Railroad v. Hunton. In St. L., K. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Clark, 121 Mo., 185, 25 S. W., 192, 906, 26 L. R. A., 751, it is said : "We think the evidence of sales of similar property to that in question, made in the neighborhood, about the same time, was admissible to aid the jury in determining the damages to which the owner was entitled. The value of property is ascertained largely from such sales, and the opinions of witnesses as to values are largely predicated upon them. It is best, when it can be done, to put the jurors in possession of all the facts from which values are ascertained, and allow them to draw the conclusion therefrom. Witnesses basing their opinions upon recent sales of like property are liable to exaggerate or underestimate values. In any consideration they are no more capable of deducing fair conclusions from the known facts than the jury. The object is to ascertain the general market value, and, if particular sales are made under exceptional circumstances, the fact can be shown, and the jury can determine its probative force. Certainly no more reliable method of determining the fair market values of land can be reached than that derived from bona fide sales of similar lands in the vicinity. The objection that such evidence raises collateral issues as to the character of the land sold and the circumstances of such sales is more than compensated for by its value in aiding the jury to a correct conclusion. The weight of authority supports this view." In Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Smith et al., 80 Md., 473, 31 Atl., 423, it is said: "We all know, from observa Railroad v. Hunton. tion, if not experience, that if inquiry is made as to the value of a lot on a certain street in a city or town, where other sales have been recently made, it is generally answered by naming the price realized at such sales. If twelve jurors are taken upon land to ascertain its value, with which they are unacquainted, the first question which is suggested to them is, 'What does land in this neighborhood sell for? As was said in Moale v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 5 Md., 324, 61 Am. Dec., 276, 'with a view to get at this [the value of the lot], the neighboring and contiguous lots may be looked to, but they do not furnish an unerring standard to measure the value of the lot condemned.' The property sold may, owing to peculiar circumstances, have brought more or less than the real market value; but those circumstances can be explained, and, if it is similar in character, location, etc., and the sale was of a sufficiently recent date, and was not made under unusual conditions, the price realized would help a jury to reach a just and proper conclusion." It is insisted by counsel for the defendants in error that the above matter is not presented in such way that the court can consider it, for the reason that the record fails to show what the answer of the witness would have been. We adhere strictly to the rule referred to as declared and illustrated in Shugart v. Shugart, 3 Cates, 179, 185; Stacker v. Railroad, 106 Tenn., 450, 61 S. W., 766; Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn., 495, 48 S. W., 809, 43 L. R. A., 185, 70 Am. St. Rep., 693; Insurance Railroad v. Hunton. Co. v. Scales, 101 Tenn., 628, 49 S. W., 743; Truslow v. State, 95 Tenn., 199, 31 S. W., 987; R. R. v. Stonecipher, 95 Tenn., 315, 32 S. W., 208; Pearce v. Suggs, But it does not ap 85 Tenn., 724, 4 S. W., 526. ply where the circuit judge rules out an entire line of competent evidence, or refuses to hear any examination thereon, just as it does not apply when he holds that a witness is incompetent, and refuses to hear him at all. The eighth assignment presents the point that the circuit judge erred in refusing to allow the witness E. B. Le Master to testify concerning the rental value of the property or lot of land in controversy in this case. Mr. Le Master testified that he had knowledge of two rental contracts of neighboring lots within a short time before the taking in the present case, and that, although he had no specific information of any other contract in that neighborhood, yet that he was acquainted with the property there, and also had had a great many years' experience as a real estate agent in the city of Memphis, and on these grounds that he believed he could state the rental value of the property in question. We are of opinion that under these circumstances Mr. Le Master should have been allowed to state his opinion. It should be observed that, while it must appear that the witness had some knowledge of the matter whereof he speaks, so that the court may see his evidence will aid the jury, yet it is not necessary that he should fill the measure of a technical expert. Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 137 U. S., 354, 11 Sup. Tt., 96, 34 L. Ed., 681; Chica Railroad v. Hunton. go, etc. Ry. Co. v. Blake, 116 Ill., 166, 167, 4 N. E., 488; Wray v. Knoxville, etc., Ry. Co., 5 Cates, 544, 555, 556, 82 S. W., 471, 474. In 1 Elliott on Evidence, section 685, it is said: "Witnesses who are not strictly experts, as well as expert witnesses, may testify as to the value of property, real or personal, or as to the value of services in a proper case. They must, however, have some knowledge on which to base their opinion. If they have such knowledge, the fact that it is slight will go to the weight of their testimony, rather than to its competency; but if they are not acquainted with, or have no knowledge of, the matter in question, so that their opinion can in no way aid the jury, the court should refuse to permit them to give an opinion which would necessarily be a mere guess or conjecture." Again, it is said in the same authority: "Although ordinary witnesses may give their opinions as to value, it is universally held that experts may be called in a proper case for the same purpose, and when experts are so called it is not a necessary qualification to their competency that their knowledge should have come from observation of the particular article or real estate. 'It is difficult to lay down any exact rule in respect of the amount of knowledge a witness must possess, and the determination of this matter rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge.' But if the witness has no actual knowledge on the subject, and is no better qualified to judge than the jury, his opinion would be Railroad v. Hunton. worse than useless, and the court may well decline to receive it." Id., section 1109. In the same authority, speaking to the subject of the admissibility of the opinions of nonexpert witnesses, it is said: "It would be almost impossible to enumerate all the particular cases or instances in which the opinions or conclusions of ordinary witnesses are admissible. One of the most comprehensive statements upon the subject is found in an opinion of the supreme court of New Hampshire, where it is said: 'Courts and text-writers all agree that upon questions of science and skill opinions may be received from persons specially instructed by study and experience in the particular art or mystery to which the investigation relates. But without reference to any recognized rule or principle, all concede the admissibility of the opinions of nonprofessional men upon a great variety of unscientific questions arising every day and in every judicial inquiry. These are questions of identity, handwriting, quantity, value, weight, measure, time, distance, velocity, form, size, age, strength, heat, cold, sickness and health; questions, also, concerning various mental and moral aspects of humanity, such as disposition and temper, anger, fear, excitement, intoxication, veracity, general character, and particular phases of character, and other conditions, and, things both moral and physical, too numerous to mention." Id., Vol. 1, section 676. The ninth assignment of error is overruled. This in |