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chaser of real estate. Ryan v. Walker, 169 P., 417.

Under Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 6, requiring real estate employment contracts to be in writing, there is no distinction between a middleman and an agent, as applied to real estate brokers. -Id.

14(6) (Wash.) Stockholder withdrawing from association can take only his pro rata share of its assets.--Huber v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 169 P. 979.

14(8) (Wash.) Stockholder withdrawing from association cannot by exercising his right escape his just proportion of loss incurred by association previous to withdrawal.-Huber v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 169 P. 979. BULK SALES.

43(3) (Wash.) Under Rem. Code 1915, § 5289, contract agreeing to pay broker's commission for furnishing buyer or party who would exchange for "my stock ranch located in sections 9, 17, and 21," etc., was unenforceable for want of sufficient land description.-Rogers See Fraudulent Conveyances, 172, 225, 229. v. Lippy, 169 P. 858.

* *

BURDEN OF PROOF.

43(3) (Wash.) Under Rem. Code 1915, § 5289, agreement to pay commission for ex- See Criminal Law, 331. change of "my 667-acre hay ranch located near Cataldo, Idaho," was unenforceable for want of sufficient land description.Nance v. Valentine, 169 P. 862.

Agreement to pay commission provided "exchange is made" could not be construed as unconditional promise to pay for services rendered so that it could be enforced regardless of insufficiency of description of realty under Rem. Code 1915, § 5289.-Id.

49(2) (Cal.App.) Plaintiff held not entitled to compensation as broker on account of sale made by owners to one who through plaintiff's efforts entered into option contract for purchase of mine; option never being exercised.-Woolley v. Batchelder, 169 P. 408.

BURGLARY.

See Indictment and Information, 122.
BUSINESS.

9.

See Libel and Slander,
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See Fraudulent Conveyances, 298, 301;
Mines and Minerals, 58; Public Lands,
121; Quieting Title; Reformation of In
struments; Taxation, 900.

II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF.

56 (3) (Cal.App.) Where a real estate bro-43 (Cal.App.) In suit to cancel deed reservker introduces the purchaser to the owner, he has done all that the law requires of him to entitle him to his commission, though the owner subsequently sells the property, or a part thereof, at a reduced price.-Ryan v. Walker, 169 P.

417.

V. ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION.

ing possession in grantor for life, where complaint alleged that plaintiff executed the deed, and no issue was tendered of grantor's inten tion that the deed should not take effect until his death, it could not be found that the deed was void as an ineffective testamentary disposition.-White v. Hendley, 169 P. 710.

79 (Wash.) Plaintiff who was to have share of profits from theater for procuring owner of lots to build theater and lease it to defendants, See Shipping. held entitled to sue at law, and not limited to a suit for an accounting.-Griffiths v. Von Herberg, 169 P. 587.

84(1) (Cal.App.) For broker to recover commissions on a sale of land, it must appear that he was duly authorized by instrument in writing to act as agent of owners of property, and that he either accomplished such sale under the agency, or procured purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy on terms stated.-Woolley v. Batchelder, 169 P. 408.

VI. RIGHTS, POWERS, AND LIABILI-
TIES AS TO THIRD PERSONS.

94 (Colo.) Where defendant authorized broker to sell, he could not bind defendant, to sell in the absence of specific authorization in writing. Stark v. Rogers, 169 P. 146.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIA

TIONS.

2 (Wash.) Rights of stockholder withdraw ing from building and loan association are after its enactment governed by Laws 1913, p. 326 (Rem. Code 1915, § 3601-1 et seq.), saving clause with respect to the act of 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 216), found in section 26 of the act relating only to existing obligations and contracts of any association.--Huber v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 169 P. 979.

See Rape.

CARGO.

CARNAL KNOWLEDGE.

CARRIERS.

See Constitutional Law, 297; Livery Stable
and Garage Keepers, 11; Railroads,
282.

I. CONTROL AND REGULATION OF
COMMON CARRIERS.

(A) In General.

(Cal.) Where pipe line company made no irrevocable dedication of property to public use, in order to make it subject to the regulation of Const. art. 12, § 23, and St. 1913, p. 657, regulating carriage of oil by pipe line or otherwise, it must be shown that it voluntarily devoted facilities to the indiscriminate use of the public for hire, so as to become common carrier.-Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 169 P. 62.

and section 23, declaring every association or 2 (Cal.) St. 1913, p. 657, § 1, subsec. "d" corporation using, operating, owning, managing, or controlling any oil pipe line a common carrier, held invalid.-Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 169 P. 62. 19134 (Cal.) One who offers to carry goods for any person between certain termini, and who is bound to carry for all who tender their goods and the price of carriage, is a "common carrier."-Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 169 P. 62.

14(4) (Wash.) Requirement of Laws 1913, p. 326, that stockholder withdrawing from building and loan association shall give notice, being for benefit of association, is waived by its payment without objection.-Huber v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 169 P. 979.

Pipe line companies, owning oil fields, and transporting only oil products thereof, or purchased by them from other producers for the operation of their own business, not constitut

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

Carriers

628.

ing a monopoly of the transportation, are not, cago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McElreath, 169 P. common carriers of oil, within Const. art. 12, § 23, or St. 1913, p. 657, and need not file schedules of rates with the railroad commission.

-Id.

228(6) (Okl.) In action for injury to interstate shipment of live stock, evidence held insufficient to show shipper's compliance with contract requiring notice of claim within 90 days after injury as condition precedent to action.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McElreath, 169 P. 628.

5 (Cal.) A pipe line company engaged in transporting oil by means of pipe line held subject to Public Utilities Act, making order of Railroad Commission requiring it to show cause why it should not file rates and schedules war-230(8) (Kan.) In action for damages for deranted in view of St. 1913, p. 657, and Const. lay in transporting cattle, instruction as to carart. 12, § 23.-Producers' Transp. Co. v. Rail- rier's liability for failure to inform shipper of conditions which might occasion delay held aproad Commission of California, 169 P. 59. propriate.-Ott v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 169 P. 957.

That a pipe line company availed itself of right of eminent domain in condemning property for right of way must be deemed conclusive evidence of dedication of property for public use, in view of Code Civ. Proc. § 1238.-Id.

IV. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS. (A) Relation Between Carrier and Pas

senger.

As jurisdiction of Railroad Commission to make order as to petitioner filing schedules, etc., depended upon whether petitioner was com-244 (Wash.) Where, through permission of mon carrier transporting oil by its pipe line, division superintendent, a ticket was sold to commission had power to determine business in plaintiff from a station where passengers were which petitioner was engaged.-Id. not taken on, the relation of carrier and passenger was created.-Fenlon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 169 P. 863.

5 (Cal.) St. 1913, p. 657, regulating pipe line companies, or other instrumentalities, or persons transporting oil, petroleum, or its products, enacted in pursuance of Const. art. 12, § 23, authorizing the Legislature to regulate such or other business, applies only to persons agencies transporting oil or its products to or for the public.-Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 169 P. 62. 18(1) (Cal.) On writ to review proceedings of Railroad Commission requiring petitioner to show cause why commission should not make order requiring petitioner to file schedules of rates, held, objections based upon apprehension of results from further action by commission were immaterial.-Producers' Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 169 P.

59.

II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS.

(C) Performance of Contract of Trans

portation.

265 (Wash.) Where, through permission of division superintendent, a ticket was sold to plaintiff from a station where passengers were not taken on, the carrier was liable in tort for not stopping its train at that point.-Fenlon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 169 P. 863.

Although a carrier is under no duty to stop at a station, where special permission is gained and a ticket sold, but the train fails to stop, such failure is the proximate cause of damages occasioned by a passenger having to walk, although he would have had to walk if such special permission had not been given.-Id.

276(3) (Wash.) Evidence held to support a finding that a carrier knew that it was imperative that a passenger for whom a train did not stop should reach another station by such train or have to walk.-Fenlon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 169 P. 863.

(H) Limitation of Liability. 159(2) (Or.) Report of damages to shipment of tomatoes made by carrier's inspector and filed by consignee within 10 days after arrival, as required by bill of lading, held a sufficient notice of a claim for damages. United 277(5) (Wash.) As punitive damages are not Brokers' Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 169 P. 114. allowed, it is immaterial whether the failure of Stipulation as to notice of a claim for dama carrier to stop and take on a passenger be conage to goods while being transported by a com-sidered a tort or breach of contract, because mon carrier should be given a reasonable con- the damages are the same.-Fenlon v. Chicago, struction, and a substantial compliance therewith is all that is required, in view of the M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 169 P. 863. object of the requirement of notice.-Id.

(I) Connecting Carriers.

185 (1) (Or.) Where goods were delivered to initial carrier in good condition and by terminal carrier in damaged condition, there is a presumption, in absence of evidence as to place, that the damage was done on terminal carrier's line, and burden of proof is on it to show that it was not.-United Brokers' Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 169 P. 114.

278(1) (Wash.) Where train failed to stop, whether illness of husband was sufficiently imperative necessity to render it prudent for wife to reach another town by walking through a mountain pass through six feet of snow to get money to take him to hospital, was question for jury-Fenlon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 169 P. 863.

(D) Personal Injuries.

280 (2) (Mont.) Under statutes of Montana, burden is placed on carrier of passengers to use utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage. for-Garvin v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 169 P. 40.

III. CARRIAGE OF LIVE STOCK. 213 (Kan.) When cattle were tendered shipment, if carrier knew of conditions likely to 280(3) (Colo.) There was contract relation cause delay, and shipper did not, it should have between street railway and passenger, with reinformed shipper of such conditions to excuse sulting duty on railway to exercise highest dedelay which conditions occasioned.-Ott v. Atchi-gree of practicable care and skill to transport son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 169 P. 957.

218(10) (Kan.) Under contract requiring notice of loss or injury to live stock in transit, or at loading or unloading places, notice of loss after delivery was not necessary, as contract was concluded with delivery.-Ott v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 169 P. 957.

safely.-Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 169 P. 572.

283 (2) (Colo.) A railroad company whose physicians treated an injured passenger was not liable for their negligence or incompetence, unless it knew of their unfitness.-Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Ptolemy, 169 P. 541.

218(10) (Okl.) Provision in contract for in-292 (1) (Mont.) By statute it is duty of terstate shipment of live stock that as condition precedent to suit for damages shipper shall give written notice of claim to carrier's agent within 90 days after injury, and that failure to comply therewith shall bar recovery, is valid.-Chi

street railway to exercise utmost care for safety of passengers, whether in cleaning steps of car of ice and snow when it leaves barn, or whether in keeping steps free during day.-Garvin v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 169 P. 40.

CATTLE GUARDS.

295(1) (Colo.) It is common knowledge that competent motormen are negligent at times, and, fact that motorman was going at full head- See Railroads, 103. way does not show there could not have been sudden overfeeding of controller by him.-Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 169 P. 572.

See Action.

CAUSE OF ACTION.

CENSORS.

315(4) (Colo.) In action against street railway for injuries to passenger, where plaintiff See Evidence, 83; Theaters and Shows, pleaded negligence both generally and specifically, he established cause of action by proving either general or specific negligence.-Colorado

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CERTIFICATE.

Springs & Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 169 P. See Corporations, 99, 105.

572.

Where passenger, suing street railway for injuries, in one count alleged negligence generally,

CERTIORARI.

he could rely on maxim of res ipsa loquitur to See Justices of the Peace, 196. establish it.-Id.

Where passenger, suing street railway, in sep

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS.

arate count set forth cause of action by allega-4 (Idaho) Where plaintiff can obtain the retions of specific negligence, he could rely upon lief sought by mandamus to compel the performany pertinent evidence to establish the same. ance of an official duty, a writ of review will be -Id. denied. Kootenai County v. State Board of Equalization of State of Idaho, 169 P. 935.

316(8) (Colo.) That machinery of street car is complicated does not exclude application of res ipsa loquitur to case of passenger injured when controller of car exploded, causing him to jump.-Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 169 P. 572.

5(1) (Cal.App.) Under Code Civ. Proc. $ 1068, a writ does not lie when petitioner has a right of appeal from the order which he seeks to have reviewed.-Cline v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 169 P. 453. Street railway, sued for injuries by passenger.31 (Cal.App.) Certiorari to annul an order need not show cause of accident when controller of car exploded, causing passenger to jump, but could escape liability by showing accident occurred through no fault of its own.-Id.

320(13) (Colo.) Questions of inspection or lack of inspection of street car's controller, lightning arrester, and insulations thereof before accident to passenger held for jury.-Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 169 P. 572.

320 (13) (Mont.) In action against street railway for injuries to passenger who slipped on snow and ice on car step, case held for jury on issue of company's negligence in failing to remove snow and ice. Garvin v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 169 P. 40.

dissolving a preliminary injunction in suit to enjoin sale of capital stock for payment of assessment, after assessment had been voluntarily paid and litigation thereby settled, will be discharged.-James v. Superior Court of California in and for Butte County, 169 P. 398.

CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE. See Criminal Law, -90.

7(5) (Okl.) Grantor in deed champertous because in violation of Rev. Laws 1910, § 2260, has such interest in land as will enable him to maintain action to recover it for benefit of his grantee against those in adverse possession at making of deed and at time of action.-Harjo v. Owensby, 169 P. 875.

See Equity.

CHANCERY.

320(15) (Colo.) Where passenger is injured on cars by failure of railroad to discharge functions, or as result of failure in means of transportation, or by conduct of servants, presump tion of negligence arises against carrier, and if, on evidence, different minds might differ as to negligence, question of liability is for_jury. -Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. Co. v. See Venue, ☺—50, 72. Reese, 169 P. 572.

Motorman's competency and freedom from negligence could not be established by himself

CHANGE OF VENUE.

CHARACTER.

or witnesses called for purpose; what he did See Witnesses, 337.
or did not do could be accepted in evidence, and
jury only was competent to find truth there-
from.-Id.

CHARGE.

321 (8) (Mont.) In action against street To jury, see Trial, 185–296. railway for injuries from slipping on car step covered with snow and ice, instruction as to

CHARITABLE USES.

duty of railway to remove snow and ice, and See Common Law.
its nonliability if it did not have a reasonable
opportunity, held properly refused in absence
of certain limitations and conditions.-Garvin
v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 169 P. 40.

CHARITIES.

See Perpetuities.

(E) Contributory Negligence of Person I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND VA

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346(2) (Colo.) In action against street rail-3 (Colo.) Statute of 43 Elizabeth, c. 4, so way for injury to passenger when explosion of far as it defines and validates charitable uses, is car's controller caused him to jump, evidence in force in Colorado; but the details of the held to warrant jury's conclusion that his con- statute and the remedies therein provided are duct was not unreasonable.-Colorado Springs & not in force.-Haggin v. Internationa! Trust Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 169 P. 572. Co., 169 P. 138.

See Animals.

CATTLE.

14 (Colo.) Devise and bequest to executors for purpose of constructing ornamental gate or arch at city's Civic Center, with inscription as memorial to the testator and his wife, held a

valid charitable trust.-Haggin v. International, sessory liens, with right of sale, and despite Trust Co., 169 P. 138.

18 (Colo.) A devise to charity is not rendered invalid because trustees are not named, nor because a trustee incapable of taking it is named.-Haggin v. International Trust Co., 169

P. 138.

section 2897 giving liens priority according to time of creation, with certain exceptions, a possessory lien for automobile repairs is superior to previous chattel mortgage.-Mortgage Securities Co. of California v. Pfaffmann, 169 P. 1033.

Naming municipal corporation as trustee. under charitable trust repugnant to or inconsist- IV. RIGHTS ent with proper purposes of such corporation held not to invalidate the trust.-Id.

20(5) (Colo.) Municipal corporations may take and hold property in trust for charitable uses within the scope of their powers and duties.-Haggin v. International Trust Co., 169 P.

138.

21 (1) (Colo.) Devise and bequest for construction of gate or arch at Civic Center of City of Denver held not invalid for want of beneficiary, in view of Const. art. 20, § 1, and Denver Charter, § 102.-Haggin v. International Trust Co., 169 P. 138.

23 (Colo.) Trust for construction of gate or arch in city park held not invalidated by provision for selection of testator's friends to act in conjunction with the city officials in the construction of such gate or arch.-Haggin v. International Trust Co., 169 P. 138.

II. CONSTRUCTION, ADMINISTRA-
TION, AND ENFORCEMENT.

31 (Colo.) A bequest or devise to charity is to be given the most liberal construction, to the end that the wishes of the donor may be enforced.-Haggin v. International Trust Co., 169 P. 138.

AND LIABILITIES OF
PARTIES.

169 (Kan.) Where chattel mortgagee on default took possession of property with right to sell it outright, his conditional sale was a technical conversion, and he was liable to mortgagor for reasonable value at time of conversion. Montgomery County Nat. Bank v. Wherry, 169 P. 1146.

chattel mortgagee 176(4) (Kan.) Where took charge of property on default and made an ineffectual sale, price fixed in such sale was not necessarily the fair and reasonable basis to determine true value of property.-Montgomery County Nat. Bank v. Wherry, 169 P. 1146. VIII. PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE OF CONDITION, RELEASE, AND

SATISFACTION.

244 (Idaho) A waiver, either express, implied, or tacit, as to a portion of the security does not operate to waive the lien of a chattel mortgage upon the remainder of the property.— Seat v. Quarles, 169 P. 1167.

CHEAT.

See False Pretenses; Fraud.

CHECKS.

CHILDREN.

43 (Colo.) Courts have original, inherent jurisdiction over charitable gifts and trusts.Haggin v. International Trust Co., 169 P. 138. See Payment, 22.. 45(2) (Wash.) Incorporated hospital having no stock, organized to treat sick persons and authorized to perform gratuitous services, and also to exact fees from persons capable of paying, is liable, when a patient is injured by the negligence of a nurse, only for its own negligence, if any, in hiring the nurse.-Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 169 P. 828.

CHARTER.

See Evidence, 31.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

See Pledges.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Transfers of Chattels as Security.

See Adoption; Bastards; Guardian and Ward;
Infants; Negligence, 39; Parent and
Child.

CHOSE IN ACTION.

See Assignments.

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CLAIM AND DELIVERY.

32 (Kan.) Where machine is sold with guar- See Indians. anty to perform intended work and notes are given secured by chattel mortgage on machine and other property, breach of guaranty effects an extinguishment of chattel mortgage.-Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Willhite, 169 P. 549.

32 (Wash.) A chattel mortgage on logs, given a party furnishing the money with which to buy them, under an arrangement for financing the business indulged in for some time, was not void for want of consideration.-Otto v. England, 169 P. 964.

(B) Form and Contents of Instruments.

51 (Wash.) Chattel mortgage describing logs as in mortgagor's boom, though they did not reach the boom for 12 days thereafter, held good between the parties, and against the parties not acquiring rights before they reached the boom.-Otto v. England, 169 P. 964. III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA

TION,

(D) Lien and Priority.

See Replevin.

CLAIMS.

See Attachment, 296; Corporations, →→→ 566; Justices of the Peace, 135; States, 169, 182.

CLERKS OF COURTS.

66 (Cal.App.) Clerk of superior court is not invested with power to determine whether two petitions for probate of estate of decedent are identical.-Wolf v. Mulcrevy, 169 P. 259.

71 (Cal.App.) Sole right which petitioner for probate of estate of decedent has is to have petition filed in superior court, and, if clerk fails to file it properly, petitioner has remedy in superior court by application there to have paper filed, numbered, and indexed as it ought to be.-Wolf v. Mulcrevy, 169 P. 259. CLOUD ON TITLE.

138(1) (Cal.) Under Civ. Code, §§ 3051 and

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(Colo.) The principles of the common See Carriers, 185.

law as it existed prior to the fourth year of James I, so far as applicable, are in force in

CONSENT.

Colorado, and charitable uses are to be en- See Insurance, 393; Rape, ~52.
forced in accordance therewith.-Haggin v. In-
ternational Trust Co., 169 P. 138.

COMMON SCHOOLS.

See Schools and School Districts, 81-140.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

See Husband and Wife, 267.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

See Negligence, 101.

COMPENSATION.

See Attorney and Client, 131-166; Brokers, 40-84; Eminent Domain, 148; Insurance, 84; Master and Servant, 77, 385, 388; Officers, 100; Sheriffs and Constables, 65, 76.

COMPETENCY.

See Evidence, 151, 539; Witnesses, 219.

CONSIDERATION.

See Chattel Mortgages, 32; Contracts, 51-75, 112-138; Deeds, 17; Fraudulent Conveyances, 87, 277; Guaranty, 16. CONSPIRACY.

I. CIVIL LIABILITY.

(B) Actions.

19 (Or.) A conspiracy may be inferred from circumstances.-State v. Hyde, 169 P. 757. II. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

(A) Offenses.

41 (Okl.Cr.App.) The least degree of collusion makes the act of one conspirator the act of all, and each conspirator liable for the act of each other conspirator done in pursuance of the conspiracy.-Blanck v. State, 169 P. 1130.

(B) Prosecution and Punishment. 37-47 (Okl.Cr.App.) Evidence in prosecution for false pretenses held to support the theory of

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