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Civ. Proc. 37), for purposes of garnishment tal and corporate control of city, and not within action by lessee's creditors, interpleaders, in jurisdiction of Public Utilities Commission. claiming liens on property.-Hamilton-Collinson -Id. Hardware Co. v. Arkansas City Oil & Gas Co.,

169 P. 190.

GIFTS.

Where lessee of oil land abandoned digging See Charities; Taxation, 861-900. of wells and allowed lease to lapse, formal forfeiture by lessor after giving notice was not

I. INTER VIVOS.

necessary to his liability as garnishee in ac-49(4) (Utah) Evidence held insufficient to tions brought by lessee's creditors.-Id. show a parol gift of land.-Stephens v. Stephens, 169 P. 742.

V. LIEN OF GARNISHMENT AND
LIABILITY OF GARNISHEE.

105 (Or.) Garnishment does not create lien upon property of garnishee or money in its hands, but merely a contingent personal liability to respond to any judgment afterwards recovered. Murphy v. Bjelik, 169 P. 520.

Statements of sons while erecting a house on land owned by their mother, not in her presence, that they were building it so that she could collect the rent as long as she lived, was insufficient to show that the mother was only to have a life estate therein, or that the sons were intended to have an interest therein.-Id.

When plaintiff in an action in which a garnishee files an answer satisfactory to plaintiff secures a judgment, it does not create a lien See Contracts, upon any property of the garnishee.-Id.

112 (Wash.) General contractor having mon

ey to subcontractor's credit when writ of gar

1035.

GRAFT.

131; Municipal Corporations, GRAND JURY.

nishment was served, but subsequently required See Indictment and Information.

to satisfy liens to protect itself and the building, held not liable to plaintiff.-Puget Sound Machinery Depot v. Pearson, 169 P. 847.

VI. PROCEEDINGS TO SUPPORT OR

ENFORCE.

GRAND LARCENY.

See Larceny, 23.

GRANTS.

GUARANTY.

158 (Wash.) Contractor denying indebted- See Public Lands; Railroads, 72, 75. ness to subcontractor held entitled under its answer to show the facts concerning liens created by subcontractor and their payment in view of Rem. & Bal. Code, § 285.-Puget Sound Machinery Depot v. Pearson, 169 P. 847.

See Frauds, Statute of, 23, 33; Indemnity;
Principal and Surety.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.

162 (Wash.) Contractor paying liens after garnishment held to have burden of showing that liens were bona fide debts created by sub-16(2) (Cal.App.) Where a contract guarancontractor and that it was necessary to pay them to discharge the liens.-Puget Sound Machinery Depot v. Pearson, 169 P. 847.

teeing performance of another was made simultaneously therewith, no other consideration need exist, by specific provision of Civ. Code, § 2792. -Lewin v. Hanford, 169 P. 242.

180 (Or.) Under L. O. L. 8 295 et seq., money judgment against a garnishee is a nullity where he answers admitting an indebtedness II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION. and plaintiff is satisfied with the answer.-Mur-40 (Cal.App.) Where plaintiff and a corpophy v. Bjelik, 169 P. 520.

189 (Or.) Under L. O. L. §§ 233, 234, and 308, sale under execution of debt which has matured and is due from garnishee is not contemplated, and an order for such a sale would be a nullity.-Murphy v. Bjelik, 169 P. 520.

Under L. O. L. § 234, where garnishee has admitted indebtedness, demand for payment before levying on its property is jurisdictional, and a sale without such demand is a nullity.—ld.

IX. OPERATION AND EFFECT OF
GARNISHMENT, JUDGMENT,
OR PAYMENT.

235(2) (Okl.) Where intervener, claiming funds in possession of garnishce, withdraws his petition, garnishee need not serve notice of proceeding on claimant or interpose any defense in his behalf, and garnishee's payment of judgment is binding on such claimant.-Schenbeck v. First Nat. Bank, 169 P. 619.

GAS.

ration made and executed contract that plaintiff would sell and the corporation buy stock, and simultaneously defendants guaranteed performance that the corporation would buy, and agreed that, if it failed to do so, they would personally pay the agreed price, such contract did not violate Civ. Code, § 2809, limiting liability of guarantor to amount recoverable from principal.Lewin v. Hanford, 169 P. 242.

IV. REMEDIES OF CREDITORS.

78 (Cal.App.) Where defendants guaranteed purchase by corporation of stock from plaintiff, who tendered the stock, it was no defense, in action on the guaranty, that the stock was worth more than the agreed price, so that plaintiff suffered no damage.-Lewin v. Hanford, 169 P. 242.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

See Insane Persons, 39.

II. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION,
AND TENURE OF GUARDIAN.

(Kan.) Power to regulate lighting equip-13(3) (Cal.) Where after a separation the ment for city streets, when service is to be husband went to his wife's town and took their performed principally within city, is, by public children into his custody, and notified her of his utilities act (Gen. St. 1915, §§ 8329, 8361), re-act, notice to such wife was not necessary in served to city government, and is not vested a proceeding to have the husband appointed in Public Utilities Commission.-Welsbach guardian.-In re Morehouse, 169 P. 365. Street Lighting Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-15 (Wash.) Under Rem. Code 1915, §§ 1395, sion, 169 P. 205. 1449, 1632, 1633, giving of bond is condition precedent to right of guardian to act, and he cannot qualify without giving bond.-Vanhorn v. Nestoss, 169 P. 807.

Where at expiration of earlier contract new contract was made between public utility company and municipality, held, that matter which involved street lighting was within governmen- Guardian's failure to qualify by giving bond

is a jurisdictional defect, which makes sale of real estate in a proceeding where no bond has been given illegal and void.-Id.

father, in ignoring his natural rights.-Ex parte Turner, 169 P. 109.

Where father, on death of child's mother, and after statement of her sister, "Give the child IV. SALES AND CONVEYANCES UN- to me and I will raise it," said, "You shall have DER ORDER OF COURT. it," he could revoke such agreement.-Id.

76 (Wash.) Probate Code (Laws 1917, c. 156) 215, as to defects in guardian's sales, held not applicable to jurisdictional defects in sales prior to its taking effect, in view of sections 222 and 223, repealing Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1693.-Vanhorn v. Nestoss, 169 P. 807.

113(12) (Or.) On habeas corpus to determine right to custody of infant, review on appeal is de novo, despite L. O. L. § 669, providing for appeal in habeas corpus "in like manner and with like effect as in an action.”—Ex parte Turner, 169 P. 109.

HANDWRITING.

104 (Wash.) Failure of guardian to qualify by giving bond held not a defect, within the curative provisions of Rem. Code 1915, § 1693, See Evidence, 511. since, the bond being jurisdictional, the court had no jurisdiction of the estate.-Vanhorn v. Nestoss, 169 P. 807.

HARMLESS ERROR.

See Appeal and Error, 1028-1073; Criminal Law, 1169-1172; New Trial, 32.

105(2) (Wash.) Action to have sale in guardianship proceeding declared illegal and void, and establish plaintiff's title, and for accounting on ground that sale was void, because guardian gave no bond, held a proper attack on See Trial, 374. sale and confirmation.-Vanhorn v. Nestoss, 169 P. 807.

108 (Wash.) A purchaser of land at a sale in a guardianship proceeding was charged with notice of the guardian's failure to qualify by giving a bond.-Vanhorn v. Nestoss, 169 P. 807.

VIII. LIABILITIES ON GUARDIANSHIP BONDS.

182(1) (Okl.) District court has jurisdiction of action by ward against estate of his former guardian and the surety on guardian's bond, although guardian had not accounted to the county court prior to his death.-Morey v. Christian, 169 Þ. 887.

HABEAS CORPUS.

See Mandamus, ~31.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS OF
REMEDY.

(Wyo.) Province of habeas corpus proceedings is to inquire only into jurisdiction matters.-Ex parte Madson, 169 P. 336.

HEARING.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

See Criminal Law, 419, 420; Evidence, 317. HEIRS.

See Descent and Distribution.

HIGHWAYS.

See Jury, 14; Municipal Corporations, 294-519, 657-706; Public Lands, 64; Railroads, 75, 328–350; Street Railroads, 85.

I. ESTABLISHMENT, ALTERATION, AND DISCONTINUANCE. (A) Establishment by Prescription, User, or Recognition.

17 (Colo.) In suit to enjoip road overseer from removing fences belonging to plaintiffs for purpose of opening alleged public highways, evidence held insufficient to show that alleged highways were established by prescription. Korf v. Itten, 169 P. 148.

(B) Establishment by Statute or Statu

tory Proceedings.

3 (Cal.App.) Person in custody under magistrate's commitment will not be discharged on habeas corpus because case was not certified to juvenile court, as he might raise every ques-66 (Colo.) Where he is in possession landtion in the proceeding on the information filed owner is not obliged to bring direct action to against him.-Ex parte Northon, 169 P. 1051. set aside proceedings to establish highway rest on his possession.-Korf v. Itten, 169 P. over his land which were defective, but may

1 (Cal.App.) Where petitioner voluntarily submitted to imprisonment from which he seeks to be discharged for purpose of presenting in habeas corpus proceeding question of validity of order holding him to answer, petition will be dismissed.-Ex parte Bernson, 169 P. 916.

27 (Cal.App.) Under St. 1195, p. 1225, §§ 4d and 6, suggestion on preliminary hearing that defendant, was under 18, held not to deprive magistrate of jurisdiction so as to require discharge from custody under his commitment on habeas corpus.-Ex parte Northon, 169 P. 1051.

38 (Cal.App.) Under Pol. Code, § 2189, as amended by St. 1915, p. 568, as to release of insane person on recovery and section 2185c, as to release of persons committed for excessive use of drugs, held that, no specific remedy being provided for release of one committed for use of drugs when superintendent does not so recommend, writ of habeas corpus is open to such person.-Ex parte Goldie, 169 P. 925.

II. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF.

99 (1) (Or.) Evidence that father, on death of child's mother, and after statement of her sister, "Give the child to me and I will raise it." said. "You shall have it," does not

148.

68 (Colo.) Where lands claimed by defendant to be portion of county highway were under fence and plaintiffs were in possession ing existence of highway.-Korf v. Itten, 169 claiming title, defendant has burden of provP. 148.

established, burden is on the landowner denyWhere existence of county highway is once ing it to show abandonment.-Id. III. CONSTRUCTION, IMPROVEMENT, AND REPAIR.

113(2) (Wash.) It was not within the apparent scope of authority of right of way agent cure right of way for the highway to bind the or deputy prosecuting attorney authorized to secounty as to the character of the paving to be used.-Town of Tukwila v. King County, 169 P. S24.

Since under Rem. Code 1915, § 5879-7, all plans and specifications for proposed highways are subject to supervision of state highway commissioner, county commissioner could not bind county as to material to be used in paving highway.-Id.

113(3) (Wash.) Where county was divided into three road districts, any agreement by

of each other in respective districts, bartering away their discretion, was void as against public policy, and no one could acquire rights thereunder, so that agreement of single commissioner that brick paving would be used did not bind the county.-Town of Tukwila v. King County, 169 P. 824.

contract of purchase and a lease executed between seller and purchaser, not signed by or consented to by wife, were void.-Walz v. Keller, 169 P. 196.

Although homestead may be sold to pay obligations contracted for its purchase, purchaser and wife may defend their right as against Where county has power to condemn right of seller's action for rent and forcible detainer, way for highway under Rem. Code 1915, §§ based on contracts of lease void because not 5879-8, 5879-18, 5879-19, acceptance and re- consented to or signed by wife.-Id. tention of right of way did not ratify void96 (Okl.) No homestead right, under Const. agreement of single county commissioner that brick would be used for paving.-Id.

In order to constitute ratification, the act must be accompanied by a manifestation of intent to ratify or must be of such nature as to be utterly inconsistent with any other course of conduct.-Id.

115 (Wash.) Where single county commissioner made void agreement that highway should be paved with brick. and the other parties sought injunction to prevent paving with other material, which was denied, they were not entitled to damages for the use of the other material; there being no valid contractual duty. -Town of Tukwila v. King County, 169 P. 824. IV. TAXES, ASSESSMENTS, AND

WORK ON HIGHWAYS.

130 (Okl.) Rev. Laws 1910, § 433, relating to disposition of road taxes, applies to road taxes collected from residents of an incorporated city or town, and on account of property situated in town, levied for town purposes, but not to taxes levied by county authorities for county road funds.-Town of Comanche v. Ferguson, 169 P. 1075.

V. REGULATION AND USE FOR

TRAVEL.

(A) Obstructions and Encroachments. 155 (Cal.App.) One suffering special injury in the use of his property from obstruction of a highway may maintain an action to enjoin the public nuisance.-Sherwood v. Ahart, 169 P. 240.

160(2) (Cal.App.) The wife of one obstructing a highway need not be joined in action to enjoin the obstruction, merely because she is a co-owner with him of the adjoining premises. Sherwood v. Ahart, 169 P. 240.

(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions. 213(2) (Wash.) Whether county's failure, if any, to maintain reasonably safe roadway was cause of accident to plaintiff, held for the jury.-Buchanan v. San Juan County, 169 P.

972.

HOIST.

See Master and Servant, ~265.

HOMESTEAD.

See Exemptions; Fraudulent Conveyances, 52.

1. NATURE, ACQUISITION, AND

EXTENT.

(D) Property Constituting Homestead.

81 (Cal.App.) Homestead right in house and lot wrongfully possessed by wife, husband having previously sold it and holding legal title in trust for vendees, could not be acquired by wife by filing declaration of homestead.-MeClellan v. Lewis, 169 P. 436.

(E) Liabilities Enforceable Against Homestead.

96 (Kan.) A homestead right attaches to land obtained under a contract of purchase where the purchaser and his wife occupy it as a residence, and a new contract modifying

art. 12, § 2, can be acquired or asserted in land upon which any purchase money is unpaid, as against party to whom it is due.-Zehr v. May, 169 P. 1077.

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154 (Okl.) When homestead character once attaches to land, it continues until owner voluntarily changes its character by disposing of it, or by leaving with intention or with later formed intention of not returning and occupying it as homestead.-German State Bank of Elk City v. Ptachek, 169 P. 1094.

162(1) (Okl.) Temporary absence from homestead does not constitute an abandonment, where there exists definite and fixed intention to return.-German State Bank of Elk City v. Ptachek, 169 P. 1094.

Abandonment of homestead is accomplished, not merely by going away without intending to return at particular time, but by going away with definite intention never to return; intention being the controlling fact.-Id.

164 (Okl.) Homestead owner's acquisition of title to premises as domicile in nearby town does not amount to such permanent absence as to work abandonment of homestead, so long as he intends to return to it.-German State Bank of Elk City v. Ptachek, 169 P. 1094.

1811⁄2 (Okl.) Whether homestead has been abandoned is a question of fact, ascertainable from circumstances of particular transaction.— German State Bank of Elk City v. Ptachek, 169

P. 1094.

HOMICIDE.

See Criminal Law, 438, 448.

IV. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL. 86 (Wash.) To constitute assault in the first degree, there must be a specific intent to kill a human being.-State v. Albutt, 169 P. 584. VII. EVIDENCE.

(A) Presumptions and Burden of Proof. 145 (Cal.App.) First part of Pen. Code, § 1105, dispenses with necessity for showing intent on trial for murder.-People v. Byler, 169 P. 431.

151(1) (Cal.App.) First part of Pen. Code, § 1105, shifts burden of proving mitigation after proof that defendant committed homicidal act.-People v. Byler, 169 P. 431.

(B) Admissibility in General. ›166(1) (Cal.App.) Evidence that after the homicide defendant went toward the tong headquarters was admissible as indicating the tong's connection with the killing and so furnishing a motive.-People v. Ah Wing, 169 P. 402.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

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174(6) (Cal.) In prosecution of a Chinese for murder, it was not error to admit evidence as to the meaning of Chinese characters appearing on a badge found in his possession when arrested.-People v. Wong Hing, 169 P. 357.

(E) Weight and Sufficiency. 234(1) (Cal.App.) Under Pen. Code, § 1105, in prosecution for murder, homicide being proved, people need prove defendant's guilt of offense of which he is convicted only beyond reasonable doubt under all evidence.-People v. Byler, 169 P. 431.

244(3) (Mont.) For a defendant to avail himself of self-defense after proof of homicide, he must under Rev. Codes, § 9282, furnish sufficient evidence to raise reasonable doubt of his guilt.-State v. Powell, 169 P. 46.

250 (Cal.) Evidence held to sustain conviction of murder.-People v. Wong Hing, P. 357.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Abatement and Revival, 6; Divorce;
Executors and Administrators, 181, 182;
Marriage; Parent and Child, 3; Witness-
es, 59.

I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES.

6(3) (Colo.) Where deceased made a trust deed to his son by a former marriage, leaving the wife without any interest in his estate and without money to pay funeral expenses, but the deed was not recorded, and the husband retained dominion until his death, there was a fraud on the rights of the wife, and the deed will be set aside.-Grover v. Clover, 169 P. 578.

V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. (C) Liabilities and Charges. 154 (Cal.) Where a husband and wife joined in a mortgage on her separate property, the wife getting a part of the money raised, and paying off such part out of her own funds, she is liable for money she consented to be paid by her husband to discharge the balance out of funds she knew he held in trust for another.Gray v. Huffaker, 169 P. 1038.

VII. COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 169267(1) (Cal.) Under Civ. Code, § 172, as amended by St. 1891, p. 425, conveyance by husband without consideration, and without wife's consent of community property, held not void; voidable only by her; voidable without regard to other property left by husband; but voidable only to wife's half interest as survivor.-Dargie v. Patterson, 169 P. 360.

250 (Cal.App.) Evidence held to support verdict of guilty of manslaughter.-People v. Byler, 169 P. 431.

When defendant admits killing, and people's evidence tends to show him guilty of manslaughter, and he offers evidence to mitigate or excuse killing, jury may reject defense, if unreasonable, and convict of manslaughter, if satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without attempt by people to rebut defense.-Id.

250 (Mont.) Evidence held sufficient to support conviction of murder.-State v. Fisher, 169 P. 282.

VIII. TRIAL.

(B) Questions for Jury.

282 (Okl.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for murder, evidence held to justify the submission of question whether defendant was guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.-James v. State, 169 P. 1127.

(C) Instructions.

267(1) (Cal.App.) Husband, by Civ. Code, § 172, had power to sell community property of himself and wife as if it were his separate property for adequate consideration, so that it was immaterial that his contract to sell it was not signed or acknowledged by his wife.-McClellan v. Lewis, 169 P. 436.

267(8) (Cal.App.) Where husband sold community property for adequate consideration, purchasers acquired equitable title, and became equitable owners, and husband held legal title in trust for them.-McClellan v. Lewis, 169 P. 436.

VIII. SEPARATION AND SEPARATE

MAINTENANCE.

279(3) (Okl.) Where the parties to a contract of separation live together as husband and wife, by mutual consent, for ever so short a time, the contract will be considered as rescinded.-Ahrens v. Ahrens, 169 P. 486.

297 (Mont.) Requested charge that, if any proof offered by state tends to show accused was excused or justified, then he should be acquitted, is obviously erroneous, even though under Rev. Codes, § 9282, accused could avail himself of affirmative defense established by state's evidence.-State v. Powell, 169 P. 46. 305 (Cal.) Where the evidence justified See Master and Servant, 278. conviction on theory either that defendant shot deceased or was present, aiding, and abetting, it was proper, under Pen. Code, § 1127, to in

HYDRO-FLUORIC ACID.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.

struct that in either case he was guilty as a See Bastards. principal.-People v. Wong Hing, 169 P. 357.

308(5) (Mont.) Where defense was alibi, instructions on murder in second degree were properly omitted.-State v. Fisher, 169 P. 282.

309(3) (Mont.) Where defense was alibi, instructions on manslaughter were properly omitted. State v. Fisher, 169 P. 282.

IMMORALITY.

See Contracts, 112.

IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CON-
TRACT.

309(4) (Okl.Cr.App.) On a trial for murder,
where the evidence, however slight, would war- See Constitutional Law, 154.
rant jury in convicting of manslaughter in the
first degree, trial court should instruct on law
of manslaughter in the first degree.-James v.
State, 169 P. 1127.

HOSPITALS.

IMPEACHMENT.

See Criminal Law, 942; Witnesses, 337.

IMPLIED CONTRACTS.

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3 (Or.) Treaty of June 9, 1855, between United States and Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla Indians, ratified March 8, 1859, did not impliedly appropriate waters of Umatilla river for use of Indians whenever they might see fit to use such waters.-Byers v. Wa-wane, 169 P. 121.

Indian treaties should be liberally construed in favor of the Indians, and the treaty may be read in the light of the circumstances under which it was negotiated and ratified, and the purposes in view and the situation of the parties may be considered.-Id.

10 (Or.) Whatever rights of Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla Indians under treaty of June 9, 1855, ratified March 8, 1859, it was competent for Congress to terminate them by legislation, as Congress may extinguish Indian titles.-Byers v. Wa-wa-ne, 169 P. 121.

15(1) (Okl.) Deeds executed by a Creek minor attempting to convey his allotted lands are absolutely void, and no rule of estoppel operates to prevent the assertion of invalidity.-Parks v. Berry, 169 P. 884.

Purchaser from allottee, the restrictions being removed, after the allottee's majority, takes title free from any claim by reason of any attempted conveyance or transaction as to such lands during allottee's minority.-Id.

15(2) (Okl.) Where Chickasaw Indian, prior to removal of restrictions against alienation, executed a conveyance, and after removal of such restrictions executed a second conveyance, the latter deed, under Act Cong. May 27, 1908, c.

199, passed title, though former deed was void.— Ehrig v. Adams, 169 P. 645.

15(2) (Okl.) Approval of Secretary of Interior was not necessary to validity of guardian's deed to interest of minor in lands of his full

blood mother, executed after her death, where it did not appear that minor was full-blood.-Moffer v. Jones, 169 P. 652.

16(2) (Okl.) Const. art. 25, § 2, did not repeal Act Cong, March 1, 1907, providing that filing of any lease in office of Indian agent should be constructive notice, and oil and gas lease so filed imparted notice to all persons subsequently dealing with land.-Scioto Oil Co. v. O'Hern, 169 P. 483.

16(3) (Okl.) Where full-blood creek Indian executed oil and gas lease on his allotment, which was filed with Indian agent, and died before its approval by Secretary of Interior. and his heirs conveyed his land, the subsequent approval related to date of lease, and heirs' grantees took subject thereto.-Scioto Oil Co. v. O'Hern, 169 P. 483.

16(8) (Okl.) In a forcible detainer action, wherein defendant claimed a valid lease from allottee and plaintiff's approval thereof, held, that the direction of a verdict for plaintiff was proper.-Gunn v. Jones, 169 P. 895.

18 (Okl.) Enabling Act, §§ 13, 21 (Const. art. 25, § 2), repealed that part of section 6 of Supplemental Agreement providing that descent of lands, etc., prescribed by Act Cong. March 1, 1901, should be according to Mansf. Dig. c. 49, and substituted laws of territory of Oklahoma, and left in force provision of section 6 as to inheritance of lands of Creek Nation.-Moffer v. Jones, 169 P. 652.

27(6) (Okl.) Petition attacking decision of Secretary of Interior in deciding contest of an allotment, and in awarding a patent, not showing that he made "a gross mistake of facts," or a material error of law, or that fraud was practiced on him by successful party, failed to state a cause of action.-Hill v. Burnett, 169 P. 1120.

Petition attacking decision of Secretary of Interior in contest of allotment, and in awarding a patent, held not to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendant to whom patent issued.-Id.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

See Adultery, ~7; Embezzlement, ~30; False Pretenses, 29–38; Intoxicating Liquors, 221.

IV. FILING AND FORMAL REQUISITES OF INFORMATION OR

COMPLAINT.

41(6) (Okl.Cr.App.) Under Bill of Rights, § 17, holding of preliminary examination held jurisdictional basis for prosecution on information in district court.-Norwood v. State, 169 P. 656. V. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF ACCUSATION.

93 (Or.) Use of word "unlawfully" cannot supply omission of statement of facts necessary to show commission of offense.-City of Astoria v. Malone, 169 P. 749.

110(15) (Cal.App.) To charge in words of statute is insufficient for indictment under Pen. Code, 72, for presenting, with intent to defraud, a false or fraudulent claim to officials for allowance or payment.-People v. Butler, 169 P. 918.

122(2) (Cal.App.) An information should not charge accused with an offense with which he was not charged in the preliminary complaint; accused not being legally committed for such offense.-People v. Hudson, 169 P. 719.

Since, under Pen. Code, § 459, the intent with which a burglary is done is an essential part of

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