The pre six months' previous notice. His lordship laid considerable stress upon the word certain, applied to the first twelve months, which showed that every thing afterwards was uncertain, and depended on the notice." As implied tenancies from year to year depend upon the sumption presumption that it was the intention of the parties to create of a yearly them, evidence is admissible to rebut such presumption; as where the rent is not paid and received as between landlord and tenant, but upon some other consideration, a tenancy from year to year will not be created.b tenancy may be rebutted. Defendant in possession under a lease for fourteen years, assigned the lease, by way of mortgage, to plaintiff, and then committed a forfeiture, for which the lessor brought ejectment. It was then agreed, at a meeting of all the parties, that judgment should be signed in the ejectment, that the lessor should grant a new lease to plaintiff, and that plaintiff should grant an under-lease to defendant. The new lease was accordingly granted to plaintiff, who then delivered defendant the key, saying, "go on as usual, pay the money" (due on mortgage,) "and when you have done so, you shall have an under-lease;" held, that this did not constitute defendant tenant from year to year; for the defendant was not put into possession under an agreement for a lease, the intention was to spur him up to pay *861 the money which was due, and under such a state of facts there was no room to imply a tenancy from year to year.e Tenancy at will. A party who has been let into the possession of land under a contract of sale, or for a letting, which has not been completed, is a tenant at will to the vendor. If an agreement be made to let premises so long as both parties like, and reserving a compensation, accruing de die in diem, and not referable to a year, or any aliquot part of a year, it does not create a holding from year to year, but a tenancy at will strictly so called. And though the tenant has expended money on the improvement of the premises, that does not give him a right to hold them until he be indemnified. Where a minister of a dissenting congregation was placed in possession of a chapel and dwelling-house, by persons in whom the legal fee was vested, in trust to suffer the chapel to be used for the purposes of religious worship; it was held, that he was a mere tenant at will to those persons, and that his interest was determinable instanter, by a demand of possession.f Thompson v. Maberly, 2 Camp. 573. Right d. Dean of Wells v. Bawden, 3 East, 260. Sykes d. Murgatroyd v. — cited in 1 T. R. 161. Roe d. Brune v. Prideaux, 10 East, 156. Doe d. Rogers v. Pullen, 2 Bing. N. C. 749. (29 Eng. C. L. 474.) 2 Hodges, 39. 4 Ball v. Cullimore, 2 C. M. & R. 120. 1 Gale, 96. And see Goodtitle v. Her bert, 4 T. R. 680. Dunk v. Hunter, 5 B. & A. 322. (7 Eng. C. L. 115.) Doe d. Bingham v. Cartwright, 3 B. & A. 326. (5 Eng. C. L. 306.) Doe d. Hollingsworth v. Stennet, 2 Esp. 717. Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128. Doe d. Jones v. Jones; 10 B. & C. 718. (21 Eng. C. L. 153.) Doe d. Nicholl v. M'Keag, 10 B. & C. 721. (21 Eng. C. L. 154.) There is no distinction with respect to notice between houses There is and land. Where there is a yearly tenancy, half a year's no- no distinctice to quit, ending with the year of the tenancy, must be given tion in respect of in both cases, except by special agreement between the parties, notice beor by some local custom. Neither will the circumstance of tween the rent being reserved quarterly vary the case, if the tenancy houses be from year to year. So if an house be let from year to and land. year, to quit at a quarter's notice, the notice must be given to quit at the end of a quarter expiring with a year of the tenancy. But if the demise be for one year only, and then to continue tenant afterwards, and to quit at a quarter's notice, a quarter's notice ending at any time will be sufficient. So *where pre- *862 mises are taken under an agreement by which the "tenant is always to be subject to quit at three months' notice," this constitutes a quarterly tenancy, which may be determined by a three months' notice to quit, expiring at the same time of the year it commenced, or any corresponding quarter-day. But although the tenant under such an agreement enters in the middle of one of the usual quarters, if there appears to be no agreement to the contrary, he will be presumed to hold from the day he enters, and the tenancy can only be determined by a notice expiring that day of the year, or some other quarterday calculated from thence.d In the case of an ordinary weekly tenancy, a week's notice Weekly to quit is not implied as part of the contract, unless there be a tenancy. usage to that effect; but in absence of such usage, a weekly tenant who enters on a fresh week, may be bound to continue until the expiration of that week, or pay the week's rent.e Where a tenant from year to year dies, his personal representatives have the same interest in the land which he had, and are therefore entitled to the same notice to quit.' posses Where a party has put another into possession with a view When a to a future tenancy, or purchase, or circumstances of a similar demand of nature, although he may have done no act acknowledging a gion is neregular tenancy, he cannot afterwards eject him without a de- cessary mand of the possession, unless some wrongful act has been done though by such party determining his lawful possession. Thus, where there is no the party was let into possession under an agreement for the regular tepurchase of the land, and had possession formally given to him, and paid part of the purchase-money, (and there was no default on his part,h) the court held, that a demand of possession was necessary. So, where A. entered into an agreement with B. to sell land then in possession of the latter, on certain terms, Right v. Darby, 1 T. R. 162. b Shirley v. Newman, 1 Esp. 267. Doe d. Pitcher v. Donovan, 1 Taunt. 555. 2 Camp. 78. • Huffell v. Armistead, 7 Č. & P. 56. L. (32 Eng. C. L.) nancy. Parker d. Walker v. Constable, 3 Wils. 24. 115.) Doe d. Parker v. Boulton, 6 M. & S. 148. and to execute a conveyance in case A. should be found owner *863 thereof, and could make a good title "thereto; and agreed that in the mean time B. should remain in possession; held, that A. could not bring ejectment against B. to try the title without having demanded possession, or otherwise determined B.'s tenancy. So also, when a party is admitted into possession under an invalid lease, the landlord must demand possession, or in some other manner determine the will, before he can maintain ejectment, although he has not acknowledged the party as his tenant. So if the agent of mortgagee applies to a person in possession of the land for rent, he cannot afterwards eject him without a demand of possession. A notice is neces sary. 2.-Form of the notice] Notice by parol is sufficient, unneed not less required to be in writing by agreement between the parbe in writ- ties, or the provisions of a power. When the landlord intends ing. No partito enforce his claim for double value, if the tenant holds over, cular form it is necessary that the notice should be in writing; and in all cases it is advisable, as it prevents mistakes, and renders the evidence certain and correct. But it is advisable that there should not be a subscribing witness to the notice, for it may cause some difficulties in the proof. It has been held, that a notice to quit in writing, signed by the party giving it, and attested by a witness, must be proved by calling that witness, or his absence must be accounted for-proof that it was served on the tenant, that he read it, and did not object to it, is not sufficient.f The words of the notice should be clear and decisive, without any ambiguity, or giving any alternative to the tenant. If, however, it appears clearly on the face of the notice that the landlord's only object was to turn out the tenant, it will be sufficient, though it apparently contains an alternative-as *864 where the words were, "I desire you to quit the possession at Lady-day next, &c., or I shall insist upon double rent," it was held sufficient, because the latter part of the notice evidently referred only to the penalty inflicted by 4 Geo. II, c. 28, though the terms of that statute, which gives double the annual value, were mistaken.g Where the notice was to quit "on the 25th day of March, Doe d. Newby v. Jackson, 2 D. & R. 514. 1 B. & C. 448. (8 Eng. C. L. 126.) Goodtitle d. Herbert v. Galloway, 4 T. R. 680. Clayton v. Blakey, 8 T. R. 3. Thunder d. Weaver v. Belcher, 3 East, 449, 451. Doe d. Warner v. Browne, 8 East, 165. Doe v. Hales, 7 Bing. 322. (20 Eng. C. L. 147.) a Timmins v. Rowlison, 3 Burr. 1603. Doe d. Macartney v. Crick, 5 Esp. 196. Roe v. Pearce, 2 Camp. 96. Id. Legg d. Scott v. Benion, Willes, 47. Doe d. Sykes v. Durnford, 2 M. & S. 62. Doe d. Mathews v. Jackson, Doug. 175. the option of a new agreement, and said for double rent, it would not have been good." But if the notice had really contained instance," or else that you agree to pay Per Lord Mansfield, id. or 6th day of April next ensuing," and was delivered before new Michaelmas-day, it was held to be a good notice; as being intended to meet an holding commencing either at new, or old Lady-day, and not to give an alternative. So in case of an obvious mistake, the court will not invalidate the notice. As where a notice was given at Michaelmas, 1795, to quit at Lady-day, which will be in 1795, and the defendant was told at the time of the delivery of the notice, that he must quit nert Lady-day; it was held sufficient notice to quit at Ladyday, 1796.b Where the tenancy commenced in February, and notice was served in October, 1833, to quit at the expiration of half a year from the delivery of this notice, or at such other time or times as your present year's holding of the said messuage shall expire after the expiration of half a year from the delivery of this notice; held, that the notice was good for February, 1835, and that the word "present" must be taken to be referable to the expiration of the year current after that time. So, where there was a misdescription of the premises in the notice, which could lead to no mistake, the house being described therein as the Waterman's Arms instead of the Bricklayer's Arms, no sign called the Waterman's Arms being in the parish, the notice was deemed good. As a lessor cannot determine the tenancy as to part of the things demised, and continue it as to the rest, the notice *must *865 include all the premises held under the same demise; and the courts will, if possible, give effect to the notices, so as to determine the tenancy altogether. Where a house, lands and tithes are held under a parol demise at a joint rent, a notice to quit "the house, lands, and premises, with the appurtenances," was held to include the tithes; for the tithes having been held along with the farm, the notice must have been understood by both parties to apply to both.f Where the notice is directed to the tenant by a wrong Christian name, and he keeps it, the misdirection is waived. 3.-By whom notice should be given.] The notice to quit The notice must be given by the person interested in the premises, or his should be authorised agent; and such agent must be clothed with his given by the lessor, power to give the notice at the time when the notice is given; a subsequent assent on the part of the landlord being not sufficient to establish by relation a notice given in the first in- authorized stance without his authority. Therefore, where a lease for twenty-one years contained a Doe d. Mathewson v. Wrightson, 4 Esp. 5. or his agent duly Doe d. Rodd v. Archer, 14 East, 245. 'Doe d. Morgan v. Church, 3 Camp. 71. Le Blanc. Doe v. Spiller, 6 Esp. 70. VOL. II.-9 proviso, that in case either landlord or tenant, or their respective heirs or executors, wished to determine it at the end of the first fourteen years, and should give six months' notice in writing under his or their respective hands, the term should cease; held, that a notice to quit, signed by two only of three executors of the original lessor, to whom he had bequeathed the freehold as joint-tenants, expressing the notice to be given on behalf of themselves and the third executor, was not good under the proviso, which required it to be given under the hands of all three. Neither could such notice be sustained under the general rule of law, that one joint-tenant may bind his companions by an act done for his benefit; for non constat that the determination of the lease was for the benefit of the co-joint tenant; which it was incumbent on the party who wished to avail himself of it to prove. And the notice to quit being such as the tenant was to act upon at the time, no subsequent recog*866 nition of the third executor will make it good by relation; nor was his joining in the ejectment, evidence of his original assent to bind the tenant by the notice. If one of several joint-tenants gives notice on behalf of himself and the others, it is sufficient as to all; for the true character of a joint-tenancy is that the tenant holds the whole of all so long as he and all shall please; and as soon as any one of the joint-tenants gives a notice to quit, he effectually puts an end to that tenancy.b It has been held that notice given by a stranger purporting to act as agent for all the joint-tenants was sufficient, though he was authorised by some of them only at the time, the others having subsequently recognised his authority before the action was brought, in accordance with the maxim, omnis ratihabiAuthority tio, &c. But in a subsequent case it was ruled that, to render of an agent notice by an agent valid, his authority to give such notice must to give no- be complete at least before day of the demise laid in the decla tice. ration; and that an authority to receive rent does not imply an authority to give notice to quit. The court said that the subsequent ratification after the notice had been given would not be sufficient; that the notice was only valid from the time that Notice by it became the notice of the landlord.d And in a very recent the agent case, where the notice was served by a person who was emof an agent ployed to receive the rents by the agents of the plaintiffs, who cient. were mortgagees, which person knew nothing of the plaintiff's themselves, but he had frequently paid the rents into the bank not suffi Doe d. Fisher v. Cuthell, 5 East, 491. 2 Smith, 83. 5 Esp. 149. Doe d. Aslin v. Summersett, 1 B. & Ad. 135. (20 Eng. C. L. 361.) This case overrules Doe d. Whayman v. Chaplin, 3 Taunt. 120. Good title d. King v. Woodward, 3 B. & A. 689. (5 Eng. C. L. 424.) Parke, J., expressed himself dissatisfied with the reasons given for this decision in 10 B. & C. 634. (21 Eng. C. L. 141.) The decision, however, seems to be correct, according to the principles laid down in Doe v. Summersett, supra, for if notice from one joint tenant is sufficient, notice from the agent of one, duly authorised, must be sufficient; and in this case the agent had the authority of one before he served the notice. Doe d. Mann v. Walters, 10 B. & C. 626. (21 Eng. C. L. 139.) |