143. Debtor Having Access to Papers; Possession by Joint Obligor.— The presumption of payment from mere possession can arise only where the possession is free from suspicion.19 Hence where the maker of a note has access to the papers of the holder, and may have acquired the note as well without payment as with, the presumption of payment does not arise.20 But according to another view the mere opportunity to obtain a note unlawfully does not as matter of law destroy the presumption arising from the possession, but the effect to be given to such opportunity taken in connection with the other circumstances is for the determination of the jury. This presumption is strictly predicable of a security payable by one. So the production of an evidence of indebtedness by one of several obligors is no evidence that he has paid the whole, because being incapable of manual possession by all, the custody of it by any one in particular is either accidental or dependent on a variety of circumstances. In some cases, it may possibly be committed to the particular obligor who has paid it, as evidence against the rest, but such is not the common course. It just as frequently happens that the bond is delivered up in the absence of the rest who have paid their proportion to him who extinguishes the debt by payment of the residue. Therefore no presumption arises more favorable to the one state of things than to the other.s

Presumption of Payment from Lapse of Time

144. In General.-In all civilized countries where the law is administered as a science, having reference to the peace, quiet, and progress of society, as well as to the protection of individual rights, it has been thought wise that there should be some limit to litigation, some boundary beyond which contests or matters open to contest should be regarded as settled. Early in the judicial history of England the presumption of payment was raised after a great lapse of time between. the creation of an obligation and an attempt to enforce it in the courts. This presumption became a part of the law of the United States and is applied in all jurisdictions. It originated in equity in the application of the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura sub

v. Shaffer, 9 Ohio St. 43, 72 Am. Dec. 613; Witte v. Williams, 8 S. C. 290, 28 Am. Rep. 294.

19. Arnold v. Arnold, 124 Ala. 550, 27 So. 465, 82 A. S. R. 199.

Note: 14 Ann. Cas. 257.

20. Clymer v. Groff, 220 Pa. St. 580, 69 Atl. 1119, 14 Ann. Cas. 256 and note.

1. Note: 14 Ann. Cas. 258.

2. Heald v. Davis, 11 Cush. (Mass.)

318, 59 Am. Dec. 147; Craig v. Craig, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 472, 24 Am. Dec. 390; Mills v. Hyde, 19 Vt. 59, 46 Am. Dec. 177.

3. Craig v. Craig, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 472, 24 Am. Dec. 390.

4. Higginson v. Mein, 4 Cranch 415, 2 U. S. (L. ed.) 664; Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 466; McCoy v. Morrow, 18 Ill. 519, 68 Am. Dec. 578; Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588,

veniunt, but was soon engrafted in the common law, and has since been steadily applied. It is not to be confused with the equitable doctrine of laches, since laches is generally regarded as being not delay alone, but rather delay working a disadvantage to another. Lapse of time may also be set up to show that no claim ever existed as well as to raise a presumption of payment."

145. Basis and Reason of Presumption.-The rule of presumption of payment when traced to its foundation is said to be a rule of convenience and policy. It was adopted by the law in the interest of repose and the ending of litigation. The presumption rests, not only on want of diligence in asserting rights, but on the higher ground that it is necessary to suppress frauds, to avoid long dormant claims, which, it has been said, have often more cruelty than justice in them; that it relieves courts from the necessity of adjudicating rights so obscured by the lapse of time and the accidents of life that the attainment of truth and justice is next to impossible. In a word, the most solemn muniments are presumed to exist, in order to support a long possession; the most solemn of human obligations. lose their binding efficacy and are presumed to be discharged after many years.10 Forbearance to enforce a pecuniary claim is not direct. evidence that the money has been paid,11 but on the fact of forbearance the law builds a presumption that a demand has been satisfied, vesting it on the rational ground that a person naturally desires

6. See EQUITY, vol. 10, p. 399. 7. Wanamaker v. Van Buskirk, 1 N. J. Eq. 685, 23 Am. Dec. 748.

97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505; 594; 68 A. S. R. 899; 90 A. S. R. 659; Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 135 A. S. R. 110. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592; 5. Gregory v. Commonwealth, 121 Howland v. Shurtleff, 2 Metc. (Mass.) Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 26, 35 Am. Dec. 384; Jackson v. Wood, 804; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 242, 7 Am. Dec. 46 Am. Rep. 153. 315; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711; Alston v. Hawkins, 105 N. C. 3, 11 S. E. 164, 18 A. S. R. 874; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454 and note; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879 and note; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. L. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618; De Cordova v. Smith, 9 Tex. 129, 58 Am. Dec. 136; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401; Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861, 64 A. S. R.

726.

Notes: 11 Am. Dec. 737; 53 Am. Dec. 734; 18 A. S. R. 883; 54 A. S. R. R. C. L. Vol. XXI.-9.

8. Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894; Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

129

9. Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894.

10. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A.

454.

11. Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711.

to possess and enjoy his own and that an unexplained neglect to enforce an alleged right for a long period casts suspicion on the existence of the right itself,12 because in the ordinary course of human affairs it is not usual for men to allow real and well founded claims to lie dormant a great length of time.18 Such a presumption is not founded simply on belief. It is based on policy and necessity, and is frequently in direct opposition to belief.14

146. Statute of Limitations Distinguished.-The presumption of payment from the lapse of time differs essentially from a statute of limitations which presupposes an established substantive right, but forbids its enforcement by the customary remedies.15 The presumption of payment may be rebutted by sufficient evidence, no matter how long the time may be; but a statute of limitations cuts off the right of action, although it may be admitted that no payment has ever been made.16 A statute of limitations must ordinarily be pleaded and relied on by the defendant,17 while the presumption of payment. arising from the lapse of time is usually drawn from the plaintiff's own case, and when so drawn it can hardly be regarded as a matter of affirmative defense.18

147. Nature of Presumption. As the presumption of payment arising from lapse of time is based on reasons of public policy and social convenience and security, it is a presumption which the courts are bound to draw when the facts are undisputed and undisturbed by conflicting evidence,19 and its effect is to cast the burden of proof on to the plaintiff.20 It would seem to follow that it should be closed as a presumption of law, though it has been characterized as a pre

12. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711.

Note: 8 Ann. Cas. 780.

13. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

14. Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

15. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734.

16. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734; Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

732; 68 A. S. R. 883; 90 A. S. R. 659. 17. See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, vol. 17, p. 984 et seq.

18. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734.

19. Alston v. Hawkins, 105 N. C. 3, 11 S. E. 164, 18 A. S. R. 874; Gregory v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804.

20. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827; In re Ash, 202 Pa. St. 422, 51 Atl. 1030, 90 A. S. R. 658.

Notes: 18 A. S. R. 879; 64 A. S. R. 732; 68 A. S. R. 883.

1. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454.

Notes: 18 A. S. R. 883; 68 A. S. R.

Notes: 8 Am. Dec. 311; 64 A. S. R. 883.

sumption of fact for the reason that it may be rebutted. By other courts the question of the presumption of payment from the lapse of time is said to be one of fact and law, and cannot be determined by the court until the evidence on the point is before it. This presumption is an artificial and arbitrary rule of law, which gives to the evidence a technical efficacy beyond its simple and natural force and operation. The presumption of payment is not a bar to an action on the original contract, and the burden of proof on the creditor is not to establish a new contract, or promise, as when a debt is barred by the statute of limitations, but to show by competent evidence that the debt or judgment has not been paid."

148. Effect of Presumption.-The presumption of payment is conclusive in the sense that where it appears that the requisite time has elapsed and no countervailing evidence is given, neither the court nor the jury is at liberty to find that the debt was not paid; but it is not conclusive in the sense that the plaintiff. may not introduce evidence to disprove the fact which by force of law the lapse of time establishes. Some courts hold that after the lapse of the prescribed period of time, the presumption of payment is conclusive where the creditor has been during the period inactive, or there has been no recognition of the liability of the debtor.10

2. Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 26 S. E. 861, 64 A. S. R. 726. 10 L.R.A. 454.

Note: 3 A. S. R. 515; 18 A. S. R. 884.

3. Lewis v. Schwenn, 93 Mo. 26, 2 S. W. 391, 3 A. S. R. 511.

4. Gregory v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. L. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

Notes: 64 A. S. R. 732; 68 A. S. R. 883; 90 A. S. R. 659.

5. Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711.

6. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

Notes: 53 Am. Dec. 734; 68 A. S. R. 883; 90 A. S. R. 659.

7. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454.

8. Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588, 97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505; Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19

Notes: 11 Am. Dec. 737; 135 A. S. R. 110.

9. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States. 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734; Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 287, 8 Am. Dec. 562: Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879; Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

Notes: 53 Am. Dec. 734; 18 A. S. R. 879; 64 A. S. R. 732; 68 A. S. R. 899.

10. Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 151, 5 S. Ct. 1181, 29 U. S. (L. ed.) 336; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894; Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578, 135 A. S. R. 107, limiting McArthur v. Carrie, 32 Ala. 75, 70 Am. Dec. 529; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. L. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Charleston Dist. v. Steedman, Harp. L. (S. C.) 287, 18 Am. Dec. 652. And see infra, par. 157 et seq.

149. Presumption as Merely Defensive. The law formerly was that the statute of limitations could be used only as a shield and not as a sword, but this view has been very much modified, and a limitation title may be used as a means by which to reclaim the possession of land as well as a means of defense, and there is an inclination among some courts to take the same view of the presumption of payment.11 Generally, however, the presumption of payment cannot be availed of as a weapon of attack in a case involving the rights to land, and it has been determined that while the presumption is available as a defense in a proceeding to enforce payment of the purchase money, yet the vendee in possession is not entitled to the benefit of the presumption in a proceeding in which he asks for affirmative relief. While the weight of authority supports the rules stated, there is very good authority maintaining the view that the presumption of payment arising from lapse of time is available to defeat an action of ejectment brought by a vendor against his vendee on the ground that the vendee had failed to pay the purchase price. 13

15 to

150. Debts Affected by Presumption.-It may be stated generally that the presumption of payment arising from the lapse of time is applicable to every debt, no matter how solemn the instrument may be by which the debt is evidenced.14 Specifically, the presumption has been applied to debts arising on simple contracts generally,1 stock subscriptions,16 notes,17 leases, 18 legacies, 19 taxes, 20 contracts for the sale of land, fiduciary debts of every character due from a trustee to his cestui que trust, and obligations arising out of agency. It is also applicable to sealed instruments or specialties, including

11. Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588, 97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505. And see ADVERSE POSSESSION, vol. 1, p. 691; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, vol. 17, D. 681.

12. Note: Ann. Cas. 1913A 508. 13. Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588, 97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505.

14. Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879.

Notes: 54 A. S. R. 594; 68 A. S. R. S99; 135 A. S. R. 110.

15. Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153.

16. Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894.

17. Smith v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 60 Vt. 682, 15 Atl. 353, 6 A. S. R. 144, 1 L.R.A. 216.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 882.

18. Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309.

19. Note: 18 A. S. R. 883.

20. Notes: 18 A. S. R. 884; 90 A. S. R. 659.

1. Fagan v. Bach, 253 Ill. 588, 97 N. E. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1913A 505 and note.

2. Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 151, 5 S. Ct. 1181, 29 U. S. (L. ed.) 336; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894.

3. Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S. 520, 14 S. Ct. 189, 37 U. S. (L. ed.) 1167; Roberts v. Armstrong, 1 Bush (Ky.) 263, 89 Am. Dec. 624.

4. Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153.

Notes: 6 A. S. R. 811; 10 L.R.A. 454.