I Do not mean to say, that the doctrines of the philofophers, particularly of Socrates, and the better fort of Stoics, did no good. What Socrates taught, or rather conjectured, concerning the immortality of the foul; and what both he and the Stoics delivered, though not always clearly or confiftently, with refpect to the divine existence, providence, omniprefence, and omnipotence, was, no doubt, of ufe in diffipating fome of those clouds of fuperftition and error which then overshadowed the nations. But, as a fyftem of natural religion and moral duty, all ancient philosophy was very incomplete, as Socrates well knew; nor was it accompanied with evidence or authority fufficient to raise the attention, or convince the underftanding of any, except perhaps of a few fpeculative men and even they were inclined, as Lactantius, Cicero, and Ariftotle teftify, to make it a fubject of declamation and dispute, and a mere tongue-exercise, rather than a rule of life. Indeed, if we believe Laertius, who though neither an elegant nor a judicious writer, yet deferved praise as a collector of anecdotes; nay, if we believe Cicero, to whofe judgment more refpect is due; we must alfo believe, that the greater part of thofe, whom aniquity honoured with the name of philofophers, were men of loofe principles and bad morals. Many of them difgraced human reason by their profligate tenets and fophiftical wrangling; and fome of them, by their impudence, buffoonery, and beastliness, were a difgrace to human na ture. BUT, even from the beft of them, what was to be expected in behalf of the common people, that is, of mankind? Socrates was the most popular, and, in all respects, the leaft exceptionable teacher of heathen morality. He taught, that is, converfed in public as well as in private; and all who chose it were permitted to attend him. But he never fet himself up as a general reformer, nor did he pretend to more wifdom than other men. And, as the charms of his conversation drew the chief men of Athens around him, we may prefume, that the common people, probably not very curious to know what he faid, would keep at a distance. Befides, his peculiar way of reasoning, by question and answer, though as fair and fatisfactory as can be, is better fuited to the purpose of inftructing a fmall circle of friends converfing familiarly and at leasure, than of conveying knowledge to the common people. ABOUT the common people the Stoics gave themselves no trouble, but feem to have confider ed them as little better than beafts *. Some of their paradoxes would appear, from their extreme abfurdity, to have been contrived on purpose to exclude the herd of mankind from the fublime myfteries of that philofophy. And many of their tenets they wrapt up in ftrange language (for they were very licentious in the ufe of words); and they fo perplexed the human intellect by frivolous difputation, that their teaching could not be generally useful; nay, even to thofe men of learning who had made it their ftudy, it must have been in many particulars unintelligible. Cicero, indeed, in his book of moral duties, explained the practical part of their moral philofophy, in a clear and elegant ftyle; and, by fo doing, enriched his native tongue with the beft fyftem of Pagan morality extant. Yet ftill it is an imperfect fyftem; and for a great part of it he was indebted, not to the Stoics, whom, though he followed, he did not follow as a tranflator, but to Plato, Ariftotle, and his own good fenfe. THOUGH the Stoics had been better qualified than they were for the office of public teachers, the people would not have greatly profited by what they taught.—That external things are nei * See Mrs. Carter's learned and elegant Introduction to the Tranflation of Arrian's Epictetus. ther good nor evil; and that to be ftretched on a rack, or to repose on a bed of rofes, are, to a wise man, matters of equal and abfolute indifference; is a tenet which the generality of mankind could hardly believe, and which if they did believe it, was more likely to do them harm than good. For from this principle it would require no profound skill in logic (and the Stoics were deep logicians) to infer, that by robbing a wife man of his money, cutting off his leg or arm, ftealing his child, or murdering his friend, they only took that from him on which he fet no value. That men ought to be refigned to the divine will, but that, when any thing vexed them, they had an undoubted right to make away with themselves, after the example of Zeno, who in a pet hanged himself, because he had hurt his finger*; would, to a man of plain sense, appear neither very confiftent doctrine, nor very beneficial.--That the Deity is fuperior to fate, and that fate is fuperior to the Deity, is not more confiftent; and that the world is God, or at least his body or substance, is an aphorifm that throws no great light on the first principles of theology.-That the foul is immortal, is affirmed by Seneca ; who also affirms that death is nothing, and reduces every thing * Diogenes Laertius. to nothing, and that the tranquillity of the dead is the fame with that of those who are not born *. --That at death we return to the elements whence we came, and lose all personal existence; that there is no future punishment or reward, and that it is no matter whether there be any or not; are doctrines of the fame fchool, alike unfriendly to happiness and to virtue.-That pity is unworthy of a wife man, is a ftrange leffon to inculcate on beings fo frail as we are, who ftand fo much in need of the compaffion and kindness of one another: yet this was taught by the followers of Zeno.-And that human fouls are part of the divine effence, and that a man may become equal, and in some respects superior, to the Deity:-Is this audacious and impious tenet likely to have any other effect than to cherish pride and prefumption fo extravagant, as to harden the heart against every amiable affection, and make the understanding equally impatient to hear, and incapable to receive, the dictates of true wisdom? In fact, notwithstanding the morals of fome of them, which I am not anxious to find fault with, and the beauty of many of their fentiments, which I readily acknowledge, I am in doubt, whether * De Confolat, ad Marc. cap. 19. |