vent an invasion; and may send our fleets, whenever he pleases, upon his errands to some of the farthest parts of the world, or keep them attending upon his own coasts, till he thinks fit to dismiss them. These fleets must likewise be subject in all things, not only to the king, but to his viceroys, admirals, and governors, in any of his foreign dominions, when he is in a humour to apprehend an invasion; which I believe is an indignity that was never offered before, except to a conquered nation. *

In the defensive alliance with that crown, which is to remain perpetual, and where only England and Holland are parties with them, the same care, in almost the same words, is taken, for our fleet to attend their coasts and foreign dominions, and to be under the same obedience. We and the States are likewise to furnish them with twelve thousand men at our own charge, which we are constantly to recruit; and these are to be subject to the Portuguese generals.

In the offensive alliance, we took no care of having the assistance of Portugal, whenever we should be invaded; but in this it seems we are wiser; for that king is obliged to make war on France or Spain, whenever we or Holland are invaded by either; but before this, we are to supply them with the same forces both by sea and land, as if he were invaded himself. And this must needs be a very prudent and safe course for a maritime power to take, upon a sudden invasion; by which, instead of making use of our fleets and ar

To this it was plausibly answered, that an engagement to support the King of Portugal with a fleet for his defence, no way implied its being placed at his implicit disposal.

mies for our own defence, we must send them abroad for the defence of Portugal.

By the thirteenth article, we are told what this assistance is, which the Portuguese are to give us, and upon what conditions. They are to furnish ten men of war; and when England and Holland shall be invaded by France and Spain together, or by Spain alone, in either of these cases, those ten Portuguese men of war are to serve only upon their own coasts; where no doubt they will be of mighty use to their allies, and terror to the enemy.

How the Dutch were drawn to have a part in either of these two alliances, is not very material to inquire, since they have been so wise as never to observe them; nor I suppose ever intended it; but resolved, as they have since done, to shift the load upon us.

Let any man read these two treaties from the beginning to the end, he will imagine that the king of Portugal and his ministers sat down and made them by themselves, and then sent them to their allies to sign; the whole spirit and tenor of them quite through running only upon this single point, what we and Holland are to do for Portugal, without any mention of an equivalent, except those ten ships, which, at the time when we have greatest need of their assistance, are obliged to attend upon their own coasts.

The barrier treaty between Great Britain and Holland was concluded at the Hague on the 29th of October in the year 1709. In this treaty, neither her majesty nor her kingdoms have any interest or concern, farther than what is mentioned in the second, and the twentieth articles; by the former, the States are to assist the queen in defending the act of succession; and by the other,

not to treat of a peace, till France has acknowledged the queen, and the succession of Hanover, and promised to remove the pretender out of that. king's dominions.

As to the first of these, it is certainly for the safety and interest of the States-general, that the protestant succession should be preserved in England; because, such a popish prince as we apprehend would infallibly join with France in the ruin of that republic. And the Dutch are as much bound to support our succession, as they are tied to any part of a treaty, or league offensive and defensive against a common enemy, without any separate benefit upon that consideration. Her majesty is in the full peaceable possession of her kingdoms, and of the hearts of her people; among whom, hardly one in five thousand is in the pretender's interest. And whether the assistance of the Dutch, to preserve a right so well established, be an equivalent to those many unreasonable exorbitant articles in the rest of the treaty, let the world judge. What an impression of our settlement must it give abroad, to see our ministers offering such conditions to the Dutch, to prevail on them to be guarantees of our acts of parliament! Neither perhaps is it right, in point of policy or good sense, that a foreign power should be called in to confirm our succession by way of guarantee, but only to acknowledge it; otherwise we put it out of the power of our own legislature to change our succession, without the consent of that prince or state who is guarantee, however our posterity may hereafter, by the tyranny and oppression of any succeeding princes, be reduced to the fatal necessity of breaking in upon the excellent happy settlement now in force.*

See the Postscript.

As to the other articles, it is a natural consequence that must attend any treaty of peace we can make with France; being only the acknowledgment of her majesty as queen of her own dominions, and the right of succession by our own laws, which no foreign power has any pretence to dispute.

However, in order to deserve these mighty advantages from the States, the rest of the treaty is wholly taken up in directing what we are to do for them.

By the grand alliance, which was the foundation of the present war, the Spanish Low Countries were to be recovered, and delivered to the king of Spain; but, by this treaty, that prince is to possess nothing in Flanders during the war and after a peace, the States are to have the military command of about twenty towns, with their dependencies, and four hundred thousand crowns a year from the king of Spain, to maintain their garrisons. By which means, they will have the command of all Flanders, from Newport on the Sea, to Namur on the Maese, and be entirely masters of the Pais de Waas, the richest part of those provinces. Farther, they have liberty to garrison any place they shall think fit in the Spanish Low Countries, whenever there is an appearance of war; and consequently to put garrisons into Ostend, or where else they please, upon a rupture with England.

By this treaty likewise, the Dutch will in effect be entire masters of all the Low Countries; may impose duties, restrictions in commerce, and prohibitions, at their pleasure; and in that fertile country may set up all sorts of manufactures, particularly the woollen, by inviting the disobliged

manufacturers in Ireland, and the French refugees, who are scattered all over Germany. And as this manufacture increases abroad, the clothing people of England will be necessitated, for want of employment, to follow; and in few years, by the help of the low interest of money in Holland, Flanders may recover that beneficial trade, which we got from them. The landed men of England will then be forced to re-establish the staples of wool abroad; and the Dutch, instead of being only the carriers, will become the original possessors of those commodities, with which the greatest part of the trade of the world is now carried on. And as they increase their trade, it is obvious they will enlarge their strength at sea, and that ours must lessen in proportion.

All the ports in Flanders are to be subject to the like duties that the Dutch shall lay upon the Schelde, which is to be closed on the side of the States: thus all other nations are in effect shut

out from trading with Flanders. Yet in the very same article it is said, that the States shall be favoured in all the Spanish dominions as much as Great Britain, or as the people most favoured. We have conquered Flanders for them, and are in a worse condition, as to our trade there, than before the war began. We have been the great support of the king of Spain, to whom the Dutch have hardly contributed any thing at all; and yet they are to be equally favoured with us in all his dominions. Of all this, the queen is under the unreasonable obligation of being guarantee, and that they shall possess their barrier, and their four hundred thousand crowns a year, even before a peace.

It is to be observed, that this treaty was only