a conspiracy between defendant and another to unlawfully secure the signature of a third party to a check.-Blanck v. State, 169 P. 1130. CONSTABLES. See Sheriffs and Constables. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. to public safety, comfort, and health.-People v. V. PERSONAL CIVIL AND POLITI- 83(1) (Or.) Municipal ordinance held invalid as invasion of personal liberty in depriving workmen of their right to strike en masse, though it might be valid as regarding picketing. For validity of statutes relating to particular-Hall v. Johnson, 169 P. 515. Special or local laws, see Statutes, 76, 77. II. CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, VII. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. (C) Contracts of Individuals and Private Corporations. 154(3) (Cal.App.) Fraternal Act 1911, limiting the class who may be beneficiaries under insurance policies, does not violate the Constitution, prohibiting laws impairing the obligation of contracts, though it regulates future designations of beneficiaries under certificates previously issued.-Machado v. Ellison, 169 P. 917. XI. DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 19 (Mont.) It is a general rule that contemporaneous construction by the department of government specially delegated to carry out a provision of the Constitution raises a strong presumption that such construction, if uniform and long acquiesced in, rightly interprets the provision; and, while such instruction is not conclusive upon the courts, it is entitled to the most respectful consideration.-Wells Fargo & Co. v. Harrington, 169 P. 463; American Ex-out due process of law in violation of Const. U. press Co. v. Same, Id. 466. 278(1) (Cal.) Forfeiture of lodge property of a subordinate lodge by act of Supreme Lodge without notice, charges, hearing, or finding of guilt would be a deprivation of property withS. Amend. 14.-Supreme Lodge of the World. de-Loyal Order of Moose, v. Los Angeles Lodge, No. 386, Loyal Order of Moose, 169 P. 1040. 26 (Utah) Power of the Legislature to termine what shall be public policy is limited by state Constitution.-Tribune Reporter Printing Co. v. Homer, 169 P. 170. 27 (Utah) Power of the Legislature to determine what shall be public policy is limited by federal Constitution.-Tribune Reporter Printing Co. v. Homer, 169 P. 170. 283 (Cal.) St. 1911, p. 1290, as amended by St. 1911 (Ex. Sess.) p. 92, authorizing the people of several municipalities of a county to form a municipal water district, whose directors may tax for its purposes, does not take property without due process, because an insition.-Henshaw v. Foster, 169 P. 82. habitant has no opportunity, except by his vote on election for formation, to declare his oppofa-290(3) (Cal.) Due process of law does not require that landowners be accorded hearing on question of inclusion of their land within the flood protection district when the Legislature has determined the benefit.-Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 169 P. 1028. ture to enact St. 1915, p. 1502, creating Los III. DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERN- (A) Legislative Powers and Delegation 52 (Colo.) The right to punish as for contempt may be taken from the court by constitutional provisions. Marians v. People, 169 P. 155. 63(1) (Cal.) St. 1911, p. 1290, as amended by St. 1911 (Ex. Sess.) p. 92, delegating to board of directors of a water district which the people of several municipalities of a couaty may organize, power to tax for its purposes, does not contravene Const. art. 11, § 13, prohibiting the Legislature from delegating power to control their affairs.-Henshaw v. Foster, 169 P. 82. (B) Judicial Powers and Functions. 68 (1) (Cal.) Fixing district to bear expense of local improvement and the mode of distribution of expenses are, primarily, legislative questions with which the court will not ordinarily interfere.-Los Angeles Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 169 P. 1028. 70(1) (Utah) To construe meaning of language of statute is judicial function; to add words to those used by lawmaking body is legislative function.--Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 169 P. 954. IV. POLICE POWER IN GENERAL. 81 (Cal.App.) Fourteenth Amendment does not curtail the police power of the state, and all owners hold their property subject co such police power and to such reasonable conditions as 297 (Cal.) St. 1913, p. 657, § 1, subsec. "d," and section 2, declaring every association or corporation using, operating, owning, managing, or controlling any oil pipe line a common carrier, is void as denial of due process of law. Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 169 P. 62. 306 (Cal.App.) The abatement law, declaring property used for purposes of prostitution to be a nuisance, and providing for abatement by injunction after process and opportunity to be heard, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.-People v. Casa Co., 169 P. 454. 309(1) (N.M.) Code 1915, §§ 5739-5743, providing for condemnation of right of way for acequia purposes, are unconstitutional, because not providing for notice to owner of meeting of appraisers to fix damages, or opportunity to be heard thereon.-Janes v. West Puerto de Luna Community Ditch, 169 P. 309. 309 (3) (Kan.) Service on duly licensed general agent of foreign insurance company construed as sufficient to give court jurisdiction does not violate Const. U. S. Amend. § 14, by depriving it of property without due process of law.-Snelling v. National Travelers' Benefit Ass'n, 169 P. 1144. CONSTRUCTION. See Charities, 31-45; Constitutional Law, 19-48; Contracts, 164-187; Evidence, 448-461, 471; Indemnity; Insurance, 146-165: Libel and Slander, 19; Master and Servant, 348; Mines and Minerals, 54; Mortgages, 100-186; Sales, 68; Statutes, 181-263; Stipulations, 14; Taxation, 773; Trial, 295; Vendor and Purchaser, 57; Wills, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS. See Trusts, 110. CONTEMPT. I. ACTS OR CONDUCT CONSTITUT- lease; Sales: Schools and School Districts, 81, 86; Set-Off and Counterclaim, 28; Specific Performance; States, 108; Stipulations; Subrogation; Trial, 191, 252; Usury, 69-109; Vendor and Purchaser, 17; Waters and Water Courses, 156. I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. 8 (Colo.) Under Const. art. 21, § 1, pro- (A) Nature and Essentials in General. viding for recall from office, and requiring the petition for recall to contain a general state-10(1) (Wash.) Agreement whereby ment of the grounds upon which it is sought, fendant promised, in case he ever purchased one seeking the recall of a judge is privileged, certain timber, to purchase through plaintiff, and is not guilty of contempt in stating the facts held not binding when supported by no considerupon which the recall is sought.-Marians v.ation, but the mutual promises because plaintiff People, 169 P. 155. did not bind himself.-Brown v. Brew, 169 P. 992. A statement of grounds of recall of a judge, though intemperate and ill-advised held not to show contempt of court.-Id. 20 (Cal.) One who is ordered by a court to pay money to another, on pain of imprisonment if he fails, is entitled to a formal expression by the court of such order.-McCaleb v. McCaleb, 169 P. 1023. 12 (Cal.App.) Where a case was called five years after defendant had filed his answer, refusal of continuance held not abuse of discretion on a mere showing that defendant's attorney was ill.-Mazitelli v. Crane, 169 P. 721. 12 (Kan.) Evidence held to justify court's decision that the defendant's sickness, made the ground of an application for a continuance, was only feigned, and that the application was merely to hinder the administration of justice.-Ladd v. Flato, 169 P. 958. 22 (Kan.) There was no abuse of discretion in refusing application of a corporation defendant for a continuance to procure attendance of its president, who had absented himself with knowledge that case had been set for trial. Garner v. Dodge City Wholesale Grocery Co., 169 P. 219. CONTINUING OFFENSES. See Intoxicating Liquors, 143. CONTRACTORS' BONDS. See Counties, 123. CONTRACTS. (D) Consideration. de 51 (Wash.) Release of deposit made as guarantee of performance of contract which was thereupon canceled held not a sufficient consideration for a new promise by defendant because cancellation of first contract was to the benefit of plaintiff, and not of defendant.-Brown v. Brew, 169 P. 992. 57 (Wash.) Mutual promises are a sufficient consideration, but to be binding they must be mutual, concurrent, and obligatory upon both parties, and both parties must be bound at the same time.-Brown v. Brew, 169 P. 992. as 75(1) (Okl.) Where partnership acted manager for insurance company, a partner's payment of a shortage due it, incurred through fault of another partner, was not a consideration within Rev. Laws 1910, § 926, to support company's agreement to modify an existing written contract.-Bowers v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 169 P. 633. (E) Validity of Assent. 93(1) (Idaho) Party will not be relieved from terms of written contract on ground of mistake due to his negligence, when he might have stipulated in agreement so as to have protected him fully.-Jensen v. McConnell Bros., 169 P. 292. (F) Legality of Object and of Consideration. 112 (Or.) Where, pursuant to agreement that plaintiff, a married man should divorce his wife and marry defendant, plaintiff advanced money and performed services for defendant, transaction was illegal, parties indulging in immorality, so notes given by defendant to reimburse plaintiff, defendant refusing to con summate agreement, are tainted with illegality. -Olson v. Saxton, 169 P. 119. 131 (Mont.) Where one paid money quarterly to a city for the privilege of keeping a pop corn wagon on a street corner in violation of an ordinance, solely as immunity from arrest, he was in pari delicto, and cannot recover such money from the city.-Brush v. City of Helena, 169 P. 285. 138(3) (Mont.) Where one paid money to a city as immunity from arrest, he was in pari delicto, and cannot recover such money from the city.-Brush v. City of Helena, 169 P. 285. II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA TION. See Account Stated; Alteration of Instruments; Assignments; Bailment; Bills and Notes; Breach of Marriage Promise; Brokers, 40; Cancellation of Instruments; Carriers, 159, 218; Champerty and Maintenance; Chattel Mortgages; Constitutional Law, 154; Counties, 123; Covenants; Customs (A) General Rules of Construction. and Usages; Deeds; Estoppel, 78; Evidence, 385-461; Exchange of Property; 164 (Cal.) Two instruments simultaneously Frauds, Statute of; Guaranty; Highways, executed held to constitute one contract not 113; Indemnity; Insurance; Interest; wanting in mutuality, in view of Civ. Code, §§ Joint Adventures; Landlord and Tenant, 1642, 1647.-Frost v. Alward, 169 P. 379. 331; Mechanics' Liens; Mortgages: Munici-164 (Wash.) Description of property to be pal Corporations, 331-347; Novation; exchanged under commission contract could not Partnership; Payment; Pleading, 180, be aided by resorting to contract to which com433; Principal and Agent, 103; Principal mission contract did not refer.-Nance v. Valenand Surety; Reformation of Instruments; Re- tine, 169 P. 862. CONVERSION. 176(1) (Kan.) Where contract is not ambiguous and there is no charge of fraud, accident, or mistake, its construction as matter of See Trover and Conversion. law is for court.-Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 169 P. 219. (B) Parties. 187(1) (Okl.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 895, contract made expressly for benefit of third person may be enforced by him at any time before party thereto rescinds it.-Smith v. Jos. W. Moon Buggy Co., 169 P. 875. IV. RESCISSION AND ABANDON- 253 (Colo.) One party to an executory contract cannot rescind, in the absence of fraud or a special reason, but an agreement, mutual, with the knowledge and understanding of all the necessary parties to the original contract, is necessary.-Adams v. Guiraud, 169 P. 580. 274 (Colo.) An instruction "that when persons enter into a contract and one of the parties decides to rescind it and so informs the other, then the other party is no longer bound to carry out any part of the contract; the law does not require a useless act," is a clear misstatement of the law.-Adams v. Guiraud, 169 P. 580. V. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH. 285(2) (Colo.) Building contract authorizing architect to construe drawings and specifications held to empower him to decide which should govern in case of conflict.-Stewart v. Breckenridge, 169 P. 543. 296 (Colo.) Deviations and omissions not due to bad faith, and not impairing structure as a whole, which can be conveniently remedied and paid for by deductions, held not to constitute noncompliance with building contract.Stewart v. Breckenridge, 169 P. 543. A building contractor's use of door locks as good as those specified in the contract, but not of the kind specified, does not constitute a failure to perform the contract.-Id. Use of different lumber in porch columns which architect thought was better, and which did not change appearance, held not to constitute a failure of performance.--Id. 305(1) (Colo.) That part of a building which has been approved by the owner or architect, expressly or by implication, is not open to objection by them afterwards to defeat a suit on a building contract.-Stewart v. Breckenridge, 169 P. 543. 309(1) (Kan.) Whenever subsequent impossibility of meeting conditions of a contract night readily have been foreseen by party ligated to perform, he will not be excused from performance on ground of impossibility. Carter v. Wilson, 169 P. 1139. CONVEYANCES. See Assignments for Benefit of Creditors; Chat- IV. CAPITAL, STOCK, AND DIVI- (B) Subscription to Stock. 76 (Cal.App.) Stock subscription held not binding on the subscriber, the condition exacted by him and indorsed on the back and signed by company's agent, not having been submitted to company and accepted by it.-Tidewater Southern Ry. Co. v. Merz, 169 P. 1054. 90(5), (Cal.App.) Corporation's complaint alleging defendant's refusal to pay a stock subscription, held insufficient for failing to allege that remedies given by Civ. Code, § 331 et seq., authorizing sale of stock, etc., have been exhausted.-Bell Development Co. v. Marshall, 169 P. 717. (C) Issue of Certificates. 99 (1) (Okl.) "Watered stock" or fictitiously ob-paid-up stock is stock which is issued as fully paid-up stock, when in fact the whole amount of its par value has not been paid; stock purporting to represent, but which does not in good faith represent, money paid into corporation's treasury, or money's worth actually contributed to its capital.-Lee v. Cameron, 169 P. 17. VI. ACTIONS FOR BREACH. building contract 327(1) (Wash.) Where provided that, if changes were made, and parties failed to agree on costs, the architect should determine it, but each could appeal to arbitrators, the architect fixed cost of changes, and contractor made them without appealing, owner's failure to arbitrate did not defeat his right to recover damages for failure to complete building.—Stocking v. Fouts, 169 P. 593. 348 (Colo.) The same degree of proof of an agreement to rescind an executory contract is required as in case of proof of the contract alleged to be rescinded; the burden being on the party alleging it.-Adams v. Guiraud, 169 P. 580. CONTRADICTION. See Witnesses, 379. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. Const. art. 9, § 39, prohibiting the issuance of watered or fictitiously paid-up corporate stock is violated by a corporation's sale of shares of stock for money, labor done or property actually received of less than the par value, and the stock so issued is void.-Id. 105 (Okl.) Stock certificates are void in the hands of all holders, if they were issued by corporation in violation of Const. art. 9, $ 39, for a consideration less than the par value thereof. Lee v. Cameron, 169 P. 17. (D) Transfer of Shares. 116 (Cal.App.) A contract whereby plaintiff agreed to sell and a corporation agreed to buy certain stock at a price named payable on a certain date was an executed contract, and where plaintiff tendered the stock, the corporation became instantly liable for the price, and when it failed to pay, it became liable for the 121(4) (Cal.) Complaint for rescission of creditors may not enforce stockholders' liabilsale of shares of stock held demurrable in ab-ity against pledgees or trustees. La Habra Oil sence of averment showing stock to be worth- Co. v. Francis, 169 P. 401. less or that sellers were able to, or had upon tender of stock before suit refused to, return purchase price in view of Civ. Code, § 1691, subd. 2.-Fairchild v. Western Securities Corp., 169 P. 363. 123(8) (Cal.) Under Civ. Code, § 2989, pledge of corporate stock carries with it a pledge of the dividends.-Savings Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Crowley, 169 P. 67. 123(10) (Cal.) A lawful pledgee of corporate stock could collect the dividends from the corporation, and apply them in satisfaction of the secured debt.-Savings Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Crowley, 169 P. 67. 130 (Cal.) An attachment upon corporate stock is merely a lien on the shares, and does not interfere with the right to transfer the title to the stock, and the corporate officers must issue a new certificate to an assignee or be liable to a penalty as provided by Civ. Code, § 324; attachment in such cases being regulated by Code Civ. Proc. § 542, subd. 4, and not by subdivision 5, and section 544 does not apply.-Ramage v. Gould, 169 P. 670. V. MEMBERS AND STOCKHOLDERS. (A) Rights and Liabilities as to Corporation. 175 (Cal.App.) A person holding corporate shares in his own name is personally liable for assessments, etc., although stock is actually held in trust for other persons.-Webster v. Bartlett Estate Co., 169 P. 702. 181(1) (Cal.App.) Stockholder has both common law and statutory right to inspect corporation's books.-Webster v. Bartlett Estate Co., 169 P. 702. Prior to 1917 amendment to Civ. Code, §§ 377, 378, authorizing inspection of corporate books, and under Const. art. 12, § 14, requiring corporate books to be open for inspection, etc., inspection could not be denied because stockholder intended to use information to corporation's injury.—Id. 181(3) (Cal.App.) The 1917 amendment to Civ. Code, §§ 377, 378, restricting inspection of corporate books to bona fide stockholders, is inapplicable to case arising before amendment.-Webster v. Bartlett Estate Co., 169 P. 702. A bona fide stockholder to be entitled to inspection of books need not have a beneficial interest in shares.-Id. The fact that shares are transferred in order to qualify person as director fails to show that holder is not a bona fide stockholder entitled to inspect books.-Id. VI. OFFICERS AND AGENTS. (A) Election or Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure. 282 (Cal.App.) Only corporate stockholders may be directors.-Webster v. Bartlett Estate Co., 169 P. 702. to (B) Authority and Functions. 300 (Cal.App.) Assignment of claim plaintiff for collection by president of corporate seller according to his custom held valid, although there had been no meeting of board of directors authorizing assignment by president. 169 P. 405. -Burrell v. Southern California Canning Co., (C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to Corporation and its Members. 320(5) (Utah) Where the directors were adthem to institute the suit would have been of no verse to bringing suit, and an application to avail, and the stockholders had been damaged by the acts upon which the suit was based, they could bring the action in their own names and in behalf of the corporation.-Anderson Grantsville North Willow Irr. Co., 169 P. 168. V. (B) Representation of Corporation by officers and Agents. 397 (Cal.) Authority of corporate agent need not be shown by resolution or express declaration of directors, but may be proved by circumstantial evidence.-E. Aigeltinger, Inc., v. Burke, 169 P. 373. 406(4) (Cal.) Where one has management of business of corporation with knowledge of members or directors, company will be bound by his contracts within apparent scope of business.-E. Aigeltinger, Inc., v. Burke, 169 P. 373. 408 (Utah) In view of Comp. Laws 1907, § 324, requiring the powers of a corporation to be exercised by the directors, where the directors refused to order president and secretary to transfer shares of stock, their transfer of such shares was illegal, although the stockholders had voted in favor of it.-Anderson v. Grantsville North Willow Irr. Co., 169 P. 168. 425(4) (Cal.) Corporation which suffers appearances to exist, and officers and agents to act so as to give one employed by them reason to believe he is employed by company, becomes Aigeltinger, Inc., v. Burke, 169 P. 373. liable as his employer to pay for services.-E. in-426(10) (Cal.) Corporation cannot knowingly accept benefits of contract made in its behalf or in which it is interested, and refuse to be bound by terms and conditions, as it ratifies agreement by acceptance of benefits.-E. Aigeltinger, Inc., v. Burke, 169 P. 373. Prior to amendment in 1917 to Civ. Code, §§ 377, 378, making corporate books subject to inspection by stockholders, authorized spection by person holding share in her own name, though share belonged to another and was transferred simply to qualify her as director.-Id. (B) Meetings. 201 (Cal.App.) One attacking the validity of a resolution of corporate directors as having been adopted at a special meeting of which sufficient notice was given has the burden of showing affirmatively insufficiency of such notice.-La Habra Oil Co. v. Francis, 169 P. 401. (D) Liability for Corporate Debts and Acts. VIII. INSOLVENCY AND RECEIVERS. in-542(1) (Or.) Conveyances by insolvent corporation of its property to another corporation without property, consideration of which fails, and unauthorized conveyances thereof by second corporation to first corporation's mortgagee, held properly annulled at suit of creditors of first corporation.-Brayton & Lawbaugh v. Monarch Lumber Co., 169 P. 528. 243(3) (Cal.App.) Holder of corporate stock as trustee for others, although names of those for whom he holds are known to corporation, is personally liable for assessments levied by corporation to pay corporate debts, notwithstanding Civ. Code, § 313, as to voting such stock, and section 322, under which corporation 542(1) (Or.) Sale of portion of heavily mortgaged property of a corporation to obtain funds for maintaining remaining portion held not fraudulent as against a judgment creditor. -Clarke Woodward Drug Co. v. Hot Lake Sanatorium Co., 169 P. 796. 542(4) (Or.) Leasing by a corporation of heavily mortgaged sanatorium property to another corporation in which a railroad was interested held not fraudulent as to a judgment creditor, especially since prior mortgage exceeded property's value.-Clarke Woodward Drug Co. v. Hot Lake Sanatorium Co., 169 P. 796. 548 (9) (Or.) Evidence in suit by nonsecured creditors of corporation to avoid its mort gage held to show the indebtedness represented thereby free from fraud.-Brayton & Lawbaugh v. Monarch Lumber Co., 169 P. 528. 566 (1) (Or.) Insolvent corporation's sets will be applied to secured debts and then to unsecured debts_pro_rata.-Clarke Woodward Drug Co. v. Hot Lake Sanatorium Co., 169 P. 796. 237 (Or.) Although judgment for costs was reversed, appellant was not entitled to costs in Supreme Court, where principal judgment was affirmed, in view of L. O. L. §§ 569, 570, 581.-School Dist. No. 30 of Clatsop County v. Alameda Const. Co., 169 P. 788. as-260(3) (Ariz.) On dismissal of appeal, which appellant has not prosecuted, as taken for delay, a sum not exceeding 10 per cent. of the amount of the judgment will be awarded as damages for a frivolous appeal.-Mounce v. Garrett, 169 P. 458. prop-260(4) (Cal.App.) Where defendant appellant asked reversal merely because of claimed preponderance of evidence in his favor, although the findings were substantially supported, the appeal was not in good faith, and damages, in addition to costs, will be awarded respondent.-Brannigan v. Miller, 169 P. 696. 566 (3) (Or.) Bondholders under mortgage of a corporation covering after-acquired erty who consented to sale of part of property upon condition that proceeds be used in maintaining remaining portion, etc., have lien on such proceeds, including unexpended balance, superior to judgment creditor's lien.-Clarke Woodward Drug Co. v. Hot Lake Sanatorium Co., 169 P. 796. 260 (4) (Cal.App.) Appeal from decree foreclosing mortgage held so frivolous that penalty would be imposed.-Dunn v. Barry, 169 P. 910. 263 (Cal.) Where an appeal is taken for delay, the appellant may be fined under Code Civ. Proc. § 957, and such fine added to the damages.-Laughlin v. Pacific Coast Motor Car Co., 169 P. 996. VIII. PAYMENT AND REMEDIES 277(1) (Cal.) Under common law, a court of general jurisdiction had power to stay proceedings upon a second action, where costs of prior action had not been paid, to prevent vexatious multiplicity of suits.-Weile v. Sturtevant, 169 P. 685. Superior courts of California have power to stay a retrial following reversal on appeal, where costs of appeal have not been paid, and where otherwise there would be oppression and hardship.-Id. COUNTERCLAIM. COUNTIES. IV. SECURITY FOR PAYMENT. 119 (Cal.App.) Under Code Civ. Proc. See Sales, 354; Set-Off and Counterclaim. 1054, court may extend time for the filing of bond for costs which may under section 1036 be required of nonresidents or foreign corporations, and, where bond is filed within time extended, case should not be dismissed.-Hertz v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 169 P. 258. 121 (Cal.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1036, relating to security for costs to be given by nonresident plaintiff, undertaking of surety company, not containing any express promise by it to pay such costs, held insufficient.-Carter v. Superior Court of Kern County, 169 P. 667. 124 (Cal.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1036, 1037, and in view of section 1056, surety company's undertaking to pay costs awarded against nonresident is sufficient, and its qualification need not appear on face thereof. Carter v. Superior Court of Kern County, 169 P. 667. 134 (Cal.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1036, 1037, trial court in its discretion may permit new security for costs against nonresident plaintiff to be filed after statutory time, and should do so where there is an original endeavor to comply by filing a defective undertaking.-Carter v. Superior Court of Kern County, 169 P. 667. 137 (Cal.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1036, 1037, relating to security for costs by nonresident plaintiff, failure to file such security See Injunction, 85; Mandamus, 74. 16(1) (N.M.) Under Laws 1917, c. 23, § 4. plaintiff county, mainly created from territory of defendant county, was entitled to delinquent tax on land in it, and defendant's treasurer was bound to pay it over, less state's share thereof. -Board of Com'rs of Lea County v. Board of Com'rs of Chaves County, 169 P. 306. Under Laws 1917, c. 23, creating plaintiff county, mainly from territory formerly within defendant county, it was the duty of treasurer of defendant county to collect delinquent taxes on property within plaintiff county.-Id. III. PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND LIABILITIES. (B) Contracts. 123 (Wash.) Actual knowledge by contractor with a county of furnishing of materials to subcontractor held not to take place of written notice required by Rem. Code 1915, § 1159-1, to authorize recovery against contractor or his bond.-Cascade Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Wright, 169 P. 833. Under Rem. Code 1915, § 1159-1, written |