67. Insane Persons-Voidable Contract. The deed of one mentally unsound is not necessarily void, but is only voidable, and, unless there was unfairness or injustice, such as inadequate consideration, etc., the deed should not be set aside.-Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Napier's Heirs, Ky., 169 S. W. 1017.

68. Voidable Contract. Where insured, though knowing the effect of his act, was induced, by an insane delusion that his children were about to murder him for his insurance, to surrender his policies in consideration of payment of the surrender value, such surrender was voidable after his death at the instance of Life his personal representatives.-New York Ins. Co. v. Hagler, Tex., 169 S. W. 1064.

in

69. Insurance Accident.-Where person, using nasal douche, sniffed more violently than usual, drawing germs into the middle ear, whence they penetrated into the brain, causing spinal meningitis, held that there could be no recovery under a policy insuring against death from injuries effected through external violent, and accidental means.-Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., Mass., 106 N. E. 607.

70. Adopted Children.-"Adopted children," as used in a law of a beneficial association authorizing the making of adopted children beneficiaries, held to include the foster mother of the insured, whom he had legally adopted as his heir.-Mellville v. Wickham, Tex., 169 S. W. 1123.

71. Process.-A party suing a foreign insurance company has an option to serve process upon the insurance commissioner or upon the agents of the foreign company.-Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, Ky., 169 S. W. 1028.

72. Reinstatement.-On an issue as to insured's health at his reinstatement, statements by the beneficiary were admissible in favor of defendant.-Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cosgrove, Ky., 169 S. W. 999.

73. Intoxicating Liquors-Clubs.-A sale of liquor belonging to an incorporated club made by an employe of the club to members thereof does not come within the rule that the distribution among the members of a joint association of liquors purchased for them is not a sale. Commonwealth v. Woelz, Mass., 106 N. E. 560.

court

74. Judgment-Process.-The supreme acquires no jurisdiction in an action against a non-resident for a money judgment, by personal service outside of the state.-Jacobs v. White, 149 N. Y. Supp. 500.

75.-Res Judicata.-A former judgment between the parties is conclusive, in all subsequent actions involving the same question, as to all matters belonging to the subject of the controversy, and properly within the issues which might have been raised and determined. -Southern Pac. Co. v. Edmunds,. Cal., 143 Pac.

597.

76. Jury-Disqualification.-That a juror had loaned money to another to pay counsel assisting in the prosecution did not disqualify him from serving as a juror.-Bird v. State, Ga., 83 S. E. 238.

77. Landlord and Tenant-Estoppel.-When the owner of a paramount title, having a present right of possession, demands possession, the tenant may yield possession, and is not estopped to deny the landlord's title.-Stanley v. Topping, Ore., 143 Pac. 632.

78. Eviction.-As between a landlord and tenant, an eviction must be due to some wrongful act on the part of the landlord, depriving the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises.-Taber v. Van Pelt, 149 N. Y. Supp.

ant; it not being a stock dividend, though for convenience paymtht was made in notes, rather than in actual money.-Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Adam Mass., 106 N. E. 590. 81. Limitation of Actions-Overdraft by overdrafts Partner. The charging,of by a partner to profit and loss, and the striking of the balance due from hir, which was carried forward to the following year,,was not an account stated, and does not begin to run against an action for such overdrafts until the dissolution of the firm.-McMahon v. Brown, Mass., 106 N. E. 576.

82. Master and Servant-Independent, Contractor. That an aviator, who was giving, exhibitions at a fair, was an independent contractor, and was negligent in handling is ma chine, does not relieve the fair association from hability, if it also was negligent.-Platt v. Erie County Agricultural Society, 149 N. Y. Supp. 520. •

83.- Obvious Danger.-An employe not en→ gaged in making a reasonably safe place dangerous, or an obviously dangerous place safe, was not, as a matter of law, when injured by its condition injured by a risk incident to his employment.-Chicago, R. I. & P. ky. Co. v. Townes, Okla., 143 Pac. 680.

84. Presumption.-In an action for the wrongful death of a servant run down by a motor car in a mine, there is no presumption either that the servant was guilty of negligence or that those in charge of the car were negligent.-Linard's Adm'r v. Interstate Coal Co., Ky., 169 S. W. 1006. 85.

-Proximate Cause.-Where a servant in the exercise of ordinary care while trying to save a bundle of laths from a saw, pushed too hard against the laths, in view of the weak support afforded by a block which a superior had negligently failed to wedge, fell against the saw, the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Pine Mountain Mfg. Co. v. Bishop, Ky., 169 S. W. 1010.

86.- -Usage.-A usage of an employe of a railroad company may be shown to be at variance with a rule when the company has knowledge of such usage, and the knowledge may be implied from the notoriety of the custom or inferred from circumstances.-Finnegan v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., Mo., 169 S. W. 969.

87. Mechanics' Lien-Waiver.—A contractor's bond against sub-contractors' liens does not waive the lien of the contractors themselves. Maynard v. Lange, Ore., 143 Pac. 648.

88. Mortgages-Bidder at Sale.-A plaintiff who bids in the property at foreclosure may be compelled to complete his purchase by paying the referee's fees and expenses and taking the deed.-Brighton Heights Development Co. V. Interboro Home Builders' Co., 149 N. Y. Supp. 496.

89. Municipal Corporations-Abutting Owner. The right granted by an abutting owner to a water company to lay water pipes in a street was subordinate to the right of the public to compel the removal of the pipes, when necessary to enable the city to construct a subway in the street.-Moffat v. City and County of Denver, Colo., 143 Pac. 577.

90. Competitive Bidding.-That a street is directed to be paved with a patented article does not necessarily prevent competitive bidding. Whitmore, Rauber & Vicinus v. Edgerton, 149 N. Y. Supp. 508.

91. Indictment.-Where a municipal corporation allows its streets to get out of repair or become obstructed so as to be a public nuisance, its officers are liable to indictment. Southern Ry. Co. v. State, Tenn., 169 S. W. 1173. 92. Negligence Assumption of Risk. The defense of assumption of risk can be invoked only in cases between master and servant.Furbeck v. I. Gevurtz & Son, Ore., 143 Pac. 654.

93.- -Proximate Cause. The owner of a store, to which entrance was had through a swinging door, is not liable for an injury to a customer, occasioned by the negligence of another customer, who jammed the door on the first one's hand.-Smith v. Johnson, Mass., 106 N. E. 604.

corporation, the right of one partner to an accounting, and the payment of the balance due him from the other is not an asset of the partnership.-McMahon v. Ron, Mass., 106 Ñ. E.

576.

95. Party Walls Covenants.-Under Civ. Code 1910, 4192.party wall agreement contained in deeds by tenants in common of two adjoining lots, constituted a covenant running with each ot.-Horne v. Macon Telegraph Pub. Co., Ga., 83 S. E. 204.

96. Principal and Surety-Contribution.Where aegotiable note is paid after maturity to a holder in due course by a surety, failure of consideration is no defense in an action for contribution by a surety against his cosurety. Cummins v. Line, Okla., 143 Pac. 672.

97.-Discharge.-A supplemental contract.

providing for submission to arbitration of any disputed question as to what constituted extras, did not discharge the surety on the contractor's bond, though the original contract provided that payments for extras should be made monthly.-Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Realty Trust Co., Ga., 83 S. E. 210.

98. Process-Defined.-The word "process" includes the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before it or a compliance with its demands, and is not restricted to mesne process. In a restricted sense it means those mandates of the court intending to bring parties into court or to require them to answer proceedings there pending.-Cloquitt Nat. Bank v. Poitivint, Ga., $3 S. E. 198. 99. Railroads―Trespassers.—If. after notices forbidding trespass were posted by a railroad, the people continued to use a bridge as a footway with the railroad's knowledge and without objection, a jury may find that the company acquiesced in the use, notwithstandwing the notice.-Doyle v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., Ore., 143 Pao. 623.

100. Release-Valid.-A release of a claim for damages for personal injuries. executed while a party was in a semiconscious condition to such an extent that he did not know what he was doing. was not binding upon him. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Hubbard, Tex., 169 S. W. 1058.

101. Replevin-Special Property.-Where the defendant in replevin claims only a special interest in the property under an attachment, a judgment for the defendant should state the value of the property and also the value of defendant's interest therein.-Bolitho V. East, Utah, 143 Pac. 584.

102. Sales--Acceptance. Where a buyer of machinery accepts it in a defective condition and undertakes to place it in good condition at the cost of the seller, he becomes liable for the price. less his necessary expenditure.-Southern Gas & Gasoline Engine Co. v. Adams & Peters, Tex., 169 S. W. 1143.

103.- -Conditional Sale.-Where a contract of conditional sale contains no provision that. on default by the buver. prior payments shall be forfeited, if the seller retakes the property, the payments made, less damages sustained by the seller. may he recovered by the huver.Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, Ind., 106 N. E. 541.

104.- -Executory Agreement.-An executory agreement for the sale of goods to be delivered at a future date is valid.-Robson & Evans v. N. J. Weil & Co., Ga.. 83 S. E. 207.

105.- -Implied Warranty.-Where defendant sold plaintiff an automobile under an implied warranty that it was fit for a particular service. а breach of warranty held ground

for

rescission.-International Harvester Co. of

106.

America v. Porter, Ky., 169 S. W. 993. Set-Off and Counterclaim-Counterclaim. -In action for conversion of furs alleged to have been delivered to defendant for storage, counterclaim for foreclosure of lien, on allegations that the furs were delivered as security for a debt. held a proper counterclaim.Harrison v. Frederick C. Loeser & Co., 149 N. Y. Supp. 491.

107. Recoupment.-Recoupment is a defensive. rather than an offensive, proceeding. and has in view a claim in behalf of each con

tending party, and will not apply where, to sustain defendant's claim, it is necessary to show that plaintiff has no right of action.-Hoover Commercial Co. v. Humphrey, Miss., 66 So. 214.

108. Specific Performance-Bond for Title. Where title to land was taken in the name of defendant's ancestor, who gave a bond for title to S in order to defraud the latter's creditors, and the rights under the bond passed by quitclaims to plaintiff's ancestor, his rights were based on the bond, which was independent of any fraud on the creditors of S, and was enforceable without reference to the consideration passing between the intervening parties.

Taft v. Henry, Mass., 106 N. E. 553.

109. Taxation-Salary of State Officer. The United States government cannot tax the salary of any state functionary.-City of New Orleans v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., La., 66 So. 237. 110. Telegraphs and Telephones-Common Carrier. A telephone company is a "common carrier."—Gainesboro Telephone Co. v. Buckner, Ky., 169 S. W. 1000.

111.Mental Anguish.--Where a message announcing the death of the brother of the sender and addressee was negligently delayed, so that the addressee was deprived of the privilege of attending the funeral, both the sender and the addressee were entitled to recover for mental anguish.-Betts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., N. C., 83 S. E. 164.

112. Venue-Undue Influence.-That plaintiff is personally popular in the county where suit is brought, and has numerous relatives there. does not constitute undue influence authorizing a change of venue within Ky. St. $ 1094.Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Netherby, Ky., 169 S. W. 883.

113. Vendor and Purchaser-Lis Pendens.Notwithstanding the failure to file a lis pendens notice of an attachment or execution, subsequent purchasers claiming superior rights must be bona fide purchasers, and take notice of persons in possession.-Daniel v. Holtelaw, Ky., 169 S. W. 1013.

114. Waters and Water Courses-Water Company. While a water company is obliged to furnish water to each abutting owner along the line of its mains, it cannot be compelled to extend its mains at the request of individual users. Watson v. French, Me., 92 Att. 290.

115. Wills-Construction. A remainder to testator's daughter during her natural life and at her death to her "nearest blood relative" vested in her but a life estate; the words "nearest blood relative" not being synonymous with "heirs," so as to pass a fee under the rule in Shelley's Case.-Miller y. Harding, N. C., 83 S.

E. 25.

it does

116. Contingent Interest.-Where not clearly appear from a will or the circumstances of its execution that a contingent interest was intended, the remainder will be regarded as vesting at testator's death, and not at the expiration of a life tenancy.-In re Bach's Estate, Pa., 92 Atl. 304.

117.- -Distribution.-Where testator declared that his property should be divided between S and I and the three daughters of G, and the five devisees were his nieces, the division must be per capita.-Justice v. Stringer, Ky., 169 S. W. 836.

118.

-Insane Delusion.--An insane delusion is a belief which springs spontaneously from a diseased or perverted mind, without reason or without foundation in fact.-Coffey v. Miller, Ky.. 169 S. W. 852.

119. Limitation Over.-In a devise to a granddaughter to be given to her at her majority or marriage, but, if she died before that or without heirs, to be given to a grandson, the limitation over applies if the granddaughter dies without heirs after the property has been turned over to her.-Johnson v. Powell, Ky., 169 S. W. 1009.

120. Witnesses-Rebuttal.-Where one accused of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor contended that the prosecuting witness was so intoxicated as to have no recollection of ine transaction, the prosecution may show that the witness, although somewhat under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was not drunk.-Clark v. State, Tex., 169 S. W. 895.

the city liable for the whipping. Blakeman v. City of Wichita, 144 Pac. 816.

The Kansas court adverts to former statutes concerning "riotous assembly," and defining “a mob" with reference to lynching, but these only concerned the committing of criminal offenses and not the placing of any responsibility for damage on a city for the acts of a mob.

The mere playing of a prank upon another, when the crowd playing it is not assembled in open defiance of the officers of the law, would seem to have about it little of the spirit of a mob, no matter how many people are engaged in committing the prank. The general peace of the community, which a municipality must maintain to the utmost of its ability, seems no more violated by such an unlawful act, than by a mere affray, if as much. A ruling of this kind seems so opposed to reason and common sense, and adherence to technical definitions as varying from common parlance, that it is difficult to understand how the decision could have been rendered.

A mob is an assemblage of frenzied people, who set out to avenge some wrong or fancied wrong and their purpose is in the way of an insurrection against constituted authority-not to commit a mere trespass against another. Any trespass may be merely an incident of a mob rising, while in the case at bar it is the main intent. It is used by the court to prove the existence of a mob, when often no injury may follow from there being a mob.

ALIENAGE-RIGHT OF RECOVERY UNDER EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.-In McGovern v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 35 Sup. Ct., XLVII Chicago Legal News 193, it is held that alienage is not a condition affecting recovery under the federal employers' liabil ity act.

Mr. Justice McKenna speaks of diversity of opinion on the subject of recovery under compensation cases for injury for tort and distinguishes as to the federal act as follows:

"Its purpose is something more than to give compensation for the negligence of railroad companies. * * The rights and remedies of the statute are the means of executing its policy. *** It is for the protection of life that compensation for its destruction is given and to those who have relation to it."

This is scarcely as clean cut a statement, as one might desire. Instead of saying the purpose "is something more than to give compensation," etc., it seems to us it were better to say its only purpose is imposing a right of

action as "the means of executing its policy." Our federal government has no jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to grant to any citizen a right of action for anything. Private rights and wrongs are exclusively of state cognizance. It seems to us that all recoveries by individuals under federal law, rather ought to be regarded as in the nature of qui tam proceedings in aid of enforcing regulation. Regulation is the only power that is granted by the commerce clause.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES-SEPARABLE CONTROVERSY AS REFERRING TO JURISDICTION OR GROUND OF RECOVERY.-The District Court of Western District of Washington holds that an attachment suit against stockholders of an insolvent company for the purpose of subjecting property in a state to their liability as stockholders is removable by one of them as a non-resident, upon the ground that their liability is joint and several. Wright v. Ankeny, 217 Fed. 985.

In support of this ruling there is cited section 28 of the judicial code which provides that: "When * * there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants" may remove it. It seems to us that this section in no way refers to separableness. It only gives to one of several nonresidents the right to remove on the presumption that others will not object.

But the court goes on to say that "the liability of each stockholder of an insolvent corporation is a distinct and separable liability which could be pursued by the receivers in separate causes of action." Then the court further adds that "all of the parties are necessary to an adjudication of the conspiracy charged as bearing upon the title to this land *** and the cause of action being removable upon any phase of legal approach" as to nonresident under the section from the judicial code, is removable as to all of them, though it is not contended that the controversy is "wholly" between citizens of different states. If this does not fly in the very teeth of this section it is hard to understand the section at all.

The court, in effect, here determined that though there is no separableness so far as jurisdiction is concerned there is such so far as alleged liability is concerned and apparently is dissatisfied with its ruling as it endeavors to bolster up the ruling with an inapplicable provision of law.