Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry Into the Psychological Character of Logical ProcessesWilliam Graham, 1851 - 320 σελίδες |
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Σελίδα v
... connection with some of the various objects of thought to which it may in practice be applied , or in relation to the thinking mind and to that mental philosophy of which it forms a portion . The former method has been abundantly tried ...
... connection with some of the various objects of thought to which it may in practice be applied , or in relation to the thinking mind and to that mental philosophy of which it forms a portion . The former method has been abundantly tried ...
Σελίδα vi
... connection , not in confusion , with cognate sciences , as a branch of mental philosophy , that Logic may and ought to be studied . One of the objects of the present work is to shew that Logic as a science cannot be rightly understood ...
... connection , not in confusion , with cognate sciences , as a branch of mental philosophy , that Logic may and ought to be studied . One of the objects of the present work is to shew that Logic as a science cannot be rightly understood ...
Σελίδα vii
... connected course of Mental Science , embracing , as its constituent por- tions , the three cognate subjects of Logic , Ethics , and Psychology . To Ethics , as well as to Logic , Psychology is an indispensable supplement . The science ...
... connected course of Mental Science , embracing , as its constituent por- tions , the three cognate subjects of Logic , Ethics , and Psychology . To Ethics , as well as to Logic , Psychology is an indispensable supplement . The science ...
Σελίδα 46
... connection with logical definition . Locke's ideas of sensation , simple or complex , are all excluded from the province of definition , as being individuals , i . e . as not being concepts at all . On the other hand , the concept ...
... connection with logical definition . Locke's ideas of sensation , simple or complex , are all excluded from the province of definition , as being individuals , i . e . as not being concepts at all . On the other hand , the concept ...
Σελίδα 64
... connection of an attribute with its subject in the represented fact , but to declare the present coexistence of two con- cepts in the representative act of thought ' . Before quitting this portion of the subject , it will be desirable ...
... connection of an attribute with its subject in the represented fact , but to declare the present coexistence of two con- cepts in the representative act of thought ' . Before quitting this portion of the subject , it will be desirable ...
Άλλες εκδόσεις - Προβολή όλων
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
act of thought analytical judgments antecedent applicable Aristotle assertion attri attributes axioms cause character conceive conclusion consciousness consequence constitution contingent Contradiction copula definition Descartes determined distinct distinguished Edinburgh Review empirical equal existence experience fact faculties formal thinking former furnish Geometry given Hamilton Hegel Hence hypothesis hypothetical hypothetical syllogisms imagination immediate implies individual Induction inference Kant language laws of thought limits logician Logik Maine de Biran material matter ment mental Metaphysics moral nature necessary truth necessity notion object of intuition object of thought observed Organon perceived perception phenomena philosophy physical portion positive predicate premise present principle of causality Principle of Contradiction Principle of Identity priori proposition psychological pure thinking question racter reasoning regarded Reid relation representative rience sensation sense sensible shew shewn Sir William Hamilton space substance supposed syllogism term theory thing tion triangle true universal volition whole
Δημοφιλή αποσπάσματα
Σελίδα 26 - I find, indeed, I have a faculty of imagining, or representing, to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
Σελίδα 125 - The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
Σελίδα 36 - When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there...
Σελίδα 72 - finite.' Therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call ' infinite.' No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say...
Σελίδα 317 - Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.
Σελίδα 61 - Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals.
Σελίδα 125 - It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance...
Σελίδα 27 - I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color.
Σελίδα 292 - If a straight line meet two straight lines, so as to make the two interior angles on the same side of it taken together less than two right angles...
Σελίδα 27 - It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree...