Bernardino County v. Industrial Acc. Commis- 375(1) (Cal.App.) Use of circular saw to make board of suitable length to barricade door of premises which applicant was employed to watch held beyond scope of employment, making award by Industrial Commission improper. Brusster v. Industrial Accident Commission, 169 P. 258. (C) Proceedings. Austrian father of son killed in America, to 398 (Cal.App.) Unauthenticated letter by third person not a relative, as attorney in fact, purporting to authorize third person to apply under Workmen's Compensation Act for adjustment of claim, constituted no legal authority for third person's action in filing application.Western Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission of State of California, 169 P. 261. Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 22, 375(1) (Cal.App.) Relation of employer and where no application was made by one unrelatemployé under Workmen's Compensation Acted to deceased servant for reimbursement for held not to exist between city and member of funeral expenses, Industrial Accident Commiselection board while he was taking the returns sion had no jurisdiction to make allowance to the city hall.-City of Los Angeles v. State therefor.-Id. Industrial Acc. Commission, 169 P. 260. 375(2) (Cal.) Employé assisting superintendent in certain work, and then riding with the superintendent on auto truck, and injured on the way, held not to have sustained injury in the course of the employment, and arising out of the employment.-Boggess v. Industrial Accident Commission, 169 P. 75. 403 (Okl.) Employer has burden of estabing facts constituting a bar to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act.-Wick v. Gunn, 169 P. 1087. 405 (4) (Cal.) Evidence held insufficient to show that the accident for which compensation was sought arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased workman.-Casualty Co. of America v. Industrial Accident Commission, 169 P. 76. 375(2) (Colo.) Employé permitted to take work home, and who had been working at home and was injured on the street on way to employer's store, held not entitled to compen-405(5) (Cal.) A finding that wife living sation, under Laws 1915, c. 179, § 8.-Indus- apart from husband and not receiving nor seektrial Commission of State of Colorado v. An ing support from him was not in fact dependent derson, 169 P. 135. on him held supported by the evidence.-Perry 380 (Okl.) Under Workmen's Compensa- V. Industrial Acc. Commission, 169 P. 353. tion Act, art. 2, § 1, workman's mere voluntary 405(5) (Cal.App.) Under Workmen's Comand intentional failure to use a safety appliance will not necessarily render the omission "willful," as a willful failure implies premeditation, obstinacy, or intentional wrongdoing. -Wick v. Gunn, 169 P 1087. Employers must provide proper guards and safety appliances for machinery used by workmen, and install proper guards and appliances ordered by the state labor commission, so that employé could not be convicted of willfulness for failure to use a guard furnished not of the standard required.-Id. 382 (Cal.) A release not providing for full compensation, and which was not approved by Industrial Commission, was invalid, and no bar to an action by employé for additional compensation, in view of Workmen's Compensation Act, § 32, subd. "b," as amended by St. 1915, p. 1093.-Employé's Credit Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 169 P. 1001. pensation Act, § 77, subd. "a," as amended by St. 1915, p. 1102, § 28, there is no warrant for finding deceased contributed to father's support by sending money to him in Austria, sole basis of which is testimony by deceased's depositary that deceased had requested advancement, saying it was for such purpose.-Western Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission of State of California, 169 P. 261. 4175) (Cal.App.) On petition for writ of review to vacate award to employé of manufacturer which carried with petitioner policy of insurance covering industrial liability, where record shows commission's finding is sustained by law and evidence, award will be affirmed, and writ dismissed.-Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission of State of California, 169 P. 257. 417 (7) (Cal.) Industrial Accident Commission's conclusion as to apportionment of compensation between dependents should not be interfered with unless it clearly appears that it is without substantial support in the record.Perry v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 169 P. 353. 382 (Kan.) Workmen's Compensation Act recognizes legality of voluntary settlement and release of claim for personal injury, and, without fraud or mutual mistake, satisfaction and release cannot be set aside for gross inadequacy of compensation.-Dotson v. Proctor &417(7) (Okl.) Employe's willful failure to Gamble Mfg. Co., 169 P. 1136. (B) Compensation. use guards or safety appliances provided according to law or by order of state labor comCommission, and if its finding of willfulness mission is a question of fact for the Industrial is supported by any evidence, its action will not be disturbed.-Wick v. Gunn, 169 P. 1087. 385(1) (Cal.App.) Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 17, subd. 2, held, that commission might award compensation to injured servant who had been employed for only few days at much higher rate than that he receiv-419 (Cal.) On claims for compensation, evied; there being evidence that such was the usual rate in the locality.-Hickox v. Industrial Accident Commission of State of California, 169 P. 1048. 388 (Cal.) Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 19, commission held authorized to award death benefit to children dependent on deceased employé to total exclusion of wife, even though she was conclusively presumed dependent on the employé.-Perry v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 169 P. 353. Commission's conclusion that it would be just and equitable and in proportion to respective needs to award entire compensation to infant children to exclusion of wife living apart from the employé and not supported by him held warranted.-Id. dence held to sustain Industrial Accident Commission's finding that a slight disability continued from date of first operation after injury in 1914 until second operation in 1916, followed by death.-Western Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of State of California, 169 P. 663. subd. b (2), as amended by St. 1915, p. 1085, § Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 16. 5, limiting proceedings for compensation, widow's claim two years after injury held not barred, where there was a finding of continuous disability to date of death.—Id. Continuing jurisdiction given by Workmen's Compensation Act, § 25d, held immaterial to widow's supplementary application, where injury and death arose out of same casualty, so that order consolidating it with former proceeding by employé was unnecessary.-Id. MEETINGS. MEMORANDA. In widow's proceeding under Workmen's See Corporations, 201. Compensation Act for death of employé arising out of same casualty as the injury, findings and award of commission in employe's proceeding See Witnesses, 255. two years before, having effect of judgment binding on insurer, held admissible.-Id. MENTAL SUFFERING. Industrial Accident Commission, which had made award of temporary total disability and See Damages, 48, 178. which found a disability continuing from operation following injury to second operation, resulting in death, had power to make an award to deceased employé's widow.-Id. 419 (Cal.) Workmen's Compensation Act, § 20, as amended by St. 1915, p. 1089, requiring written notice of accident within 30 days, does not apply to claims for further disability under section 16, subd. "c," as amended by St. 1915, p. 1085, where compensation has been made for original injury.-Employé's Credit Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 169 P. 1001. In proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 16, subd. "c," as amended by St. 1915, p. 1085, for compensation for further disability, evidence held to justify finding of the commission that claimant's "further disability" had not existed for so long a time that a claim therefor was barred.-Id. MAXIMS. See Equity, 57. MAYHEM. See Criminal Law, 354. (Mont.) Man's right testicle is "member of his body" within Rev. Codes, $ 8304, defining mayhem.-State v. Sheldon, 169 P. 37. MECHANICS' LIENS. II. RIGHT TO LIEN. (E) Subcontractors, and Contractors' Workmen and Materialmen. 105 (Cal.) Where individual was personally interested as partner in subcontract whereby corporation undertook to plaster building, he and company were jointly interested in such contract.-E. Aigeltinger, Inc., v. Burke, 169 P. 373. VI. WAIVER, DISCHARGE, RELEASE, See Nuisance, 3. MILLS. MINES AND MINERALS. II. TITLE, CONVEYANCES, AND (A) Rights and Remedies of Owners. 52 (Or.) Removal of ore from the premises of another without his consent will be enjoined.-Barnes v. Esch, 169 P. 512. (B) Conveyances in General. 54 (2) (Cal.App.) Where deed of mining claim provided that "it is hereby mutually agreed" that the grantee will open and develop the property at his own expense, it was not upon condition subsequent, but was mere covenant.-White v. Hendley, 169 P. 710. (C) Leases, Licenses, and Contracts. 58 (Okl.) In action to cancel oil and gas leases to defendants, evidence held to sustain finding of fraud inducing the lease.-Dieterle v. Harris, 169 P. 873. III. OPERATION OF MINES, QUARRIES, AND WELLS. (B) Mining Partnerships and Companies. 97 (Cal.) Under Civ. Code, § 2511, interest under contract giving person right of possession and right to purchase mining property, held such an interest as could form the subject of a mining partnership.-Harper v. Sloan, 169 P. 1043. Contract between plaintiff having option to purchase mining claim and defendants, held to vest in defendants a share in plaintiff's rights, and to create a mining partnership.-Id. ants, held, that there was a mining partnership, at least from the date when plaintiff acquired title from third parties to the mining claim involved in the contract.-Id. Under contract between plaintiff and defend ed mining claim and defendants furnished monUnder Civ. Code, § 2511, where plaintiff workey to be used in working it, there was a mining partnership, though defendants did no physical work on the claim.-Id. specting transactions prior to the dissolution or abandonment.-Harper v. Sloan, 169 P. 1043. 99 (2) (Cal.) Though mining partnership (A) Waiver of Right to Lien. previously existing had been dissolved or aban208 (Cal.) Clause of agreement by materi-doned, plaintiff held entitled to accounting realman and subcontractor purporting to release original contractor and owner "from any and all liens for labor and materials furnished by them" included materials and labor previously furnished for performance of subcontract.E. Aigeltinger, Inc., v. Burke, 169 P. 373. VII. ENFORCEMENT. 281 (1) (Cal.) In action to foreclose lien for materials furnished by corporation to subcontractor, evidence held to support finding individual who was moving spirit in plaintiff company represented to original contractor that he had personally furnished materials.E. Aigeltinger, Inc., v. Burke, 169 P. 373. In action to foreclose lien for materials furnished by corporation to subcontractor, evidence held to sustain finding plaintiff was interested in subcontract.-Id. (C) Rights and Liabilities Incident to Working. 125 (Kan.) In action for damages from subsidence of surface caused by mining coal, evidence held to show that surface had subsided in 250 or 260 different places within two years prior to commencement of action and resulting decrease in value of surface.-Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 169 P. 219. See Infants. MINORS. MISCEGENATION. See Constitutional Law, m48. on execution sale which were assigned to the grantee of the trust deed, the mere fact that the mortgagor made a written statement showing amount of incumbrances against his property, but failing to show liens against the certificates of sale held by the third party, did not prevent the grantee under the trust deed from relying on the paramount title of the third party, though she had orally agreed to make her lien subject to the mortgage.-Allen v. Mitchell, 169 P. 826. 163 (2) (Wyo.) As between two mortgages for moneys advanced to apply on purchase price on land, mortgage first recorded held to have priority. Walter v. Kressman, 169 P. 3. 183 (Wash.) Where grantee under trust deed having legal title also held equitable title under execution sale by sheriff's certificates, there was no equitable estoppel against him to assert title, by reason of act of assignor of certificates in agreeing that they should be subject to a mortgage, where the mortgagee did not rely on any misrepresentations, but upon the mere verbal promise.-Allen v. Mitchell, 169 P. 826. 186(5) (Wyo.) In suit involving priority between several mortgages, evidence held suffi cient to support a finding that on one of such mortgages for $145,000 not more than $25,000 was advanced.-Walter v. Kressman, 169 P. 3. In view of evidence showing facts tending to throw doubt upon the good faith of mortgage, a judgment adjudging that it and other mortgages were of equal rank, held to award the holder all that he was entitled to.-Id. VI. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY MORTGAGED OR OF EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. 38(1) (Or.) Evidence held to warrant a finding that a deed absolute in form was intend-275 ed only as security for a loan.-Purdy v. Underwood, 169 P. 536. (C) Execution and Delivery. 70 (Wyo.) Execution and recording of mortgage by one who had promised that it would be executed and recorded, held to constitute a delivery.-Walter v. Kressman, 169 P. 3. III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA TION. (A) General Rules of Construction. 100 (Wyo.) Agreement to give mortgage for amount advanced for completion of purchase price of land, held not to require the lender to advance the entire sum needed in order to be entitled to a mortgage.-Walter v. Kressman, 169 P. 3. (D) Lien and Priority. 151(4) (Or.) Lien of mortgage on property which mortgagor may "hereafter acquire" held superior to lien of subsequent judgment on such property.-Clarke Woodward Drug Co. v. Hot Lake Sanatorium Co., 169 P. 796. 151 (5) (Mont.) Lien of judgment yields to equitable right in prior mortgagee to lien on land left out of mortgage through mutual mistake. Stockmen's Nat. Bank of Ft. Benton v. Hofeldt, 169 P. 48. 151(5) (Or.) A judgment creditor of one who accepted a voluntary conveyance of land and immediately mortgaged it to the grantor, and also made a reconveyance which was not recorded, has no greater interest than the judgment creditor, and cannot defeat the mortgage in the hands of an assignee on the ground that the transaction between the parties was fraudulent. -Hawkenson v. Rostad, 169 P. 350. (Okl.) One purchasing property and expressly assuming payment of a mortgage thereon cannot deny existence of mortgage, indebtedness or amount thereof, or question consideration.-Schuber v. McDuffee, 169 P. 642. 295(1) (Kan.) Where mortgagee took quitclaim deed from mortgagor's grantee in lieu of mortgage, and canceled mortgagor's note, but debt was not satisfied or mortgage released, position of junior mortgagee under mortgage from grantor in quitclaim deed was not bettered by cancellation of note.-James v. Williams, 169 P. 1163. VII. PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE OF CONDITION, RELEASE, AND SATISFACTION. 300 (Okl.) A tender of a mortgage debt will not extinguish the lien unless made by one entitled to make it and not by a stranger.Knudson v. Fenimore, 169 P. 478. Where tender of a mortgage debt is not made by the mortgagor, the lien is not extinguished thereby unless the mortgagee knew the tenderer had a right to make the tender, and that all rights of the mortgagor would be protected by acceptance of the money and discharging the mortgage.-Id. 308 (Kan.) To accomplish equitable result, mortgage lien may be kept alive and enforced after lien claimant is precluded from resorting to personal obligation of mortgagor, or of any one else, to satisfy debt.-James v. Williams, 169 P. 1163. 319(3) (Okl.) In an action for the balance due on a note and to foreclose a mortgage, where the issue was as to whether a quitclaim deed from plaintiff to defendant had released the mortgage, evidence held to sustain a judgment for plaintiff.-Price v. Rollow, 169 P. 1073. 159 (Wash.) Where mortgagor made trust 319(3) (Wyo.) Evidence held insufficient to deed subject to mortgage at time of execution show payment of a mortgage by the delivery of which a third party held sheriff's certificates of bonds of a company to which the mortgaged land was conveyed.-Walter v. Kressman, 169 | set out in petition.-Broquet v. Mosier, 169 P. P. 3. 1153. X. FORECLOSURE BY ACTION. (A) Nature and Form of Remedy. 390 (Kan.) Plaintiff, in action to recover indebtedness and to foreclose a mortgage, may issue order of attachment and levy it on property other than that included in the mortgage, as party may employ as many concurrent and consistent remedies as law gives him.-Hodgen v. Roy, 169 P. 1143. (B) Right to Foreclose and Defenses. 401(2) (Cal.App.) Provision in mortgage giving mortgagee option to declare entire amount due upon default in payment of any installment of interest will not be construed a penalty.-Dunn v. Barry, 169 P. 910. 401(5) (Cal.App.) After mortgagee had exercised his option to declare whole amount due and payable, his right of foreclosure could not be defeated by tender of all interest due; a tender of full amount of note being essential.Dunn v. Barry, 169 P. 910. 408 (Cal.App.) Under note and mortgage providing that on default both principal and interest should become immediately due at option of holder, where holder accepted first two installments of interest only after protest against delay, held, he would not be estopped for default in payment of third installment to advance maturity of principal without prior notice of intention so to do.-Dunn v. Barry, 169 P. 910. In action to foreclose mortgage after exercise of option to declare entire amount due for failure to pay installments, held, that mortgagee had not lulled mortgagor into security, but had acted in good faith in exercising his option.-Id. 415(1) (Cal.App.) That mortgagor did not know mortgagee's address would not excuse payment of installments when due in view of Civ. Code, § 1500, declaring that an obligation may be extinguished by deposit in name of creditor.-Dunn v. Barry, 169 P. 910. (E) Parties and Process. 427(1) (Or.) Under L. O. L. § 41, providing that the court shall cause necessary parties to be brought in, where an owner voluntarily conveyed land, and the grantee gave back notes and a mortgage, which was recorded, and made a reconveyance, which was not recorded, and foreclosure suit was brought by the assignee of the mortgage, who alleged the reconveyance, the owner was necessary party.-Hawkenson v. Rostad, 169 P. 350. (F) Pleading and Evidence. 464 (Kan.) In foreclosure district court has jurisdiction to render judgment by default, on personal service, without the notes and mortgage sued on being filed with clerk or presented to court.-Broquet v. Mosier, 169 P. 1153. (G) Injunction and Receiver. 467(1) (Or.) Receiver of mortgaged property of insolvent is properly appointed at suit of mortgagor's creditor, though mortgagee be rightfully in possession; mortgagee being insolvent, and expenses of property exceeding receipts from sales and rentals.-Brayton & Lawbaugh v. Monarch Lumber Co., 169 P. 528. (I) Judgment or Decree and Execution. 496 (Kan.) In foreclosure plaintiff's failure to file with clerk or to present to court the notes and mortgage sued on, or to introduce any evidence thereof petition was not a fraud on defendant, in view of Code Civ. Proc. §§ 110, 129 (Gen. St. 1915, §§ 7002, 7021), where personal service was made, and there was judgment by default, and copies of notes and mortgage were MOTIONS. See Appeal and Error, 285; Attachment, 248; Continuance; Criminal Law, 696, 958, 959; Execution, 170; Indictment and Information, 144; Pleading, 343-352. MOTIVE. See Homicide, 166. MOVING PICTURES. See Evidence, 83; Theaters and Shows, m2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See Constitutional Law, 83; Counties; Criminal Law, 260; Evidence, 25; Garnishment, 17; Mandamus, 79; Quo Warranto, 8, 49; Schools and School Districts; Street Railroads; Waters and Water Courses, 182. I. CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE, AND DISSOLUTION. (A) Incorporation and Incidents of Existence. 18 (N.M.) Action by county commissioners in incorporating a village may at any time be shown to have been without jurisdiction by showing that petition on which it acted was not signed by majority of qualified electors, as required by Code 1915, §§ 3764, 3766.-State v. Porter, 169 P. 471. IV. PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OR OTHER GOVERNING BODY. (B) Ordinances and By-Laws in General. 112(3) (Kan.) Under Gen. St. 1915, § 1413, the portion of an ordinance undertaking to exclude territory from a city's corporate limits held ineffective, where its title expressed only the purpose of "extending the limits of the city."-State v. City of Hutchinson, 169 P. 1140. V. OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYÉS. (A) Municipal Officers in General. 159(4) (Or.) A civil service board acting as a quasi judicial tribunal for determining whether an officer was properly removed cannot grant a rehearing, unless specifically authorized by law.-Crowe v. Albee, 169 P. 785. 159(6) (Or.) Under Portland City Charter 1914, c. 4, § 62, providing for suspending of city officers, and sections 98, 100, 101, 108, and 114, establishing a civil service board, the board is a quasi judicial tribunal whose judgment and discretion in removing officers will not be interfered with by the courts, unless the statutes are violated.-Crowe v. Albee, 169 P. 785. The civil service board, on appeal by officer dismissed, considers only questions whether dismissal was for political or religious reasons, and in good faith for the improvement of the service; and under Portland City Charter 1914, c. 4. § 108, where, without written findings, a conclusion of law commuting the sentence of dismissal to suspension is made, it will be presumed the charges were sustained.-Id. (B) Municipal Departments and Officers Thereof. 176(3) (Cal.) Where pensions for policemen are predicated merely upon death occurring during period of service, and death only fixes the right to a pension, a repeal of the pension statute before death destroys the pension right.-O'Dea v. Cook, 169 P. 366. 187 (Cal.) Pensions to families of policemen, provided for by San Francisco Charter, sion, and the building was accepted as completed, by a resolution which was a public rec ord, and 10 per cent. of price reserved for 30 days, claim of materialman filed against the contractor's bond 31 days thereafter was too late. Pearson v. Puget Sound Machinery Depot, 169 P. 961. c. 10, art. 8, are not gratuities. forbidden by Const. art. 4, § 31.-O'Dea v. Cook, 169 P. 366. Where San Francisco Charter, c. 10, § 8, providing for pensions for families of policemen killed on duty, imposed no time limit at time a policeman received fatal injuries, his widow may, on his death more than two years thereafter, claim a pension, despite amendment in interim allowing pensions only in case of- (E) Assessments for Benefits, and Special ficer shall have died within a year after injury.-Id. 434(1) (Cal.) In the absence of constitu211 (Cal.App.) Under St. 1909, p. 908, §tional restriction the Legislature's power to ex1, and Pol. Code, § 1617, subd. 21, a board of empt property from taxation includes power to education is not limited to employing an ex- exempt from special assessments.-Los Angeles amining staff, but, without employing such a County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 169 P. staff, may employ an optometrist.-Beard v. 1028. Webb, 169 P. 927. IX. PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. (B) Preliminary Proceedings and Ordi. nances or Resolutions. Taxes. 450(4) (Mont.) A resolution proclaiming the fact of creation of an improvement district, and expressing intention to assess, is not a resolution of intention to form it; the necessary first step, under Laws 1913, c. 89, in its creation.-Cooper v. City of Bozeman, 169 P. 801. 294(3) (Cal.) In proceeding for street opening under St. 1903, p. 375, section 3, of 469(4) (Cal.) In proceeding under St. 1909, which, as amended by St. 1913, p. 430, § 2, p. 171, § 6, requiring cost of sidewalks and requires notice of date of passage of ordinance curbing to be assessed to abutting property in for the improvement, the notice must state proportion to frontage, held improper to apthe date of the ordinance, and a statement of portion the cost of a sidewalk in proportion the number is not sufficient,, in spite of St. to the square feet of sidewalk in front of each 1903, p. 386, § 37, requiring liberal construc- lot.-City Securities Co. v. Harvey, 169 P. 380. tion.-Ferri v. City of Long Beach, 169 P. 385.477 (Okl.) Assessment for street improveIn proceeding for street opening under St. ment under Laws 1907-08, c. 10, made against 1903, p. 375, § 3, as amended by St. 1913, p. 430, § 2, a notice of passage of ordinance for void, and paving bonds are also void and subowner and not against adjacent property is the improvement, defective in failing to set ject to cancellation in action for that purpose. out date thereof, was not cured by reference Guaranteed State Bank of Durant v. D'Yarto the ordinance "for further particulars."-Id. mett, 169 P. 639. 297(1) (Utah) Under Comp. Laws 1907, 8490 (Cal.) Where assessment under St. 273, and in spite of section 266, a railroad com- 1909, p. 167, was illegal on its face, the proppany owning the right of way across which a street is to be paved may validly protest against erty owner need not, as provided by section 10, the improvement.-Cave v. Ogden City, 169 P. appeal to the city council, but could urge invalidity in an action to enforce the assessment.-City Securities Co. v. Harvey, 169 P. 380. 163. Where the title to land is in the county under a tax deed, the individual prior owner was not competent to protest a projected paving. 513(1) (Or.) Under Portland City Charter, -Id. §§ 397, 400, held, that assessment for street improvements will not be set aside on mere showing that no improvement had been constructed since assessment was levied, for it might well be reassessment which was allowed was error.Wilson v. City of Portland, 169 P. 90. A corporation occupying certain frontage owned by individuals could not protest a projected paving.-Id. Comp. Laws 1907, § 273, providing that the council shall be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction to order paving, unless written ob-513(3) (Or.) Where city about to sell propjections signed by the owners of two-thirds of the front feet are filed, being silent upon who may protest, the section must be held to contemplate protests only by owners of legal title. -Id. erty to collect assessment was claiming right to collect illegal items, property owners held to have no remedy at law, and so equity would cancel the illegal items.-Elliott v. City of Portland, 169 P. 504. 320 (Cal.) Under San Francisco Charter, 514(12) (Or.) An appeal to the circuit art. VI, c. II, § 33, authorizing the board of court, under Portland Charter,, § 401, from a supervisors to provide a procedure for the im- reassessment for a public improvement, transprovement of streets, an ordinance not requir- fers the assessment proceedings, as to those ing formalities as to assessments, warrants, dia- parties who appeal, to the circuit_court.-Elligram, or affidavit of demand on nonpayment, or ott v. City of Portland, 169 P. 504. other formalities, could be adopted, subsequent 515(1) (Mont.) Failure to make resolution to notices necessary to acquire jurisdiction, and of intention to create a special improvement hence a provision that no proceeding shall be district-the initial step required by Laws 1913, held invalid for disregard of such formalities c. 89, to give jurisdiction-cannot be cured by was authorized.-Bienfield v. Van Ness, 169 P. Laws 1915, c. 142.-Cooper v. City of Bozeman, 225. 169 P. 801. (C) Contracts. 331 (Mont.) Contracts for special local improvements cannot be sustained, the 10 days' notice for bids, required by Laws 1913, c. 89, not being given as authorized by the council.Cooper v. City of Bozeman, 169 P. 801. 337 (Mont.) Contract for special local improvement cannot be sustained, not having been entered into within the time after notice required by Laws 1913, c. 89.-Cooper v. City of Bozeman, 169 P. 801. 347 (2) (Wash.) Where Seattle port commission contracted for a warehouse by contract providing that it should not be deemed completed unless so declared by the port commis 518(2) (Or.) Under Portland Charter, 88 400, 401, and 407, where reassessment ordinance did not provide for interest, and appeals were taken, assessment held not to bear interest until ten days after mandate of Supreme Court was filed in circuit court.-Elliott v. City of Portland, 169 P. 504. 519(2) (Cal.) That a copy of a list of unpaid assessments for street improvements recorded in the assessment book was not authenticated by the signature of the secretary of the board of public works, did not invalidate the contractor's lien on the lots, where the original was authenticated.-Bienfield v. Van Ness, 169 P. 225. |