tered upon the said land, and ejected the
plaintiff therefrom; that the plaintiff was
the owner of an undivided one-half part or
interest of, in, and to said land in the com-
plaint described, and that the defendant
wrongfully withheld the same from him.

From their findings the court drew the
conclusions of law that the plaintiff was enti-
tled to recover possession of the said land in
dispute, being the undivided one-half part or
interest of, in, and to said lot No. 4, in said
block No. 4, in said town of Juneau, against
said defendant and all persons claiming un-
der him, and to recover a judgment for said
possession and for costs.

tablished. That remains in the United
States, and the only question presented is the
priority of right to purchase *the fee. Hence[290]
the inapplicability of a statute regulating
generally actions for the recovery of real es
tate, in which actions different kinds of title
may be sufficient to sustain the right of re-
covery. It would be purely surplusage to
find in terms a priority of the right to pur-
chase when that is the only question which
can be litigated in such statutory action."

This principle applies more strongly to the present case, in which the real nature of the plaintiff's estate in the property is truly alleged as ownership by right of prior occuThe appellant now contends that, under §pancy and actual possession, and was $0 318 of Hill's Oregon Code (which by the act found to be by the trial court. of May 17, 1884-23 Stat. at L. 24-was made applicable to Alaska, and which is in [289]the following *terms: “The plaintiff in his complaint shall set forth the nature of his estate in the property, whether it be in fee. for life, or for a term of years, and for whose life, or the duration of such term, and that he is entitled to the possession thereof, and that the defendant wrongfully withholds the same from him to his damage such sum as may be therein claimed"), the plaintiff failed to plead the nature of his estate in the property, whether it be in fee, for life, or for a term of years.

The same view of the nature of a title to a lot in a townsite in Alaska, under these acts of Congress, was expressed by the district court of the United States for the district of Alaska, in the case of Carroll v. Price, 81 Fed. Rep. 137. As, then, the only kind of estate that could be held was that of possession, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to allege that his was of that nature.

It is next contended on behalf of the plain-
tiff in error that, even if the complaint
should be held otherwise sufficient, yet the
action must fail because coming within §
3524, Hill's (Oregon) Code, which is as fol-
Without stopping to consider whether the lows: "In an action to recover the possession
defendant could be heard to again raise a of any land, tenement, or other real property,
question that had been decided against him where the entry is forcible, or where the pos-
on his demurrer to the complaint, we think session thereof is unlawfully held by force,
that the objection is not a sound one. The the merits of the title shall not be inquired
plaintiff alleged, and the court has found, into; and three years' quiet possession of the
that for more than nine years prior to April premises immediately preceding the com-
29, 1891, he and his grantors were the own-mencement of such action by the party in pos-
ers by right of prior occupancy and actual
possession of the land in dispute.

In the condition of things in Alaska under the act of May, 1884, providing a civil government for Alaska, and under the 12th section of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 1100), the only titles that could be held were those arising by reason of possession and continued possession, which might ultimately ripen into a fee-simple title under letters patent issued to such prior claimant when Congress might so provide by extending the general land laws or otherwise. Davenport v. Lanb, 13 Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 655. In Bennett v. Harkrader, 158 U. S. 447, 39 L. ed. 1048, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 863, brought to this court by a writ of error to the district court of the United States for the district of Alaska, it was said by Mr. Justice Brewer, in disposing of a somewhat similar objection: "Where the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of certain described property, which is unlawfully detained by the defendant and the possession of which the plaintiff prays to recover, a general verdict for the plaintiff is a finding that he is entitled to the possession of all the property described in the complaint. Again, in this action, brought under a special statute of the United States in support of an adverse claim, but one estate is involved in the controversy. No title in fee is or can be es

session, or those under whom he holds, may
be pleaded in bar thereof, unless the estate
of such party in the premises is ended."

It is argued that, as the complaint was
filed in the court below May 25, 1896, more
than five years from the day of entry al-
leged in the complaint, and as the defendant
pleaded in bar of the action the three years'
quiet possession of the premises immediately
preceding its commencement, the defendant
is entitled to a judgment of reversal.

If this were indeed an action in forcible entry and detainer, and as the complaint shows on its face that the defendant's pos session was longer than three years prior to the commencement *of the action, then the de-[291] fendant was entitled to have had his demurrer sustained. But he did not stand on his demurrer, but availed himself of the court's leave to answer; and hence it might well be questioned whether it was competent for him to again raise in his answer a question already ruled against him under his demurrer.

But this it is unnecessary to consider, because it is altogether clear that, on the complaint and the facts found, this was not an action for a forcible entry and detainer, under the section of the Oregon Code pleaded by the defendant, but was an action of ejectment to which the statute pleaded did not apply.

The judgment of the District Court of the United States for the District of Alaska is affirmed.

[292]

JOSEPH BRADFIELD, Appt.,

v.

or sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church, and is conducted under the auspices of said

ELLIS H. ROBERTS, Treasurer of the church; that the title to its property is

United States.

vested in the 'Sisters of Charity of Emmit--
burg, Maryland;' that it was incorporated
(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 291-300.)
by a special act of Congress approved April
Appropriation of money to hospital-secta- 8, 1864, whereby, in addition to the usual
rian character of hospital-constitutional powers of bodies corporate and politic, it was
provision against religious establishment. invested specially with full power and all
the rights of opening and keeping a hospital
in the city of Washington for the care of
such sick and invalid persons as may place
themselves under the treatment and care of
said corporation.'

The appropriation by Congress of money to a
hospital, as compensation for the treatment
and cure of poor patients under a contract,
does not constitute an appropriation to a re-
ligious society in violation of the constitu-
tional provision against laws respecting an
"That in view of the sectarian character of
establishment of religion, where the hospital said Providence Hospital and the specific and
is incorporated under an act of Congress, and limited object of its creation, the said con-
its property is acquired in its own name and tract between the same and the surgeon gen-
for its own purposes, and its business man-eral of the army and also the said agreement
aged in its own way, subject to no visitation, between the same and *the commissioners of[293]
supervision, or control by any ecclesiastical
authority whatever, although the members the District of Columbia are unauthorized by
of the corporation may be also members law, and, moreover, involve a principle and
of a church and of a monastic order or sis-a precedent for the appropriation of the
terhood of that church, conducting the hos-
pital under its auspices.

[No. 76.]

funds of the United States for the use and support of religious societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that Congress shall make no law respecting

Argued October 27, 1899. Decided Decem- a religious establishment, and also a prece

A

ber 4, 1899. dent for giving to religious societies a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and PPEAL from a judgment of the Court of civil duty which would, if once established, Appeals of the District of Columbia re-speedily obliterate the essential distinction versing the decision of the Supreme Court between civil and religious functions. in favor of the complainant in a suit to en- "That the complainant and all other citijoin the payment of moneys to a hospital un- zens and taxpayers of the United States are der an appropriation by act of Congress. Af-injured by reason of the said contract and firmed.

the said agreement, in virtue whereof the public funds are being used and pledged for the advancement and support of a private and sectarian corporation, and that they will suffer irreparable damage if the same are allowed to be carried into full effect by means of payments made through or by the said defendant out of the Treasury of the United States, contrary to the Constitution and declared policy of the government."

The agreement above mentioned, between the commissioners of the District of Columbia and the directors of Providence Hospital, is annexed to the bill, and is as follows:

See same case below, 12 App. D. C. 453. Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: *This is a suit in equity, brought by the appellant to enjoin the defendant from paying any moneys to the directors of Providence Hospital, in the city of Washington, under an agreement entered into between the commissioners of the District of Columbia and the directors of the hospital, by virtue of the authority of an act of Congress, because of the alleged invalidity of the agreement for the reasons stated in the bill of complaint. In that bill complainant represents that he "Articles of agreement entered into this is a citizen and taxpayer of the United sixteenth day of August, in the year of our States and a resident of the District of Co-Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninetylumbia, that the defendant is the Treasurer of the United States, and the object of the suit is to enjoin him from paying to or on account of Providence Hospital, in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, any moneys belonging to the United States, by virtue of a contract between the surgeon gen"That they will erect on the grounds of eral of the army and the directors of that said hospital an isolating building or ward hospital, or by virtue of an agreement be- for the treatment of minor contagious distween the commissioners of the District of eases, said building or ward to be erected Columbia and such directors, under the au- without expense to said hospital, except such thority of an appropriation contained in the as it may elect, but to be paid out of an apsundry civil appropriation bill for the Dis-propriation for that purpose contained in trict of Columbia, approved June 4, 1897.

Complainant further alleged in his bill: "That the said Providence Hospital is a private eleemosynary corporation, and that to the best of complainant's knowledge and belief it is composed of members of a monastic order

seven, by and between the commissioners of
the District of Columbia and the directors of
Providence Hospital, a body corporate in said
District, whereby it is agreed on the part of
the commissioners of the District of Colum-
bia-

the District appropriation bill approved
March 3, 1897, on plans to be furnished by
the said commissioners, and approved by
the health officer of the District of Colum-
bia, and that when the said building or ward
is fully completed it shall be turned *over te[294]

*Mr Justice Peckham, after stating the[295) facts, delivered the opinion of the court: "First. That two thirds of the entire ca- Passing the various objections made to the pacity of said isolating building or ward maintenance of this suit on account of an alshall be reserved for the use of such poor pa-leged defect of parties, and also in regard to tients as shall be sent there by the commissioners of the District from time to time through the proper officers. For each such patient said commissioners and their successors in office are to pay at the rate of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) per annum, for such a time as such patient may be in the hospital, subject to annual appropriations by Congress.

3d section gave it full power to make such of a purely secular one as constituted by the
by-laws, rules, and regulations that might law of its being. Whether the individuals
be necessary for the general accomplishment who compose the corporation under its char-
of the objects of the hospital, not inconsist- ter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all
ent with the laws in force in the District of Methodists, or Presbyterians, or Unitarians,
Columbia. Nothing is said about religion or members of any other religious organiza-
or about the religious faith of the incorpora- tion, or of no organization at all, is of not
tors of this institution in the act of incor- the slightest consequence with reference to
poration. It is simply the ordinary case of the law of its incorporation, nor can the in-
the incorporation of a hospital for the pur-dividual beliefs upon religious matters of the
poses for which such an institution is gen- various incorporators be inquired into. Nor
erally conducted. It is claimed that the al- is it material that the hospital may be con-
legation in the complainant's bill, that the ducted under the auspices of the Roman
said "Providence Hospital is a private elee- Catholic Church. To be conducted under
mosynary corporation, and that to the best the auspices is to be conducted under the in-
of complainant's knowledge and belief it fluence or patronage of that church. The
is composed of members of a monastic order meaning of the allegation is that the church
or sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church, exercises great and perhaps controlling in-
and is conducted under the auspices of said fluence over the management of the hospital.
church; that the title to its property is It must, however, be managed pursuant to
vested in the Sisters of Charity of Emmits- the law of its being. That the influence of
burg, Maryland," renders the agreement void any particular church may be powerful over
for the reason therein stated, which is that the members of a nonsectarian and secular
Congress has no power to make "a law re- corporation, incorporated for a certain de-
specting a religious establishment," a phrase fined purpose and with clearly stated pow-
which is not synonymous with that used in ers, is surely not sufficient to convert such
the Constitution, which prohibits the pas- a corporation into a religious or sectarian
sage of a law "respecting an establishment body. That fact does not alter the legal
of religion."
character of the corporation, which is incor-
porated under an act of Congress, and its
powers, duties, and character are to be sole-
ly measured by the charter under which it
alone has any legal existence. There is no

If we were to assume, for the purpose of
this question only, that under this appropri-
ation an agreement with a religious corpora-
tion of the tenor of this agreement would be
invalid, as resulting indirectly in the pas-allegation that its hospital work is confined
sage of an act respecting an establishment of
religion, we are unable to see that the com-
plainant in his bill shows that the corpora-
tion is of the kind described, but on the con-
trary he has clearly shown that it is not.

to members of that church or that in its management the hospital has been conducted so as to violate its charter in the smallest degree. It is simply the case of a secular corporation being managed by people who[299] The above-mentioned allegations in the hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic complainant's bill do not change the legal Church, but who nevertheless are managing character of the corporation or render it on the corporation according to the law under that account a religious or sectarian body. which it exists. The charter itself does not [298]Assuming *that the hospital is a private elee- limit the exercise of its corporate powers to mosynary corporation, the fact that its mem- the members of any particular religious debers, according to the belief of the complain- nomination, but, on the contrary, those pow ant, are members of a monastic order or sis-ers are to be exercised in favor of anyone terhood of the Roman Catholic Church, and seeking the ministrations of that kind of an the further fact that the hospital is conduct-institution. All that can be said of the cored under the auspices of said church, are poration itself is that it has been incorporwholly immaterial, as is also the allegation ated by an act of Congress, and for its legal regarding the title to its property. The stat-powers and duties that act must be excluute provides as to its property and makes no sively referred to. As stated in the opinion provision for its being held by anyone other of the court of appeals, this corporation "is than itself. The facts above stated do not not declared the trustee of any church or rein the least change the legal character of the ligious society. Its property is to be achospital, or make a religious corporation out' quired in its own name and for its own purthe same in such manner as they may deem | tion shall have full power and all the rights most for the interest of the hospital: Pro- of opening and keeping a hospital in the city vided, That the real estate held by said corporation shall not exceed in value the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

of Washington for the care of such sick and in-
valid persons as may place themselves under
the treatment and care of the said corporation.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the said corporation and body politic shall have said corporation shall also have and enjoy full full power to appoint from their own body a power and authority to make such by-laws, president and such other officers as they may rules, and regulations as may be necessary for deem necessary for the purposes of their crea- the general accomplishment of the objects of tion; and in case of the death, resignation, or said hospital: Provided, That they be not inrefusal to serve, of any of their number, the consistent with the laws in force in the District remaining members shall elect and appoint of Columbia: And provided, further, That this other persons in lieu of those whose places act shall be liable to be amended, altered, or may have been vacated; and the said corpora- repealed, at the pleasure of Congress.

poses; that property and its business are to | 2.
be managed in its own way, subject to no
visitation, supervision, or control by any ec-
clesiastical authority whatever, but only to
that of the government which created it. In
respect, then, of its creation, organization,
management, and ownership of property it is
an ordinary private corporation whose rights
are determinable by the law of the land, and
the religious opinions of whose members are
not subjects of inquiry."

It is not contended that Congress has no power in the District to appropriate money for the purpose expressed in the appropria

tion, and it is not doubted that it has power Argued November 16, 17, 1899. Decided