but because it exhibits evidence of purpose, and for this reason solely."

But the marks by which we distinguish human agency from divine, is another consideration. The mere evidence of design, is not proof of human agency. There is as much appearance of purpose in the universe, as in the works of man. Certainly, the eye is as evidently for the purpose of seeing with, and the ear for that of hearing with, as are spectacles and ear-trumpets for the enabling of the dim-eyed and the deaf to see and hear. And the sun is as evidently for the purpose of giving sight as is a candle. Design, therefore, is as clear in the works of nature, as in those of art. How, then, can we distinguish artificial from natural things? By the difference in their physical appearance. True, "the lenses, and all the nice telescopic machinery of the eye," do not prove that man made that; nay, they disprove it. And wherefore? Not "because we never saw or knew a man make an eye," (for we never saw or knew a man embalm a mummy,) but merely because it is a work superior to man's, and therefore proves a superior workman.

There were several sentences in my opponent's last letter, which it may be well to place alongside of one another, for the purpose of prominently exhibiting their incongruities. For example:

In the foregoing examples, are several contradictions and absurdities. First it is asserted, that design proves to us man's agency only in as far as we see or know it. That is, we must first see or know a thing, and then convince ourselves thereof, by something which proves nothing about it. In the assertion placed in contrast with this, it is said, that "we know very well, that is, we have rational grounds for belief, that man embalms mummies." Here, our knowing a thing is represented merely as rational belief. This, however, is neither according to the

common acceptation of the term knowledge, nor according to fact. Knowledge is more than rational belief: it is consciousness or experience. Let us, however, keep the other explanation in view, and see how it chimes with the rest; which explanation is, that knowledge is rational belief. Now read:-“An embalmed mummy is evidence to us of human agency, because we have rational grounds of belief, that man embalms mummies;"-that is to say, we believe that man embalms mummies, because we believe that man embalms mummies. This is no caricature. We are told that we rationally believe that man embalms mummies. Why? Because mummies are an evidence that man embalms them. But why? Because we rationally believe that man embalms them. Thus the belief is made the cause of the evidence, and the evidence the cause of the belief. Thus we believe because we believe.-Again, we are told that we must see or know, or have rational grounds for belief, in order to believe a thing. But seeing or knowing would exclude belief. Not to dwell on this, however, let us recall the definition of the term know, which, just back, was laid up for special use. That definition was-rational belief. So, then, we must have grounds for rational belief, or have grounds for rational belief, in order that we may have grounds for rational belief. We must believe, or we must believe, in order that we may believe. These are the legitimate consequences of my opponent's various statements and explanations. Nor do I present this view of the case for the purpose of ridicule, but that I may set forth its absurdities in the strongest possible light. If I advance absurd propositions, I wish to have them exposed in the same manner, that I may see and abandon them.

But he finds it amazingly difficult to believe in a God, because he has not a material form of flesh and blood, visible to the sight, sensible to the touch, with a local habitation," &c., &c. He does not once seem to consider, that, in urging this difficulty, he involves himself therein, as well as others. Pray, what material form has mind? How tall is thought? How thick volition? How wide recollection? How long perception? How heavy imagination? Or, to speak of the energies of nature-How large is magnetism? Of what colour is attraction ? Of what shape is repulsion? Where dwells the efficient cause of second causes-that unknown, blind, mysterious, all-pervading energy or power which sceptics themselves admit? "What material form of flesh and blood" has IT? Is it visible to the sight? sensible to the touch? located in a habitation ? Has it limbs with which it moves? momentum with which it acts? Can they take cognizance of it with their senses? Can they see how it exists? how it pervades the universe? how it operates without material organs? body? shape? colour? motion? Is it not invisible, impalpable, inaudible, imperceptible, immaterial?" They see only the effects of the power; but those effects are not the power

Has it

itself. They see matter; but matter is not the power. Still,
a power they admit, of a power they conceive, think, and
speak-yea, though they cannot explain it; though they cannot
comprehend it; though for it they have no prototype:
"in a
word, though it has not one of the attributes, conditions, quali-
ties, modifications, or phases, that constitute what men call
entity or existence." Here they waive all difficulties, and talk
of immateriality as fluently as the veriest believer on the foot-
stool. Men, if disposed, may cavil at any thing. They may,
as they have done, deny even their own existence. They may
raise objections in every case, and doubt their own senses,
because those objections cannot be obviated. But is this
reasonable? That's the question. What though we cannot
explain the divine existence ? Neither can sceptics explain the
universe without one. Our system involves one difficulty;
theirs, difficulties, nay, absurdities, without number.

"Admit a God, all other mysteries cease;
Deny him, all is mystery beside."

Admit a God, and we have at once an adequate cause for every
effect: deny him, and we have effects innumerable without any
cause. We have all the results of omnipotence, omniscience,
omnipresence, and infinite benevolence, without any power, any
wisdom, any presence, any benevolence. To say that a cause is
uncaused, is no contradiction; but to say that effects are un-
caused, is so. Inasmuch as something exists, something must
have eternally existed. And be that something what it may,
whether matter or God, it is not an effect, seeing its existence,
being eternal, is uncaused. But whatever has a beginning must
have a cause, and an efficient, adequate cause.
Mere power is
adequate to the production of physical effects, but not to the
production of intelligent effects. Nor could mere intelligence
produce effects. Intelligence and power must therefore com.
bine, to produce intelligent effects. Those who admit a power,
do indeed admit a cause, though an inadequate one, for the
intelligent effects every where observable. Were the universe
chaos, there would then be reason to admit a power only.
But the admission even of this would be the admission of a God
with one attribute; for, after all we hear of the power that
operates in the universe, the laws of nature, &c., &c., it signi-
fies nothing, without the admission of something besides nature
itself. Is nature the laws of nature? Is nature the powers of
nature? This would be a contradiction. Nature-that is,
matter-is not power. When the mighty avalanche reposes on
the towering summit of the Alps, it is powerless and harmless;
but when it makes the fearful launch, it spreads terror and
desolation. Yet even the avalanche is not the power that moves
itself. A mysterious, incomprehensible something else moves it.
Here then we have the sceptic's God. Yes, the sceptic's God-
a real existence, distinct from nature, but yet a God void of

knowledge and every thing else but power. To this we add intelligence, goodness, &c. This is God! This the uncreated, incomprehensible being in which we believe. And whether,

when the universe is taken into consideration, it is the more rational to believe in this God or the God of scepticism, judge thou. To me it appears far more reasonable, to suppose an intelligent cause for intelligent effects, than an unintelligent one. The one or the other we must suppose, if we reason at all.

I do most seriously object to one position in the reply to my last, viz., that we are to doubt what we can't unriddle. What! sir; an atom of earth, who can see but one small speck of one link of the mighty chain of all causes and effects," assuming to himself the wisdom to unriddle all realities! (Most assuredly he would not be understood to doubt realities; and therefore he can, according to his own rule, unriddle them.) Then, sir, unriddle that "mighty chain of causes and effects" of which so small part can be seen. Unriddle the sceptic's Energy or POWER. Unriddle thyself. Explain the energies of nature. Show us the main-spring of the wheels of the universe. Tell us the "why and the wherefore" of gravitation, of magnetism, of electricity, of cohesion, of attraction, of repulsion. "Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me Where wast thou when the foundations of the earth were laid? Declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? Hast thou commanded the morning since thy days, and caused the day spring to know his place? Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea? or hast thou walked in the search of the depth? Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades, or loose the bands of Orion? Canst thou bring forth Mazzaroth in his season? or canst thou guide Arcturus with his suns? Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven? Canst thou set the dominion thereof in the earth? Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts: or who hath given understanding to the heart? Gavest thou the goodly wings into the peacocks? or wings and feathers unto the ostrich? Doth the hawk fly by thy wisdom, and stretch her wings toward the south? Doth the eagle mount up at thy command, and make her nest on high? Hast thou an arm like God? or canst thou thunder with a voice like him? Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty instruct him? He that reproveth God, let him answer it."

But, sir, though we can unriddle but "a speck" of the universe, that speck we can unriddle. We are not omniscient, but we know a little. We have a little real knowledge. And what we do know, we could no more than know, were we omniscient. A child knows the alphabet as well as if he understood all literature. To comprehend infinity would be, to be

infinite ourselves. But to believe that there is an infinite being, is no more difficult than for one individual to believe that there is another superior to himself. Now, though we cannot see the whole universe, we can see the whole of some of its perfect parts. We can see a whole tree, a whole animal, a whole man; which are as evident proofs of the omipotence and omniscience of their author, as the universe would be, could we see it all.

We have seen that something must have been eternal. This, then, obviates all objections as to the eternity of God. But if eternal, he is uncreated, uncaused. And if uncaused, he has no cause, and is therefore not an effect. This then is the reason why I am satisfied to conceive a God without a maker, although I can conceive nothing else to be so. I could indeed conceive the universe to be so, were it an intelligent existence; for then could I see an adequate cause for its intelligent operations: that is, I could, under such circumstances, so conceive it to be, unless I knew it to have had a beginning. But I cannot conceive any thing to be without a maker that has a beginning.

I have said, that the design apparent in the universe is an evidence of a designer; and I have been told in reply, that if appearance of design is evidence of a designer in one case, it is evidence thereof in another, and therefore proves that God had a designer or maker. How so? What appearance of contrivance or design is there in God? In his mind, says the objector. How in his mind? Why, there is harmony, order, intelligence there. Yes, but it was not these qualities themselves, as existing in a being, but the manifestations thereof, as displayed in the organization, &c., of matter, which I made the proof of a designer. The argument consists in this: that, as mere matter is void of intelligence, it could exhibit no indications thereof, save in so far as made to exhibit the same by an intelligent being; and that, as the universe is mere matter, and does exhibit those indications, it must have had an intelligent author. The absurdity of which I spake, lay in making the mind of a being the manifestation of mind, and so an evidence of another designer. True, the human faculty of thinking has a designer; but the way by which we know this, is not that man exhibits evidence that he has such a faculty, but because that faculty has a beginning. But in his material organization, he exhibits those evidences of design which mere matter cannot of itself manifest, and which he himself has no agency in producing. Thus, man in his organization exhibits the mind of his creator; in his actions, his own; and in his own, his creator's;-and that for the sole reason, that it has a beginning, and therefore has an author.

In controversy,, it is always considered allowable, to press home upon an opponent any difficulties resulting from his own positions. Nor is it for that opponent to leave them unsettled. He is bound to abide by their consequences, and stand or fall with them, or make a recantation. It is by no means certain that keeping on the pivot between the two sides of a question,