judgments, bonds, recognizances, and sealed notes. A question has been sometimes raised whether the doctrine of presumption arising from the lapse of time and total neglect to take any measures to enforce a claim could properly be applied to the case of a mortgage of real estate; and in some of the earlier English cases the doctrine. is advanced that the common law presumption applicable to bonds, judgments, etc., arising from a delay of twenty years to enforce the same, does not apply in the case of a mortgage, because the legal estate is in the mortgagee, and the mortgagor is a mere tenant at will, and his possession is therefore the possession of the mortgagee. But this doctrine was repudiated by Lord Thurlow, and the cases of debts secured by mortgages are placed on the same footing with other demands, and held liable to be defeated by the same presumptions arising from lapse of time. And this presumption of the payment of a mortgage or release of an estate is often made against what is believed to be the very fact, for the purpose of quieting a long adverse possession, and to prevent virtual fraud, by the setting up of dormant title long since supposed to have become extinct.10

151. Debts within Statute of Limitations.-The courts have frequently said in discussion that the presumption applies only to debts not embraced by the statute of limitations,11 but there appears to be no good reason why a defendant may not avail himself of the presumption of payment, if it is applicable, although the action is brought on an obligation covered by a statute of limitations.12 And

5. Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, Dec. 384; Barker v. Jones, 62 N. H. 4 S. Ct. 426, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 466; 497, 13 A. S. R. 586; Wanmaker v. Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Van Buskirk, 1 N. J. L. 685, 23 Am. Dec. 711; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. Dec. 748; Jackson v. Wood, 12 Johns. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827. 10 (N. Y.) 242, 7 Am. Dec. 315; Bailey L.R.A. 454 and note; Hummel v. Lilly, v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. Am. Dec. 309. R. 879.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 883.

6. Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309: Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

Notes: 88 Am Dec. 590; 18 A. S. R. 880.

7. Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879.

8. Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827 and note; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

9. Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721; Howland v. Shurtleff, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 26, 35 Am.

Notes: 23 Am. Dec. 755; 18 A. S. R. 881.

And see MORTGAGES, vol. 19, pp. 457-458.

10. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454.

11. Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. L. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Smithpeter v. Ison, 4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 203, 53 Am. Dec. 732; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

Notes: 53 Am. Dec. 734; 13 A. S. R. 586; 54 A. S. R. 594; 1 L.R.A. 628.

12. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592.

it is held that the presumption of payment applies and precludes recovery on a debt which by reason of the defendant's absence from the state is not barred by a statute of limitations.13 It has also been held that a new statute of limitations which prescribes that the time of limitation should begin to run on a particular day as to all causes of action which existed on that day does not prevent a defendant from interposing the defense that the obligation was paid by reason of the lapse of time, although under the statute it was still enforceable.14

152. Time Necessary to Raise Presumption.-The length of time which is required to elapse before the presumption of payment will arise is different in different jurisdictions. As a general rule, however, twenty years is the period adopted,15 though it is variously fixed at sixteen years, 16 fifteen years, 17 and sometimes ten years.18

153. Lapse of Time for Less Period as Evidence. The presumption of payment never arises from lapse of time alone, short of the period fixed by law.19 In a given case, if there are no circumstances tending to aid the presumption of payment, and the presumption does not arise for want of the necessary time, it would be the duty of the court so to instruct the jury and withdraw it from their

13. Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Dec. 732; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, Kan. 392, 42 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 43 Am. Rep. 618; Jameson v. Rixev, 592; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861, 64 A. S. 46 Am. Rep. 153. R. 726.

14. Booker v. Booker, 29 Grat. (Va.) 605, 26 Am. Rep. 401.

15. Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, 4 S. Ct. 426, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 466; Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734; Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721; McCoy v. Morrow, 18 Ill. 519, 68 Am. Dec. 578; Barker v. Jones, 62 N. H. 497, 13 A. S. R. 586; Wanmaker v. Van Buskirk, 1 N. J. Eq. 685, 23 Am. Dec. 748; Gulick v. Loder, 13 N. J. L. 68, 23 Am. Dec. 711; Jackson v. Wood, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 242, 7 Am. Dec. 315; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454 and note; Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827 and note; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879 and note; Smithpeter v. Ison, 4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 203, 53 Am.

Notes: 11 Am. Dec. 737; 53 A.n. Dec. 734; 88 Am. Dec. 590; 6 A. S. R. 811; 13 A. S. R. 586; 18 A. S. R. 881, 883 et seq.; 54 A. S. R. 594; 68 A. S. R. 883, 899; 90 A. S. R. 659; 135 A. S. R. 110; 1 L.R.A. 628.

16. Atkinson V. Dance, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 424, 30 Am. Dec. 422; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn. 724, 69 S. W. 345, 91 A. S. R. 769, 58 L.R.A. 694.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 883.

17. Smith v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 60 Vt. 682, 15 Atl. 353, 6 A. S. R. 144, 1 L.R.A. 216.

18. Note: 18 A. S. R. 884.

19. Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721; Adair v. Adair, 5 Mich. 204, 71 Am. Dec. 779; Adlum v. Yard, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 163, 18 Am. Dec. 608; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879; Grafton Bank v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463. 47 Am. Dec. 697.

Notes: 23 Am. Dec. 755; 71 Am. Dec. 785; 18 A. S. R. 880, 885.

consideration.20 It is true, however, that time has always been regarded as an auxiliary to other facts and circumstances on questions of payment, possessing more or less importance as the period may have been longer or shorter, and it may in connection with other circumstances establish the fact of payment.1

154. Application of Presumption to State.-When the state comes into its courts, it is subject like all other suitors to the established rules of evidence. It must meet the burden of proof, its evidence must be relevant, material, the best attainable, and must be presented in due order under the regular rules of procedure. In all such respects it stands on the same footing as ordinary litigants. Statutes of limitation do not apply to it, because the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi, though probably in its origin a part of royal prerogative, has been adopted in our jurisprudence as a matter of important public policy. But rules of evidence and legal presumptions are not changed for or against the state as a suitor. A statute of limitation is a legislative bar to the right of action, but the presumption of payment. from the lapse of time is not a bar at dence, affecting the burden of proof. it should not apply to the state just as tions do. And it has been so held, supported by some authority.

all, but simply a rule of eviThere is no good reason why other legal rules and presumpthough the contrary view is

155. Evidence to Strengthen Presumption.-The fact that a creditor during the period when he might have enforced his demand by suit, if he had one, was in indigent circumstances and needed the use of his means is a circumstance tending to fortify the presumption that the demand has been paid or otherwise satisfied, especially when taken in connection with the easy and solvent circumstances of the obligor.5

20. Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879.

1. Dox v. Postmaster General, 1 Pet. 318, 7 U. S. (L. ed.) 160; Adair v. Adair, 5 Mich. 204, 71 Am. Dec. 779; Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309; Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153; Hamil ton v. Hamilton, 18 Pa. St. 20, 55 Am. Dec. 585; Hummel v. Lilly, 188 Pa. St. 463, 41 Atl. 613, 68 A. S. R. 879; Smithpeter v. Ison, 4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 203, 53 Am. Dec. 732; Husky v. Maples, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 25, 88 Am. Dec. 588; Walker v. Emerson, 20 Tex. 706, 23 Am. Dec. 207; Grafton Bank v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463, 47 Am. Dec. 697; Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E.

861, 64 A. S. R. 726.

Notes: 11 Am. Dec. 737; 53 Am. Dec. 735; 88 Am. Dec. 590; 18 A. S. R. 880, 885.

2. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A.1916B 734 and note (applying presumption in action by the United States); In re Ash, 202 Pa. St. 422, 51 Atl. 1030, 90 A. S. R. 658. 3. Note: L.R.A.1916B 740.

4. Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153.

Notes: 88 Am. Dec. 590; 18 A. S. R. 882; 8 Ann. Cas. 780.

5. Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827. Note: 88 Am. Dec. 590.

156. Interruption of Period by Infancy, Nonresidence, etc.-The doctrine of prescription rests on principles different from the statute of limitations, and the period of time necessary to raise the presumption of payment is not interrupted by intervening infancy, coverture, or nonresidence of the defendant. Neither is the period. interrupted by a state of war between the countries of the respective parties. Some courts, however, have held that the period is interrupted by the nonresidence of the defendant,10 or the existence of war between the governments of the respective parties.11

Rebuttal of Presumption of Payment

157. In General.-The presumption arising from lapse of time. may be repelled by evidence showing nonpayment,12 in which respect it differs from the bar created by the statute of limitations.13 The facts and circumstances relied on to rebut the presumption must necessarily be within twenty years before suit is brought.14

158. Sufficiency of Evidence.-There is a marked difference of judicial opinion as to the character and sufficiency of the evidence required to rebut the presumption of payment. Some of the authorities hold that any evidence tending to prove nonpayment may be sufficient; that the fact must be found by the jury, and that any evidence ordinarily competent on the question of payment, if it satis

6. See supra, par. 146.

7. Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, + S. Ct. 426, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 466, apparently overruling Dunlop v. Ball, 2 Cranch 180, 2 U. S. (L. ed.) 246; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 A. S. R. 894; Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578, 135 A. S. R. 107.

8. Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578, 135 A. S. R. 107; Courtney v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R. 592.

9. Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578, 135 A. S. R. 107.

10. Latimer v. Trowbridge, 52 S. C. 193, 29 S. E. 634, 68 A. S. R. 893.

11. Dunlop v. Ball, 2 Cranch 180, 2 U. S. (L. ed.) 246; Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309.

Note: 68 A. S. R. 899.

Metc. (Mass.) 26, 35 Am. Dec. 384; Lewis v. Schwenn, 93 Mo. 26, 2 S. W. 391, 3 A. S. R. 511; Barker v. Jones, 62 N. H. 497, 13 A. S. R. 586; Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 210, 8 Am. Dec. 309; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454; Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn. 724, 69 S. W. 345, 91 A. S. R. 769, 58 L.R.A. 694; Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861, 64 A. S. R. 726; Stark v. Brown, 12 Wis. 572, 78 Am. Dec. 762.

Notes: 53 Am. Dec. 734; 3 A. S. R. 515; 6 A. S. R. 811; 13 A. S. R. 586; 18 A. S. R. 880, 882, 884; 68 A. S. R. 883, 899; Ann. Cas. 1913A 509.

13. Adair v. Adair, 5 Mich. 204, 71 Am. Dec. 779; Allison v. Wood, 104 Va. 765, 52 S. E. 559, 7 Ann. Cas. 721. And see LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, vol. 17, pp. 666–667.

12. Higginson v. Mein, 4 Cranch 415, 2 U. S. (L. ed.) 664; Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. United States, 223 14. Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. Fed. 926, 139 C. C. A. 406, L.R.A. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804. 1916B 734; Howland v. Shurtleff, 2

fies the jury, is all that the law requires.15 It has been held that the positive testimony of the plaintiff that the debt had not been paid is sufficient; 16 but other courts follow the rule that while the same precision and particularity of proof is not required as in the case of a plea of the statute of limitations, still the presumption of payment after twenty years is a strong one, and the evidence to rebut it must be satisfactory and convincing," and clear and explicit.18 Especially is this so where suit is not brought until after the debtor's death.19 Another class of cases holds that the presumption is one of law, and can be rebutted only by some positive act of unequivocal recognition, like part payment or a written admission, or at least a clear and well identified verbal promise of admission, intelligently made within the period of twenty years.20 According to these courts the presumption, though rebuttable, has a much stronger foothold than to be overthrown by a mere balance of probabilities or by an adverse conclusion or belief deduced simply from the weight of testimony; that it was originally admitted in analogy to the prevailing statute of limitations, and in considering evidence which rebuts it, the same principles are applicable as in considering evidence which takes a case out of the statute. After the presumption once arises it will gather strength with each succeeding year, and the evidence to overthrow it must, of course, be correspondingly increased.

159. Admission and Acknowledgment.-In most jurisdictions an admission of the nonpayment of a debt, made within the period required to raise the presumption, and either before or after the presumption has arisen, is admissible to rebut it, and if clearly proven will generally be sufficient to do so. It is of no consequence that

15. Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, 68 Atl. 325, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1197; Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454; Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. St. 28, 17 Atl. 753, 14 A. S. R. 827; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn. 724, 69 S. W. 345, 91 A. S. R. 769, 58 L.R.A. 694; Allison v. Wood, 104 Va. 765, 52 S. É. 559, 7 Ann. Cas.

721.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 887.

16. Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861, 64 A. S. R. 726.

17. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454; Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804.

Note: 18 A. S. R. 880.

Y.) 243, 7 Am. Dec. 315.

19. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454 (stating rule); Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804.

20. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454 (stating rule); Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618.

1. Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am. Rep. 618; Latimer v. Trowbridge, 52 S. C. 193, 29 S. E. 634, 68 A. S. R. 893.

2. Gregory v. Com., 121 Pa. St. 611, 15 Atl. 452, 6 A. S. R. 804.

3. Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Ore. 383, 24 Pac. 195, 20 A. S. R. 827, 10 L.R.A. 454.

Notes: 6 A. S. R. 811; 18 A. S. R. 883, 885; 1 L.R.A. 628; Ann. Cas.

18. Jackson v. Wood, 12 Johns. (N. 1913A 509.