proceeding; 27 and an order of a court of bankruptcy cannot be reviewed or set aside by a State court,28 although it is claimed that the former court was without jurisdiction.29 A State court has no jurisdiction of a suit in equity against trustees in bankruptcy, to require them to pay to complainant the proceeds of property which he claims, but which the defendants sold under an order of a court of bankruptcy as assets of a bankrupt's estate.30 § 614. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy as affected by residence or place of business. The provision of the law authorizing Courts of Bankruptcy to adjudge persons bankrupt, who have had their principal places of business, residence, or domicile within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or the greater portion thereof imposes jurisdictional conditions. Its waiver by the bankrupt may estop him in in 27 Re Seavey, 195 Fed. 825; Re Stringer, 230 Fed. 177. This rule does not apply to an adjudication by the State court upon an intervention by the trustee. George B. Matthews & Sons v. Joseph Webre Co., 213 Fed. 396. See Blair v. Brailey, 221 Fed. 1. It has been held that a judgment of a State court in an action begun against the bankrupt more than four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy which establishes a lien against his property cannot be impeached in the Court of Bankruptcy by the trustee for fraud or collusion when he has had an opportunity to intervene in the State court and there set up the fraud. Frazier v. Southern Loan & Dr. Co., C. C. A., 99 Fed. 707. 28 U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Bray, 225 U. S. 205, 56 L. ed. 1055. 29 Hatch v. Curtin, 146 Fed. 200. An order of a State court made in an action at common law against the bankrupt cannot be resettled by the Court of Bankruptcy. Re Vanoscope Co., C. C. A., 253 Fed. 53. 30 Treat v. Wooden, 138 Fed. 934. It has been held that bankruptcy proceedings do not suspend the jurisdiction of a State court over proceedings for the dissolution of a corporation, although it is insolvent, Re Standard Cordage Co., 184 Fed. 156, nor affect an insolvent assignment, made more than four months prior to their institution, Re Boner, 169 Fed. 727; Hoarding v. Havemeyer, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Sp. Tm., Erlanger, J., N. Y. L. J. Nov. 25, 1911; nor supersede a State insolvent law, so far as regards persons who are excepted from the Bankruptcy Act; State Nat. Bank of Denison v. Syndicate Co. of Eureka Springs, 178 Fed. 359; nor supersede provisions in a State insolvency law which give preferential rights to certain creditors. Re Standard Oak Veneer Co., 173 Fed. 103. But see Frazier v. Southern Loan Tr. Co., C. C. A., 99 Fed. 707. § 614. 1 Re Garneau, C. C. A., 127 Fed. 677, 11 Am. B. R. 679; Remington on Bankruptcy, § 30. The residence, domicile or principal place of business must have been within the division of the district where proceedings were instituted. Re Hamrick, 175 Fed. 279; Re Lemen, 208 Fed. 80. A mere clerk, Re Lipphart, 201 Fed. 103, although he is attorney in fact of his employer, or a traveling salesman, Re Price, 231 Fed. 1001, cannot be considered as having a place of business. When a petitioner in involuntary bankruptcy resided at one district, where he was employed as clerk in a store, but was engaged in trade on his own account as a general merchant in another district, the court of the latter district took jurisdiction of the petition. Re Brice, 93 Fed. 942. In order to give the court jurisdiction, the residence of the bankrupt in the district must be bona fide; and the removal of a person from one district to another, for the express purpose of filing a petition in bankruptcy in the latter, with the intention of leaving the same as soon as he obtains his discharge, does not confer jurisdiction upon the court of such district; Re Garneau, C. C. A., 127 Fed. 677. But where a person placed in guardianship because of physical disability pending insolvency proceedings in one district changed his residence, with the consent of his guardian, to another and there lived for six months before he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, it was held that the court of the latter had jurisdiction. Re Kingsley, 160 Fed. 275. Where the debtor had lived abroad during the greater part of the preceding six months, but had not abandoned his original domicile, the court had jurisdiction where his original domicile was situated. Re Williams, 99 Fed. 544. See Re Le men, 208 Fed. 80. An insolvent assignment in the district where a man had been engaged in business before he moved to California for his health and remained there three months was held not to constitute a change of residence. Re Davis, 217 Fed. 113. A change of resi dence to support an action for divorce in another State was held sufficient to constitute a change of residence under the bankruptcy act. Re Lipphart, 201 Fed. 103. Payment of poll taxes and voting in a district which he visited only casually, staying with relations, or at a hotel, was held not to be sufficient to constitute a change of residence. Re Sedgwick, 223 Fed. 655. The residence of the members of a firm in another district is immaterial when their principal business was carried on in the district where the proceedings are instituted. Re Gurler & Co., 232. Fed. 1016; Re Flaherty, 265 Fed. 741. Where the partners had been domiciled or transacted business within the district during the greater portion of the six months the court has jurisdiction over the firm although this has been in existence a shorter period of time. Re Mitchell & Co., C. C. A., 219 Fed. 690. Where the surviving member of an insolvent firm had sold his interest therein and moved to another district more than three months before the proceedings were instituted, the court of the former district had no jurisdiction to adjudicate him a bankrupt. Re Fackelman, 248 Fed. 565. The disappearance of the bankrupt, who is an absconder, does not change his domicile. Re Oldstein, 182 Fed. 409; Re Plotke, C. C. A., 104 Fed. 964, where the bankrupt lived without the district, and had ritorial jurisdiction after the adju dication and before other proceedings have been taken. Finn v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 232 Fed. 815. It has been said: that an adjudication of bankruptcy made upon the bankrupt's default should be vacated upon proof by him that the requisite residence did not exist. Re Mitchell, C. C. A., 219 Fed. 690. voluntary proceedings, but it will not bind his creditors. It seems that creditors waive such an objection unless they make it promptly by a motion to dismiss the petition or to vacate the adjudication in bankruptcy. The adjudication is not open to collateral attack because of a defect in the territorial jurisdiction. It has been held that "the preceding six months" in this section of the statute relate to the time of the adjudication, and not to that of the filing of the petition. The words are cona principal place of business within it until four months before the petition was filed, when she ceased doing business, the court had no jurisdiction. Re Plotke, C. C. A., 104 Fed. 964. The following allegation was held to be sufficient to give the court territorial jurisdiction: "That J. Murry Mitchell, Thomas B. McGovern and Frederick B. Alexander are and have been for more than six months next preceding the date of the filing of this petition, engaged principally in the business of stock brokers and that their principal place of business during all of said period has been and now is in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, in the Southern District court of New York." Re Mitchell, C. C. A., 219 Fed. 690. 2 Long v. Lockman, 14 Am. B. R. 172, 135 Fed. 197, holding that a man, who had obtained the dismissal of bankruptcy proceedings in one district by alleging that he resided in another, was estopped from denying his residence in the latter when proceedings were there instituted. Clark-Herrin-Campbell v. H. B. Claflin Co., 218 Fed. 429, holding that a stipulation to submit to the court a determination of liability of costs and attorneys fees was a waiver of an objection to the jurisdiction. It has been held: that notwithstanding a general appearance the bankrupt may object to the ter 3 Fogarty v. Gerrity, 1 Sawyer .233, Fed. Cas. 4,895; Re Garneau, C. C. A., 127 Fed. 677, 11 Am. B. R. 679. 4 Re Mason, 99 Fed. 256; Allen v. Thompson, 10 Fed. 116; Re Worsham, C. C. A., 142 Fed. 121; Finn v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 232 Fed. 815. An appearance and answer to the merits in a summary proceeding to obtain assets of the bankrupt waives objections to the territorial jurisdiction. Fairbanks Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U. S. 642. A creditor, who has proved and filed his claim, participated in the election of a trustee and received a dividend, cannot object to the discharge upon the ground that the proceeding was instituted in the wrong district. Re Mason, 99 Fed. 256. 5 Fairbanks Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U. S. 642; Re Flaherty, 265 Fed. 741; Roszell Bros. v. Continental Coal Corp., 235 Fed. 343. 6 Re Tully, 156 Fed. 634. Where, at the time of the adjudication, the nected by a disjunctive; and there is no requirement of both residence and domicile nor of either of them when there has been the requisite maintenance of a principal place of business within the district. A corporation may be adjudicated bankrupt in a State where its principal place of business is located, although it received its charter from another State.R bankrupt had not been a resident of the district for the statutory period of time, but the petition was filed in good faith, and the bankrupt remained a resident there; it was held that a motion to dismiss the proceeding, made after the bankrupt had remained a resident more than three months, should not be granted; but the order of adjudication was set aside and a new one entered as of a later date. Tully, 156 Fed. 634. Other cases hold that the six months must precede the filing of the petition. Re Plotka, 104 Fed. 964, 44 C. C. A. 282, 5 Am. B. R. 171; Re R. H. William, 120 Fed. 34, 9 Am. B. R. 736; Remington on Bankruptcy, $ 31. Re 7 Re Brice, 93 Fed. 942, 2 Am. B. R. 197; Remington on Bankruptcy, $33. 8 Re United Button Co., 137 Fed. 668; Re Alaska American Fish Co., 162 Fed. 498; Re Guanacevi Tunnel Co., C. C. A., 201 Fed. 316; Home Powder Co. v. Geis, C. C. A., 204 Fed. 568; Re Wenatchee-Stratford Orchard Co., 205 Fed. 964; Re Beiermeister Bros. Co., 208 Fed. 145; Re E. & G. Theatre Co., 222 Fed. 657; Roszell Bros. V. Continental Coal Corp., 235 Fed. 343; Re San Antonio Land & Irrigation Co., 226 Fed. 984; Continental Coal Corp. v. Roszelle Bros., C. C. A., 242 Fed. 243; Re Worcester Footwear Co., 251 Fed. 760. Where two petitions are filed against a corporation, one in the State by which it was incorporated and one in the district where it does business, proceedings in the latter district will be usually stayed until a hearing has been had in the court of the domicile, leaving it to such court to determine where the case can be proceeded with for the greatest convenience of the parties in interest; but they will not ordinarily be dismissed until the court of the domicile has determined in which district the proceedings should be conducted. Re Tybo Min. & Reduction Co., 132 Fed. 697; Re Globe Sec. Co., 132 Fed. 709. See Kyle Lumber Co. v. Bush, C. C. A., 133 Fed. 688. Where one of two manufacturing corporations organized in different States owned practically all of the capital stock of the other and had an office in the State and district where the latter had its place of business; it was held that the Court of Bankruptcy there, which had first appointed a receiver of the property of both, should retain jurisdiction. Re Southwestern Bridge & Iron Co., 133 Fed. 568. It has been held that, upon the appointment of receivers in a district, a corporation ceases to do business therein. Re Perry Aldrich Co., 165 Fed. 249; Re Thomas McNally Co., 208 Fed. 291. In determining whether a corporation has its principal place of business in another State, its failure to obtain the license which the The Act further provides: "In the event petitions are filed against the same person, or against different members of a partnership in different Courts of Bankruptcy, each of which has jurisdiction, the cases shall be transferred, by order of the courts relinquishing jurisdiction, to and be consolidated by the one of such courts which can proceed with the same for the greatest convenience of the parties in interest."9 The General Orders provide: "In case two or more petitions shall be filed against the same individual in different dis State statute there requires is not conclusive. Re Duplex Radiator Co., 142 Fed, 906; Re Perry Aldrich Co., 165 Fed. 249. The place where the principal business of the corporation is carried on, the seat of its practical rather than of its fi nancial operations, is usually considered to be that where it is for the greatest convenience of those interested that its assets should be administered. Re General Metals Co., 133 Fed. 84, 12 Am. B. R. 770; Re Tennessee Const. Co., 207 Fed. 203; s. c., C. C. A., 213 Fed. 33; Re R. H. Pennington & Co., 228 Fed. 388. But this rule is not always followed, Re Tybo Mining & Reduction Co., 132 Fed. 978; Re United Button Co., 137 Fed. 668, and the burden of proof in this respect has been said to rest upon those who ask a removal from the district of its domicile. Re Tybo Min. & Red. Co., 132 Fed. 978; Re Tennessee Const. Co., 207 Fed. 203; s. c., C. C. A., 213 Fed. 33; Re R. H. Pennington & Co., 228 Fed. 388. "A corporation closed its manufacturing works in one district five months before the petition was filed, discharging all its employees there except a watchman and a local superintendent who were kept to preserve the property, and in the intervening time carried on Fed. Prac. Vol. III-69 a liquidation of its affairs in its general office in another district where its principal officers lived, its directors' meetings were held, its books kept, its banking business transacted and its principal purchases and sales made; the court of the latter district had jurisdiction." Re Marine Mach. & C. Co., 91 Fed. 630. So had the court of the former. Tiffany v. La Plume Condensed Milk Co., 141 Fed. 444. It has been held that a mining company is not subject to bankruptcy proceedings in the State where it maintains its principal office when its lands and mines are situated, and its sales made, in another district. Re Tygarts River Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178; Continental Coal Corp. v. Rozelle Beis, C. C. A., 242 Fed. 243. 9 30 St. at L. 544, 554, § 32; Re Sterne & Levi, 190 Fed. 70. It was held further that this section and General Order VI applied not only to a case where two or more involuntary petitions were filed, but also to a case where an involuntary petition was filed in one district and a voluntary one in another. Re Waxelbaum, 98 Fed. 589. A partnership is entitled to the benefit of this section of the statute. Ro Sears, 112 Fed. 58. |