141 (Cal.) To set aside default order after six months on motion, the order must show on its face that the court had no jurisdiction to enter it. In re Morehouse, 169 P. 365. 143(9) (Wash.) In action against sheriff for wrongful execution, a default order, entered against him for failure to appear within 20 days after service of summons, held within the court's discretion to vacate on motion 2 days after the 20-day period on his affidavit showing he understood the real party in interest would enter appearance for him.-Cammarano v. Longmire, 169 P. 806. and will not be vacated on such grounds on petition after term.-Haggerty v. Terwilliger, 169 P. 872. 359 (N.M.) Irregularity justifying setting aside of judgment within one year after its rendition, under Code 1915, § 4230, consists either in omitting to do something necessary for orderly conduct of suit, or in doing it in unseasonable time or in improper manner.-Northcutt v. King, 169 P. 473. X. EQUITABLE RELIEF. (A) Nature of Remedy and Grounds. 153(2) (Cal.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 473,412 (Cal.App.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ providing for setting aside default judgments within six months of rendition, not only the notice of motion, but the motion itself, must be made within six months.-In re Morehouse, 169 P. 365. 10, 133, 134, 135, order overruling demurrer and giving time to answer made on nonjudicial day, held not void, so that defendant could not enjoin sale under execution issued on default judgment therein; his only remedy being by direct attack in original proceeding.-McGrath v. Langford, 169 P. 424. 155 (Idaho) That notice of motion to va cate default and to set aside judgment has not been given as required by law is ground for re430 (Okl.) Equity will enjoin execution of quiring moving party to give proper notice, but judgment at law when complainant has an eqis not reason for striking motion from files.-uitable defense of which he could not avail himSmith v. Peterson, 169 P. 290. V. ON MOTION OR SUMMARY CEEDING. self at law because it did not amount to a legal PRO-defense.-Reynolds v. Hill, 169 P. 625. 444 (Wash.) A judgment obtained by perjury cannot be set aside in equity for fraud, unless there be some extrinsic or collateral fraud in addition.-Burke v. Bladine, 169 P. 811. 187 (Wash.) Where plaintiff was attempt ing to recover on contract, and it appeared at close of his evidence that contract was void, the court properly entered final judgment upon merits with prejudice on defendant's motion460(4) (Wash.) Allegations in an action to therefor.-Nance v. Valentine, 169 P. 862. VI. ON TRIAL OF ISSUES. (C)_Conformity to Process, Pleadings, Proofs, and Verdict or Findings. (B) Jurisdiction and Proceedings. set aside a judgment quieting title, that plaintiffs in the former action knew that there was a will through which defendants had legal title, that it had been filed, that they designedly failed to prove up such will, etc., did not allege fraud, where no affirmative act was alleged.-Burke v. Bladine, 169 P. 811. 251(1) (Utah) In action on indebtedness, where defendant's answer denied indebtedness, and averred account was stated, and defendant found not to be indebted, and that defendant 461(5) (Cal.App.) In suit by wife to modify was not indebted in any form, defendant's judgment for defendant in his suit against her pleadings supported judgment for him.-IIutch-contract to sell realty, evidence held to support and her husband for specific performance of ison v. Smart, 169 P. 166. findings that judge in previous case was not deceived or imposed upon by defendant's attorney, that previous judgment was not false, fictitious, fraudulent, wrong, etc.-McClellan v. Lewis, 169 P. 438. 256(7) (Or.) Under L. O. L. § 570, where court ordered that cost bill be allowed and amount thereof taxed without making any statement of amount of costs and disbursements, judgment held void, being without findings to support it.-School Dist. No. 30 of Clatsop County v. Alameda Const. Co., 169 P. 507. VII. ENTRY, RECORD, AND DOCK-470 (Cal.) Judgment by court having ju ETING. 273(1) (Nev.) The object and purpose of a nunc pro tune order is to make a record speak the truth concerning acts already done, and not to supply an omitted action.-Talbot v. Mack, 169 P. 25. 286 (Wash.) Where only final disposition of case was formal judgment for defendants signed by judge and entered, judgment was not unauthorized in that clerk after trial made informal minute entry that plaintiff have judgment. Wiggins v. Shaw, 169 P. 853. 293 (Kan.) Omission of clerk to record a judgment does not destroy the judgment, nor does its validity or effect remain in abeyance until it is formally entered on the journal. Kinkel v. Chase, 169 P. 1134. XI. COLLATERAL ATTACK. (A) Judgments Impeachable Collaterally. risdiction of the person and subject-matter, not void or invalid on its face, cannot be collater ally attacked.-Crouch v. Shafer, 169 P. 1019. (B) Grounds. 504(1) (Okl.) In collateral attack upon probate proceedings in county court, inquiry is confined to question whether court had jurisdiction, and its order will not be held void for errors or irregularity occurring in proceeding.Moffer v. Jones, 169 P. 652. (C) Proceedings. 518 (Okl.) Action to establish title to certain lands and to set aside guardian's deed exprobate proceeding in which such deed was executed thereto, held a collateral attack upon ecuted.-Moffer v. Jones, 169 P. 652. XIII. MERGER AND BAR OF CAUSES IX. OPENING OR VACATING. 355 (Okl.) In trial at which defendant was represented by counsel, a judgment of a court having jurisdiction for plaintiff is not void for (B) mistake of law, and will not be vacated on petition after term.-Haggerty v. Terwilliger, 169585(4) (Or.) Omission to plead matter of P. 872. 358 (Okl.) In trial at which defendant was represented by counsel, a judgment of a court having jurisdiction for plaintiff is not void for amendable defect or insufficiency of petition, counterclaim as a defense is no bar to a cross or separate action upon it.-Stillwell v. Hill, 169 P. 1174. Defendants in action for hay sold could elect whether they would, in that action, plead and recover on their counterclaim for damages for failure of plaintiffs to deliver all the hay contracted for, or deny the delivery and bring an independent action for damages resulting from failure to deliver.-Id. 586(2) (Cal.App.) Action against husband and wife for specific performance of husband's contract to sell community property and subsequent action to quiet title to such property by husband and wife against plaintiff in former action were actions in equity relating to same subject-matter.-McClellan v. Lewis, 169 P. 436. 592 (Okl.) Where separate actions are brought for different parts of a cause of action, a judgment upon the merits in one will be available as a bar to the other.-Akin v. Bonfils, 169 P. 899. 720 (Cal.App.) Where character of realty as community property was admitted in suit for specific performance against husband and wife, and adjudicated to be such, its character as such became matter res judicata, not subject to be again litigated in action to quiet title by husband and wife.-McClellan v. Lewis, 169 P. 436. 720 (Or.) When second action between the same parties is upon a different claim, judgment in the first suit is an estoppel only as to questions actually determined, and not as to matters which might have been determined.— Stillwell v. Hill, 169 P. 1174. Where sellers of hay sued for balance on the contract, and the issue of delivery was determined against them, they could not, when later sued by the purchasers for failure to deliver, dis-plead delivery as a separate defense and counterclaim.-Id. Where separate actions are prosecuted for tinct causes of action, which might have been united in one petition, a judgment in one action is not a bar to the others.-Id. 619 (Wash.) A judgment of the superior court for plaintiffs in an action to quiet title and partition is res adjudicata as between the parties, although there was a will filed and never probated, which fact if shown would have shown title in the defendants.-Burke v. Bladine, P. 811. 725 (4) (Cal.App.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1908-1912, where husband and wife were sued for performance of contract to sell realty by trustee, who secured judgment, such judgment was conclusive in subsequent action by husband and wife to quiet title.-McClellan v. Lewis, 169 P. 436. 169744 (Cal.) In lessee's action for breach of lease by refusing to give him possession and 619 (Wash.) In action to quiet title, to leasing to another, judgment, in former suit set aside a sale to defendant, and to have prop-defendant landlord was entitled to possession between same parties, where it was adjudged erty decreed exempt as a homestead, decree in defendant's action against plaintiff upon exeunder lease involved, was conclusive.-Horowitz cution returned nulla bona wherein defendant V. Speese, 169 P. 371. had not pleaded homestead exemption held res adjudicata.-Brandon v. Leavonworth, 169 P. 867. (C) Persons Who may Take Advantage of the Bar. 632 (Kan.) Judgment against defendant in suit in nature of creditors' bill will not inure to benefit of another creditor of defendant who is neither party nor privy to judgment.—Kinkel v. Chase, 169 P. 1134. 746 (Or.) Estoppel of a former judgment. determining that sellers had not delivered all the hay contracted for, was not waived by the purchasers bringing an action for damages for the failure to deliver the full amount contracted for.-Stillwell v. Hill, 169 P. 1174. XV. LIEN. 780(1) (Or.) A judgment is a lien only on the actual interest of the judgment debtor in land, so that a creditor obtaining judgment after a voluntary conveyance of land to the debtor deed had no lien on the land.-Hawkenson v. Rostad, 169 P. 350. XIV. CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADJUDI- who immediately reconveyed by an unrecorded CATION. (A) Judgments Conclusive in General. 663 (Utah) Judgment of city court is not res judicata pending appeal therefrom to district court, entitling both parties to trial de novo on issues.-Schramm-Johnson Drugs v. Kleeb, 169 P. 161. (B) Persons Concluded. 695 (N.M.) A judgment against a surety on a bond to secure payment of territorial money on deposit in a bank concludes the state from maintaining an action on bond of indemnity to surety where state knew of relation of principal and agent between surety and indemnitor. State v. Mills, 169 P. 1171. 704 (Wash.) Where injured person's suit against city and contractor for defective street conditions resulted in judgment against city and in favor of contractor, there was an estoppel by judgment preventing city recovering judgment's amount from contractor.-City of Seattle v. Erickson, 169 P. 985. 707 (Cal.) A judgment does not affect a subsequent action between different parties and involving different facts.-Crouch v. Shafer, 169 P. 1019. (C) Matters Concluded. 713 (2) (Okl.) Party claiming a life estate and also a fee and suing to quiet title as to the fee after an adverse judgment is affirmed by Supreme Court cannot maintain another suit based upon life estate, which might have been pleaded and proven in first action.-Sweeney v. XVI. JUDGMENTS IN REM. 807 (Mont.) A dredge was personal property, and so removable, and a judgment on constructive service describing the dredge as being on a certain mining claim within the state must be supported by record showing that the res to which the judgment is directed was within the jurisdiction of the court when suit was brought. -English v. Jenks, 169 P. 727. XVII. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. 815 (Colo.) In the absence of allegation of state is entitled to full faith and credit.-Degge fraud, a foreign judgment sued upon within the v. Baxter, 169 P. 580. 822(3) (Colo.) Where plaintiff sued on a Virginia judgment in the District of Columbia, and defendant objected that the Virginia court was without jurisdiction, he could not, in a later action in Colorado on the District of Columbia judgment, raise the same question.-Degge v. Baxter, 169 P. 580. XXI. ACTIONS ON JUDGMENTS. (B) Foreign Judgments, 946 (N.M.) In action on foreign judgment with plea of limitations (Code 1915, § 3347), and reply of nonresidence as a defense to bar within section 3352, judgment on theory that defendants failed to file affidavit as to residence, as agreed, was irregular and contrary to XXII. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE OF III. CIVIL JURISDICTION AND AUJUDGMENT AS ESTOPPEL OR DEFENSE. THORITY. 43 (3) (Cal.) Under Const. art. 6, § 11, pro 949(1) (Okl.) In a second action against mi-viding inferior courts shall not trench upon nor children of a deceased Choctaw allottee to quiet title to a life estate and to enjoin execution of judgment in former action, plea of res adjudicata held good.-Sweeney v. Coleman, 169 P. 495. JUDICIAL NOTICE. See Evidence, 15-46. JUDICIAL POWER. See Constitutional Law, 68, 70. JUDICIAL SALES. See Execution, 241. JURISDICTION. courts of record, and Code Civ. Proc. § 112, subd. 3, giving justice courts jurisdiction in actions to recover personal property of value not exceeding $300, such court has jurisdiction where the property is valued at $290 and damages for unlawful detention are $100.-Connely v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 169 P. 355. IV. PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES. 71 (Okl.) Justice, served with notice, under Rev. Laws 1910, § 153, to view and assess damages from trespassing stock, is not deprived of his jurisdiction upon premises within his county because they are not within his township or district.-Goins v. Black, 169 P. 1067. Where justice of the peace, after notice, under Rev. Laws 1910, § 153, assesses damages from trespassing stock on premises within his county, and his assessment in writing under section 154 is docketed within his township or dis See Appearance; Courts; Criminal Law, 90; Habeas Corpus, 27; Intoxicating Liq-trict, fact that he went out of his district in uors, 197; Judgment, 807; Justices viewing premises does not avoid assessment. of the Peace, 43; Municipal Corporations, mm 636. JURY. -Id. See Criminal Law, 757; Trial, 141- mutual, evinces legislative policy of requiring 143, 315, 374. II. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 14(9) (Cal.) In action to set aside deed as fraudulent, and to quiet title, defendant was not entitled of right to trial by jury.-Holland v. Kelly, 169 P. 1000. 14(12) (Cal.App.) Action to enjoin obstruction of highway being one in equity, defendant is not entitled to a jury.-Sherwood v. Abart, 169 P. 240. 28(17) (Nev.) Where right to jury trial is waived by oral consent in open court, entered in minutes, pursuant to Rev. Laws, § 5226, setting aside such waiver rests in trial court's discretion.-De Remer v. Anderson, 169 P. 737. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside waiver of jury trial made in open court, where application was not made until trial, although it is usually better policy to set aside such waivers, if no material injury or delay will be caused thereby.-Id. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. See False Imprisonment, I. porations, 636. 7; Municipal Cor 93 (Or.) L. O. L. § 2443 et seq., providing for setting off one judgment against another in justices' courts if between the same parties and that demands shall be mutual and exist between the same parties before they can be employed to extinguish, wholly or in part, the rightful claim of the adverse party.-Barnes v. Esch, 169 P. 512. 122(5) (Idaho) Under Rev. Codes, § 4674, motion for relief from default judgment in justice court, made after expiration of ten days subsequent to its entry, is nullity.-Smith v. Peterson, 169 P. 290. 135(5) (Wash.) Since Rem. Code 1915, § 1889, provides that section 1888, defining procedure for taking possession of property levied on by execution issued by justice of peace, shall not prevent claimant from resorting to any legal remedy, trustee for creditors, when single creditor has had execution from justice levied on the debtor's property, may proceed to retake possession under section 573.-Meakim v. Ludwig, 169 P. 24. V. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS. 140 (N.M.) Rule 4, of rules of practice for district court (14 N. M. 711, 107 Pac. xi), is supplementary to Code 1915, §§ 3222, 3223, relating to justice's transcript and to docketing of appeal and does not conflict with such provisions and is not invalid.-M. B. Goldenberg Co. v. El Paso & S. W. Co., 169 P. 476. 147(3) (Idaho) Where no provision for appeal to district court from order of justice of peace is made by statute, attempted appeal from order striking motion to vacate default and set aside judgment is nullity.-Smith v. Peterson, 169 P. 290. 6 (Idaho) Justices of the peace sitting as committing magistrate if not eligible under Rev. Codes, § 3885, for appointment for a certain precinct, but who when appointed and at preliminary hearing resided in another pre-159(1) (Okl.) One suing in justice court for cinct and held court therein. held an officer de damages in sum of $25 after judgment against facto whose official acts were as valid as to him may appeal to county court by executing public and third parties.-State v. Nolan, 169 bonds as provided by statute.-Clark v. Buff, P. 295. 169 P. 619. II. RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILI. 164(2) (Idaho) On appeal to district court TIES. 29(2) (Mont.) Complaint against township justice on his bond for malicious prosecution under ordinance of town within his township held insufficient, where it failed to allege that justice had not been designated police judge, in view of Rev. Codes, § 3242, and section 7962, subd. 15.-Grant v. Williams, 169 P. 286. on questions of law alone arising on pleadings or files in action or appearing from docket of justice's court, statement of case, as provided for by Rev. Codes, § 4839, is not necessary.Smith v. Peterson, 169 P. 290. 184 (Idaho) Where default was taken in action for money under Rev. Codes, § 4695, as amended by Sess. Laws 1911, c. 191, § 4, appeal from justice's court to district court there from, although notice states that it is taken on questions of law and fact, will be deemed to be taken on question of law alone.-Smith v. Peterson, 169 P. 290. Order of justice's court sustaining plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's motion to vacate the default from files was order contemplated by Rev. Codes, § 4844, and proceedings in that court subsequent to entry of judgment were reviewable by district court on appeal upon questions of law.-Id. to rent a part of a building to sell "merchandise of the same character."-Shean v. Weeks, 169 P. 231. (D) Repairs, Insurance, and Improvements. 150(1) (Kan.) The landlord is under no implied obligation to make repairs.-Garner v. Dodge City Wholesale Grocery Co., 169 P. 219. 152(2) (Kan.) Where written lease provides that repairs are to be made by tenant, landlord's subsequent promise to make them is not enforceable, unless supported by new consideration.-Garner v. Dodge City Wholesale Grocery Co., 169 P. 219. 169154(4) (Kan.) On breach of landlord's covenant to make repairs, measure of damages is difference between rental value of premises as they were, and what it would have been had they been put and kept in repair.-Murrell v. Crawford, 169 P. 561. 190 (Idaho) Where there has been no trial of facts in case arising in justice court, it cannot be first tried in district court, on appeal, but if reversed must be remanded to tribunal in which it originated.-Smith v. Peterson, P. 290. (B) Certiorari, 196(2) (Wash.) Where a justice wrongfully denied change of venue, relator is entitled to a writ of review.-State v. Brinker, 169 P. 317. Ordinary rule is that award of damages for landlord's breach of covenant to repair dwelling house does not include liability for personal injuries sustained by tenant in use of unrepaired property.-Id. (E) Injuries from Dangerous or Defective condition. 164(1) (Kan.) Where landlord knowingly conceals dangerous defects likely to injure tenant or a member of his household, and injury results, landlord's wrongdoing is tortious, and he is liable in damages therefor.-Murrell v. Crawford, 169 P. 561. 164(2) (Kan.) Where landlord breached his covenant to repair porch, tenant, knowing of its defective condition and continuing to use it, could not recover special damages for consequent injury, when by slight outlay, at landlord's expense, she could have remedied defect and averted injury.-Murrell v. Crawford, 169 P. 561. 88(3) (Nev.) Rental receipt for period longer than that named in lease is only evidence of money paid, and does not establish a new consideration, supporting a modification of lease. -De Remer v. Anderson, 169 P. 737. Evidence that lessee worked demised premis-164 (3) (Kan.) Where landlord attempts to es from date of lease, although landlord's horses make repairs on property, but only does so in were pastured on it for several weeks from such an imperfect manner, and tenant, relying theredate, held not to establish consideration for on, continues his tenancy and is injured thereby, agreement extending lease two weeks.-Id. the landlord is liable.-Murrell v. Crawford, 169 P. 561. (D) Termination. 94(1) (Kan.) Under Gen. St. 1915, § 5962, a 10-day written notice to quit must be given to terminate lease for one year for nonpayment of rent, which notice will not terminate tenancy if rent is paid within 10 days.-Norris v. McKee, 169 P. 201. 95 (Cal.) Under a lease providing that, if there be a sale of the land, the lessee to be paid for all summer fallow, "providing purchaser wants possession immediately," a sale did not necessarily terminate the lease, but the purchaser had an option and a reasonable time in which to exercise it.-McVitty v. Flentge, 169 P. 666. 168 (1) (Kan.) Where tenant, knowing that porch was defective, continued to use it for several months and was injured thereby, she was guilty of such contributory negligence as would bar a recovery for injury, notwithstanding landlord's breach of covenant to repair porch.-Murrell v. Crawford, 169 P. 561. VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES. that (A) Rights and Liabilities. 1992 (Wash.) Provision of lease premises may be used for saloon, with statement how, if so used, saloon shall be conducted, creates a permissive, and not a restricted, use, so that subsequent prohibition law does 12(1) (Kan.) Where lessee of hotel, who not defeat right to rent.-Yesler Estate, Inc., was not to underlet without lessor's written v. Continental Distributing Co., 169 P. 967. consent, temporarily rented a room to a printer202(3) (Okl.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, § without such consent, the lessor, by previously telling printer that he had no objection, waived right to terminate lease because of underletting. -Norris v. McKee, 169 P. 201. V. TENANCIES FROM YEAR TO YEAR AND MONTH TO MONTH. VII. PREMISES AND ENJOYMENT (B) Possession, Enjoyment, and Use. 3819, and in absence of contract or usage to contrary, rent under a month to month tenure is payable at end of month.-Moulton v. Garrison, 169 P. 896. 209 (Okl.) As between the lessor and sublessee of the original lessee there is neither privity of estate nor privity of contract, and lessor cannot recover of the sublessee upon lessee's covenant to pay rent.-Lunsford v. McCann, 169 P. 871. IX. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF 291(11) (Okl.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 3819, plaintiff in action of unlawful detainer, seeking to show rent would be payable in advance, must prove either contract or usage to 318(3) (Cal.) The prosecution to judgment LEGISLATIVE POWER. of unlawful detainer by a landlord, without X. RENTING ON SHARES. LETTERS PATENT. See Public Lands, 116. LEVY. 331(1) (Kan.) Where a landlord fails to See Attachment, 173; Taxation, 297. furnish stock according to his agreement, and tenant on shares thereafter raises crops, he is not relieved from payment of rent, but may recover or recoup the damages sustained by landlord's default.-Seapy v. Smart, 169 P. 1151. 331(2) (Colo.) An oral contract by which the owner of land was to furnish seed, machinery and land, and plaintiffs were to farm and irrigate the land and to receive one-half of all that was raised, was not a contract of employment, but in the nature of a joint adventure, and on breach thereof plaintiffs were not entitled to recover prevailing rate of wages.-Pace v. Beckett, 169 P. 142. LEWDNESS. See Criminal Law, 406; Prostitution; (Okl.Cr.App.) To constitute open and notorious adultery state must show not only that defendant committed adultery, but also that he torious adultery.-Spencer v. State, 169 P. 270. lived with woman not his wife in open and no is sufficient if adulterous relation became genTo constitute open and notorious adultery, it erally known among parties' neighbors and acquaintances prior to prosecution, after which 331(6) (Colo.) In action for breach of crop-proof of single day's continuance of the relationping contract plaintiffs were not entitled to evi- ship will sustain a conviction.-Id. dence of prevailing rate of wages.-Pace v.5 (Okl.Cr.App.) Information for open and Beckett, 169 P. 142. notorious adultery which charges offense on single day is sufficient, and it is not necessary to allege such offense with continuendo.-Spencer v. State, 169 P. 270. See Public Lands. LANDS. 9 (Okl.Cr.App.) In prosecution for open and notorious adultery, defendant's admissions and declarations are competent to prove marriage. Spencer v. State, 169 P. 270. 10 (Cal.App.) Evidence in a prosecution under Pen. Code. § 269a, for cohabitation and adultery held sufficient to sustain a conviction. to sustain conviction for living in open and no10 (Okl.Cr.App.) Evidence held sufficient, torious adultery.-Spencer v. State, 169 P. 270. People v. Collins, 169 P. 410. 11 (Okl.Cr.App.) In prosecution for open and notorious adultery, instruction distinguishing between adultery and open and notorious adultery held not confusing or misleading.-Spencer v. State, 169 P. 270. 14. LIBEL AND SLANDER. 45 (N.M.) In prosecution for larceny of live stock, evidence as to certain brands on See Appeal and Error, 719, 1050; Venue, cattle alleged to have been stolen was admissible to establish the identity of the cattle without proof that the brands had been recorded as required by Code 1915, § 118.-State v. Crosby, 169 P. 303. 55 (Mont.) It is competent to establish both theft and venue by circumstantial evidence.State v. Woods, 169 P. 39. LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE. See Appeal and Error, 1064. LAW OF THE CASE. See Appeal and Error, 1099. LEADING QUESTIONS. See Witnesses, 240. LEASE. I. WORDS AND ACTS ACTIONABLE, 6(1) (Nev.) Any false and malicious writing published of another is libelous per se when its tendency is to render the party contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation or expose him to public hatred or contempt.-Talbot v. Mack, 169 P. 25. Words or expressions are actionable per se when their injurious character is a fact of common notoriety and generally so understood where the utterance is published and words or expressions libelous per quod are such as require that their injurious character or effect be established by allegation and proof.-Id. 9(1) (Nev.) While words which directly tend to the prejudice of any one in his office, profession, trade, or business are actionable per se, all words disparaging persons in such matters are not, without proof of damage, actionable in See Evidence, 450; Indians, 16; Land- themselves.-Talbot v. Mack, 169 P. 25. lord and Tenant. LEAVE OF COURT. See Pleading, 237; Receivers, 174. LEGACY TAX. See Taxation, 861-900. The term "overload," used in a letter stating that an insurance business was overloaded, means bearing too heavy a burden or too heavily loaded, but implies nothing defamatory on its face in the sense of imputing dishonesty, lack of fair dealing, want of fidelity, integrity, or business ability.-Id. Statement in letter to stockholders in insurance company that the company is overloaded |