ment.20 But the government as well as individuals has power in all cases to waive the question of voluntary payment, and provide that any mistake shall be corrected and any excess of payment refunded by the officer receiving it.1

166. Reason for Rule.-The reason of the rule that money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts can never be recovered and its propriety are quite obvious when applied to a case of payment on a mere demand of money unaccompanied with any power or authority to enforce such demand, except by suit at law. In such case, if the party would resist an unjust demand, he must do so at the threshold. The parties treat with each other on equal terms, and if litigation is intended by the one of whom the money is demanded, it should precede payment. When the person making the payment can only be reached by a proceeding at law, he is bound to make his defense in the first instance, and he cannot postpone the litigation by paying the demand in silence and afterward suing to recover the amount paid. Otherwise, the privilege is left to him of selecting his own time and convenience for litigatica, delaying it, as the case may be, until the evidence on which his adversary would have relied to sustain his claim may be lost by the lapse of time and the many casualties to which human affairs are exposed.3

167. What Constitutes Voluntary Payment.-A definition of voluntary payment is useful only to the extent that it gives the elements which must exist in order to make a payment voluntary. Each case must necessarily depend on its own peculiar facts. A rule which will furnish a safe guide in the determination of particular cases is that where a person pays an illegal demand, with a full knowledge of all the facts which render the demand illegal, without an immediate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless to release his person or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of his person or property, such payment is voluntary; and the fact

20. United States v. Wilson, 168 U. S. 273, 18 S. Ct. 85, 42 U. S. (L. ed.) 464; United States v. Edmondston, 181 U. S. 500, 21 S. Ct. 718, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 971.

1. United States v. Edmondston, 181 U. S. 500, 21 S. Ct. 718, 45 U. S. (L. ed.) 971.

2. Cobb v. Charter, 32 Conn. 358, 87 Am. Dec. 178; Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552, 15 Am. Rep. 323, overruled on another point by Jennings v. Fisher, 103 Ind. 112, 2 Ñ. E. 285; Dickerman v. Lord, 21 Ia. 338, 89 Am. Dec. 579; New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Louisiana Constr., etc., Co., 109 La. 13, 33 So. 517, 94 A. S. R. 395 and

note; Decker v. Adams, 28 N. J. L. 511, 78 Am. Dec. 65.

3. Dickerman v. Lord, 21 Ia. 338, 89 Am. Dec. 579.

Note: 94 A. S. R. 410.

4. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Dodge County, 98 U. S. 541, 25 U. S. (L. ed.) 196; Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, 10 S. Ct. 620, 33 U. S. (L. ed.) 1016; United States v. New York, etc., Mail Steamship Co., 200 U. S. 488, 26 S. Ct. 327, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 569; Brunson v. Crawford County Levee Dist., 107 Ark. 24, 153 S. W. 828, Ann. Cas. 1915A 493, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E.

that the person making the payment files a written protest at the time does not change its character.5 The question whether a payment is volúntary or involuntary is one of law where the facts are undisputed, but when the facts are in dispute it is for the jury to say whether the money was paid voluntarily or in consequence of compulsion or duress."

168. Illegal Taxes.-The entire question of the right to recover the amount of illegal taxes paid by a property owner is fully discussed in another part of this work, and the discussion herein is confined to the question whether their payment is voluntary. In some of the states the right to recover illegal taxes paid under protest is given by statute. In states where there is no statute regulating the matter, if any recovery is had, it must be under the rules of the common law. In most jurisdictions the rule prevails in the absence of statute that the payment of an illegal tax with full knowledge of the facts, and without any fraud, duress or extortion, is a voluntary payment although made under protest.10 At the same time, when taxes are paid under protest that they are being illegally exacted, or with notice that the payer contends that they are illegal, and intends to institute suit to compel their repayment, a recovery in such a suit may on occasion be had; 11 although generally speaking even a protest or notice will not avail if the payment be made voluntarily, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, and without any coercion by the actual or threatened exercise of power pos sessed, or supposed to be possessed, by the party exacting or receiving the payment, over the person or property of the party making the

200, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 124; Wessel v. D. S. B. Johnston Land, etc., Co., 3 N. D. 160, 54 N. W. 922, 44 A. S. R. 529 and note.

5. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Dodge County, 98 U. S. 541, 25 U. S. (L. ed.) 196; Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, 10 S. Ct. 620, 33 U. S. (L. ed.) 1016; Wessel v. D. S. B. Johnston Land, etc., Co., 3 N. D. 160, 54 N. W. 922, 44 A. S. R. 529 and note.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1915A 495. 6. Eslow v. Albion, 153 Mich. 720, 117 N. W. 328, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 872. 7. Adams v. Irving Nat. Bank, 116 N. Y. 606, 23 N. E. 7, 15 A. S. R. 447, 6 L.R.A. 491.

8. See TAXATION.

9. Brunson V. Crawford County Levee Dist., 107 Ark. 24, 153 S. W. 828, Ann. Cas. 1915A 493, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293.

10. Lamborn v. Dickinson County, 97 U. S. 181, 24 U. S. (L. ed.) 926; Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, 10 S. Ct. 620, 33 U. S. (L. ed.) 1016; Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U. S. 253, 24 S. Ct. 262, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 432; Brunson v. Crawford County Levee Dist., 107 Ark. 24, 153 S. W. 828, Ann. Cas. 1915A 493 and note, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293; Louisville v. Becker, 139 Ky. 17, 129 S. W. 311, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1045; Cox v. Welcher, 68 Mich. 263, 36 N. W. 69, 13 A. S. R. 339; Parcher V. Marathon County, 52 Wis. 388, 9 N. W. 23, 38 Am. Rep. 745.

Notes: 94 A. S. R. 425; Ann. Cas. 1913C 1052.

11. Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U. S. 253, 24 S. Ct. 262, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 432.

payment, from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief than such payment.19

Involuntary Payments

169. In General. It is a well settled fact that illegal payments coerced under duress or compulsion may be recovered,13 provided the compulsion furnishes the motive for the payment sought to be recovered,14 and proceeds from the person against whom the action is brought.15 Where money is paid on compulsion, the law raises an obligation to refund, and the form of the action is for money had and received to the plaintiff's use. 16 The rules governing duress of the person are not applied in all their rigor to persons of weak or impaired intellects. The mental condition of the person acted on must always be taken into consideration. The law does not leave the old, the weak, the ignorant, and the timid at the mercy of those who would operate on their fears to secure the payment of an unlawful demand. Regard must be had to the age, sex, and condition of mind, and the law relaxed accordingly.17

12. Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, Bulow v. Goddard, 1 Nott & McC. 10 S. Ct. 620, 33 U. S. (L. ed.) 1016; Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U. S. 253, 24 S. Ct. 262, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 432; United States v. New York, etc., Mail Steamship Co., 200 U. S. 488, 26 S. Ct. 327, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 569.

13. Lamborn v. Dickinson County, 97 U. S. 181, 24 U. S. (L, ed.) 926; Swift, etc., Co. v. United States, 111 U. S. 22, 4 S. Ct. 244, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 341; Arkansas Bldg., etc., Ass'n v. Maddern, 175 U. S. 269, 20 S. Ct. 119, 44 U. S. (L. ed.) 159; Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552, 15 Am. Rep. 323, overruled on another point by Jennings v. Fisher, 103 Ind. 112, 2 N. E. 285; Dickerman v. Lord, 21 Ia. 338, 89 Am. Dec. 579; Chamberlain v. Reed, 13 Me. 357, 29 Am. Dec. 506; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Rep. 287; Cribbs v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 340, 49 N. W. 587, 24 A. S. R. 166 and note; Westlake v. St. Louis, 77 Mo. 47, 46 Am. Rep. 4; American Brewing Co. v. St. Louis, 187 Mo. 367, 86 S. W 129, 2 Ann, Cas. 821; Mowatt v. Wright, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 355, 19 Am. Dec. 508; Ripley v. Gelston, Johns. (N. Y.) 201, 6 Am. Dec. 271; R. C. L. Vol. XXI.-10.

145

(S. C.) 45, 9 Am. Dec. 663; Kenneth v. South Carolina R. Co., 15 Rich. L. (S. C.) 284, 98 Am. Dec. 382; Boyd v. Anderson, 1 Overt. (Tenn.) 438, 3 Am. Dec. 762; Soderberg v. King County, 15 Wash. 194, 45 Pac. 785. 55 A. S. R. 878, 33 L.R.A. 670; Guetzkow Bros. Co. v. Breese, 96 Wis. 591, 72 N. W. 45, 65 A. S. R. 83.

Notes: 51 Am. Rep. 821; 94 A. S. R. 411, 426; 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 388; Ann. Cas. 1913C 1052; 8 U. S. (L. ed.) 299, 300, 301.

14. Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 79 Am. Dec. 176; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E. 200, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 124.

15. United States v. New York, etc., Mail Steamship Co., 200 U. S. 488, 26 S. Ct. 327, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 569; Brunson v. Crawford County Levee Dist., 107 Ark. 24, 153 S. W. 828. Ann. Cas. 1915A 493, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293 and note.

Note: 45 Am. Dec. 154.

16. McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 70 Am. Dec. 655.

17. Note: 94 A. S. R. 418.

170. What Constitutes Involuntary Payment.-What shall constitute the compulsion or coercion which the law will recognize as sufficient to render involuntary is often a question of difficulty. From the nature of the question no very precise rules can be laid down. The very word used to describe an involuntary payment imports a payment made against the will of the person who pays. It implies that there is some fact or circumstance which overcomes the will and imposes a necessity of payment in order to escape further ills.18 Ordinarily it may be said duress is that degree of constraint or danger either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.19 A rule that has been frequently applied is that to constitute the coercion or duress which will be regarded as sufficient to make a payment involuntary, there must be some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be possessed, by the party exacting or receiving the payment over the person or property of another, for which the latter has no other means of immediate relief than by making the payment. 20 Beyond these and similar statements of general principles, the courts have not attempted to lay down any definite and exact rule of universal application by which to determine whether a payment is voluntary or involuntary. From the very nature of the subject, this cannot be done, as each case must depend somewhat upon its own peculiar facts. The real and ultimate fact to be deter mined in every case is whether or not the party really had a choice,1 and the determination of that question is for the jury.

18. Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E. 200, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 124; Dickerman v. Lord, 21 Ia. 338, 89 Am. Dec. 579; Kilpatrick v. Germania L. Ins. Co., 183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124, 111 A. S. R. 722, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574; Alston v. Durant, 2 Strob. L. (S. C.) 257, 49 Am. Dec. 596.

19. Maxwell v. Griswold, 10 How. 242, 13 U. S. (L. ed.) 405; Robertson v. Frank Bros. Co., 132 U. S. 17, 10 S. Ct. 5, 33 U. S. (L. ed.) 236; Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217, 32 A. S. R. 581, 16 L.R.A. 376 and ncte; David City First Nat. Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595, 59 L.R.A. 296.

Note: 94 A. S. R. 413.

20. Maxwell v. Griswold, 10 How. 242, 13 U. S. (L. ed.) 405; Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U. S. 210, 24 U. S. (L. ed.) 409; Cleaveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318, 10 S. Ct. 100, 33 U. S.

(L. ed.) 584; Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U. S. 581, 13 S. Ct. 684, 37 U. S. (L. ed.) 569; Vick v. Shinn, 49 Ark. 70, 4 S. W. 60, 4 A. S. R. 26; Brumagin v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 79 Am. Dec. 176; Bucknall v. Story, 46 Cal. 589, 13 Am. Rep. 220; Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217, 32 A. S. R. 581, 16 L.R.A. 376; David City First Nat. Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595, 59 L.R.A. 296; Kilpatrick v. Germania L. Ins. Co., 183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124, 111 A. S. R. 722, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574.

Notes: 45 Am. Dec. 155; 94 A. S. R. 411; 8 U. S. (L. ed.) 301.

1. Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217, 32 A. S. R. 581, 16 L.R.A. 376; American Brewing Co. v. St. Louis, 187 Mo. 367, 86 S. W. 129, 2 Ann. Cas. 821.

Note: 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 873.

2. Ritchie v. Sweet, 32 Tex. 333, 5 Am. Rep. 245.

171. Duress of Person or Property.-The rule of the early common law was that a payment is not to be regarded as compulsory unless made to emancipate the person or property from an actual and existing duress imposed on it by the one to whom the money is paid,* or to prevent a seizure by a person having apparent authority to that end. The rule of the common law worked hardship and injustice in many instances, and this ancient doctrine of duress of person, and later of goods, has been much relaxed through the influence of equity, and extended so as to admit of compulsion of business and circumstances. Money paid under practical compulsion has in many cases been allowed to be recovered, as, for example, payment made to obtain.goods wrongfully detained; excessive fees when taken under color of office; excessive charges collected for performance of a duty, etc. In all such cases there was a moral coercion which destroyed the contract. At one time it was considered that there could not exist duress as to real property so as to authorize a recovery of payment made by reason thereof; but it is now well settled that there may be duress with respect to real property as well as personal, so as to render a payment on account of it involuntary, so that the money may be recovered back, 10

6

172. Necessity for Protest.-The authorities are not entirely clear as to whether a payment of an illegal demand must be made under

5. Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E. 200, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 124; Greenabaum v. King, 4 Kan. 332, 96 Am. Dec. 172; Chamberlain v. Reed, 13 Me. 357, 29 Am. Dec. 506; David City First Nat. Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595, 59 L.R.A. 296; Kilpatrick v. Germania L. Ins. Co., 183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124, 111 A. S. R. 722, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574. Note: 94 A S. R. 412. 6. See infra, par. 186. 7. See infra, par. 181. 8. See infra, par. 181.

3. Vick v. Shinn, 49 Ark. 70, 4 S. ing Co. v. St. Louis, 187 Mo. 367, W. 60, 4 A. S. R. 26; Brumagim v. 26 S. W. 129, 2 Ann. Cas. 821. See Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 79 Am. Dec. DURESS, vol. 9, pp. 722-723. 176 and note; Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552, 15 Am. Rep. 323, overruled on another point by Jennings v. Fisher, 103 Ind. 112, 2 N. E. 285; Harmon v. Harmon, 61 Me. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 556; Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill (Md.) 425, 45 Am. Dec. 145 and note; Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217, 32 A. S. R. 581, 16 L.R.A. 376 (stating rule); Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 84 Am. Dec. 54 and note; David City First Nat. Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595, 59 L.R.A. 296 (stating rule); Adams v. Irving Nat. Bank, 116 N. Y. 606, 23 N. E. 7, 15 A. S. R. 447, 6 L.R.A. 491 (stating rule); Kilpatrick v. Germania L. Ins. Co., 183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124, 111 A. S. R. 722, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574 (stating rule).

Notes: 45 Am. Dec. 156; 94 A. S. R. 413.

4. Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 84 Am. Dec. 54; American Brew

9. Note: 45 Am. Dec. 160.

10. Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217, 32 A. S. R. 581, 16 L.R.A. 376; David City First Nat. Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595, 59 L.R.A. 296.

Notes: 45 Am. Dec. 160; 94 A. S. R. 419; 16 L.R.A. 376.