. Swift, 458. But as was stated by this court in Nordyke & Marmon Co. 123 N. E. 449, the difficulty does not arise so much from a determination of a proper definition of the clause under consideration as it does from an application of the same to a given state of facts. The question in each case must be determined from a consideration of its own facts and circum stances. The question whether the accident resulting in injury or death in a given case arises out of the employment does not depend upon the minute details of what the employé was doing at the time, but rather upon the question as to whether the accident was due to a hazard to which the employé would not have been exposed apart from the business in which he was employed. Great Lakes, etc., Co. v. Totzke, N. E. 675. In the case at bar, it will be observed that Bollman's employment was |