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1916, § 4919), and Rev. St. 1908, § 5834, declaration of highway over public domain does not establish same as to lands on which there has been homestead or pre-emption entry, though entries have been subsequently abandoned.-Id.

(H) Grants in Aid of Railroads.

78 (Mont.) Determination of commission established under Act Cong. Feb. 26, 1895, for determining character of lands as mineral or nonmineral in districts where land was granted to the Northern Pacific Railway, was conclusive, and Land Department officers thereafter could not examine into the character of land for which patent was applied.-Thomas v. Horst, 169 P. 731.

(J) Patents.

116 (Mont.) Where patent issued to the Northern Pacific Railway for lands including claimants' mineral location, the necessary conclusion was that determination by the commission under Act Cong. Feb. 26, 1895, had found that the lots were not mineral lots.-Thomas v. Horst, 169 P. 731.

Presumption created by Act Cong. Feb. 26, 1895, §.3, that a lot was mineral when a patent to a mineral claim on such lot had been issued was only a rule of evidence, and the commissioners' duty was to classify the lot in its true character.-Id.

deeds to school lands based on fraudulent applications held not laches.-Id.

It should not be assumed that the Legislature has ratified sales of school lands secured by gross fraud unless the language of the statute leads unmistakably to that conclusion.-Id.

Laws 1901, p. 304, held not to confirm fraudulent purchases of state's grant lands, but merely to confirm sales of lands taken on foreclosure of school fund mortgages under Laws 1899, p. 164, § 27.-Id.

State suing to cancel deeds to school lands for fraud cannot recover the lands and also have accounting from the grantees for money secured by them through attempted exchange of lieu lands.-Id.

121 (Or.) Where deeds to school lands filed as basis of lieu land selections had not been accepted and lieu selections had not been approved, suit to cancel state's deeds held determinable without the presence of the United States as a party.-State v. Hyde, 169 P. 774. In suit to cancel deeds to school lands, evidence held to show that the applications to purchase such lands were fraudulent in that the applicants were mere dummies.-Id.

Where grantee of school lands executed deeds to the United States as basis of lieu land selections, parties selecting lieu lands under power of attorney held not entitled to the consideration paid the state on cancellation of the deed. -Id.

121 (Or.) Where General Land Office has (K) Remedies in Cases of Fraud, Mistake, accepted deeds to United States for land involvor Trust.

12! (Or.) In suit to cancel deeds to school lands for which grantees had executed deeds to United States, demurrers because United States was not a party held properly overruled where it was alleged that United States refused to accept deeds.-State v. Hyde, 169 P. 757.

ed in suit by state to cancel state deeds and has approved selection of lieu lands based on relinquishment of lands described, United States is indispensable party defendant to so much of controversy as relates to such lands.-State v. Hyde, 169 P. 775.

In state's suit to cancel state deeds, evidence held to show that applications to purchase lands involved were secured for benefit of another.

Deeds to school lands held not subject to cancellation for fraud in suit to which United States was not a party, where the lands had been con--Id. veyed to and accepted by the United States as a basis for lieu land selections.-Id.

That United States cannot be sued without its consent held not to authorize decree canceling deeds to school lands subsequently conveyed to the United States in the absence of the United States as a party. Id.

United States held not necessary party to suit to cancel deeds to school lands for fraud, where deeds to the United States as a basis for lieu land selections had never been accepted.-Id. Evidence held to establish conspiracy to secure school lands in fraud of the public policy of the state through dummy applicants and to show that a defendant was a party to such conspiracy. -Id.

Where through applications of dummy applicants and false affidavits school lands were optained by nonresidents in large quantities, held, that there was fraud justifying cancellation of deeds, though state received the price at which the lands were held.-Id.

In suit to cancel deeds to school lands offered to the United States as basis of lieu land selections but not accepted, whether purchasers of the selected lands were bona fide purchasers held immaterial.-Id.

-Id.

In state's suit to cancel state deeds to lands on ground applications to purchase were fraudulently made for benefit of others than applicants, trial court improperly made state's relief conditional on payment to innocent defendants of $1.25 an acre.-Id.

12! (Or.) Where deeds to school lands filed as basis of lieu selections had been accepted by the General Land Office and lieu selections approved, suit to cancel state's deeds held not maintainable without presence of the United States as a party.-State v. Hyde, 169 P. 777.

Deed to school land will be canceled, where application was not made for benefit of the applicant, the accompanying affidavit was false, and the applicant's rights within a week were assigned to the party obtaining the deed.-Id.

121 (Or.) Suit to cancel deeds to school lands held not maintainable without presence of United States as a party where deeds as basis for lieu land selections had been accepted, but maintainable where deeds had never been accepted.-State v. Hyde, 169 P. 778.

Evidence held to show that application to purchase school lands in name of person who could not be located was frauduleut.-Id.

That applications to purchase school lands were sworn to before notary public who had procured other fraudulent applications and that applicant's rights were assigned four days later insufficient to prove fraud.—Id.

Evidence held to show that party financing purchases of school lands in names of dummy applicants and taking deeds to secure moneys advanced by him was not an innocent purchaser. Where deeds to school lands had been execut-held ed to the United States as basis of lieu land selections but not accepted, pendency of proceedings in the land office held not to prevent action to cancel the deeds from the state.-Id.

State held not chargeable with laches for failure to act for cancellation of deeds for fraud in the inception of the fraud, though there were suspicious circumstances which apparently passed unnoticed.-Id.

121 (Or.) Suit to cancel deeds to school lands for fraud held determinable without the presence of the United States as a party, where deeds to the United States as a basis of lieu selections had not been accepted.-State v. Hyde, 169 P. 779.

Evidence held to show prima facie that applications to purchase school lands were not made for the benefit of the applicants or were made in

(M) Conveyances, Contracts, and Exemp-cient to raise the issue that defendants as ten

tions.

~135(1) (Cal.) While Desert Land Act allows an assignment of an entry thereunder, contract of entrymen to convey after obtaining patent, is against public policy, as allowing nullification of provision as to amount one can hold before patent.-Eymann v. Wright,

169 P. 1037.

135 (1) (Mont.) Under Act Cong. March 28, 1908, § 2, concerning desert lands, and providing no assignment of any entry thereof made for benefit of any corporation, or association, shal! be authorized, a corporation cannot become assignee by operation of law as creditor of entrymen.-Stockmen's Nat. Bank of Ft. Benton Hofeldt, 169 P. 48.

III. DISPOSAL OF LANDS OF THE
STATES.

ants had held over so as to entitle them to possession as tenants from year to year under Code Civ. Proc. § 1161, subd. 2.-Durst v. Jolly, 169 P. 449.

An answer, in an action to quiet title, alleging that their interest in the property was "as will more fully hereinafter appear,' followed by a cross-complaint seeking specific performance of an agreement to lease, made the crosscomplaint a part of the answer.-Id.

43 (Cal.) In an action to quiet title, plaintiffs could and must show the invalidity of a deed presented by defendants.-Wolf v. Gall, 169 P. 1017. v.43 (Or.) Where, in suit by one claiming under sheriff's deed to remove clouds, plaintiff did not rely on defendants' pleadings admitting validity of the sheriff's sale but introduced record, held, that he was not entitled to decree if deed was thereby shown to be void. -Murphy v. Bjelik, 169 P. 520. quit-44(1) (Or.) Where, in a suit to remove clouds, plaintiff claims to own the land and each of the defendants claim to have a lien thereon, each party has the burden of proving his claim.-Murphy v. Bjelik, 169 P. 520.

166 (Or.) Legislative confirmation of claim to land is recognition of validity of such claim, and operates as effectually as grant or claim from government; confirmation is conveyance of estate or right to land to one who has possession or some estate therein.-Byers v. Wa-wa-ne, 169 P. 121.

184 (Wash.) State may grant to administrative or executive department the power to dispose of, and regulate use of, state lands.State v. Superior Court for Mason County, 169 P. 994.

PUBLIC NUISANCE.

See Nuisance, 60-88.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

See Schools and School Districts, 81-140.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS.

6 (Kan.) Public Utilities Act (Gen. St. 1915, §§ 8347, 8358), forbidding changes in service performed by public utility company without the consent of Public Utilities Commission, does not require company to continue service after its contract has expired.-Welsbach Street Lighting Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 169 P. 205.

QUO WARRANTO.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS.

8 (Kan.) The state may maintain quo warranto against a city to determine its true boundary where its fault consists in confining its territorial limits within too narrow limits, as well as where it undertakes to extend them. -State v. City of Hutchinson, 169 P. 1140. II. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF.

49 (Kan.) Petition in quo warranto against a city for unlawfully refusing to exercise jurisdiction within its corporate limits held to allege that a tract had not been excluded from city, unless that result followed from adoption of ordinance partly invalid.-State v. City of Hutchinson, 169 P. 1140.

RAILROADS.

Corporations, 669, 671: Public Lands, 78; Street Railroads; Trial, 252.

PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS. See Carriers; Master and Servant; Municipal
See Carriers; Railroads; Street Railroads ;
Telegraphs and Telephones.
PUBLIC USE.

See Dedication; Eminent Domain.
PUBLIC UTILITIES.

See Public Service Commissions.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

See Damages, 87, 91.

PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE. See Homestead,

96.

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V. RIGHT OF WAY AND OTHER
INTERESTS IN LAND.

72 (5) (Or.) In absence of evidence held that reference, in reservation in landowner's deed to railway, to county road, might create inference that highway designated was in being. a part of the land, so that railway was required to perform agreement to maintain wagon road crossings in favor of landowner's assigns without express words.-Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Reed, 169 P. 342.

72(8) (Or.) In suit by railway against landowners to enjoin interference with right of way and to quiet title, trial court properly restricted right of landowners to private crossing of track to be maintained by them at place designated in latest conveyance to railway's predecessor. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Reed, 169 P. 342.

offers a franchise to a railroad company to use 75 (6) (Idaho) Where city, by ordinance, streets on express condition that it be accepted in a certain manner, it may waive such manner of acceptance and recognize another.City of Coeur D'Alene v. Spokane & I. E. R. Co., 169 P. 930.

79 (Idaho) Whether city offering a franchise to railroad company to use streets on express condition that it be accepted in a certain

RAPE.

manner, has waived an acceptance in that manner is a question of fact in action against company.-City of Coeur D'Alene v. Spokane & II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. I. E. R. Co., 169 P. 930.

VI. CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE,
AND EQUIPMENT.

103(4) (Idaho) Under Rev. Codes, § 2815, as amended by Laws 1911, c. 223, railroad must maintain cattle guard at highway crossing where it has fenced its right of way up to highway either voluntarily or because required to fence by statute.-Strong v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 169 P. 179.

X. OPERATION.

(D) Injuries to Licensees or Trespassers in General.

282 (10) (Idaho) In action for injury while riding on freight train as a trespasser, held that, on facts in evidence and in view of liability imposed on carrier by Rev. Codes, § 2822, as amended by Laws 1911, c. 188, there was no error in refusing to direct verdict for defendant. Palcher v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 169 P. 298.

(F) Accidents at Crossings.

(A) Indictment and Information. 35(2) (Okl.Cr.App.) That prosecutrix was not defendant's wife must be alleged and proved Emyahtubby v. State, 169 P. 1124. as an essential ingredient of statutory rape.

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REAL EVIDENCE.

328 (4) (Colo.) Plaintiff held contributorily negligent in driving upon railroad crossing after See Criminal Law, 404.

looking for train some 30 feet from track, where trees prevented view, and taking no fur

REASSESSMENT.

ther precautions.-Nucci v. Colorado & S. Ry. See Municipal Corporations, 514, 518.

Co., 169 P. 273.

328(7) (Cal.App.) That an automobile driv

er, familiar with a railroad crossing where the

REASSIGNMENTS.

view was somewhat obstructed, could have See Schools and School Districts, 140. stopped a safe distance from the track, stilled. noise of the automobile engine and listened,

but failed to do so, was, as matter of law,

contributory negligence barring recovery for See Trial, 62.
injury to the automobile.-Rayhill v. Southern
Pac. Co., 169 P. 718.

330 (3) (Cal.) Driver of automobile dam

REBUTTAL.

RECALL.

aged in collision at a railroad crossing where See Contempt, 8.

the view was obstructed held negligent, barring recovery, in not getting out and looking up the track, although no whistle was blown nor bell

RECEIVERS.

rung.-Murray v. Southern Pac. Co., 169 P. See Appeal and Error, 1180; Mortgages,

675.

350(1) (Okl.) In an action for injury at a railroad crossing, held, on the evidence, that court did not err in submitting the question of negligence to the jury.-Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Moore, 169 P. 904.

350(24) (Colo.) Where plaintiff, injured in railroad crossing accident, could have seen approaching train had he looked, his statement that he did look, but did not see it, raises no question for jury regarding his contributory negligence.-Nucci v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 169 P. 273.

(H) Injuries to Animals on or near Tracks.

4113) (Colo.) Under stock law of 1911, failure of railroad company to maintain fences as provided by such law is negligence per se; and, when stock is killed as result, railroad company is liable.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Eyster, 169 P. 1181.

4193) (Okl.) The only duty of a railroad to a trespassing hog is to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to it after its presence on the track and its danger are discovered.-Lusk v. Skelton, 169 P. 892.

467.

IV. MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSI-
TION OF PROPERTY.

(A) Administration in General.
92 (Or.) Hotel receiver had authority to
purchase supplies which would have been a
necessary expense, even if there had been no
receivership. Henderson v. Tillamook Hotel
Co., 169 P. 519.

A hotel receiver was entitled to credit for payments for supplies purchased, whether the merchants so paid applied the payments to the receiver's accounts for such supplies, or to prior unpaid balances of the hotel company.Id.

VI. ACTIONS.

174(4) (Wash.) Treating action sought to be enjoined as one against receiver, held, that question as to permitting such action, or requiring litigation of claim in the receivership proceeding, was determinable as a matter of discretion.-Schwabacher Bros. & Co. v. Schade & Parshall Co., 169 P. 783.

174(5) (Wash.) Failure to obtain leave to sue receiver, held mere irregularity, curable by obtaining such permission, which was, in effect, granted by court's refusal to enjoin the action.-Schwabacher Bros. & Co. v. Schade & Parshall Co., 169 P. 783.

436 (Colo.) Where owner of stock killed by railroad company was not notified as required by stock law of 1911, six months' limitation prescribed by such law does not apply.-Chi-182 (Wash.) Court appointing cago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Eyster, 169 P. 1181. 443 (1) (Okl.) Evidence held not sufficient to support a verdict for damages for killing a hog by a train.-Lusk v. Skelton, 169 P. 892.

receiver

held not to have abused discretion in refusing to enjoin prosecution of action to foreclose chattel mortgage in another county, assuming that it was, in effect, an action against the re

ceiver. Schwabacher Bros. & Co. v. Schade & suffering from internal injuries, statements as Parshall Co., 169 P. 783.

See Bail.

RECOGNIZANCES.

RECORDS.

See Appeal and Error, 511-717: Courts,
114, 116; Criminal Law, 1086-1125
Mandamus, 129; Mortgages, 70, 163;
Vendor and Purchaser, ~231.

RECOUPMENT.

See Set-Off and Counterclaim.

RECOVERY.

See Sheriffs and Constables, 76.

REDEMPTION.

See Taxation, ~699, 701.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION.

See Witnesses, 287.

REFERENCE.

III. REPORT AND FINDINGS.

to her injury held not fraudulent misrepresentations avoiding a release.-Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Ptolemy, 169 P. 541.

III. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL,
AND REVIEW.

claim for injuries held to have burden of prov-
55 (Colo.) Passenger who had released
ing that defendant's agents deliberately and
consciously misrepresented her physical condi-
tion to induce the settlement, and that she was
thereby induced to make it.-Denver & R. G. R.
Co. v. Ptolemy, 169 P. 541.

57(2) (Colo.) Fraud avoiding a release of a claim for personal injuries must be proved by evidence which is clear, precise, and indubitable.-Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Ptolemy, 169 P. 541.

RELEVANCY.

See Evidence, 111-126.

RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

See Embezzlement, 30.

REMAINDERS.

See Wills, 634.

REMAND.

99 (2) (Kan.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 300 (Gen. St. 1915, § 7200), report of a referee determining whole issue by findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated, stands as decision of the court, and judgment may be entered thereon as if action had been tried by See Homestead, 162, 164. court.-Kelley & Lysle Milling Co. v. Schreiber, 169 P. 222.

See Appeal and Error, 1219; Justices of the Peace, 190.

REFINERY.

See Nuisance, 3.

REMOVAL.

REMOVAL OF CLOUD.

See Quieting Title.

RENEWAL.

See Landlord and Tenant, 88.

RENT.

1991-209, 331;

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See Alteration of Instruments; Cancellation of
Instruments; Vendor and Purchaser, 239.
II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF.
45 (8) (Wash.) Evidence held clear that
property intended to be included in a mortgage
was omitted, so as to support a reformation
of such mortgage.-Edwards v. Thompson, 169 See Landlord and Tenant, 150–154.

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See Landlord and Tenant,
Waters and Water Courses, 203.
REPAIRS.

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11(2) (Mont.) Where defendant's defense is that plaintiff is not entitled to goods, but that the title is in a debtor of defendant, neither demand for the goods nor tender of money expended by defendant is necessary.-Old Kentucky Distillery v. Stromberg-Mullins Co., 169 P. 734.

11(4) (Mont.) In claim and delivery oral demand is sufficient before suit.-Old Kentucky Distillery v. Stromberg-Mullins Co., 169 P. 734.

IV. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.

72 (Cal.App.) In an action of claim and delivery by a seller of goods under two contracts, evidence held sufficient to support a finding that the goods under one contract had been fully paid for.-Bradley v. McDonald, 169 P. 427.

ROADS.

See Highways.

ROBBERY.

VI. TRIAL, JUDGMENT, ENFORCE-
MENT OF JUDGMENT, AND

REVIEW.

239.

sustain

107 (Cal.App.) In an action in claim and delivery for goods sold under two contracts, where possession and title were found in de-24(1) (Cal.App.) Evidence held sufficient fendant as to the goods under one contract, and to show the commission of the crime of robpossession in defendant, but title to the other bery, and that the accused was the active pargoods in plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot complain ticipant therein.-People v. Brennan, 169 P. that there was no alternative judgment for the value of such part of the goods as defendant had title to.-Bradley v. McDonald, 169 P. 427. In an action for claim and delivery, where there was a finding that goods were entirely in the possession of one of several defendants, the judgment was not void for uncertainty in simply giving plaintiff judgment for the goods or their value.-Id.

24 (1) (Kan.) Evidence held to conviction of robbery in first degree.-State v. King, 169 P. 557.

ROENTGEN RAYS.

See Evidence, 359.

ROGUES' GALLERY.
438.

107 (Colo.) In replevin where verdict was for possession with finding of value of $1,000, See Criminal Law, judgment for recovery of $1,000 and costs was erroneous.-Wigton v. Wigton, 169 P. 133.

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SAFE PLACE TO WORK.

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I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
CONTRACT.

52 (3) (Or.) Although an agent did not have authority to sell goods below listed price, evidence of a conversation between purchaser, trustee of business, and such agent as to seller looking only to a pro rata share of assets for purchase price, was competent to show sale to buyer as trustee, and not as an individual.— Rothchild Bros. v. Kennedy, 169 P. 102.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT. 68 (Colo.) A sale of "50 tailenders" of a herd of about 400 cattle sufficiently identified the property to be conveyed.-Adams v. Guiraud, 169 P. 580.

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