connected with it;-but which we utterly deny are either essential to the doctrine, or in themselves capable of proof. But we will look at these objections a little more narrowly.

"This doctrine,' says Dr. F. makes God the author of sin.' But what is it to be the author of sin? Is it merely to be the creator of those free agents who do sin? Is it to institute those laws of providence or moral government, under which their sin takes place? Is it to resolve on their creation, and on going forward with that providence and government, in the knowledge that their sin will take place? To all these queries, Dr. F. must reply; No. For, all these unquestionable facts imply, that God confers on them in their creation the powers of free agency; and that He uses no influence in his providence or government, to procure their sin. Yet the doctrine in question, as we have already shown, involves necessarily, no other facts than these. But says Dr. F., some calvinistic divines expressly maintain, that God is the immediate and efficient author of the sinful volitions of his subjects. The number of such divines is extremely small; and we freely admit, that on them the charge falls in its full weight, of representing God to his kingdom as encouraging or procuring rebellion against his own laws, and directly preferring the existence of sin to its nonexistence in his kingdom. Yet the charge lies not against the great body of calvinists, nor against the doctrine which they maintain, of the purpose of God. But says Dr. F. the modern and moderate calvinists, in denying the efficient agency of God in introducing sin, escape not from the consequence, so long as they hold the doctrine itself, that God purposes whatsoever comes to pass. But in what sense are we to understand the position that he purposes the existence of sin ?* Not necessarily in the sense of His preferring its existence in his kingdom to its non-existence. Not, that he takes any measures with the free agents he creates, for the sake of securing their rebellion. Not, that he ordered any dispensation of providence in heaven, or gave out any precept, there, for the sake of drawing off Lucifer and his hosts into rebellion. Not, that he gave law to Adam, or placed him in circumstances of moral trial, for the sake of securing his disobedience; or instituted the parental relation of Adam to his race, in order that he might involve them with him in sin. In affirming the doctrine of predestination, we affirm no more, necessarily, than that God, with the knowledge that these beings would sin in despite of

*We speak here more especially of his subjects beginning to sin; for as to the continuance of sin in those subjects who by rebellion have once arrayed themselves against God and his law, there are special considerations on which we wish to enter elsewhere.

the best measures of providence and government he could take ; purposed to create them and pursue those measures, not for the sake of their sin, but for the good which he nevertheless saw it was possible to secure in his moral kingdom. This would be a purpose, with respect to the existence of sin; a purpose to permit its existence, rather than to have no moral system.

'But the doctrine,' says Dr. F. 'destroys free agency and accountability.' But what more is necessary to free agency, than that a being possess the powers of intelligence and choice? Suppose it is certainly known by God, that such a being in certain circumstances, will choose in a given manner; and suppose God determines to leave him to his choice under these circumstances: does it prove, that either the circumstances or the foreknowledge of God take away from him at all the power of choosing otherwise or the exercise of the power, at the time he wills or chooses? But according to the doctrine in question, says Dr. F., the will is "irresistably controlled," "under the influence of a secret invincible power,' the volition is "the result of God's propelling power." "He wills as he is made to will, he chooses as he must choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon him." Now all this is a radical error. Nothing more (touching freeagency) is implied in the purpose spoken of, than a CERTAINTY, foreseen of God, that if He creates and upholds that being, and pursues wise and good measures of providence, he (the being) will at a given time, freely choose in a given manner. The existence of such a certainty, Dr. F. will not deny. Where, then, is the difficulty (touching freeagency) of viewing such a certainty, as coinciding with the choice or purpose of God? Why will Dr. F. insist, that this certain ty changes its character, the moment it becomes thus coincident; and must now be founded on irresistible, and invincible propulsion? May not the purpose be simply, to give and continue existence to free agents, and to pursue the best measures for their welfare?

'But it is a strong objection,' Dr. F. contends, 'to the doctrine, that it arrays the secret purpose of God against his revealed word.' This is indeed a strong and unanswerable objection to that explanation of the doctrine, which implies, that God prefers the existence of sin, to its non-existence in his kingdom. But that explanation, we have already shown, is not necessary to establish the mere fact of a divine predetermination of all events. The doctrine, as we have already shown, involves necessarily, no more than this, that God gives and continues existence to a kingdom of free agents, and uses the best measures for their spiritual welfare. His word is the real expression to such beings of his will respecting their actions. In that word, his preference is sincerely and

strongly expressed, that they should act only in that holy manner, which is necessary to their happiness. Such a law, we agree with Dr. F., will not authorize us to suppose, that He can ever infringe on those laws of moral agency, through which alone they are capable of obeying his commands; or that He will adopt in his government any other measures, than those which are adapted to secure the greatest amount of obedience. But if the best measures taken for this end, will not entirely prevent all sin in his kingdom, then it cannot be prevented by his taking other, inferior measures. If any of his subjects will not co-operate with his revealed will or law, but are resolved to resist it; still He most obviously has no will opposed to his law, though with a foresight of their conduct, he should purpose to permit their sin rather than dispense with the existence of a moral kingdom. The very condition of their existence as free agents, to whom he delegates the power of voluntary action ;--puts it within their province to act in a holy manner, and beyond his province to compel such action by irresistible power. In deciding therefore to go forward with such a kingdom, (in foresight of all the actual results,) he lays before it a heart inflamed with one steady and intense will, respecting his holy law; a will that is pleased only when they comply with its benevolent demand, and that it is really offended and grieved when they refuse obedience. And this publication of his will to the intelligent and voluntary beings whom he creates, is one of those very measures which he adopts, as the best he can take, to prevent sin and promote holiness.

"But the system," it is said, "mars, if it does not destroy the moral attributes of God.' If God holds men responsible for what is unavoidable-if he makes laws and then impels men to break them, and finally punishes them for their transgressions-if be mourns over the evils of the world and expostulates with sinners, and still he himself impels the will of man' to all this wickedness-where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where is his justice?" We say, let those answer such questions, if they can, who insist, in their explanation of the divine purpose, that God is the sole efficient agent in the universe; or who pretend to think it a monstrous absurdity, that God should make the absolute donation to other beings, of the power of choice; or who maintain that God preferred the introduction of sin into our system, as the necessary means of the greatest good, when it might have been wholly excluded by His intervention. They who will place the doctrine of God's universal purpose on this ground, are well called upon by Dr. F. to show whether they can avoid the inferences which he urges upon them, viz. 1. That God was not actuated in the original

expression of his will with the desire to have all his subjects continue holy, or become so-which alone constitutes real veracity: 2. That in the punishment of the disobedient, he cannot be actuated by any real displeasure at them, for not avoiding sin, (since nothing but his efficient agency could make them avoid it,) or by any desire to prevent the farther extension of sin in his kingdom-which alone. constitutes real justice: 3. That in saving the redeemed, he was not actuated by the desire to reclaim them from an evil which it lay with them to avoid, or which he had been sincerely aiming to prevent-which alone constitutes real grace. Nor can they find any shelter in resorting to the vain conceit of God's pursuing an exhibitive system before his kingdom, for its welfare. For an exhibition must be, not a mere appearance and show, but the developement of a reality in order to be of any worth to his kingdom. And how can God exhibit veracity, justice, and mercy, but by speaking what is really true, and by performing acts of real justice and grace, towards those beings whose interests, (as individuals or a kingdom,) are consulted in those very deeds? But the objections now urged, lie not against the mere fact of a divine purpose, respecting the whole universe, but only the mode in which some have maintained this fact. For that fact can be fully maintained, on the ground, that the purpose was to confer on the beings composing his moral kingdom, the power of volition and choice, and to use the best influence God could use on the whole, to secure the holiness and prevent the sin of such beings; who themselves and not He, were to have immediate power over their volitions. Notwithstanding, therefore, His purpose has fixed the certainty of all the results as to his subjects, yet they are not forced results, which they have not the power to avoid, but consist simply in men's own voluntary sin or disobedience. And it is still true, that he, desires their obedience that he is displeased with sinners for opposing his authority, when they had power to obey-that he is grieved with their folly, in thus destroying themselves-that he punishes in order still to convince his kingdom, that his will is truly with his law, and against the extension of sin or rebellion—that he makes an astonishing sacrifice to render the forgiveness of transgressing men possible upon their repentance, and (without hindering the return of any,) uses all the influence he can, without sacrificing a greater good, to induce them to return and secure their own salvation. And what is this but the perfect benevolence of God, breathing forth His desires in tones of the deepest sincerity; wielding the sword of justice not for display, but for the protection of his kingdom; and meeting the rebellious with a grace, that abounds to the full limits of wisdom and prudence!

The remaining objection which Dr. F. urges, that the doctrine

puts a plea into the mouths of sinners to justify themselves in their sins, and leads to universalism and infidelity, it might be shown, in the same manner, lies not against the mere fact of a divine purpose, but against that a priori explanation of the fact, which brings for ward, as essential to it, that physical depravity, or that directly impulsive and efficient agency of God in volitions, which blots out the very idea of a moral agent, vested with the full power of choice, and able, (at the time of any given choice) to choose otherwise.*

It may be useful to turn our attention for a moment to the nature of the reaoning here alluded to. The universalist does not (if we rightly judge.) derive his doctrine in the first place from the oracles of God, but rather from the attributes of God; and then labors to interpret the scriptures in accordance with his doctrine. The argument on which he relies as the real basis of his faith is the following. God, as infinitely benevolent, must be disposed to prevent sin with all its evils. God as omnipotent, can prevent sin in all his moral creatures; God therefore will hereafter prevent all sin; and thus render all his creatures happy forever.

The infidel reasons exactly in the same manner, and comes to the same conclusion. But, then, he has discernment enough to see that the scriptures contain the doctrine of future endless punishment. He, therefore, discards the divine origin of the book, as inculeating a doctrine so obviously false, and inconsistent with the perfections of God

As a specimen of atheistical reasoning on this subject, a friend has put into our hands a card engraved in an attractive style, and said to have been printed in New-York, and extensively circulated, by a club of atheists in that city. It contains the following words, · God either wills that evil should exist, or he does not. If he wills the existence of evil, where is his GOODNESS? If evil exists against his will, how can he be ALL-POWERFUL? And if God is both good and omnipotent, where is eril? Who can answer this?"

Now it is manifest, that these several conclusions of the universalist, the infidel and the atheist, are all derived from substantially the same premises. If the premises are admitted to be true, the conclusion follows with all the force of absolute demonstration. The premises are briefly, that the permanent existence of evil is inconsistent with the goodness and the power of God. Hence the atheist infers, in view of existing evil and the want of evidence that it will ever end, that there is no omnipotent, benevolent being-there is no God. The universalist and the infidel maintain the eternal existence of evil to be inconsistent with the perfections of God, and hence infer, that ultimately all evil will be excluded from the system; the one explaining away the plainest declarations of the bible, and the other denying the divine origin of the book.

Here then the advocate of truth is bound to show, that there is a fallacy in these premises. Where then does the fallacy lie? The premises rest on two attributes of God, his power and his benevolence. As to his power, the argument assumes, that God can, by his omnipotence, exclude sin, and its consequent suffering, from a moral system. Those who admit this assumption, have therefore no plea left for the divine benevolence, except to assert, that "sin is the neessary means of the greatest good;" and that for this reason, it is introduced into our system, and will always be continued there, by a being of infinite benevolence. But can this be proved? Is this supposition consistent with the sincerity of God as a lawgiver, the excellence of his law, the known nature and tendency of sin and holiness, and the unqualified declarations of the divine word, that sin is the abominable thing which his soul hateth," that he would have all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth," &c. Can this be consistent with his actually preferring the existence of all the sin in the system to holiness in its stead? For ourselves, we must say, that we regard the success of any attempt to make men believe this, as utterly and forever hopeless. Our confident