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becomes insolvent; and a person who consigns goods to another to be sold on joint account, is likewise to be considered in the character of a vendor, entitled to exercise this right. The vendor's right is so strongly maintained, that while the goods are on the transit, and the insolvenсу of the vendee occurs, the vendor may take them by any means not criminal.b The validity of the right depends entirely on the bankruptcy or insolvency of the vendee.c It is not requisite that he should obtain actual possession of the goods before they come to the hands of the vendee; nor is there any specific form requisite for the stoppage of goods in transitu ; though it is well settled that the bankruptcy of the buyer is not of itself tantamount to a stoppage in transitu.d But a demand of the goods of the carrier, or notice to him to stop the goods, or an assertion of the vendor's right by an entry of the goods at the custom-house, or a claim and endeavours to get possesssion, is equivalent to an actual stoppage of the goods.e
• Kinlock v. Craig, 3 Term Rep. 119. Newson v. Thornton, 6 East's Rep. 17. Fenton v. Pearson, 15 Ibid. 419.
b Lord Hardwicke, in Snee v. Prescott, 1 Atk. Rep. 245.
• The Constantia, 5 Rob. Adm. Rep. 321. The consignor having made the consignment, has no right to vary it except in the sole case of insolvency. S. C. Abbott on Shipping, 5 Am. edit. Boston, 1846, p. p. 621, 122.
i Haswell v. Hunt, cited in 5 Term Rep. 231. Ellis v. Hunt, 3 Ibid. 464. Scott v. Pettit, 3 Bos. of Pull. 471.
• Walker v. Woodbridge, Cooke's B. L. 494. Northey & Lewis v. Field, 2 Esp. Rep. 613. Mills v. Ball, 2 Bos. f Pull. 457. Litt v. Cowley, 7 Taunt. Rep. 169. Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Maine Rep. 93. Notice to the carrier on the part of the vendor or his authorized agent is sufficient, unless the goods have in the meantime arrived to the actual or constructive possession of the vendee. The notice is to be given to the person who has the immediate custody of the goods, and if a servant has the custody of the gouds and notice be given to his principal, it must be in time to enable him with reasonable diligence to prevent a delivery to the con. signee; for if the vendee takes the goods from the carrier before they have arrived at their destinatio with or without his consent, the transit is at an end. Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 Meeson J. Welshy, 518.
(2.) Of matters which allow or defeat the right. The transitus of the goods, and consequently the right of stoppage, is determined by actual delivery to the vendee, or by circumstances which are equivalent to actual delivery.
*There are cases in which a constructive delivery will, and others in which it will not, destroy the right. The delivery to a carrier or packer, to and for the use of the vendee, or to a wharfinger, is a constructive delivery to the vendee; but it is not sufficient to defeat this right, even though the carrier be appointed by the vendee. It will continue until the place of delivery be, in fact, the end of the journey of the goods, and they have arrived to the possession, or under the direction of the vendec himself. If they have arrived at the warehouse of the packer, used by the buyer as his own, or they are landed at the wharf where the goods of the vendee were usually landed and kept, the transitus is at an end, and the right of the vendor extinguished.b The delivery to the master of a general ship, or of one chartered by the consignee, is, as we have already observed, a delivery to the vendee or consignee, but still subject to this right of stoppage, which has been termed a species of jus postliminii. And yet, if the consignee had *545 hired the ship for a term *of years, and the goods were put on board to be sent by him on a mercan
The transitus is not at an end until the goods have reached the place of destination named by the vendee. Coates v. Railton, 6 Barn. & Cress. 442, and have come to the actual possession of the vendee, or under cir. cumstances equivalent thereto. Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wendell, 137. Covell v. Hitchcock, 23 Wendell, 611. Edwards v. Brewer, 3 Meeson & Welsby, 375.
Snee v. Prescott, 1 Atk. Rep. 248. Stokes v. La Riviere, cited in 3 Term Rep. 466, and 3 East's Rep. 397. Ellis v. Hunt, 3 Term Rep. 464. Richardson v. Goss, 3 Boc. & Pull. 119. Scott v. Pettit, 3 Ibid. 469. Smith v. Goss, 1 Campb. Rep. 282. Lord Alvanley, in 3 Bos. & Pull. 48. Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 Ibid. 582. Rowe v. Pickford, 8 Taunt. Rep. 83. Tucker v. Humphrey, 4 Bingham's Rep. 516.
Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East's Rep. 331. Cox v. Harden, 4 Ibid. 211.
tile adventure, the delivery would be absolute, as much as a delivery into a warehouse belonging to him, and it would bar the right of stoppage.2 The idea that the goods must come to the corporal touch of the vendee is exploded ; and it is settled, that the transitus is at an end, if the goods have arrived at an intermediate place, where they are placed under the orders of the vendee, and are to remain stationary until they receive his directions to put them again in motion for some new and ulterior destination. In many of the cases, where the vendor's right of stopping in transitu has been defeated, the delivery was constructive only; and there has been much subtlety and refinement on the question, as to the facts and circumstances which would amount to a delivery sufficient to take away the right. The point for inquiry is, whether the property is to be considered as still in its transit; for if it has once fairly arrived at its destination, so as to give the vendee the actual exercise of dominion and ownership over it, the right is gone. The cases in general upon the subject of constructive delivery, may be reconciled by the distinction, that if the delivery to a carrier or agent of the vendee be for the purpose of conveyance to the vendee, the right of stoppage continues, notwith
Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Maine Rep. 93. The master gave a receipt for the goods on delivery on board by the consignor, and afterwards signed a bill of lading to the consignee. That circumstance did not take away the right of stoppage. Thompson v. Trail, 2 Carr. f Payne, 334. But in Bolin v. Iluffnagle, 1 Rawle's Rep. 1, there was a delivery of goods at a foreign port, to the master of the consignee's own ship, for him; and it was held that the transitus was at an end. This last decision may perhaps be questioned, inasmuch as the delivery in that case, to the inaster of the consignee's ship, was for the purpose of conveyance to him, and not like the case of Fowler v. Kymer, cited in the next note, for the purpose of disposal in a foreign market.
. Fowler v. Kymer, cited in 3 East's Rep. 396. Wright v. Lawes, 4 Esp. Rep. 82. Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. Rep. 457, S. P.
• Dixon v. Baldwin, 5 East's Rep. 157. Foster v. Frampton, 6 Barn. of Cress. 107. Dobson v. Wentworth, C. B. November, 1842.
Wright v. Lawes, 4 Exp. Rep. 82.
standing such a constructive delivery to the vendee; but if the goods be delivered to the carrier or agent for safe custody, or for disposal on the part of the vendee, and the middleman is by the agreement converted into a special agent for the buyer, the transit or passage of the goods terminates, and with it the right of stoppage. So, a complete delivery of part of an entire parcel or cargo, with intention to take the whole, terminates *546 *the transitus, and the vendor cannot stop the remainder.b
A delivery of the key of the vendor's warehouse to the purchaser ; or paying the vendor rent for the goods left in his warehouse ;d or lodging an order from the vendor for delivery with the keeper of the warehouse;e or delivering to the vendee a bill of parcels, with an order on the storekeeper for the delivery of the goods ;f or demanding and marking the goods by the agent of the vendee,
■ Jarnes v. Griffin, 1 Mees. & Wels. 29, 30.
b Slubley v. Heyward, 2 H. Black's Rep. 504. Hammond v. Anderson, 4 Bos. & Pull. 69. Lord Ellenborough, 6 East's Rep. 627. Jones v. Jones, 8 Meeson & Welsby, 431. In these cases there was an unequivocal act of possession and ownership. In other cases, where only a portion of the goods were delivered, and the intention of the vendee was only to take part of the goods, the right of stoppage as to the residue has been maintained. Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614. Buckley v. Furniss, 17 Wendell, 504. Tanner v. Scovell, 14 Mees. & Wels. 28.
• Lord Kenyon, 3 Term Rep. 468.
a Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Campb. Rep. 452. Suffering the goods, by agreement, to lie free of rent, in the vendor's warehouse, for a time, is still a complete delivery, and destroys the lien. Barrett v. Goddard, 3 Mason's Rep. 107. But as between vendor and vendee, the lien is not divested by an order of vendor, that he holds to the order of vendee the goods specified free of rent, while the goods remain in the same warehouse unpaid for. Townley v. Crump, 4 Adolp. & Ellis, 58.
e Harman v. Anderson, 2 Campb. Rep. 243.
f Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Caines' Rep. 182. In Akerman v. Humphrey, 1 Carr. & Payne, 52, it was held, that the delivery of a shipping note by the consignee to a third person, with an order to the wharfinger to deliver the goods to such third person, did not pass the property so as to prevent a stoppage in transitu by the consignor; and that decision was adopted, as sound law, in Tucker v. Humphrey, 4 Bing. Rep. 516.
at the inn where they had arrived at the end of the journey; or suffering the goods to be marked and resold, and marked again by the under purchaser;b have all been held to amount to acts of delivery, sufficient to take away the vendor's lien, or right of stoppage in transitu. On the other hand, if the delivery be not complete, and some other act remains to be done by the consignor, the right of stoppage is not gone. So, while a vessel is performing quarantine at the port of delivery, and the voyage not at an end, the consignor's right of stoppage has been held not to be divested, even by a premature *possession on behalf of the consignee.d That doc- 547 trine has, however, been since contradicted and overruled by Lord Alvanley, in Mills v. Ball, and by Mr. J. Chambre, in Oppenheim v. Russel ;f and the better opinion now is, that if the vendee intercepts the goods on their passage to him, and takes possession as owner, the delivery is complete and the right of stoppage is gone. But if the goods have arrived at the port of delivery, and are lodged in a public warehouse, for default of payment of the duties, they are not deemed to have come to the possession of the vendee, so as to deprive the consignor of his right.g
Ellis v. Hunt, 3 Term Rep. 464.
b Stoveld v. Hughes, 14 East's Rep. 308.
• Withers v. Lyss, 4 Campb. R. 237. Busk v. Davis, 2 Maule & Selw. 397. Coates v. Railton, 6 Barnw. & Cress. 422. Naylor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. R. 198.
d Holst v. Pownal, 1 Esp. R. 240.
2 Bos. & Pull. 461. 13 Ibid. 54.
Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. R. 613. Nix v. Olive, cited in Abbott on Shipping, 426. The English system of warehousing goods was proposed by Sir Robert Walpole, in 1733, in his Excise Scheme, but not adopted. Its advantages were pointed out by Dean Tucker, in 1750. The scheme was revived and recommended by Mr. Pitt, and digested in a practical shape under the administration of Mr. Addington. The statute of 43 Geo. III. ch. 132, laid the foundation of this wise and politic system, and the successive statutes on the subject were consolidated by the act of 4 VOL. II. 54