cannot be able as to the whole or any portion of the rent; no demise of apportion- the eight acres had ever taken place, and, consequently no right ed. to any rent in respect thereof had ever come into existence. There was no case where an entire rent reserved had been held to be apportionable, in which the tenant had not been at some period subject to the entire rent by virtue of the demise. The right of apportionment in this case was not founded on any eviction or other matter occurring subsequent to the demise, but on an original defect in the demise itself, by which *726 the entire rent was *reserved. The impediment to the defendant to take possession was not analagous to an eviction; for no interest in the eight acres passed to him, the demise being wholly void.a Plea of the limitations. All actions of debt for the arrears of rent not reserved by statute of deed must be brought within six years, and actions for rent due on specialty must be brought within twenty years after the cause of action accrued. The statute of limitations must in all cases be specially pleaded, and the plea must conclude with a verification."(1) A tenant holding SECTION VII. DEBT FOR DOUBLE VALUE. By 4 Geo. II, c. 28, s. 1, "if any tenant for life or years or other person who shall come into possession of any lands, teneover after the expiraments, or hereditaments by, under, from or in collusion with tion of his such tenant, shall wilfully hold over any lands, &c., after the term, to be determination of such term and after demand made and notice liable to in writing given for delivering possession thereof, by the landdouble va- lord or lessor or person entitled to the reversion or remainder lue. of such lands, &c., or his or their agent, such person so holding over shall, for the time he shall so hold over, pay to the persons kept out of possession, their executors, administrators or assigns, at the rate of double the yearly value of the lands, &c., for so long time as the same are detained, to be recovered in any court of record by action of debt, whereunto the defendant shall be obliged to give special bail, and against the recovery of which penalty there shall be no relief in equity." This is a remedial law, as the penalty is to be given to the Neale v. Mackenzie, 1 Mees. & Wels. 747. See Bac. Ab. "Leases," (N.) Dove v. Wilcott, Cro. Eliz. 160. Com. Dig. "Estates," (G. 13.) b 21 Jac. I, c. 16. See "Limitations, statute of," post. 3 & 4 W. IV, c. 42, s. 3, post. d 1 Saund. 283. (1) (The statute of limitations may be given in evidence under nil debet. Davis v. Shoemaker, 1 Rawle, 155.) party aggrieved, therefore, it is to be construed liberally; accordingly it has been held, that though the words are "after demand made, and notice in writing given," the notice in writing is of itself a sufficient demand; and that a receiver appointed *under an order of the Court of Chancery is " an agent lawful- *727 ly authorised" within the meaning of the statute." Lord El- The sta lenborough, however, considered that, as it was a penal statute, tute does it ought to be construed strictly, and he therefore held, that it not extend did not extend to a weekly tenant, and, consequently, that an tenants, or to weekly action of debt for double value would not lie against him for to tenants holding over after notice to quit; and a tenant who holds over holding under a fair claim of right will not be considered as wilfully over under holding over within the meaning of the statute, and, therefore, claim of a fair will not be liable to pay double value though it eventually right. turns out that he had no right. But though the landlord has recovered the premises in ejectment, he may afterwards maintain an action for double value during the time that the tenant held over after the expiration of notice to quit; for it is cumulative and has no reference to any antecedent remedy which the landlord had to recover possession. The two actions were brought diverso intuitu, the one to recover possession wrongfully withheld, the other to indemnify the landlord for the wrong.d Acceptance of a single rent is a waiver of the double value. AcceptBut where a landlord declared in debt, first, for the double ance of value; secondly, for use and occupation; the tenant pleaded single rent nil debet to the first, and a tender of the single rent before the action brought to the second count, and paid the money into court, which the plaintiff took out before trial, and still proceeded; it was contended that the plaintiff ought to be nonsuited upon the ground that such acceptance of the single rent was a waiver of his right to proceed for the double value. But the court held otherwise, observing that the plaintiff's going on with the action after taking the single rent out of court, was evidence to show that he did not mean to waive his claim for the double value, but to make it pro tanto; and they seemed to think that though the single rent were paid into *court on the second count, yet, if the plaintiff had not accept- *728 ed it, but had recovered on the first count, the defendant would have been entitled to have the money so paid in, deducted out of the larger sum recovered." If a landlord give notice to quit or pay a certain rent, and the tenant holds over, the former may maintain use and occu Lloyd v. Rosbee, 2 Camp. 453. See Sullivan v. Bishop, 2 C. & P. 329. (12 Eng. C. L. 170.) It seems to be doubtful whether quarterly holdings come within this statute. Wilkinson v. Hall, 3 Bing. N. C. 1. (32 Eng. C. L.) 3 Hodges, 56. с Wright v. Smith, 5 Esp. 203. 4 Soulsby v. Neving, 9 East, 310. Doe d. Cheney v. Batten, Cowp. 243. 9 East, 314, n. 'Ryal v. Rich, 10 East, 48. VOL. II.-2 and she af pation, and shall recover the rent specified in the notice. Notice to quit, under this act, may be previous to the expiration of the lease.b If notice In debt for double the yearly value, the plaintiff, after stating be given to a demise to the defendant's wife, and her subsequent intermara woman riage with the defendant, alleged in the first count a notice to terwards quit, and demand of possession delivered to the defendant and marries, it his wife; and in the second count alleged a notice to quit, and is not ne- demand of possession delivered to the wife previous to her incessary to termarriage with the defendant; held, that to support the segive notice to her cond count, the husband need not be joined for conformity, husband. and that to sustain the action it was not necessary to have given a notice to the husband subsequent to the intermarriage. Though a demise be for a certain time, a demand of possession and notice in writing, &c., are necessary to entitle the landlord to double rent or value; but such demand may be made above six weeks afterwards, if the landlord have done no act in the mean time to acknowledge the continuation of the tenancy; and if the tenant hold over, the landlord will be entitled to double value from the time of such demand; but if the rent be reserved quarterly, and the demand be made in the middle of a quarter, the landlord cannot recover single rent for the antecedent fraction of such quarter.d Tenants in common cannot sue jointly, under this statute, for double value, where there has been no joint demise. They must sever if the tenant held the premises by a separate demise from each, for persons cannot join in an action unless they *729 have a *joint interest. Where one entire injury is done to both tenants in common they shall have one entire remedy, but where the injury is separate they may have several actions.f The administratrix of an executor cannot sue for the double value of lands held over after notice to quit, under a demise from the testator, without taking out administration de bonis non, even though the tenant has attorned to her.s A tenant holding SECTION VIII. DEBT FOR DOUBLE RENT. By 11 Geo. II, c. 19, s. 18, "if any tenant shall give notice of his intention to quit the premises holden by him, at a time a Anon. Lofft. 153. с b Cutting v. Derby, 2 Bl. 1075. Lake v. Smith, 1 N. R. 174. See Wilkinson v. Colley, 5 Burr. 2694. a Cobb v. Stokes, 8 East, 358. • Wilkinson v. Hall, 1 Bing. N. C. 713. (27 Eng. C. L. 555.) 1 Hodges, 170. Per Curiam, in Cutting v. Derby, 2 Bl. 1077. Tingrey v. Brown, 1 B. & P. 310. landlord mentioned in such notice, and shall not deliver up the posses- over, after sion thereof accordingly at the time in such notice contained, having then such tenant, his executors or administrators shall thence- given his forward pay to the landlord double the rent which he should notice to otherwise have paid to be levied, sued for, and recovered at quit, is lithe same time and in the same manner as the single rent could; able to and such double rent shall continue to be paid during all the double time such tenant shall continue in possession." It is observable that this act is distinguishable from 4 Geo. II, c. 28, which subjects the tenant to double the yearly value when the landlord gives him notice to quit, whereas by this act he is subject to double the yearly rent when he himself gives notice. Whether the tenancy be by a lease or a parol demise it is within the above provision. The tenant's notice need not be in writing.a rent. But this statute only applies to those cases where the tenant has the power of determining the tenancy by a notice, and *where he has actually given a valid notice sufficient to deter- *730 mine such tenancy, or the insufficient notice has been assented to by the landlord in writing. There must be some time fixed in the notice to bring it within the statute; a notice that the tenant will quit as soon as he can get another situation will not enable the landlord to recover double rent though the tenant had got another situation. In an action for double rent on the statute, for holding over after notice, the jury may find for so much as the tenant appears to have overheld, without reference to the sum demanded, so that it be not more than that sum.d * Timmins v. Rowlinson, 3 Burr. 1603. This act is penned differently from that of 4 Geo. II, c. 28, and seems to have been designed to lay a less restraint upon the notice to be given by the tenant than the 4 Geo. II, had laid upon the landlord, in obliging him to give notice in writing; and the reason is much stronger for obliging landlords to give notice in writing; for landlords generally can write, tenants in the country very seldom can. Per Wilmot, J., id. 1608. Johnston v. Hudleston, 7 D. & R. 411. 4 B. & C. 922. (10 Eng. C. L. 471.) Declaration in replevin, avowry for double rent of premises of which plaintiff was tenant from year to year to defendant, and which he held over after the expiration of his own notice to quit. Plea in bar, that the notice was not in writing, and was given less than six months before the day therein mentioned for quitting possession. Replication, admitting the allegations in the plea, but averring that the demise was by parol, and that defendant recognised, assented to, and adopted the notice. On demurrer to the replication, held, first, that the tenancy was not determined, the notice to quit being insufficient, and there being no surrender in writing, or by operation of law within the statute of frauds. Second, that the landlord was not entitled to double rent under 11 Geo. II, c. 19. s. 18. And third, that under this avowry, he could not recover the single rent, it not being part and parcel of the double rent avowed for. Id. Farrance v. Elkington, 2 Camp. 591. The landlord has a remedy under this statute by distress as well as by action. Timmins v. Rowlinson, Johnston v. Hudleston, supra. But he has no right to distrain for double rent upon a weekly tenant who holds over after notice to quit. Sullivan v. Bishop, 2 C. & P. 359. (12 Eng. C. L. 170.) Anon. Lofft. 275. Of the nature of a bond. *731 1. Of the nature and requi sites of a bond. 2. Of the stamp. 3. Construction of bonds. 5. 733 . 736 740 744 1.—of the nature and requisites of a bond.] A BOND is a deed or instrument under seal whereby one person binds himself to another to pay a sum of money or to perform or suffer some particular act or thing at an appointed time. The person who thus becomes bound is called the obligor and the party to whom the bond is given is called the obligee. If the bond be merely for the payment of a sum of money, it is Condition called a single bill or bond, simplex obligatio; but there is generally a condition in the nature of a defeasance annexed to it, the performance of which discharges the obligation; as to pay rent or perform covenants contained in a deed or repay a principal sum of money borrowed of the obligee, with interest, which principal sum is generally one half of the penal sum specified in the bond. If the condition be performed the bond becomes void, otherwise it becomes forfeited and absolute in law.b Form of a bond. 1 No particular form is necessary to constitute a bond; any words which create an obligation, or which amount to an acknowledgement of a debt, will be sufficient, as “I, (G. S.) do promise to pay to N. U., in December next," &c., or any form of expression to that effect, written or printed on paper, vellum or parchment, under seal and duly executed, will create a bond or obligation. It is essential, however, that there be an obligor and an obligee, and that there be a sum in which the former is bound. If, however, there be any defect in the statement of the sum or of the parties, the courts will construe it so as to give effect to the intention of the parties, if it can be collected from other parts of the instrument. As, where a person admitted himself to be indebted to another in a certain sum to be paid at a future day, and bound himself to pay it without mentioning to whom; the court said that it should be intended that he was bound to the person to whom he acknowledged ■ A defeasance is an instrument which defeats the force or operation of some other deed or estate, and that which in the same deed is called a condition, in another deed is a defeasance. Com. Dig. "Defeasance,” A. 2 Saund. 47, 8. b 2 Bl. Com. 340. Co. Litt. 172, a. Hurlst. on Bonds, 1. Com. Dig. "Oblig." (A.) Shep. Touch. 56, 368. Loggins v. Titherton, Yelv. |