Opinion of the Court.

tract and the appointment of said superintendents, and all matters and proceedings connected therewith, which might in any way affect the validity of said bonds, should be, and the same were, thereby legalized, confirmed, and made valid in law. This act was attacked as in violation of the same section of the Constitution which the plaintiff in error invokes in this case. It was contended that the act in question, by legalizing bonds of the city, was void, because it had no power to issue them, was legally equivalent to an act conferring upon the city power to issue bonds, which was conferring corporate power, and, being a special act, was therefore unconstitutional. But this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Matthews, said:

"As the city of Plattsmouth was bound by force of the transaction to repay to the purchaser of its void bonds the consideration received and used by it, or a legal equivalent, the statute which recognized the existence of that obligation, and, by confirming the bonds themselves, provided a medium for enforcing it according to the original intention and promises, cannot be said to be a special act conferring upon the city any new corporate powers. No addition is made to its enumerated or implied corporate faculties, no new obligation is, in fact, created."

And the court added that the very proposition there involved was maintained by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in the case of Commissioners of Jefferson County v. The People, 5 Neb. 127, above referred to. See also Railroad Company v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667; Foster v. Commissioners of Wood County, 9 Ohio St. 540.

In the cases of Clegg v. School District, 8 Neb. 178, and Dundy v. Richardson County, Id. 508, cited by plaintiff in error, it was held that an act authorizing a school district or a city to contract a debt for the purpose of erecting a public building, and to issue bonds therefor, was forbidden by the Constitution because it was a special act conferring corporate powers. These cases are clearly distinguishable from those we have cited. In the latter, as in the case now under review, a debt already existed, and the statute simply authorized a change in the form of the obligation by which the debt was evidenced.

Opinion of the Court.

The distinction is clearly stated in Read v. Plattsmouth, ubi supra, the court remarking:

"The statute operates upon the transaction itself, which had already been consummated, and seeks to give it a character and effect different in its legal aspect from that which it had when it was in force;" and adds that such a result "is not affected by the supposed form of the enactment as a special or general act conferring corporate powers."

The cases cited effectually dispose of the point under consideration.

Lastly, the plaintiff in error contends that the act under which the bonds in suit were issued is repugnant to section 15, art. III., of the present Constitution of Nebraska, which went into effect November 1, 1875, after the law authorizing the issue of the bonds was passed, but before the bonds were issued. The section referred to declares:

"The legislature shall not pass any local or special laws in any of the following cases: Granting to any corporation, association, or individual, any exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever. In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."

It is a sufficient answer to the contention to say that the word" corporation," as used in this section of the Constitution, does not apply to a county. If a county is a corporation at all, it is necessarily a municipal corporation. But the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the case of Woods v. Colfax County, 10 Neb. 552, expressly held that in Nebraska, a county was not considered to be a municipal corporation. And it is clear that the authority given by the act of February 18th, 1875, to Sherman and other counties, to fund the indebtedness evidenced by county warrants, by giving their bonds in exchange therefor, does not of itself make them municipal corporations.

case.

But it is unnecessary further to discuss this branch of the The decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in The Commissioners of Jefferson County v. The People, 5 Neb. 127, ubi supra, which, as before stated, was a case in all respects

Opinion of the Court.

similar to this, and in which the constitutionality of a similar act of the legislature was put in issue, is precisely in point and is conclusive of the question in hand.

We find no error in the record.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

INDEX.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

In a suit to set aside a deed of trust executed to secure the payment of a
note signed by husband and wife, and the acknowledgment of which
was certified as required by law, it was in proof that the wife signed
the note and the deed, having an opportunity to read both before
signing them; she was before an officer competent to take her ac-
knowledgment, and he came into her presence, at the request of the
husband, to take it; and she knew, or could have ascertained, while
in the presence of the officer, as well to what property the deed re-
ferred as the object of its execution. Held, That the certificate must
stand against a mere conflict of evidence as to whether she willingly
signed, sealed, and delivered the deed, or had its contents explained
to her by the officer, or was examined privily and apart from her
husband; and that even if it be only prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated, it cannot be impeached, in respect to those facts, ex-
cept upon proof which clearly and fully shows it to be false or fraud-
ulent. Young v. Duvall, 573.

ACTION.

See CONTRACT 5,

EQUITY, 2;

PRINCIPAL & AGENT, 1, 2.

ADMINISTRATION.

For the purpose of founding administration, a simple contract debt is
assets where the debtor resides, even if a bill of exchange or promis-
sory note has been given for it, and without regard to the place where
the bill or note is found or payable. Wyman v. Halstead, 654.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES;

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 4.

ADMINISTRATOR DE BONIS NON.

1. When an administrator duly appointed in the District of Columbia, is