vides that the marriage shall not affect property rights of their own individual property, does not deprive the wife of a right to the husband's homestead.-Plistil v. Kaspar, Iowa, 152 N. W. 584.

47. Parties.-Where a trustee, under a trust deed executed by a husband alone, filed suit against the husband and wife for the construction of the deed and for a settlement of the trust, a claim for legal services for the wife was not "necessaries," within Ky. St. § 2130.Mulligan v. Mulligan, Ky., 171 S. W. 420.

48. Trustee.-Where a wife contributes her separate estate for a portion of the consideration of a purchase of property by the husband, the deed to which is made to them jointly, the property does not come into possession of the husband so as to make him prima facie a trustee. Scrogin v. Dickison, Ind., 107 N. E. 86.

49. Indians-Allotments.-Where a Choctaw Indian died before receiving his allotment, he had no estate of inheritance in land subsequently allotted in his name under Supplemental Agreement Act Cong. approved July 1, 1902, § 22. Cook v. Childs, Okla., 145 Pac. 406.

50. Infants-Equity.-A sale by a court of equity nominally of the mineral rights in an infant's lands should not be made with such indefinite rights to the purchaser, as to use of the surface and timber for mining purposes, so as to make it impossible to sell the surface, except at a great sacrifice.-Hays v. Wicker, Ky., 171 S. W. 447.

51. Injunction-Inspection Fees.-Injunction will lie to prevent the holding up of oil in transit from other states for nonpayment of excessive inspection fees where there is no adequate remedy at law.-Bartels Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, N. D., 150 N. W. 576.

52. Insurance-Estoppel.-Insurer, under liability policy excepting injuries caused by persons employed in violation of law, held not estopped, by taking charge and continuing in charge of litigation, to deny liability for injuries caused by negligence of boy under 16, having no employment permit.-J. S. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., Wis., 150 N. W. 991.

53. Evidence.-Where parts of insured's books of account, including those showing its inventories and cash sales were destroyed, the action of the court in adopting the bank deposits made in the name of insured, together with the unpaid accounts and bills receivable, as a basis for ascertaining the amount of the loss, held not erroneous.-Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Union Mercantile Co., Ky., 171 S. W. 407. 54. Loss.-Injury to a steam boiler from excessive heat, through negligence of some one connected with the insured's business, creates no liability under a policy insuring against direct loss from fire.-McGraw v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, Kan., 144 Pac. 821.

55.- -Mortgagee.-A mortgagee has no interest in a policy on the mortgaged property to the mortgagor unless created by covenant.Johnson v. Northern Minnesota Land & Investment Co., Iowa, 150 N. W. 596.

56. Privity. An employer's liability insurance policy creates no privity between the insurer and an employe and is not a promise for the benefit of the employe.-Scheuerman Mathison, Ore., 144 Pac. 1177.

V.

57. Severable Policy.-Where, in an action on a severable policy covering several classes of property, it appears that insured has committed no fraud, and no act prohibited by public policy is involved, recovery may be had on account of property not affected by the breach of a contract respecting only one class, though the policy stipulates that it shall be void if any one of its conditions be broken.-Fisher v. Sun Ins. Co. of London, W. Va., 83 S. E. 729.

58.- -Waiver.-A fraternal beneficiary order held not to waive a forfeiture of a certificate for nonpayment of dues, though dues were received prior to the member's death and returned without knowledge of the death subsequent thereto.-Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Jones, Ala., 66 So. 834.

59.—Intoxicating Liquors-Clubs.-The act of a social fraternal order in purchasing liquor and disposing of the same to members by selling coupons good for definite quantities of liquor is a sale of liquor in violation of Burns' Ann, St. 1914, § 8351, and an employe of the order, delivering to coupon-holding members liquor according to a fixed schedule, may be convicted.-Givens v. State, Ind., 107 N. E. 78.

60. Local Option Law.-Carrier's transportation of liquor to a wholesaler doing business in a dry unit to replenish his stock, which he sold in wet units, held not violative of the Local Option Law, § 18.-State v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Wash., 145 Pac. 187.

62.

Judgment-Default.-That the defendants were old and feeble, although of sound mind, and that they forgot about the service of summons upon them, and therefore took no steps to defend the action, does not show excusable neglect justifying the setting aside of a default judgment against them.-Pierce v. Eller, N. C., 83 S. E. 758.

63. Nunc Pro Tunc.-A court can enter a judgment nunc pro tunc, where one has been ordered, but the clerk has omitted to make the proper entry, and the power to make such entry is not lost by mere lapse of time.-Locher v. Livingston, Iowa, 150 N. W. 614.

64.

Jury-Disqualification.-That a juror was served with summons as a member of the board of trustees of a village in an action to disconnect territory from the village, held_not to render him a "party" to the suit within Rev. St. 1913, § 8158.-Krum v. Sullivan & Schaberg Transfer & Fuel Co., Neb., 150 N. W. 640.

65. Landlord and Tenant-Estoppel.-Defendant's knowledge that plaintiff had bought his tenant's crop of wheat, without his consent, as required by the lease, held to require him to assert his rights, so that his silence would operate as estoppel.-Maxwell v. Dimond, Wash., 145 Pac. 77.

66. Re-entry.-A lease of premises to be used for hotel, saloon and bathing purposes, with right of re-entry for breach of conditions, does not authorize re-entry for failure to continue the use of the premises for saloon purposes. Henry Rahr's Sons Co. v. Buckley, Wis., 150 N. W. 994.

67. Surrender.-That there is a little plunder in some of the rooms of a rented house which could be removed in a few minutes is not a failure to give possession where the lessee arrived without notice and gave no time to remove before repudiating the lease.-Adams v. Hambrick, Ky., 171 S. W. 398.

68. Libel and Slander-Nonfeasance.-Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2424, defining a libel, and section 2268, declaring nonfeasance in office a crime, held that a publication charging a county prosecutor with nonfeasance in office in respect to the prosecution of a confessed criminal was libelous per se.-State v. Sefrit, Wash., 144 Pac. 725.

69. Limitation of Actions-New Starting Point.-A payment by the maker on a note before the bar of the statute does not operate as a renewal of the note as to mere accommodation indorsers, though it does as to sureties, as well as the maker.-Houser v. Fayssoux, N. C., 83 S. E. 692.

70. Malicious Prosecution-Evidence.-In an action for malicious prosecution against a peace officer who arrested plaintiff on the theory that she was a thief wanted at another place, testimony that the description of the thief contained in the circular letters sent out to peace officers over the state describing the thief fitted plaintiff is admissible.-Keiner v. Collins, Ky., 171 S. W. 399.

71. Mandamus-Officers.-Mandamus will lie to compel a state auditor to receive warrants

paid by the state treasurer and issue his receipt therefor and credit the treasurer with the sums paid.-State v. Jorgenson, N. D., 150 N. W. 565.

72. Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk. -A brakeman held not to assume, as a matter of law the risk of injury occurring while attempting to board an engine by stepping on a step on the pilot of an engine.-Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 171 S. W. 451.

73. Course of Employment.-The act of a section foreman in asking men on a work train, in charge of a superior foreman in charge of the work, to jump from the train to escape injury from a collision, which the section foreman erroneously believed would occur, held to be in the course of his employment, within the federal Employers' Liability Act.-Cincinnati, 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Wilson's Adm'r, Ky., 171 S. W. 430.

N.

74.- -Fellow Servant.-Where an employe is injured by the negligence of his employer, the contributory negligence of a fellow servant will not prevent recovery.-Wenquist v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., Neb., 150 N. W. 637.

75.-Independent Contractor.-The defense of independent contractor is not available, where the thing contracted to be done is necessarily attended with danger, or will probably become a nuisance, as digging a deep excavation for a railroad across a principal street, into which, while unguarded and unlighted, at night, a pedestrian fell.-Dunlap v. Raleigh, C. & S. R. Co., N. C., 83 S. E. 703.

76. Independent Contractor.-A proprietor may become liable for the acts of an independent contractor by retaining or assuming control of the time and manner of doing the work, but not merely by supervising the right to dismiss incompetent workmen.-Embler v. Gloucester Lumber Co., N. C., 83 S. E. 740.

77. Medical Attention. The rule that an employer is bound to furnish medical attention to an injured employe on an extreme emergency does not apply, where an injured employe has been removed to a hospital of the employer's selection and selected a different surgeon than the one furnished.-Vanderboget V. Campbell Mill Co., Wash., 144 Pac. 905.

78. Obvious Danger.-A protruding set screw upon a shaft, although somewhat covered by dirt and grease, must be considered an obvious danger, where visible, and the employer is not bound to warn an experienced employe of its presence, though such screws were not in common use in the locality.-Pettingill v. William Porter & Son, Mass., 107 N. E. 269.

79. Proximate Cause.-Where a switchman stepped between moving cars to uncouple them, because of a defective coupler, held that his act was not the sole proximate cause of his injury, but that the violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act contributed thereto. Otos v. Great Northern Ry. Co., Minn., 150 N. W. 922.

80. Respondeat Superior.-A pedestrian injured through the actionable negligence of the driver of a horse may recover from the driver's master if the driver was engaged in carrying on the master's business.-James v. Hayden Bros., Neb., 150 N. W. 1013.

81. Simple Tools.-A repairer putting in new ties, directed to use the old spikes when possible, otherwise new spikes furnished, assumes the risk, under the simple tool rule, when driving an old spike, from rust thereon.-Paich v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Wash., 144 Pac. 919.

82. Vice Principal.-A conductor ordering an inexperienced employe to walk on the top of a car, when the wind was so violent that the conductor himself had to hold to the running board to prevent being blown off, was guilty of grossly negligent conduct rendering the company liable for injuries to the employe.-Ridge v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., N. C., 83 S. E. 762.

83. Workmen's Compensation Act.-Where the employer was under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Wisconsin when an employe working for him in Minnesota was requested to go to work in Wisconsin, the employe elected to accept such act.-Johnson v. Nelson, Minn., 150 N. W. 620.

84. Mechanics' Liens-Bankruptcy.-On foreclosure of a mechanic's lien on property of a discharged bankrupt, held that the judgment. should be that the property be sold for payment of the lien debt with costs, but no deficiency judgment be entered.-Moreau Lumber Co. v. Johnson, N. D., 150 N. W. 563.

85. Monopolies-Indictment.-A combination by dealers in a necessary of life to raise, by agreement, the price thereof is indictable at common law.-State v. Craft, N. C., 83 S. E. 772.

mort

86. Mortgages-Alteration.-Where a gage duly executed was changed but there was no new acknowledgment, the defect of recording and of constructive notice extended only to eliminate in legal effect the inserted clause from the record. Johnson v. Northern Minnesota Land & Investment Co., Iowa, 150 N. W. 596.

87. Estoppel.-Where the mortgagor knew of defects in the foreclosure, and remained silent while a purchaser. made improvements, satisfied a prior mortgage, and sold the property, which greatly increased in value, held that he was estopped to assert title or right to redeem.-Purcell v. Thornton, Minn., 150 N. W.

899.

88.-Foreclosure.-Where a sale under a trust deed executed by a husband alone was made to pay debts, including a debt secured by a mortgage, in which the wife joined, of a part of the property worth more than the debt, but unmortgaged property was sold to pay the mortgage, the proceeds must be applied as if mortgaged property had been sold to discharge the mortgage.-Mulligan v. Mulligan, Ky., 171 S. W.

420.

89. Foreclosure.-In foreclosure for nonpayment of taxes which were paid by the mortgagee, it was no defense that the description on the assessment role was defective.-Farmers' Security Bank of Park River v. Martin, N. D., 150 N. W. 572.

90. Pretended Transfer.-Where defendant, to avoid appearance of liability, procured land to be conveyed to K., who mortgaged it for a part of the price, as a mere straw man, defendant's liability to pay the debt, though resting in parol, was enforceable by an assignee of the mortgages.-Dexter Horton Nat. Bank v. Seattle Homeseekers Co., Wash., 144 Pac. 691.

91. Municipal Corporations-Abolition of Office.-Abolition of a city office within the civil service solely to get rid of the incumbent and avoid performance of a decree enjoining the incumbent's removal held ineffective.-State

City of Seattle, Wash., 145 Pac. 61.

V.

92.- Collateral Attack.-In an action against a city for injuries from the collapse of a bridge claimed by the defendant to have been left outside of the city limits by an ordinance changing such limits, held that plaintiff could not collaterally attack the corporate organization of the city by questioning the validity of the ordinance through a contention that the statute under which the ordinance was passed (Laws 1905, c. 519, § 7) was unconstitutional.-Horner v. City of Atchison, Kan., 144 Pac. 1010. 93.- -Contributory Negligence.-Momentary diversion of a pedestrian's attention is not, as a matter of law, contributory negligence.-Kelly v. City of Spokane, Wash., 145 Pac. 57.

94. Special Assessment.-Property owned by a cemetery association is subject to special assessment for the construction of sewers by the city in which the property is located, unless expressly exempted by charter from such tax.People v. Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n., Ill., 107 N. E. 143.

95. Names-Business Names.-The sole owner and manager of a business may in good faith conduct his business under any name, and sue under such name for breach of contract.-Robinovitz v. Hamill, Okla., 144 Pac. 1024.

96. Navigable Waters-Floating Logs.-Defendant lumber company held to have a right to accumulate so much water by flooding dams as was reasonably necessary to drive with reasonable efficiency logs floated by it, though such

detention lessened the supply available to run plaintiff's mill.-Johnson v. Wild Rice Boom Co., Minn., 150 N. W. 218.

97. New Trial-Special Questions.-New trial held not to be granted because, jury being unable to decipher the word "punitive" in a special question, the foreman entered the courtroom and asked the judge the meaning of the word, to which he replied, "Punitive, by way of punishment."-Dishmaker v. Heck, Wis., 150 N. W.

951.

98. Partnership-Burden of Proof.-A party, claiming that the individual note of a partner for the firm debt discharges the debt as to the firm, has the burden of proving that the note was so intended and accepted.-Fayette Liquor Co. v. Jones, W. Va., 83 S. E. 726.

99.- -Dissolution.-On the dissolution of a firm, it immediately ceases to exist, except for the purpose of winding up the firm, and there can be no successor, and no question of survivorship is involved, either under the terms of the contract with the firm or by reason of the manner in which the dissolution was effected.Schlau v. Enzenbacher, Ill., 107 N. E. 107.

100. Physicians and Surgeons-Employment. -Where defendant contracted with a hospital association to care for injured employes, but the physician was not satisfactory to an employe's uncle, and plaintiff was employed instead, defendant was not liable for his services.-Vanderboget v. Campbell Mill Co., Wash., 144 Pac. 905. 101. Principal and Agent-Opinion Evidence. -Testimony of an agent of a mortgagor that he had no authority to deliver the mortgage as changed by him is mere conclusion, where at the time he believed in good faith that he acted within his authority.-Johnson v. Northern Minnesota Land & Investment Co., Iowa, 150 N. W. 596.

102. Railroads Cause of Death.-Where, in an action for death of a person struck by a train at night, the evidence showed failure of the train to carry a headlight, but the evidence of the cause of death was circumstantial, and was as consistent with decedent coming on the track suddenly in front of the train as with any other theory, there could be no recovery as a matter of law. McNeill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., N. C., 83 S. E. 704.

103.- -Evidence.-Railroads being required to keep a headlight on an engine at night, testimony that a person was likely to be blinded by meeting a train, with a large headlight, at night, is improper as putting the company in a position of being guilty of negligence for doing what it was required to do.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Shoemake's Adm'r, Ky., 171 S. W. 383.

104. Rape-Pleading.-Where, in a civil action for rape, the petition charged that defendant administered to plaintiff medicine which caused unconsciousness, and assaulted her while unconscious, such allegation as to unconsciousness was surplusage and did not authorize an instruction that plaintiff could not recover unless she proved that the assault was committed while she was so unconscious.-Wessel v. Lavender, Mo., 171 S. W. 331.

105. Resistance.-Consent by the female, however reluctantly given, prevents the offense being rape, but a woman who does not consent need not continue to physically resist in face of reasonably supposed imminent peril of great bodily harm.-Skulhus v. State, Wis., 150 N. W. 503.

106. Reformation of Instruments-Fraud and Mistake. A petition by a grantee, which alleges that she was informed and believed that the deed was subject to a life estate in the grantor, held not to state a cause of action for fraud and mistake in reserving a life estate also for his wife.-Plistil v. Kaspar, Iowa, 150 N. W. 584. 107. Release Joint Tortfeasors. Unconditional release of policemen jointly liable for false imprisonment held to discharge another policeman against whom plaintiff's right of action was not reserved.-Stires v. Sherwood, Ore., 145 Pac. 645.

108. Remainders-Merger.-Where a remainderman purchases a tax title and enters in possession under it and afterwards takes a quit

claim deed from the life tenant, the tax title is not necessarily merged in the conveyance of the life estate.-Jinkiaway v. Ford, Kan., 145 Pac. 885.

109. Replevin-Right of.-The owner may replevin chattels levied on by an officer not in possession, if the officer could take possession as against a wrongful taker.-Francis v. Guaranty State Bank of Texola, Okla., 145 Pac. 324.

110. Schools and School Districts-Taxation. -Where extensive repairs and improvements were needed for various school properties, the mere fact that the school board, in making its estimate, levied a tax for an amount larger than was actually required, did not render such act fraudulent, in the absence of proof that the tax was grossly excessive.-People v. Bates, Ill., 107 N. E. 123.

for

111. Set-off and Counterclaim-Action Death. A counterclaim for damages to the rolling stock of a railway company by the negligent act of the driver of an automobile cannot be asserted against the beneficiaries in an action under Lord Campbell's Act.-Craig v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., Neb., 150 N. W. 648.

112. Street Railroads-Proximate Cause.Failure to warn a person negligently walking beside a street car track when there was opportunity, if warned, for him to step aside is the proximate cause of the injury.-Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Drooks, Ala., 66 So. 824.

113. Taxation-Income Tax.-Under the statute providing for set-off against income tax of a tax on personalty paid, it is the identity of time for which each is paid, and not the time when the income tax ecomes due, that is the basis of the right to set-off.-Van Dyke v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 150 N. W. 509.

114. Levy.-Where the Legislature grants power to levy a tax for a particular purpose and prescribes the conditions under which and the method by which the tax is to be levied, the provisions of the statute must be substantially complied with or the tax will be void.-People v. Jacksonville & St. L. Ry. Co., Ill., 107 N. E. 237.

115. Telegraphs and Telephones-Pleading.In an action for damages from the payment of a draft in consequence of a mistake in a telegram stopping payment, the complaint need not negative the bank's knowledge of the mistake. -Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louissell, Ala., 66 So. 839.

116. Trespass-Pleading.-If the declaration in trespass be general, without describing the locus, and defendant, filing a plea of liberum tenementum, has any land in the jurisdiction, plaintiff must make a new assignment setting out a description with more certainty.-Ward v. Mississippi River Power Co., Ill., 107 N. E.

115.

117. Trusts-Estoppel.-If it was the intention, when a conveyance was made to a wife, to confer a beneficial interest upon her, the husband, paying the purchase money, cannot put a different construction on the transaction at a subsequent time.-Dodge v. Thomas, Ill., 107 N. E. 261.

118. Wills-Heirs.-The word "heirs" in its primary legal sense means those entitled to succeed to a decedent's property in case of intestacy, but in a secondary, and more general, sense, may mean those on whom property of any kind devolves on the death of another, either by law or will.-Hoke v. Jackman, Ind., 107 N. E. 65.

Infirmity

119. Incapacity of Testator. from old age does not render a person incapable of making a will unless it has so far impaired the testator's mind that he is incapable of understanding his business at the time he is engaged in making the will.-Carnahan v. Hamilton, Ill., 107 N. E. 210.

120. Witnesses-Competency.-The rule governing the admissibility of testimony to transactions with a person since deceased should not be looked on with disfavor, and a presumption of fraud should not be indulged in to avoid its effect.-Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, Wis., 150 N.

W. 516.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 16, 1915.

THE NEED OF CERTAINTY IN A CRIMINAL STATUTE TO MAKE IT CONSTITUTIONAL.

It seems to us that we are constantly getting further away from the principle, that a criminal statute should be so definite as to enable those included in its terms to know in advance whether an act is criminal or not, and an illustration of how very far we have gone in this departure is shown by a recent unanimous decision by the federal Supreme Court, affirming a ruling by Washington Supreme Court. Fox v. Washington State, 35 Sup. Ct. 383.

The statute held constitutional by the above courts provided that: "Every person who shall wilfully print, publish, edit, issue or knowingly circulate, sell, distribute or display any book, paper, document or written or printed matter, in any form, advocating, encouraging or inciting, or having a tendency to encourage or incite the commission of any crime, breach of the peace or act of violence, or which shall tend to encourage or advocate disrespect for law or any court or courts of justice, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor." Under such a statute we undertake to say, that there is not given any criterion between an honest and a dishonest

publication, between one made in good faith and one for the accomplishment of some unlawful purpose.

We would not have to exercise our fancy inordinately to suppose that in a certain state of public opinion the open advocacy by printing or writing and circulation of certain doctrines regarded by the circulator as tending to advance morality or science would not reasonbly tend to a breach of the Or even the insistence in print upon peace. the existence of some physical fact disputed in a certain community, inevitably might not tend to a riot or affray. For ex

ample, it is related that a Paynim Knight and a Crusader, after fraternizing in a soldierly way, fell out and nearly came to blows, because the latter told the former, that in his country the rivers often became so hard on the surface, that one could walk across them. This Crusader might have been punished according to law under this statute, if a jury should think, whether he did or not, that the printing and circulation of such extraordinary information tended to a riot.

The case in which plaintiff in error objected to this statute's uncertainty was surely a gross one, but he was charged on information, under perhaps the most general clause of the statute, with editing and circulating certain printed matter tending to encourage disrespect for law. This matter was an article entitled, "The Nude and the Prudes," and it advocated the boycott of certain people who procured the arrest and punishment of certain members of a society called the "Homeites" for indecent expos

particular statute or of law in general. In the present case the disrespect for law that was encouraged was disregard of it-an overt breach and technically criminal act."

The fact, that appeal is made in the last clause above to the facts of the case at bar to sustain the general conclusion of constitutionality, exhibits to our mind a lack of confidence, in the reasoning advanced. A law is constitutional or not for one offender as well as for another. And neither is supposed to take his chances of liberty according to the "likely" way a statute may be construed by the courts. The question is far deeper than that. And if the "likely" way depends upon the circumstances of a particular offense, uncertainty is the rule in application.

There appears to us here also something of surrender by our highest court, bound to construe our federal constitution for state courts, when it ought to lay down for the latter some guiding rule in cases of this kind. If a state law may, as construed in a certain way by state courts, offend the federal constitution, may our highest court permit it to go abroad as constitutional, when the reasons given for sustaining it in a particular case themselves logically offend constitutionality?

Another reason stated by Mr. Justice Holmes for sustaining the conviction in this case is that: "By indirection, but unmistakably, the article encourages and incites a persistence in what we must assume would be a breach of the state laws against indecent exposure; and the jury have so found." But shall not an accused be informed before he commits an act of a reasonable certainty that his act directly, and not by some theory of indirection, however "unmistakable," constitutes disrespect of law, and also know what is disrespect in the statutory sense, and not as some court may construe the act?

We care nothing in this inquiry about freedom of the press and questions like that. If a law can create a boundary line for the use of speech, it can declare what amounts

to an abuse, but in doing the latter it ought to inform citizens what in all cases with reasonable certainty amounts to stepping across the boundary. Something is said about statutes being held valid where they sustain the use of the word "tend," but we think these cases ought not to control in a case of this kind. The thing to which a tendency is denounced is more certain as an offense when directly committed, than what is here spoken of, so far, at least, as the only clause of the law considered by the court is concerned. We hardly think, however, that the clauses are separable in character, so that if one clause goes by the board the others would remain unaffected.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS

NEGLIGENCE-APPLICATION

OF DOCTRINE RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN FAVOR OF LICENSEE.-The Supreme Court of Missouri lately considered the question of liability (under a "Fire Escape Ordinance") of the owner to a roomer in a lodging house. Burt v. Nichols, 173 S. W. 681.

Its position on this subject is known by the following excerpt: "The rule res ipsa loquitur has been invoked in cases which upon analogy are similar in all material aspects to the conditions found here. For example, it was held to apply to an injury received by a clerk of a shipper upon a railroad who went to the railroad yards to inspect a shipment of goods consigned to his employer. Taterman v. Railroad, 96 Mo. App. 448, 70 S. W. 514. There, as here, no contractual relation or privity by contract subsisted between the plaintiff and the defendant. Plaintiff there, as here, was merely upon the premises as an implied licensee. Blanton v. Dodd, 109 Mo. 74, 18 S. W. 1149; Gallagher v. Edison Co., 72 Mo. App. 576; Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 331, 29 Atl. 380. We think these reasons suffice to uphold the rule; but if they do not, and if to hold thus makes necessary the creation of a new precedent, then we ought, in a case of such crying necessity, to create it. Neither the day for the making of new precedents is past, nor is the field thereof already occupied to exclusion. Therefore we hold that whereas here these fires